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NOVEMBER 27, 28, 29, AND 80, 1978 


Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations 

39-936 0 WASHINGTON : 1979 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
Stock Number 052-070-04877-8 


LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman 


District of Columbia 

HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee 
ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania 

Subcommittee on the 
Assassination of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 

LOUIS STOKES, ex officio 
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio 

STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut 

Subcommittee on the 
Assassination of 
John F. Kennedy 

LOUIS STOKES, ex officio 
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio 



Hearings: Pa e e 

November 27, 1978: 

Narration by Prof. G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director . 1 

Testimony of Cartha D. DeLoach, former assistant to the Director, 

FBI 18 

November 28, 1978: 

Narration by Prof. G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director . 117 

Testimony of: 

William Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United 

States 120 

William Ramsey Clark — (resumed) 135 

Afternoon Session 

Stephen J. Poliak 163 

November 29, 1978: 

Narration by Gene Johnson, deputy chief counsel 173 

Testimony of: 

Russell George Byers 177 

Murray L. Randall, special judge, St. Louis, Mo 204 

Afternoon Session 

Lawrence Weenick, attorney, Clayton, Mo 238 

Russell George Byers — (resumed) 245 

Edward Evans, chief investigator, (staff SCA) 247 

November 30, 1978: 

Narration by Prof. G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director . 311 

Testimony of Jerry Ray 318 




House of Representatives, 

Select Committee on Assassinations, 

Washington, D.C. 

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:10 a.m., 
in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, the Hon. Louis Stokes 
(chairman of the select committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney, 
Fauntroy, Fithian, and Edgar. 

Also present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; 
Peter Beeson, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. 


Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Over the past 3 days of hearings the committee has heard dis- 
turbing testimony on FBI programs that were aimed at discrediting 
Dr. King and undermining the progress of the civil rights move- 
ment that he directed. An examination of those FBI programs 
ultimately led to the stark question, Did the FBI kill Dr. King? 

Today other implications of the FBI issue will be explored. They 
can be stated in a single, troubling question: Was the Bureau 
willing or able to conduct a thorough and far-reaching criminal 
investigation of the King assassination despite its long history of 
an adversary posture toward Dr. King? 

The committee has completed a comprehensive, 2-year review of 
the FBI investigation. Voluminous files, assembled, as it was con- 
ducted both at FBI headquarters in Washington and in major field 
offices, were carefully studied; some two dozen officials of both the 
Bureau and the Department of Justice were interviewed; and testi- 
mony was taken in executive session from certain key individuals. 

The results of the committee investigation have been compiled in 
a staff report, 1 copies of which have been given to each of the three 
witnesses who are scheduled to testify today or tomorrow. They are 
Cartha DeLoach, former assistant to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover; 
Steven Pollack, former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights; 
and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark. 

1 The committee's staff report is included in full as an appendix to the hearings. See Vol. 14, 
HSCA-MLK Hearings. 

( 1 ) 


A copy of the staff report has also been released to the public, so 
I will only summarize at this time for the record its major findings: 

In 1968 the FBI was divided into 10 internal divisions. 

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that Martin Luther 
King exhibit F-435 be inserted into the record and appropriately 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 



MLK Exhibit F-435 


Mr. Blakey. It is an FBI organization chart. 

Division Six, the General Investigative Division, headed by As- 
sistant Director Alex Rosen, was responsible for Federal criminal 
investigations, including those of civil rights violations. In the as- 
sassination of Dr. King, Federal jurisdiction was predicated on the 
Federal Civil Rights Statute — 18 U.S.C. Section 241 — that covers 
conspiracies to interfere with someone’s constitutional rights. 

Within the General Investigative Division, day-to-day manage- 
ment of the case was handled by the civil rights section headed by 
Clem McGowan, and responsibility filtered down to the civil rights 
unit headed by Edward McDonough. Richard Long, a headquarters 
case agent, was assigned to the investigation. 

As the case progressed, information on developments was passed 
up through the chain of command to the Assistant to Director 
DeLoach, Associate Director Clyde Tolson, and ultimately to Direc- 
tor Hoover. Major developments were summarized and sent along 
daily, if not more frequently. 

Out in the field, the Memphis office, designated the “office of 
origin,” initiated its investigation shortly after the assassination. 
While day-to-day direction of the case resided in Washington, Mem- 
phis had a pivotal role to play in the administration and coordina- 
tion of the case. It was sent copies of most of the reports from 57 
other domestic field offices; it initiated and coordinated leads; and 
it produced a prosecutive summary report after James Earl Ray’s 
arrest in June 1968. 

There were no specific guidelines in 1968 for an FBI investiga- 
tion of an assassination, but the King murder was promptly classi- 
fied as a “special investigation” and it was handled in a way that 
was quite distinct from that of the ordinary criminal case. A 24- 
hour deadline was set for the running down of leads. The special 
agents in charge — the SAC’s — of field offices were held personally 
accountable for investigative errors. The staff of the Memphis Field 
Office was augmented by additional agents and administrative per- 
sonnel. An inspector selected from the Headquarters staff, Joseph 
Sullivan, was sent into the field to help direct the effort. 

The committee found that the FBI files indicate that the Bu- 
reau’s investigation represented a broad and extensive effort to 
identify and apprehend Dr. King’s assassin. In fact, it might be 
argued — at least from the files — that the antagonism that had been 
demonstrated by Director Hoover toward Dr. King and the Bu- 
reau’s campaign to discredit him, had the effect of inspiring an 
intensified investigation. The apparent reason for this desire — iron- 
ically — to protect the Bureau and Mr. Hoover from charges that 
the FBI made anything short of a total effort in the case. 

The files indicate, for example, that there were exhaustive inter- 
views and record checks of every conceivable information source — 
banks, telephone companies, credit agencies, police departments, 
motor-vehicle bureaus, motels, hotels, dry cleaners, and dancing 

At the same time, extensive work was done on physical evidence, 
with some major breakthroughs coming from scientific analysis in 
the FBI’s Washington laboratories. A pair of pliers was traced to a 
California hardware store, underwear to a dry cleaner in Los Ange- 
les, the rifle found at the scene to a retail outlet in Birmingham. 


Then on April 19 a left thumbprint from the rifle was traced to 
James Earl Ray. It was the first major break in the case. 

Following the identification of a suspect, a massive manhunt, 
focused on Ray, was begun. Ray's family was approached, both 
directly — by interviews — and indirectly — by surveillance. Inmate 
associates of Ray at Missouri State Penitentiary were questioned 
and as Ray’s activities from his escape from MSP to the assassina- 
tion became clearer, efforts were made to learn more about his 
sources of funds, as they might reveal evidence about his move- 

On May 10, after the FBI had learned of Ray’s entrance in 
foreign countries, it launched a domestic passport review project. It 
had 36 agents assigned to it and the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police were also asked for assistance. It was a worthwhile endeav- 
or, for, on June 10, an RCMP officer turned up a Canadian pass- 
port in the name of Ramon George Sneyd that bore a photo of a 
man who looked remarkably like Ray. After making positive iden- 
tification and learning that Sneyd left Canada on May 6, the FBI 
extended its search overseas. 

On June 8 Ray was arrested by officers from Scotland Yard as he 
was about to board a flight for Belgium. 

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that Martin Luther 
King exhibit F-500 be inserted into the record and appropriately 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it will be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 



MLK Exhibit F-500 


Mr. Blakey. It shows the month-by-month cost of the Murkin 
investigation, as provided by the FBI. 

In April, $781,403 was spent; in May, $336,467. Because the fig- 
ures for June are not broken down by days, it is impossible to 
determine precisely how much of this amount — $135,375 — was 
spent before June 8. In part, these figures reflect a natural de- 
crease in the expenses of any criminal investigation. 

It is also clear, however, not only from this chart but from the 
FBI files themselves that after July a dramatic reduction occurred 
in the time and expense devoted to the investigation. Efforts were 
made in the Springfield, 111., office to solve the Alton bank robbery, 
considered a possible source of Ray's funds; but largely with that 
exception, major investigative efforts were limited. 

It might be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to comment that these 
statistics, particularly as represented in this chart, are perhaps 
misleading, to the degree that they show such a sharp breakdown 
in expenditures. Nevertheless, their general direction is clear and 
is fully supported by the record. 

By June 20, Mr. Hoover had apparently come to the conclusion 
that Ray was the assassin and he had acted alone, out of hatred for 
Blacks, Dr. King in particular. Summarizing a conversation with 
Attorney General Clark on that date, the Director wrote: 

I stated that in Ray’s case we have not yet found a single angle that would 
indicate a conspiracy. I said the only significant thing is the money he had and 
which he spent freely in paying bills, and I thought that could have been obtained 
from a bank robbery. 

Mr. Hoover went on to describe Ray: 

I said I think we are dealing with a man who is not an ordinary criminal in the 
usual sense but a man capable of doing any kind of sly act. * * * I said Sirhan 
Sirhan is a different individual, as he is a fanatic * * * and Ray is not a fanatic in 
that sense. 

I said, I think Ray is a racist and detested Negroes and Martin Luther King, and 
there is an indication that prior to the Memphis situation he had information about 
King speaking in other towns, and then picked out Memphis. I said I think he acted 
entirely alone but we are not closing our minds that others might be associated with 
him, and we have to run down every lead. 

But as can be seen from the downward progression of expendi- 
tures in the chart, while the Bureau — at least theoretically — was 
willing to consider new evidence, it considered the case, in fact, 
largely closed with Ray’s arrest. 

In addition to showing an exhaustive manhunt, the FBI files do 
indicate that there were innumerable efforts to check individual 
conspiracy leads. 

Early in the investigation the files on Dr. King were reviewed 
and about 50 previous death threats were assembled. On April 26 
leads were sent to the field office with instructions that they and 
others indicating conspiracy “be thoroughly resolved, no matter 
how remote.” 

Nevertheless, candor requires the comment that the evidence 
indicates that the performance of the FBI, as well as the Justice 
Department, was flawed, not in pursuit of the fugitive but in the 
search for others who may have been involved in the assassination. 

For example, there is reason to question the adequacy of the 
FBI’s response to substantial evidence of contacts between Ray and 
his brothers, Jerry and John, at various times between his escape 


from prison and the assassination. That evidence includes such 
items as: (1) Statements of several witnesses pointing to meetings 
between Ray and a brother; (2) denials by Jerry and John of 
preassassination contact with James that are in conflict with infor- 
mation established independently; (3) Missouri State Penitentiary 
records indicating John visited James the day before he escaped; (4) 
information that Jerry, on two occasions, admitted knowledge of a 
conspiracy in the assassination; and (5) Ray’s statement to a sales- 
man in a gun store, just 6 days before the assassination, that he 
wished to exchange the rifle on advice from his brother. 

Coupled with these indications of a possible family based associ- 
ation that pointed toward a criminal relationship were the indica- 
tions that the mysterious Raoul might actually have been one or 
both of the brothers. Even so, the FBI never made a concerted 
effort to check out the possibility of a Ray family conspiracy in the 
assassination. Instead, it treated the brothers and other relatives 
almost solely as information sources as to James’ whereabouts. 

In fact, the Bureau became so preoccupied with the fugitive 
search that on May 13 Mr. Hoover recommended — with the concur- 
rence of Mr. DeLoach, Mr. Rosen, and Mr. Tolson — the placing of 
electronic surveillance devices in the homes of John Ray, Carol 
Pepper— a sister— and John’s place of business— the Grapevine 
Tavern in St. Louis. 

This clearly illegal action was never endorsed by the Department 
of Justice but the request itself is disturbing enough. Not only does 
it show a lack of concern for the constitutional rights of the rela- 
tive, it establishes the Bureau’s lack of interest in a possible con- 
spiracy involving the brothers. Had the taps picked up evidence of 
such a conspiracy, the illegality of the surveillance would almost 
surely have tainted the evidence in any subsequent conspiracy 
trial. Internal FBI memoranda, moreover, indicate that Mr. Hoover 
and his assistants were well aware of the problem but made the 
request in any event. 

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that Martin Luther 
King exhibits F-501 and F-502 be inserted in the record and appro- 
priately displayed. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered in the 
record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-501 

^tfTTED states government 


zh\ a 

:r ’ 

]v. tu— 


date; Mays, 2968 

<2 ar; 

* . 1 - Mr. DeLoach **«■*— — y 

1 ^ .1 - Mr. Bo sen ST, ■ / 

i X. «. jjr. MaHey 

* X -Mr* McGowan 

— X -Mr. Lang O ' 

X -Mfc Conrad 1 - Mr. Gale 

PURPOSE: To recommend the installation erf a technical surveillance^. . . 
(TESXXR) on the telephones of Albert and Carol Pepper, St- Lauis, P y 

Missouri, and the telephone listed to the Grapevire Tavern in. St. I>jnisy~ 4 A 
Missouri, owned by Carol Pepper, subject's sister, and operated by (J 

John Iarry Ray, subject’s "brother, and the installation of a mic rophone 
surveillance at the residences of Carol Pepper, and John lorry Ray, * \Jr*' 
\and at the Grapevine Tavern. These installations could assist in the 
l early apprehension of the subject, which could possibly be instrumental 
kn reducing the stresses and tension placed on our national security 
Subsequent to the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. •>* 

BACKGROUND: We are presently conducting eadansthre and extensiv e ,* ;* 
r , imyp5?H^r!an ta dete rmi ne the present whereabouts of the subject James **• 

•• Earl'Ray,- who is on® of the TEN MOST WANTED FUGmVES. Although c \‘ 
many hundreds of interviews have been conducted and leads ran cut^ we /V 
: have not been able to locate the subject nor have ve .located any person Ni 
r who can fpmich us any information as to the subject’s present whereab out s. 

; It has been determined that Carol Pepper, the s is ter of the subject, and 
; John Larry Ray, the brother of the subject, are fee closest relatives to , ^ 
him. Xarol is married to Albert Pepper a^d they reside at 2025 Belle view, 

St. Louis, Missouri, telephone number 645-2948. Jfchn Larry Ray resides 
at 1900 A Cherokee, St. Louis, Missouri, no telephone listed. CJdroi’ ^ ^ 
presently owns the Grapevine Tavern, 1982 Arsesal, St. Louis, Missouri^ * 
telephone number PR 6-9417. This tavern is operated by John Laxjry Ray- . 

John Larry Ray has expressed a cooperative attitude; however, 

■s is .felt that he is not giving us complete and accurate inform ation . ^ Carol 
Pepper refuses to submit to interview and is not cooperative. - R is felt that 
if the subject telephones or personally contacts any of the relatives, it will ^ . 
most likely “be Carol Pepper or brother John LanyBajc f \^PY^h O l ' 

I n. cue subject ceiepnones or personally cun acts any m. uio xswufca, «^ ***** ^ , 

most likely “be Carol Pepper or brother John LamyBajc /£/ •*. 3 / ; 


^ * — CQNU Nuh.u — O V t* 1 ^ - 


Memorandum to Mfr^DeLoach 

EE COMMENDATION; That a technical surveillance he installed on. the * 
telephones of Albertand Carol Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern and a 
microphone surveillance he installed at the residences of Albert and 
Carol Pepper and John Larry Ray and at the Grapevine Tavern. 

- 2 - 


MLK Exhibit F-502 

Onited states governmi 


• • — we p pnp vff mas© micxupjauiies caa ua uuumeu atju useu w tmu ut 

[ prejudging the cose against the subject. In a very recent decision of the United 
.States District Court lor the Southern District of New York, a listening device 
installed oxx/the premises of one Levine. Later, a subject named Granello, 
an adnata of Levine, «**** up for trial an d claimed that the listening device 
installed on Levtx2s premises, which was installed by trespass, was illegal as 
to him, Granello. It was not contended that any info rmation obtained from the 
Levine microp hon e was used as evidence against Granello at tzzal either directly 
or as a The co ur t held that yri-nn* Granello had no interest in the Levine 

premises, monitor was not Illegal as to him and he could not obtain a new 
trial or dismissal of the 1 ndic fe m en k U»S. v. Gr^^Uo, 230 F. Snpp. 482 (1968). 


Applied to instant case, this rule of law could work out in different 
ways . that tfa> subject of this case is not on thdfpr praises to bel. v 

surveilled by the means suggested, and has no possessory or other right In - ? * 

those premises, any information disclosed by the surveillance in some •’way, 
such as conversation among the Peppers, could be used to learn the whereabouts 
of the Subject for purposes of arreshr The problem becomes somewhat more 
complicated, however, if tfo* subject of, this case a telephone -call to those 
premises that foi were Recorded and used as the basis^for his 

apprehensiocu He c ou ld elaiip that the. surveillance viol Ike right of 
privacy in the telephone cofe^^cdtrOi^ke ^T! a rip to that place, citing the Katz, 
decision in the Supreme Court. rf/I 'JS ^ / 

"ccwrmrnrn - ovfw 1 


Memorandum J. J v Gasper to Mr. Mp hr 

; .The -worst that could happen in either of ths afc>v£ circmnstances, 

uuwvYfzr, - assuming that we follow the precautionary measures listed below - * 
that we Illegally learn where the' subject Is located and tons irfe ahla to arrest 
Wm o n toat k nowledge. Tha role that comes into play here, established l £ ~ £fe 
last century by toe Supreme Coart tn gar v. HUnots. 30 UlS. 347 (1886), is that 
aafflfigai azrest is no -bar to-prosecution. Wong Son v. U.S. . 371 U.S. 471 (1963 
g. S ti T . Hoffman , 385 F2d 501 (1967); Keegan vu U.S. , 385 F2d&60 (1967) A 
p«seo.fflay be arrested unlawfully and actually: kidnapped into toe court having 
Jnrisdictton at toe criminal case; yet tha «rortstil^«tains-)nrisdic±ton to to 
the person tor the offense. The court would, not affine toe prosedbttoato use- 
as evid ence, any Info rma ti on obtained t h r ou gh the fljegal surveHlacce but the 
ffl^al surveillance would nottaint the use cfiatqr otherevidence«btained either 
r!** 0 .?? ^ wblc ^' wa3 gottrai to alegal. m an n er/ Nor, toirepeat, would 

the ille gality of the arrest a£dne r resta t i ng , from whereaboutk disclosed bytmlawfu 

•orveillance, prevent the court from trytog the subject tor the offense. *-t- 

^ •«&*. u , * . ■ . • * 

v. - . -K toe action being' considered is taken;' we-strongly suggest three- 

procanttonary measures, as follows: . • \ 11 

. W ^ wortfings be preserved intact, it may be necessary 

to disclose some of them to the court or, even to the defense. ' 

... * /. ‘ . ■ *- *r ’ 

(2) That so use be made of any intoraatton obtained against 
*nyeme whatsoever or in any way whatsoever except tor the single purpose of 
to^ngtoe subject in.tois case. As .we weUlmow by this ttow.-evidene* of 
toe offe nse obtained in this mahner is not admissible, ttwouMnoTbeadmissihre 
agato^toe subject and it would not be admissible a gainaf the Peppers on a charge 
ox harboring. ^ ® 

• ./ - W Be aware that since this search and seizu&ds unconstitutional 
as to the Peppers, they have at least a theoretical cause of action tor damages 
£Si!w the .devices by trespass. Here again, however, if 

nothing learned by this surveillance Is used against the Pepped In any way. their 
< Hr ? <r tll,l ? d *“***• lowest possible degree, becoming that for a 

technical violation only rather toan one of substantial harm to toem. Moreover 

to any such case toe government of toe United States sluqld surely be willing to’ 
pick up the tab tor any judgment had against those who installed tha microphones. 


For infer 



Mr. Blakey. These are the FBI internal memos reflecting consid- 
eration of the propriety and the legality of the electronic surveil- 

While the FBI was proposing unlawful electronic surveillance, it 
apparently failed to take advantage of a legal way to accomplish 
the same objective. There is nothing in the FBI files to indicate 
consideration was given to title III of Public Law 90-351. Signed on 
June 19, 1968, it empowered the Department of Justice to conduct 
court-ordered electronic surveillance in the investigation of a vari- 
ety of crimes, including murder. 

The committee has uncovered two incidents in which the consti- 
tutional rights of Ray himself were also apparently a matter of 
little concern to the FBI: The first occurred while Ray was waiting 
trial in Shelby County, Tenn. 

On September 30, 1968, Judge W. Preston Battle issued an order 
emphasizing Ray’s written communications with his attorney at 
the time, Arthur Hanes, Sr., were privileged. Battle directed that 
they could be monitored only for the purpose of detecting attempts 
to break prison security but not in order to learn their full content. 

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to introduce 
Martin Luther King exhibit F-503, an FBI memorandum, incorpo- 
rating Judge Battle’s order. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 
record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 

39-935 0 - 79 -2 




Mr. Blakey. Nevertheless, during the month of October at least 
three Ray-to-Hanes letters were intercepted, photocopied, passed 
along to the FBI’s Memphis field office and subsequently transmit- 
ted to FBI headquarters in Washington. 

On October 31, 1968, after a directive issued from headquarters, 
no further letters were Xeroxed. MLK exhibit F-504 — which I 
would request be entered into the record at this point — is a copy of 
this headquarters directive. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 

MLK Exhibit F-504 


T ’v'ly ’ r 

it jfiji fi-mm |ji|i 
!! Kzh InJ 1 

•| tall |RiM!|i ill' 
H iW\* f«*iHH|f S«*f 

H mi mi 

fs? a||E| IfftSgatar !&* 
:u b * 1 1 «ls- 5s *is :-P» 

•5 2 . fa* 
« 2 ?aS° 


Mr. Blakey. The second occurred shortly after Ray pled guilty in 
March 1969. 

Ray was interviewed by the agents-in-charge of the Memphis 
field office for the purpose of obtaining information on an assassi- 
nation conspiracy. Ray was not accompanied by an attorney nor 
was he informed of his Miranda rights — that is, his right to have 
an attorney, paid or appointed, present; his right to terminate the 
interview at will; his right to remain silent; and the fact that the 
Government could use his statements against him. 

Of course, the use of Ray’s self-incriminatory statements in a 
later conspiracy prosecution would have depended on the ability of 
the Government to survive a motion to suppress them. So not only 
were Ray’s rights disregarded but the FBI again was risking de- 
struction of valuable evidence in a conspiracy case if one was ever 
to be made. 

Finally, the committee has taken into account the notable ab- 
sence of active participation in the assassination investigation by 
attorneys for the Department of Justice. 

It seems reasonable to attribute this to the state of relations 
between the Department and the FBI in 1968. That they were poor 
and counterproductive is demonstrated by Mr. Hoover’s criticism of 
Attorney General Clark’s press policy, FBI complaints of intrusion 
by the Department into its investigative territory, and a general 
lack of respect for the Department’s leadership by the FBI. 

Departmental attorneys received digests of investigative reports, 
often in a superficial form and weeks late, as the day-to-day inves- 
tigation was directed at FBI headquarters without consultation 
with the Department. This was the case, even though it had been 
common practice in major conspiracy investigations — for example, 
in antitrust and organized crime areas — for the Bureau and the 
Department to work together, and to work together successfully. 

When major investigative steps were taken — an interview with 
Ray, for example — there was no participation by a Departmental 
attorney; and not once during the investigation was grand jury 
interrogation — with its sophisticated techniques such as immunity 
grants — put to use to prove or probe a possible conspiracy. 

The committee is aware that the blame for any deficiencies in 
the relationship of the FBI and the Department of Justice must be 
shared. While we are addressing the performance of the Bureau in 
today’s hearing, that of the Department itself will be the subject of 
attention tomorrow. 

Mr. Chairman, the next witness, Cartha DeLoach, was one of two 
assistants to Director Hoover between 1965 and Mr. DeLoach’s 
retirement in 1970. Mr. DeLoach supervised the activities of four 
separate divisions which together constituted the Bureau’s investi- 
gative arm. Included among them was domestic intelligence, which 
managed both the security and the Cointelpro cases against Dr. 
King; and the general investigative, which provided supervision for 
the assassination investigation. 

Mr. DeLoach, therefore, is in a unique position to comment on 
FBI programs against Dr. King and the performance of the Bureau 
in its investigation of his death. 

At this time, Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to call 
Cartha DeLoach. 


Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. DeLoach. 

Mr. DeLoach, would you please stand and raise your right hand 
and be sworn? 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the 
committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 

Mr. DeLoach. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. 

Will counsel for the witness please identify himself for the 

Mr. Morgan. Edward P. Morgan, Welch & Morgan, Farragut 
Building, Washington, D.C. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, sir. 

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Mr. Peter Beeson. 




Mr. Beeson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Can you hear me, Mr. DeLoach? 

Mr. DeLoach. Very well; thank you. 

Mr. Beeson. Would you state your full name for the record, 

Mr. DeLoach. Cartha D. DeLoach. 

Mr. Beeson. Would you give the committee a brief rundown of 
your employment history from the time you entered the FBI until 
your retirement from the FBI in 1970? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, Mr. Beeson. I graduated from college in 1942. 
I entered the FBI in a clerical capacity the same year, I believe in 
either July or August 1942. I became an agent after being in the 
FBI about 6 weeks. 

I served in offices in Norfolk, Cleveland, in the various capacities 
as a special agent of the FBI. 

I left the FBI in 1944 to go in the service, in the U.S. Navy, 
during World War II. After being honorably discharged from the 
Navy in 1946, I returned to the FBI, again as a special agent in 
Cleveland, Ohio. 

After serving there for some period of time, I was transferred to 
Washington headquarters of the FBI in 1947. In 1951, if my 
memory serves correctly — and it has been 9 years since I left the 
FBI, quite a long time — but I think I became an inspector in 1951. 1 
became an Assistant Director in 1959, I believe, and an Assistant to 
the Director in 1965, and retired in July 1970, after 28 V 2 years 
service in the FBI. 

Mr. Beeson. If I could just cover a couple of points in that 
chronology: In 1959 you became an Assistant Director. Which divi- 

Mr. DeLoach. Crime Records Division, Mr. Beeson. 

Mr. Beeson. In 1965 you became Assistant to the Director, Mr. 
Hoover. Would you describe briefly your responsibilities as an As- 
sistant to the Director, Mr. Hoover? 

Mr. DeLoach. As an Assistant Director in charge of the Crime 
Records Division, I had supervision of one division. 


When I became an Assistant to the Director in 1965, I had 
supervision under — reporting to — Mr. Clyde Tolson, who, in turn, 
reported to Mr. Hoover — I had supervision of four divisions. That 
was the General Investigative Division which handled general 
criminal matters; the Special Investigative Division which handled 
organized crime and special investigations; the Crime Records Divi- 
sion — which I had just left — which handled public relations mat- 
ters; and the Domestic Intelligence Division. 

Mr. Beeson. The Domestic Intelligence Division was a division 
within the Bureau, Division 5, which was responsible for the secu- 
rity case against Mr. King; is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. The security case involving Mr. King, but the 
General Criminal Division handled the special investigation involv- 
ing Dr. King’s assassination. 

Mr. Beeson. And that would be the General Investigative Divi- 
sion, which was Division 6 in the FBI? 

Mr. DeLoach. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. So in 1968 at the time of Dr. King’s assassination 
you were No. 3 man in the Bureau underneath Mr. Tolson and Mr. 
Hoover and had direct supervisory responsibility for the activities 
in both the Domestic Intelligence Division and the General Investi- 
gative Division, as well as other divisions, correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. The facts aren’t exactly correct, Mr. Beeson. We 
didn’t play the numbers game. There was no No. 3 or no No. 4 
man. There were two Assistants to the Director. I was assistant to 
the Director in charge of Investigative Activities and Crime Rec- 
ords, which included public relations; and Mr. John P. Mohr was 
was an Assistant to the Director in charge of General Administra- 
tive Matters. In fact, your chart is incorrect; it puts me on a 
parallel with Mr. Tolson. I reported to Mr. Tolson. 

Mr. Beeson. All right. Well, we certainly would like to clarify it 
for the record. 

In terms of your specific responsibilities, you had superiors only 
in the persons of Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover, is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. I would like to focus your attention now on the time 
of the assassination of Dr. King — April 1968. 

Would you describe for the committee how the decision was 
made to involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a crime 
which to some people may have appeared to be a local murder 
case, primarily the responsibility of the local authorities in Tennes- 

Mr. DeLoach. That responsibility lay with the Department of 
Justice, Mr. Beeson, and not the FBI. We, of course, could have 
gotten in on the matter if the fugitive had more or less been 
identified and the local authorities had requested the FBI under 
the Fleeing Felon Statute, previously established by the Congress 
to look for James Earl Ray; but the matter of the civil rights 
investigation being under that particular category was established 
by the Department of Justice almost immediately after the crime 

Mr. Beeson. Do you recall who was involved in that decision? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir. I know that Mr. Clark 
called me several times immediately following the assassination, 


during the night, and I called him several times; and I also recall 
that a memorandum was received from the Department of Justice 
at FBI headquarters, indicating the FBI had jurisdiction under the 
civil rights statutes, so that we followed the instructions of the 
Department in that regard. 

Mr. Beeson. You certainly are correct in describing the paper- 
work involved. There is a memorandum coming from the Depart- 
ment of Justice on the same day as the assassination, asking you to 
investigate a possible civil rights violation — conspiracy to violate 
the civil rights of Dr. King. 

Do you recall any concern within either the FBI or the Depart- 
ment of Justice about whether or not there was, in fact, an appro- 
priate statutory jurisdiction for the Federal investigation in this 

Mr. DeLoach. Not for me personally, I don’t recall any concern. 
We had a job to do and we were prepared to do it. 

Mr. Beeson. To your right is a chart which details the chain of 
command in Division 6, the General Investigative Division, that 
was responsible for the assassination investigation. 

As was briefly explained by Mr. Blakey before, within the Gener- 
al Investigative Division, Mr. Rosen was the Assistant Director, 
and then for purposes of the assassination investigation, the Civil 
Rights section under Clem McGowan, and the Civil Rights unit 
under Mr. Edward McDonough, were responsible for the day-to-day 
operation of that investigation. 

Would you give the committee a brief idea, please, of the roles 
that were played by yourself, Mr. Rosen and the other headquar- 
ters personnel primarily involved in the assassination investigation 
in terms of the day-to-day operations of that division? 

Mr. DeLoach. Certainly, Mr. Beeson. The agents on the supervi- 
sory desk — Mr. McDonough, Mr. Long, Mr. Martindale — did a ma- 
jority of the paperwork; they reported to Mr. McGowan. Mr. 
McGowan reported to Mr. Rosen, and Mr. Rosen reported to me. 

Mr. Rosen and I had daily conferences. As a matter of fact, Mr. 
Rosen and I had lunch together almost every day, either in our 
office or outside, and we constantly discussed the case while it went 
on. But primarily that was the situation. Mr. Rosen and I made the 
high level decisions as recommended in various memoranda by the 
supervisory agents. 

Mr. Beeson. How was Mr. Hoover himself informed on the prog- 
ress of the investigation? 

Mr. DeLoach. Occasionally a telephone call from me. I would 
advise him as to any breaks in the case, the progress of the case, as 
I did Attorney General Clark on an almost daily or certainly 
several times a week basis. 

Verbally and through memoranda, Mr. Hoover would be advised 
about — both the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, 
through various communications being sent to them, written com- 

Mr. Beeson. In terms of actual command responsibility within 
the chain of command at the FBI, what was the lowest level of true 
command responsibility? By that I mean at what stage was an FBI 
official able to independently send out a directive or lead in the 
assassination case? 


Mr. DeLoach. The section chief, Mr. McGowan, could do that on 
his own if it was nothing of any great importance. Mr. Rosen, of 
course, could, being the Assistant Director in charge of the division. 
I could. 

But primarily in this particular case, being the major case that it 
was and treated accordingly by the FBI, I would — to the best of my 
recollection — in most instances they would go up to Mr. Tolson and 
Mr. Hoover prior to being sent on. 

Mr. Beeson. But at no time, or at least only on rare occasions, 
would something be done independently by somebody below the 
level of Mr. McGowan; is that fair to say? 

Mr. DeLoach. It could have been done, Mr. Beeson. I am not 
aware of it. 

Mr. Beeson. The committee has received testimony from at least 
one witness testifying previously that the responsibility for the 
day-to-day investigation in this case was, in fact, that of the Domes- 
tic Intelligence Division; is that, in fact, correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. The responsibility of the criminal-type investiga- 

Mr. Beeson. Of the assassination investigation itself. 

Mr. DeLoach. Absolutely not. The Domestic Intelligence Division 
assisted in some minor respects, to the best of my recollection, but 
the responsibility for the investigation of the assassination of Dr. 
King was with the General Investigative Division of Mr. Rosen. 

Mr. Beeson. What role do you recall the Domestic Intelligence 
Division played in the actual assassination investigation itself? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have no recollection of any, specifically, Mr. 
Beeson; but just looking back upon the logical possibilities, furnish- 
ing intelligence concerning hate groups, who might have been in- 
volved in a conspiracy, for instance, the Ku Klux Klan, extreme 
right-wingers in some respects that had possibly made threats. 

For instance, I do recall in one particular instance — to give you 
an example — that the General Investigative Division wanted a col- 
lection, a summary, of every individual who had ever made a 
threat against Dr. King or against high ranking Blacks in the civil 
rights movement; and this would have been a natural thing for the 
Domestic Intelligence Division to prepare and furnish to the Gener- 
al Investigative Division. 

Let me add at this point, Mr. Beeson, that in any major case of 
this nature, not only would it be handled in a very intensified 
manner, but everyone in the FBI who could possibly help out was 
called upon to help out — the FBI laboratory handling all specimens 
of investigation; the Fingerprint or Identification Division, who 
handled all matters of identification; the Training Division who 
handled the liaison with the police, the Domestic Intelligence Divi- 
sion furnishing information concerning hate groups and threats to 
Dr. King and other leading Blacks; and, of course, the General 
Investigative Division who handled the criminal matters; the Spe- 
cial Investigative Division who handled organized crime matters, 
where any threats might have been represented against leading 

The point is that all divisions of the FBI, and all FBI men, were 
involved in this overall case. 


Mr. Beeson. OK. I understand that. I only wanted to clarify that 
the actual control and day-to-day operation of the investigation was 
within the province of the General Investigative Division, Division 
6 . 

Mr. DeLoach. That’s absolutely correct, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. The investigation itself has been referred to, Mr. 
DeLoach, as a special investigation. 

What are the implications of characterizing an investigation as a 
special investigation? 

Mr. DeLoach. A crime so horrible, a crime that was of immense 
importance to the Nation, a crime in which so much pressure was 
put on by outside, external forces. In some situations responsibility 
is fixed by the Department of Justice, that made it a major case; 
tremendous publicity that was involved in such a crime. Many 
things would enter into such a matter making it such a major case. 

Dr. King, being a major figure, why, this naturally was a major 

Mr. Beeson. In terms of the operation of the investigation, how 
was it handled any differently from a normal criminal investiga- 

Mr. DeLoach. In major cases, to the best of my recollection — 
and, again, I have been gone almost 9 years, Mr. Beeson — but I do 
have recollection that we would demand, insist, with the true 
discipline in the FBI, that daily teletypes be sent in, that summary 
reports be sent in on a frequent basis, that any major breaks in the 
case or changes in the case be called in, on a constant basis; in 
other words, that FBI headquarters be kept constantly up to date 
by the field, so we in Washington would know what to do at all 

Mr. Beeson. It would be fair to say, would it not, Mr. DeLoach, 
that a special investigation was not a category created for this 
investigation; it was one which was created for all major cases 
handled by the FBI at that time? 

Mr. DeLoach. I think all major cases were handled pretty much 
on the same basis. However, I must say that in this particular case 
I believe more pressure was put on than any other case that I can 
recall; and I supervised other cases, including the Mackle kidnap- 
ping case, and quite a number of others. 

Mr. Beeson. I would like to change the focus of questioning 
somewhat now. 

As Professor Blakey stated during the narration, a committee 
staff report was issued today summarizing the current findings of 
the committee concerning the Department of Justice and the FBI’s 
assassination investigation. 

Have you had an opportunity to review a draft copy of that 
report previously? 

Mr. DeLoach. I received the report last night upon arriving in 
Washington. I have scanned through it twice, Mr. Beeson, not 
thoroughly, but I have scanned through it twice. 

Mr. Beeson. We also sent you a draft copy of the report approxi- 
mately 3 weeks ago, is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. You have not seen a draft copy of the report prior to 
last night? 


Mr. DeLoach. I have seen a draft copy of the report. I have not 
seen a final copy of the report. The draft copy of the report was 
delivered to my attorney’s office, not to me, and my attorney called 
me, I believe last Thursday or last Friday, and indicated he had 
received it; and I believe it was sent to the wrong man in his office. 

However, I received a draft copy only last night, inasmuch as it 
was not sent to my home, and I have not seen a final report yet, 
Mr. Beeson. 

Mr. Beeson. Let me summarize then — before getting into special 
areas of questioning — the report’s findings. 

The findings in the report indicate that the involvement of the 
Department of Justice and specific attorneys within the Depart- 
ment of Justice was in a background role. They received informa- 
tion on the progress of the investigation. Major reports were sent 
summarizing the investigation on a monthly basis of field offices. 

Also, formal letterhead memoranda were sent summarizing the 
resolution of specific issues under investigation, but in terms of the 
actual day-to-day investigation and the control and operation of the 
day-to-day Federal investigation, the report sees little evidence of 
active participation by Department of Justice attorneys. In fact, 
the investigation appears to have been in the exclusive province of 
the FBI, with the Department of Justice maintaining a background 
role, receiving information on a periodic basis but not involved in 
the actual decisions and the focus and direction of the investiga- 

Would you agree with that assessment of the investigation? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, Mr. Beeson, simply because of the fact that I 
took it upon myself to see Attorney General Clark not daily but 
almost daily, and to brief him thoroughly on almost every aspect of 
the investigation, in my opinion, and Mr. Clark from time to time 
made suggestions as to things to look for and things to do; and I 
certainly followed them out. 

Mr. Beeson. Well, in terms of leads, directives from headquar- 
ters, directives out of the Memphis field office — would you not 
agree that the primary leadership and direction came from FBI 
headquarters and that the role of the Department of Justice was 
one of being informed after the fact, of investigative developments 
in the field? 

Mr. DeLoach. I think this, Mr. Beeson, that Mr. Clark and Mr. 
Vinson, as indicated by your report, your draft report, indicated 
they had complete faith in the FBI and were content to allow the 
FBI to conduct the investigation and to report to them, which was 

Mr. Beeson. Yes, I don’t contest that, I just want to secure your 
position on that. 

Do you consider the background role of the Department of Jus- 
tice attorneys to have been an appropriate role for them to take in 
the investigation? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, I think that the actions of Mr. Vinson 
and Mr. Poliak in following the investigation were quite thorough. 
I had no discrepancy with them concerning their supervision of the 
investigation from a prosecutorial standpoint. 

Mr. Beeson. Well, let me ask you the question this way: Do you 
recall any efforts by the Department of Justice attorneys, either 


Mr. Clark or Mr. Poliak, or any attorneys within the Civil Rights 
Division, to become actively involved on a day-to-day basis in the 
direction of the investigation? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t personally recall that — on a day-to-day 
basis. I would be terribly surprised if they had not offered sugges- 
tions as to conducting the conduct of leads, possible suggestions as 
to the conduct of the case. 

I think you’ve got to remember that in my position I was dealing 
more or less with Attorney General Clark on a constant basis, and 
the supervisory agents were dealing with Mr. Poliak and Mr. 
Vinson more or less on a constant basis; so I am not in a good 
position to answer your question. 

The only thing I can say is, I dealt quite frequently with Mr. 
Clark, and I kept him fully advised, in my opinion, and Mr. Clark 
did from time to time discuss the case with me, thoroughly, and did 
make some suggestions from time to time. 

Mr. Beeson. The report also — in line with this line of question- 
ing — finds substantial amount of evidence that relations between 
the Department of Justice and the FBI were at times strained, at 
at times counterproductive. Incidents were discussed which indicat- 
ed mutual distrust on the part of FBI officials and Department of 
Justice officials during the course of the investigation, and inci- 
dents were located which indicated a lack of respect for the leader- 
ship provided in 1968 by the Department of Justice over the activi- 
ties of the FBI. 

Do you consider this an accurate characterization of the relations 
which existed at the time between the Department of Justice and 
the FBI? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, Mr. Beeson, I do not. 

With all due respect to the committee — and I want to be as 
helpful to the committee as I possibly can — and I am testifying to 
the best of my belief, and based on my opinion— there was a 
distrust between Mr. Hoover and Attorney General Clark; there 
was more or less a feeling of hostility between Mr. Hoover and 
Attorney General Clark, but on a working level, for instance, on 
my own level, I had very pleasant relations with the Department of 
Justice, and I don’t recall but one specific instance, an isolated 
instance, where there was a feeling or incident which occurred 
which one might express distrust or lack of confidence. 

I have here, for instance, Mr. Beeson, a number of letters, includ- 
ing one from Mr. Clark: 

Dear Deke: Warmest congratulations on your appointment as an Assistant to the 
Director. This is a high and well-deserved honor indeed. It is a privilege to be 
associated with you in the Department and reassuring to know that the great 
Bureau will now employ your talents to even higher purposes. 



Mr. Beeson. This would have been in 1965? 

Mr. DeLoach. That was in 1965, yes, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. Would you care to have these introduced in the 
record, Mr. DeLoach? 

Mr. DeLoach. I would be perfectly glad to, sir, if I could get 
them back. 


Mr. Beeson. I am sure we could make copies and give you back 
the originals. 

Mr. DeLoach. Fine. I have other copies of letters here, simply to 
express my own relationship with the Department of Justice, but 
there is no need for me to take the time of the committee or the 
people here to read these; but my point is that while there was a 
feeling on the part of Mr. Hoover from time to time that the 
Department of Justice was trying to take headlines away from the 
FBI, there was no such — there was a very pleasant working rela- 
tionship among the troops, so to speak. 

Mr. Beeson. Your recollection then, in terms of your own — let 
me ask you this first: The date of Mr. Clark’s letter commending 
you on your appointment as Assistant to the Directorship, what is 

Mr. DeLoach. The date on it? 

Mr. Beeson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DeLoach. December 2, 1965. 

Mr. Beeson. In 1968, which is the focus of my questioning, is it 
your recollection today that in fact your relations with Mr. Clark 
were harmonious? 

Mr. DeLoach. With the exception of one isolated incident, Mr. 
Beeson, yes. 

Mr. Beeson. Did this incident occur on June 8, the day of Mr. 
Ray’s arrest, Mr. DeLoach? 

Mr. DeLoach. That’s correct, it did, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. Is it not, in fact, the case that following a confronta- 
tion with Mr. Clark on that day, your functions as liaison with the 
Department of Justice were terminated by Mr. Clark? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have read your report, Mr. Beeson, and it states 
that; but frankly I have no such recollection of any — Mr. Clark 
calling Mr. Hoover, whatsoever, and terminating me as liaison. As 
a matter of fact, let me make it very clear to the committee and to 
you, sir, that I was never established formally, to the best of my 
knowledge, as liaison with the Department of Justice. There was 
no such title, to my recollection. I took it upon myself to keep the 
Attorney General advised because I had a very close personal 
friendship with him and close relationship with him. 

Mr. Beeson. Was there any other Headquarters official who was 
more involved in the briefing of Mr. Clark during the assassination 
investigation than yourself? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. OK. I did not mean to imply that there was an 
official designation of “liaison”; but that was, in fact, one of the 
roles that you served during the assassination investigation, cor- 

Mr. DeLoach. But I do not recall Mr. Clark calling over and 
indicating that my services should be terminated as liaison to him. 
It may have happened, but I certainly don’t recall it. 

Mr. Beeson. In other words, if Mr. Clark were to testify to that 
effect, it is your opinion that his recollection would be erroneous on 
that matter? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have no recollection of Mr. Clark calling Mr. 
Hoover. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hoover, to the best of my knowl- 


edge, never told me that I was terminated or that I should not see 
the Attorney General or officials of the Department again. 

As a matter of fact, Mr. Beeson, I quite frequently conferred with 
the Department of Justice following the apprehension of James 
Earl Ray on many cases. 

Mr. Beeson. Let me ask you this, Mr. DeLoach: Did you confer 
specifically with Mr. Clark 

Mr. DeLoach. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Beeson [continuing]. Following the apprehension of Mr. Ray? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, I would not have, unless Mr. Clark called 
me, and I did not take it upon myself to contact Mr. Clark. 

I have seen Mr. Clark since then within recent months and we 
had a very cordial, brief conversation, shook hands. There is no — to 
my knowledge — certainly not on my part — there is no feeling of 
hostility toward Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Beeson. If I understand your testimony correctly, you met 
with Mr. Clark on a weekly, if not daily basis, prior to Mr. Ray’s 
arrest, and you have no recollection of being with him after Mr. 
Ray’s arrest, is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. After the isolated incident that I referred to, I 
have no recollection of being with him. It may have been that 
happened but I don’t recall it. 

Mr. Beeson. So that would be consistent with Mr. Clark’s recol- 
lection that your function as liaison with Mr. Clark was, in fact, 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes; as long as you understand Mr. Beeson there 
was never any such designation or never any such title with Mr. 
Clark. The records should also reflect that I had frequent liaison 
with the Department of Justice. 

Mr. Beeson. I understand that. I am dwelling now on your 
relation with the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Clark 
at the time. Your testimony today remains that, beyond this isolat- 
ed incident on June 8, you recall harmonious relations only be- 
tween the FBI and the Department of Justice? 

Mr. DeLoach. As far as I personally am concerned, as far as Mr. 
Rosen is concerned, as far as many of the agents working under 
Mr. Rosen’s supervision or, as a matter of fact, the Intelligence 
Division or other divisions. There were frequent not only official 
conferences but social intercourse between the FBI and the Depart- 
ment of Justice numerous times. 

Mr. Beeson. Investigative files reflect no use of grand jury 
during the assassination investigation, Mr. DeLoach. The grand 
jury, of course, was an investigative method which required close 
coordination between the Department of Justice and the FBI in 
whatever investigation is involved; attorneys working closely with 
agents in the development of witnesses, strategy conferences, im- 
munization decisions. 

Can you explain why the grand jury method was not employed 
during the assassination investigation? 

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my ability, sir, frankly, as I said in 
executive testimony previously, did not recall any request concern- 
ing the grand jury investigation. After reading the report refresh- 
ing my memory, there was one request for either a search warrant 
or grand jury investigation, so the Bureau did make a request. 


However, the matter of an establishment of a grand jury is entirely 
up to the Department of Justice. Based upon the facts furnished to 
them by the FBI, the FBI could not in my opinion, to the best of 
my recollection, go to the Department of Justice and say we want a 
grand jury. 

It is not up to us to do that. We were an investigative agency. 
We determined the facts, the Department handles the prosecution. 
They determine whether or not a grand jury is to be established. 

I would like to go further, if I may, please. I agree thoroughly 
with Attorney General Clark and Attorney General Vinson of the 
Criminal Division, as expressed in your report, that a grand jury 
would have been laborious, inefficient, might even perhaps slow 
down the investigation, when we were looking throughout the 
world as intensively as we could for James Earl Ray, and would 
have been of little usage. I agree with that because I think we have 
established that grand jury investigation during the fugitive inves- 
tigation, would have taken the time of agents, would have taken 
the time of officials of the Department of Justice, and agents of the 
FBI. I doubt very seriously whether it would have been productive, 
as later investigation has more or less established. 

Mr. Beeson. Is your view any different for the situation after Mr. 
Ray’s incarceration, in terms of the possibility of then utilizing 
perhaps in more leisure a grand jury investigation in order to 
determine whether or not there might have been associates of Mr. 
Ray involved in the assassination? 

Mr. DeLoach. As your report reflects, the FBI did make a re- 
quest for grand jury investigation or search warrant in one particu- 
lar instance, and it was turned down. I do not recall this. I am 
testifying strictly based on opinion. But I would certainly think 
that after a turndown by the Department of Justice in this one 
instance, expressed a philosophy that would have kept the FBI 
from making further requests for grand jury investigation. It ap- 
peared very obvious that the philosphy of the Department of Jus- 
tice was there should be no grand jury investigation. 

Mr. Beeson. The one instance that you are referring to was a 
request by the FBI to the Department of Justice to consider using 
grand jury subpena to obtain the notes of William Bradford Huie, 
who was an author who was in indirect communication with Mr. 
Ray at the time and possibly had information in his possession 
indicating a possible conspiracy. 

The decision of the Department of Justice not to pursue a search 
warrant in that case, based on memos that we have reviewed, 
appears to have been based on the rather narrow grounds that 
there were serious first amendment problems; also a question of 
whether or not Mr. Huie was in fact an agent of Mr. Ray and 
therefore subject to the attorney-client privilege, which might be 
violated by an attempt to compel the production of those notes. 

In other words, there were serious legal questions involved in 
that specific instance which would not appear in a grand jury 
investigation, say, of Mr. Ray’s associates, a grand investigation 
perhaps of the associates of Mr. Ray’s brothers, a grand jury inves- 
tigation of Mr. Ray’s escape from the Missouri State Prison, and 
possible involvement of a family member there. 


In light of that review of the basis of the Department of Justice’s 
decision not to use it in that one instance, you still think that in 
fact provided guidance for the use of grand jury throughout the 

Mr. DeLoach. In my opinion; yes, Mr. Beeson. 

Mr. Beeson. Let me just review one other point you have made 
in this area, Mr. DeLoach. You stated the ultimate decision to 
employ grand jury is the Department of Justice’s. I agree with you. 
But it is certainly not beyond the ability of the FBI to recommend 
areas which might be fruitfully explored through the grand jury 
investigation. Is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. In consultation with the U.S. attorneys or with 
representatives of the Department of Justice, the FBI could have 
made a suggestion. 

Mr. Beeson. In fact, it was the recommendation of the FBI to use 
the grand jury against Mr. Huie’s notes that brought the Depart- 
ment of Justice into that consideration in the first place? 

Mr. DeLoach. You are absolutely correct. 

Mr. Beeson. Following Mr. Ray’s guilty plea in 1969, a decision 
was made to interview Mr. Ray to determine whether or not you 
had evidence of possible conspiracy in the case. Several alternative 
approaches to Mr. Ray were considered, including a grand jury, 
placing him before a grand jury and taking sworn testimony, and 
also a basic field interview by an FBI agent, in the end the decision 
was made for Mr. Ray to be interviewed one-on-one by the head of 
the Memphis FBI office. 

Do you recall whether or not any consideration was given to the 
possible participation by a Department of Justice attorney in that 
interview of Mr. Ray? 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not, sir. I have no such recollection. 

Mr. Beeson. What would your position have been concerning the 
involvement of a Department of Justice attorney in an interview of 
that nature? 

Mr. DeLoach. Looking back over 9 years, Mr. Beeson, and know- 
ing of the thoroughness of Mr. Vinson, I would have recommended 
and can now think of no objection to Mr. Vinson accompany SAC 
Jensen to such an interview. It may have happened, but, again, I 
am testifying — and just trying to be of help to the committee — 
testifying based on opinion, that it might have been felt at that 
time — I don’t know this to be true but having some knowledge of 
investigative activities, it was felt at the time you might get more 
from an individual like James Earl Ray, a loner, a bigot, a man 
that was somewhat of an egotist if there was a one-on-one investi- 
gation rather than two against one. The FBI has always had some- 
what of a rule that not over two agents should interview one 
defendant, because one, the possibility of deprivation of civil liber- 
ties of the defendant, or, two, the fact that the defendant would be 
more willing to talk to one or two men rather than talking to an 
“army.” So that may have been the idea here, but I don’t recall 
specifically in this particular instance. 

Mr. Beeson. As you heard in Mr. Blakey’s narration, no Miranda 
warnings were given prior to the initiation of this interview. Do 
you consider this proper or improper investigative procedure? 


Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know what was in Mr. Jensen’s mind, who 
conducted the interview, and again this was many years ago — but 
again, based on opinion, I can only consider the fact that the FBI 
went to great lengths to get the opinion of the Department of 
Justice to get approval and permission from the Department of 
Justice to conduct this interview; and second, to get the opinion of 
the defendant’s attorney at the time to conduct the interview on a 
singular basis. So Mr. Jenson, possibly believing he had approval of 
both the Attorney General and the Department of Justice and the 
defendant’s attorney, possibly felt there was no need to warn him 
of his rights at the time of interview while he was in incarceration. 

Mr. Beeson. Your speculation is certainly correct. The interview 
was authorized by the Department of Justice and in fact the FBI, 
through one of their Texas regional offices, made contact with Mr. 
Percy Foreman, then the attorney of record for Mr. Ray, and Mr. 
Foreman gave permission for the interview of his client out of the 
presence of FBI agents — I don’t want any misunderstanding 
there — or rather out of the presence of himself. 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. My question goes to whether or not Mr. Ray himself 
should have been advised of his constitutional right to have an 
attorney present at that time and the other particulars which are 
always given or which are normally given to a defendant prior to 
the initiation of an interview by government authorities. 

Mr. DeLoach. I can only say again, Mr. Beeson, having the 
approval of the defendant’s attorney and the Attorney General and 
the Department of Justice, Mr. Jensen, who conducted the inter- 
view at the time possibly felt there was no need to warn him of his 
rights. That is strictly sheer speculation, not based on knowledge. 

Mr. Beeson. What would your recommendation have been if you 
had been consulted on whether or not Miranda rights should have 
been given in that situation? 

Mr. DeLoach. Let me point this out. Mr. Jensen was a very 
thorough, experienced FBI special agent in charge. I am certain in 
my own mind, my opinion, is that he knew of Miranda, that on 
many occasions in the past he had given subjects their rights in 
advance of an interview, so being an experienced man, he undoubt- 
edly felt, having the approval of the Attorney General and the 
Department of Justice, having the approval of the defendant’s at- 
torney, there was no need to advise him of his rights. 

I am certain, knowing Mr. Jensen as I do, under no circum- 
stances would he or any member of the FBI in interviewing James 
Earl Ray or in the conduct of an interview with James Earl Ray, 
anyone in the case, have had any idea of depriving anyone of their 
civil liberties. 

Mr. Beeson. So there is no mistake, in authorizing the interview, 
the Department of Justice did not authorize the interview without 
Miranda rights. Similarly, Mr. Foreman did not authorize the in- 
terview without Miranda rights. But if I could repeat the question, 
what would your advice have been to Mr. Jensen if you had been 
consulted concerning the administration of Miranda rights in this 

Mr. DeLoach. I think Mr. Jensen was perfectly in his rights to 
conduct the interview as he did. 

39-935 0 - 79 -3 


Mr. Beeson. Without the administration of Miranda rights? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, having the approval that he did, I feel he 
acted properly. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, I would like to change the focus now 
to another area of the assassination investigation. Some brief back- 
ground facts: Mr. Ray is arrested in June 1968; he is, after some 
extradition hearings in England, taken to Shelby County, Tenn., 
where he is placed in the custody of Shelby County authorities in 
the Shelby County Penitentiary. His first attorney is Arthur 
Hanes, Sr. Mr. Hanes represents Mr. Ray until November 1968, 
when Mr. Foreman comes into the case. 

Approximately 2 months before the termination of his represen- 
tation, Mr. Hanes submitted a motion to Judge Battle, who is the 
trial judge in the case, concerning certain conditions of confine- 
ment for Mr. Ray. In responding to that motion, Judge Battle ruled 
that communications going between Mr. Ray and his attorney, Mr. 
Hanes, were privileged communications, that they could be perused 
by the prison authorities in an attempt to ascertain any breach of 
security of the prison, but that they were not to be reviewed in 
order to ascertain the full contents of the letters, which were 
privileged communications between a criminal defendant and his 
attorney facing trial. 

Do you recall this general situation? 

Mr. DeLoach. As I testified in executive session, Mr. Beeson, I do 
not recall the specific incident. My memory has been refreshed 
after reading your report. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman, if I could have the committee clerk 
give to Mr. DeLoach a copy of Martin Luther King exhibit F-503 at 
this time. 

[Handed to witness.] 

Mr. Beeson. I will describe this for the record. It is a copy of the 
September 30 teletype, going between the Memphis field office of 
the FBI and the Washington headquarters of the FBI. It is two 
pages long. It is dated September 30, 1968. 

Mr. DeLoach, please familiarize yourself with it first. 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. I will read for the record the portion of the second 
paragraph on page 1 which starts: 

Judge Battle ruled that written notes exchanged between Ray and his attorney 
are privileged; however, the Shelby County sheriff or his designated agent has the 
authority to peruse these notes to determine if there is any attempt to breach 
security of the jail. These notes should not be perused for the purpose of ascertain- 
ing the full contents of the messages. 

Again, this is a summary of the proceedings in Memphis being 
sent from the Memphis field office to Washington headquarters. Do 
you recall seeing this teletype, Mr. DeLoach? 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that the 
witness be able to review Martin Luther King exhibits F-508, F- 
509, and F-510. 1 

If we could start with exhibit F-508 and go through these togeth- 
er, perhaps that would save some time. F-508 — you will notice the 
numbers in the upper right-hand corner— is a memorandum. It is 

MLK exhibits F-508, F-509, and F-510 appear at pp. 81-87 of this volume. 


sent from the special agent in charge of the Memphis field office 
again to the Director in Washington. It is dated October 11, 1968. 
The memorandum indicates: 

Enclosed are two Xerox copies of the letter and envelope addressed by subject 
James Earl Ray to Mr. Arthur Hanes, Sr., Attorney. This letter was written by Ray, 
October 3, 1968, while incarcerated in Shelby County Jail, Memphis, Tenn. 

The memorandum includes as an attachment a Xerox copy of 
Mr. Ray’s letter to Mr. Hanes dated October 3. This is, of course, 3 
days after Judge Battle’s order concerning Mr. Ray’s correspond- 
ence with his attorney. Do you recall seeing a copy of this letter at 
FBI headquarters? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, I don’t, Mr. Beeson. As a matter of fact I 
believe none of these memoranda have my initials on them. 

Mr. Beeson. Let me turn to F-509, Mr. DeLoach. So the record 
can be clear on what we are reviewing here, this is a similar 
memorandum from the field office in Memphis to the Director of 
the FBI. It is dated October 14, 1968. This memorandum also 
includes as an attachment a letter dated October 14, 1968, from the 
subject Mr. Ray, to his attorney Arthur Hanes, this letter being 
sent 2 weeks after Judge Battle’s order. I take it from your previ- 
ous testimony you do not recall seeing this. Your initials are not on 
this memorandum or on the accompanying letter; is that correct? 
Mr. DeLoach. That is correct. 

Mr. Beeson. Finally, Martin Luther King exhibit F-510, a third 
communication from the Memphis field office to Washington, 
which encloses, among other things, a letter from subject Ray to 
his attorney Arthur Hanes. This memorandum also directs the 
attention of Washington headquarters to portions of Mr. Ray’s 
letter to Mr. Hanes and states: 

Of significance, Ray in his letter to Hanes requests that Mr. Huie not go to any of 
the addresses in Miami until after the trial. 

In this connection, Ray also states: 

* * * that part of the story just covers a few days anyhow and is not too 

This is sent on October 24, after Judge Battle’s order. Your 
initials do not appear on the memo. Is it your testimony you do not 
recall seeing this letter or memorandum? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir, to the best of my knowledge. 
Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, my question to you is this: What we 
have here derived from FBI files is, first of all, the September 30 
communication from the Memphis field office indicating an under- 
standing of Judge Battle’s orders concerning the privileged nature 
of Mr. Ray’s communications with his attorney. We then have, on 
at least three separate occasions after that order, the Memphis 
field office sending to Washington Xerox copies of letters that Mr. 
Ray is sending to his attorney at the time. 

Can you provide the committee with any explanation for the 
conduct of the Memphis field office in systematically collecting 
copies of letters sent from a criminal defendant to his attorney 
during the course of trial preparation? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, I can only speculate or give you my 
personal opinion since my initials do not appear on any of these 
and I do not recall any of these as specifically stated in the record 


prior to this. My opinion is that, as Mr. Jensen has previously 
testified, I would certainly agree with his testimony that these 
were not solicited by the FBI. These were voluntarily given to the 
FBI. Whether Mr. Jensen and the FBI may have accepted them 
under the perogative of Judge Battle’s opinion. In other words, 
they could be perused for security reasons. I don’t know, but I 
would presume this was what happend. 

Mr. Beeson. Let’s take this up point by point. Do you find a 
significant difference in terms of analyzing the conduct of the 
Memphis field office in the issue of whether or not they were 
merely willing recipients of these letters or in fact initiated the 
mail interception? 

Mr. DeLoach. The only way I can answer that question, Mr. 
Beeson, if someone were to hand me a letter following Judge 
Shelby’s decision that these notes could be perused for security 
reasons, the FBI having the leading responsibility for investigation 
in this case and knowing full well the background of James Earl 
Ray to have a record of previous escapes, certainly had the respon- 
sibility to review these for security reasons to see if James Earl 
Ray had planned an escape from prison. As a matter of fact, this 
later did happen after he was transferred to another institution. 

Mr. Beeson. The FBI had absolutely no responsibility for the 
custody of Mr. Ray in Memphis, is that not correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. They still had a responsibility for the investiga- 
tion of the case, but they had no responsibility that I can recall for 
the custody of Mr. Ray at that time. 

Mr. Beeson. They were not in a position to take any direct 
action concerning possible breaches of security. In fact, that was 
the responsibility of the Shelby County authorities, is that not 

Mr. DeLoach. Would you repeat the question, please. 

Mr. Beeson. They had no jurisdiction concerning Mr. Ray’s in- 
carceration in Shelby County. This is the responsibility of the 
Shelby County authorities, is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. As far as incarceration is concerned, this is cor- 
rect, but if this man had escaped once again, the FBI certainly 
would have had increased responsibility all over again. We still 
had the leading responsibility from the standpoint of conspiracy or 
the investigation of the case. 

Mr. Beeson. Let me ask you this, Mr. DeLoach. If it is your 
feeling that what the FBI was involved in here was perusing these 
letters to attempt to ascertain a breach of security of Shelby 
County Prison, why does there appear in the third memorandum 
going to the Washington headquarters a paragraph describing Mr. 
Ray’s comments concerning witnesses in Miami, and the fact that 
that only covers a small part of the story anyway? 

Mr. DeLoach. Which exhibit are you referring to, Mr. Beeson? 

Mr. Beeson. Martin Luther King exhibit F-510. 

Mr. DeLoach. And your question please, again. 

Mr. Beeson. You will note that in the memorandum which is 
accompanying Mr. Ray’s letter, it is pointed out by the Memphis 
field office that Mr. Ray comments on witnesses in Miami, and that 
that part of the story “only covers a few days anyhow.” 


If in fact the FBI was perusing these letters solely to see whether 
or not there was an attempt to breach the security of Shelby 
County penitentiary, what conceivable purpose is there for high- 
lighting that portion of Mr. Ray’s letter? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, how was the FBI to know, one way or 
another, whether or not the witnesses referred to were not people 
who would assist him in an escape? 

Mr. Beeson. If, in fact, as was the case, the order of Judge Battle 
was these letters could be perused to attempt to ascertain breaches 
of security of the Shelby County Prison situation, does it not go far 
beyond the authorized action to Xerox these letters, receive them 
in the Memphis field office and then to transmit them to Washing- 
ton headquarters? If in fact the only purpose was to attempt to 
ascertain breaches of security, what purpose was there in sending 
these letters, after they had been perused, to Washington head- 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, the Memphis field division was only 
one field division that had responsibility. It was the office of origin 
but Bureau headquarters had the coordination of the entire investi- 
gation. There were many things in the FBI files which are not 
included in the files of the Memphis division, as the committee 
knows from its perusal of files during this investigation. 

Again, this is sheer speculation and not based on knowledge, but 
I am trying to help the committee by giving my opinion. Obviously 
these letters were sent to FBI headquarters to determine if the 
supervisory agents saw anything in these letters which represented 
a breach of security and a possible attempted escape on the part of 
James Earl Ray. I can assure you that I believe I never heard of 
any desire to abrogate or to violate the civil liberties of James Earl 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, there are indications in FBI files that 
the initial interception of this correspondence occurred at the 
Shelby County Prison by Shelby County Prison authorities. They, 
of course, perused the mail themselves under Judge Battle’s order. 
What additional purpose could have been served in terms of the 
security of the prisoner for them to pass the mail on to the FBI 
after they had themselves perused the mail and determined what- 
ever implications it had on the security of the prisoner? 

Mr. DeLoach. Simply because of the fact, Mr. Beeson, the FBI 
had responsibility for the case, the overall investigative responsibil- 
ity. The sheriffs office had custody of the man, but they had little 
knowledge of the overall investigation of this case. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, I would like to turn to another area 
now, the area of electronic surveillance or its use or attempted use 
during the assassination, if you recall, about the use or attempted 
use of electronic surveillance in the assassination investigation. 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not, sir. However, my memory was refreshed 
by reading your report. 

Mr. Beeson. Let’s go to the documents that lay at the foundation 
of that report, then. 

Mr. Chairman, if Mr. DeLoach could be given a copy of Martin 
Luther King exhibits F-501, F-502, and F-507. 

Mr. Beeson. If we can go through these again in order starting 
with exhibit F-501, I will describe that for the record. If you would 


like to familiarize yourself with the document at this time, it is a 
copy of a memorandum dated May 9, 1968. 

It is directed from Mr. Rosen, the Assistant Director in charge of 
the General Investigative Division, to Mr. DeLoach, captioned 
“MURKIN.” The purpose described in the memorandum is: 

To recommend the installation of technical surveillance on the telephones of 
Albert and Carol Pepper, St. Louis, Missouri, and the telephone listed to the 
Grapevine Tavern in St. Louis, Missouri, owned by Carol Pepper, subject's sister, 
and operated by John Larry Ray, subject's brother, and the installation of a micro- 
phone surveillance at the residences of Carol Pepper, and John Larry Ray, and at 
the Grapevine Tavern. 

It is then stated: 

These installations could assist in the early apprehension of the subject which 
could possibly be instrumental in reducing the stresses and tension placed on our 
national security subsequent to the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. 

The recommendation portion of the memorandum, the recom- 
mendation is: 

That a technical surveillance be installed on the telephones of Albert and Carol 
Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern and a microphone surveillance be installed at the 
residences of Albert and Carol Pepper and John Larry Ray and at the Grapevine 

Does your initial appear on this memorandum? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. Along with the initial is a note you appended to the 
end of the memorandum, is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. Could you read the note, please. 

Mr. DeLoach, “It is doubtful that the A.G. — meaning the Attor- 
ney General— “will approve. These could be of great assistance.” 

Mr. Beeson. Would you explain that comment first? Why did you 
consider it doubtful the Attorney General would approve this rec- 
ommended electronic surveillance? 

Mr. DeLoach. I believe, Mr. Beeson, that my thoughts are ex- 
pressed quite well in the memorandum. I don’t recall this but my 
memory has been refreshed after reviewing your report. Down in 
the third paragraph, where it was suggested in a memorandum 
dictated by Mr. Long: 

John Larry Ray has expressed a cooperative attitude; however, it is felt that he is 
not giving us complete and accurate information. Carol Pepper refuses to submit to 
interview and is not cooperative. It is felt that if the subject telephones, meaning 
James Earl Ray, or personally contacts any of the relatives, it will most likely be 
Carol Pepper or brother John Larry Ray. 

There is obviously a second reason. In the first paragraph it says, 
“These installations could assist in the early apprehension of the 
subject.” We were spending hundreds of thousands of dollars of 
taxpayers’ moneys, and we had the FBI tied up to a great extent on 
this particular case. There was another overriding reason, again on 
sheer speculation, as to why we thought it was necessary, and that 
was spelled out in this sentence, “This could possibly be instrumen- 
tal in reducing the stresses and tension based on our national 
security subsequent to the death of Dr. King.” 

Because of pillaging and rioting throughout our country, a time 
of stress and strain, it is my opinion at this late date that the FBI 


was very anxious to cause an early apprehension of the subject and 
a solution of this case as early as possible. 

As to the legality or illegality, Mr. Beeson, that is a matter 
entirely up to the Department of Justice. The FBI can recommend 
investigative leads to the department but in a matter of this 
nature, as the committee well knows, at that particular time the 
FBI was not placing any wiretaps or microphones, to the best of my 
knowledge, unless they had the approval of the Attorney General. 

The FBI felt if the Attorney General did approve, this would be 
sufficient legal status. So there was no question in the FBI’s mind 
as to the legality or illegality. It was a matter of putting an 
investigative lead up to the Attorney General of the United States. 

Mr. Beeson. Right now if you are responding, I am sorry that I 
cut it off. “It is doubtful if the A.G. will approve,” what were you 
thinking of at that time when you were speculating about the 
possibility of having this proposal rejected by the Attorney Gener- 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Clark’s philosophy that he was against wire- 
taps unless they were under the aspect of national security. As 
expressed in this memorandum by Special Agent Long, he felt this 
did have a connotation of national security in view of the rioting, 
pillaging, and burning that was going on in our country. However, 
I felt that was not a strong enough case and the Attorney General 
would probably disapprove as later turned out to be the case. 

Mr. Beeson. To the best of your recollection, Mr. DeLoach, is it 
not a fact that 5 weeks after the assassination major portions of 
the rioting and pillaging had subsided in the country? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, but some was still going on, Mr. Beeson, to 
the best of my knowledge, and it could arise at any time. The 
situation was still tense. Washington has never seen such things as 
went on during the middle and late sixties — brickbats thrown 
through the windows of the Department of Justice, the Pentagon 
stormed, bombs going off in various hallowed institutions. There 
was a very bad feeling in our country at that time. 

Mr. Beeson. I just want to clarify. The situation you are current- 
ly describing was not going on in Washington as of May 9, was it? 

Mr. DeLoach. What date? 

Mr. Beeson. May 9, the date of this memo — fires going off, 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall whether there was or not, Mr. 
Beeson, but throughout the country there was considerable tense- 

Mr. Beeson. If I could ask you to refer to Martin Luther King F- 
502, the next memorandum in your pile. And if you would like to 
familiarize yourself with that, I will describe it in the record. It is a 
memorandum sent from Mr. J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr. Its date is 
May 10, 1968, 1 day following the initial memorandum. The pur- 
pose of the memorandum is essentially to analyze within FBI head- 
quarters the legality and constitutionality of the proposed electron- 
ic surveillance, and also to recommend certain precautionary meas- 
ures that might be taken by the FBI in order to avoid prejudice to 
the case against Mr. Ray. 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir. 


Mr. Beeson. Do your initials appear on that memorandum, Mr. 

Mr. DeLoach. They do, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. Do you recall this memorandum? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. Would you take an opportunity now to completely 
familiarize yourself with the contents then, please? 

Mr. DeLoach [reading]. OK, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. Would it be fair to state, Mr. DeLoach, that the 
conclusion reached in this memorandum is that the electronic sur- 
veillance that was proposed would in fact be illegal and unconstitu- 
tional but that by taking certain precautionary measures, prejudice 
to the case against Mr. Ray could be avoided? 

Mr. DeLoach. That apparently was the opinion of the training 
division of the FBI and the attorney in the training division, Mr. 
Dalby, who wrote this memorandum, Mr. Beeson. 

Mr. Beeson. That the electronic surveillance would be illegal and 
unconstitutional, correct? Referring, for example, to point 3 on the 
second page, “Be aware since this search and seizure is unconstitu- 
tional as to the Peppers” 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, I see that, Mr. Beeson. 

Mr. Beeson. You did review this memorandum as indicated by 
your initials on the document; is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, over 10 years ago. 

Mr. Beeson. If I could ask you to refer to Martin Luther King F- 
507, the final exhibit in front of you. 1 This, Mr. DeLoach, is a copy 
of the actual authorization request that was sent by the FBI to the 
Department of Justice and the Attorney General. It is dated May 
13, 4 days after apparently initial consideration of the electronic 
surveillance began at FBI headquarters, and the recommendation 
of the FBI to the Attorney General is to implement the electronics 
surveillance which is discussed in the previous memos. Is that not 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Beeson. My question to you is to request an explanation, for 
the purposes of the committee’s investigation, of this attempt by 
the FBI and yourself and Mr. Hoover to use what was analyzed 
and recognized within FBI headquarters as unconstitutional and 
illegal electronic surveillance in the assassination investigation? 

Mr. DeLoach. My only answer, M-. Beeson, is that I do not 
recall these memoranda. You have given me the opportunity of 
reviewing them. I recall none of the circumstances surrounding 
them. The Department of Justice makes the legal determination 
insofar as FBI actions are concerned. The FBI was following an 
investigative lead through the Department of Justice and the De- 
partment of Justice had the responsibility of either accepting it or 
turning it down in accordance with the rules of the United States 
as understood by the Attorney General. 

Mr. Beeson. Would it be fair to conclude from these memos that 
the FBI in recommending this investigative step was willing to 
engage in what it recognized as a violation of constitutional rights 
of the Peppers and perhaps of other people in order to achieve the 
investigative ends of the proposal? 

1 MLK exhibit F-507 appears at p. 80 of this volume. 


Mr. DeLoach. The conclusion I draw from it is the FBI was very 
seriously concerned about the national security of the United 
States by the incident I mentioned previously and a very fervent 
desire to apprehend the man responsible for the assassination of 
Dr. King. As a result, they forwarded an investigative lead to the 
Attorney General, and the Attorney General would make a deci- 
sion as to whether or not this would be conducted. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, do you recall any consideration given 
to the taint problems that this recommendation could raise in a 
possible conspiracy case against relatives of the Ray family? 

To make my question clearer, evidence intercepted by these taps, 
if they had been installed, would not have been admissible against 
any of the family members of Mr. Ray because it was obtained in 
an unconstitutional manner. In addition, that evidence could not 
have been used as the basis for any type of investigation against 
the family. 

Did you consider the possible jeopardy that you were posing to a 
possible conspiracy case against family members of Mr. Ray when 
you recommend this proposal? 

Mr. DeLoach. The question is moot, Mr. Beeson, because, as I 
testified previously, I don’t recall the memoranda at all, so I do not 
recall any taint. That was considered over 10 Vz years ago. It does 
express to me a very sincere desire on the part of the FBI to look 
into all aspects of the case including the possible conspiratorial 
aspects of the case. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, in June of 1968 — to continue ques- 
tions on electronic surveillance — title III was passed. It was a Fed- 
eral statute which provided a basis for legal, court-authorized elec- 
tronic surveillance in certain criminal investigations. Do you recall 
any additional consideration being given to the use of legal elec- 
tronic surveillance in this case following the passage of title III? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have no such recollection, Mr. Beeson. 

Mr. Beeson. One Final area of questioning, Mr. DeLoach. I be- 
lieve you testified previously that Mr. Hoover was informed on the 
progress of this case through telephone calls and conferences on 
occasion. Is this the only basis or are there other bases on which he 
was informed of the progress of the investigation? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, I don’t recall ever personally face to 
face briefing Mr. Hoover on this case. I did call him, I believe, 
frequently to advise him of progress concerning the case, or else he 
called me. But I don’t recall going to his office and briefing him 
concerning the case at any time. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hoover 
left the running of this case, the supervision of this investigation 
largely up to Mr. Rosen and to me and the agents who were 
handling it. But to be specific again, I don’t recall going to Mr. 
Hoover’s office and briefing him on a face-to-face or one-to-one 
basis. I did call him, I do recall vividly, using as an example, of 
calling him, telling him about the identification of James Earl Ray 
through fingerprints. I was so delighted, I called Mr. Hoover and I 
immediately thereafter went over and briefed Attorney General 
Clark on a one-on-one basis concerning this identification. 

Mr. Beeson. Was it strange in your experience with Mr. Hoover 
that you did not brief him in person on a case of this magnitude? 


Mr. DeLoach. It wasn’t strange at all, Mr. Beeson. Despite the 
fact that I was in charge of all investigative activities, it was the 
policy in the FBI and historical policy you did not see Mr. Hoover 
unless you had an absolute reason for doing so. And while I talked 
to him on the telephone, I did not go to his office. At the times, I 
saw him I requested an appointment ahead of time with his secre- 
tary and was called in when his time allowed. I was handling this 
investigation along with Mr. Rosen and the other agents that have 
been mentioned here today, and I saw no reason to go in and brief 

I might say also, Mr. Beeson, that Mr. Hoover left the supervi- 
sion of this case up to Mr. Rosen and to me. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the witness could see one 
final exhibit, Martin Luther King exhibit F-511. 1 For the record, 
this is a seven-page memorandum dated June 20, 1968. It is written 
by Mr. Hoover himself. The time on it is 1:05 p.m. The memoran- 
dum is directed to Mr. DeLoach as well as Mr. Tolson, Mr. Rosen, 
Mr. Bishop, and Mr. Sullivan, officials in the FBI at the time. 

Mr. DeLoach, I don’t think there is need to go through this 
entire memorandum. If I can direct your attention to the second 
page, second full paragraph, the memorandum written by Mr. 
Hoover is discussing a conversation he had with Attorney General 
Clark, and he summarizes that conversation in the following way: 

I stated that in Ray’s case, we have not found a single angle that would indicate a 
conspiracy. I said the only significant thing is the money he had and which he spent 
freely in paying bills and I thought that could have been obtained from a bank 
robbery. The Attorney General said that if we could show he robbed the bank at 
Alton, it would be helpful. I said we were working on that because he was paying 
his bills with $50 bills up to his arrest. I said on the other hand he stayed at flop 
houses and never stayed at first-class hotels but at the same time he spent, I 
thought, $1,200 or more in buying guns and the car, which I thought was $1,500, 
and then he took dancing lessons, bartender lessons, and lessons in picking locks, 
and that is why I think security is so exceedingly important not only in England but 
on the way back to this country and when he gets here. 

Then, Mr. DeLoach, if you could refer to page 5 of the memoran- 
dum starting with the second full paragraph in the second to last 

I said this shows his shrewdness. I said I think we are dealing with a man who is 
not an ordinary criminal in the usual sense, but a man capable of doing any kind of 
a sly act. The Attorney General said he was exceptionally clever. 

I said Sirhan Sirhan is a different individual as he is a fanatic and killed Robert 
Kennedy because he spoke in favor of Israel and this fellow being an Arab became 
intensely bitter against Kennedy and felt he should be killed, which he did, but he 
is a fanatic and Ray is not a fanatic in that sense. I said I think Ray is a racist and 
detested Negroes and Martin Luther King and there is indication that prior to the 
Memphis situation, he had information about King speaking in other towns and 
then picked out Memphis. I said I think he acted entirely alone, but we are not 
closing our minds that others might be associated with him and we have to run 
down every lead. 

In essence, Mr. DeLoach, Mr. Hoover appears to be indicating 
the conclusion on his part, personal conclusion on his part, that the 
evidence as of this point indicated no conspiracy and that most 
likely Mr. Ray’s motive was racism, and that he indicated racism 
and a personal dislike of Martin Luther King. 

Did you personally and do you now agree with Mr. Hoover’s 
general assessment of the case? 

1 MLK exhibit F-511 appears at p. 88 of this volume. 


Mr. DeLoach. I do, sir. In my opinion, Mr. Beeson, there is no 
concrete evidence whatsoever established by this committee or by 
witnesses before this committee that there is a conspiracy. When I 
left the FBI in 1970, over 8 years ago, I believed that, I still believe 
that. I do think that just as in the assassination of President 
Lincoln, who was assassinated — what — on or about 116 years ago, 
that from time to time people will write books, people will attempt 
to exploit the situation, people will attempt to make money out of 
the situation, people will attempt to bleed the taxpayers by trying 
to perpetuate their own names and reputations out of these unfor- 
tunate incidents. 

But again, I repeat, to the best of my knowledge there is no 
conspiracy, and I do agree with these statements. But at the same 
time I think that committees of this nature do valuable service to 
the people of the United States and the Congress by assisting in 
running down leads and putting out fires of emotion that happen 
from time to time as a result of such unfortunate incidents. I think 
that the FBI in all instances should continue to run down leads 
that continue to come up to prove whether or not there is a 
conspiracy. But as of this time, based upon my knowledge in the 
case, admittedly many years have passed, but nevertheless I know 
of nothing which would indicate a conspiracy. 

Here you had a subject who was a loner, an egotist, a bigot, a 
man who had verbally in prison threatened to kill Dr. King, or said 
he was going to kill Dr. King, a man that hated Blacks, a man that 
wanted to be known, a man who stalked Dr. King; the evidence is 
overwhelming that he did assassinate Dr. King. 

Mr. Beeson. You have had an opportunity to review the staff 
report concerning the conspiracy investigation which was conduct- 
ed by the Department of Justice and FBI. The report finds evidence 
and indicates a failure of the FBI and the Department of Justice 
together to adequately explore the possibility of family involve- 
ment in the assassination investigation. Would you care to com- 
ment on those findings? 

Mr. DeLoach. Your report makes that allegation, Mr. Beeson, 
but, on the other hand, your report is somewhat contradictory in 
that the report stated there was an intense effort to interview the 
family and to stick with that phase of it, to continue interviews, 
and there were frequent interviews of the family, as given the 
example of the fact that the FBI at a late date wanted to put on an 
electronic surveillance. If the Attorney General, the highest legal 
officer in the United States, had approved, that was a direct exam- 
ple of the FBI bringing pressure or at least attempting to find out 
if there was a conspiracy involving the particular family. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, isn’t it clear from your recent review 
of the documents surrounding the electronic surveillance request, 
that the sole purpose stated for implementing that request was to 
attempt to ascertain whether Mr. Ray made contact with family 
members in order to locate the subject? 

In other words, the use of electronic surveillance there was not 
in order to ascertain possible evidence of a conspiracy but only to 
attempt to track down a fugitive in the case? 

Mr. DeLoach. While the memorandum may not have reflected 
that, I feel certain it was in the minds of the FBI, certainly in my 


mind at the time, any phase of the investigation including the 
conspiracy that came about as a result of that microphone or 
telephone surveillance, would have been beneficial to the FBI, 
providing the chief legal officer of the United States, the Attorney 
General, had given authority and thought it had been legal. 

Mr. Beeson. Don’t you think it would have made a stronger 
authorization request to the Department of Justice to include as 
one of the reasons for it possible interception of evidence in the 
conspiracy, if, in fact, that was in the minds of the FBI agents 
involved in this request? 

Mr. DeLoach. I doubt the necessity of the supervisory agent 
including everything in a memorandum going to the Department of 
Justice. I think he felt in his own mind — again this is sheer specu- 
lation, Mr. Beeson — but that his case had been made strong enough 
by considering the national security, by considering the absolute 
necessity of the early apprehension of James Earl Ray, and deter- 
mining whether or not other people were involved in that. It might 
lead to the apprehension of Ray. 

The very fact that he wanted to find out if the relatives were 
involved certainly indicates a feeling that the FBI wanted to run 
down any conspiratorial element. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, I don’t have any further questions for 
you myself. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. At this time the Chair yields such time as it 
may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5- 
minute rule. 

Mr. DeLoach, you are aware, I am sure, that the committee has 
received testimony of several former agents prior to your testimony 
this morning, two of them, Mr. Brennan and Mr. Mohr, whom I am 
sure you also know. Based upon the testimony already received, let 
me ask you 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, excuse me, sir. I have not seen 
their testimony. I have seen newspaper accounts. 

Chairman Stokes. Yes; I didn’t mean to indicate that you had 
seen the testimony. I meant you are aware of the fact they had 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes; I’m sorry to interrupt you. 

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask you a couple of general questions. 
Maybe we can avoid an indepth interrogation on a couple of sub- 
jects. Would you agree that between 1962 and April 4, 1968, the 
Bureau conducted a security investigation of Dr. King and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference to determine the extent 
of Communist influence being exerted upon him? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General of the United 
States, first requested — I am testifying strictly from knowledge 
over a long period of time. Let me state first, Mr. Chairman, that I 
was not on the investigative side of the House at that time and had 
nothing to do with the request for the investigation of the electron- 
ic surveillance on Dr. King — the initiation of it. I was then Assist- 
ant Director in charge of the Crime Records Division, as I previous- 
ly have testified. But to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Kennedy 
requested the FBI to put an electronic surveillance on Dr. King, 
and Mr. Hoover at that time felt this was not the thing to do and 


sent the liaison man with the Attorney General back over to see 
Mr. Kennedy and to talk him out of it. 

Several months later when it was discovered there was a possibil- 
ity of Dr. King being affiliated with a high-ranking member of the 
Communist executive board, board of trustees, or whatever it was, 
Mr. Hoover brought that to Mr. Kennedy’s attention immediately, 
and Mr. Kennedy at that time authorized the surveillance. That 
did initiate the surveillance on Dr. King, and it was handled by the 
Domestic Intelligence Division. As I say, I did not have supervision 
of the Domestic Intelligence Division and so consequently my 
memory is somewhat hazy. 

Chairman Stokes. Would you agree that between 1963 and 1968 
the Bureau engaged in a campaign to discredit and neutralize Dr. 
King as an effective civil rights leader? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to answer 
that question in this way. Dr. King made an allegation that FBI 
agents were not to be trusted in the handling of civil rights cases 
in Albany, Ga., inasmuch as they were all southern born, reared, 
and educated. That cast great doubts upon the integrity of FBI 
agents in the handling of civil rights cases. In those particular 
cases the FBI was “damned if you do and damned if you don’t.” In 
a certain State, agents had rattlesnakes put in the driver’s seat of 
a car so they would be bitten when they sat down. Agents were spit 
upon. Agents were refused service in restaurants. One agent’s wife 
heard a knock at her door and she went to the front door and there 
were four men carrying a coffin. They simply told her that her 
husband’s body was contained in that coffin, dumped it on the floor 
and left. 

What I’m trying to point out— it was hard enough to investigate 
civil rights cases at that time without allegations being made cast- 
ing aspersions against the integrity of FBI agents. I can easily 
understand that Dr. King at an emotional moment might have 
made that statement, but it was not a true statement. 

The fact was that four out of five agents in Albany were nothern 
bom, reared, and educated. But this touched off a feud between 
Mr. Hoover and Mr. King. In my opinion it was an unfortunate 
feud. The feud alienated civil rights forces and prevented some 
from furnishing badly needed information. 

In a press conference that Mr. Hoover held, he indicated that Dr. 
King was the most “notorious liar” in the United States. I was 
against him making that statement and I think the feud was very 
unfortunate as was the alleged campaign that you alluded to. 

I sent Mr. Hoover during that press conference with 22 ladies, 
three different notes asking him to withdraw that statement or at 
least to indicate to the ladies that it was off the record, the 
women’s national press group in the Washington area. He refused 
to do so. 

On the third occasion I sent him a note — he said to the effect: 
“You mind your own business.” The ladies could not wait to get out 
of the room and report this to the wire services and their papers. 
This touched off the feud between Mr. Hoover and Mr. King. 
Allegations flew back and forth 

Dr. King later called Mr. Hoover “senile” and said he was 
bowing under the weight of his office. Mr. Hoover again repeated 


his notorious liar statement. Mr. Hoover again repeated this in a 
statement later on to a reporter and I asked the reporter if he 
would withdraw the statement from his article because it was 
causing the FBI difficulties from a public relations standpoint, but 
it did become more or less of a feud between the two men. 

I was responsible for trying to contact Dr. King. Dr. King would 
not return my calls. I did eventually talk to the now Ambassador 
to the United Nations representing the United States and we ar- 
ranged a meeting between Mr. Hoover and Dr. King and it turned 
out to be a very peaceful meeting. 

To specifically answer your question, there was a feud and a 
campaign Mr. Hoover carried on and supervised and there were 
unfortunately incidents that went on between the two men, mostly 
on Mr. Hoover’s part to discredit Dr. King, to specifically answer 
your question, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. When we strip your answer of the surplusage, 
the answer to my question would be yes, wouldn’t it? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, it would, but on the part of both men. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Would the chairman yield? 

Chairman Stokes. I certainly yield to the gentleman from the 
District of Columbia. 

Mr. Fauntroy. It appears that the burden of Mr. DeLoach’s 
testimony is that the feud began or surfaced at the time Mr. 
Hoover had a press conference in 1964. Is that your testimony? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is when Mr. Hoover answered Dr. King 
insofar as the Albany, Ga., allegation is concerned. That is my 
recollection, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware that Mr. Hoover exhibited hos- 
tility for Dr. King much earlier? 

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of that, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You are not aware of memos? 

Mr. DeLoach. At least I don’t recall that, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. I will 
look forward to my 5 minutes. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, let me ask you this: The com- 
ments that were made by Dr. King with reference to the FBI and 
Albany had occurred some 2 years prior to the statement made by 
Mr. Hoover at the press conference when he called Dr. King a 
notorious liar, had it not? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall the specific dates, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Well, the press conference was in 1964, was it 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. You don’t recall that the Albany situation 
occurred in 1962? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir. In the best of my knowl- 
edge the two incidents were quite close together. 

Chairman Stokes. Are you aware of the fact that Mr. Murtagh, a 
former FBI agent, testified before this committee, and with refer- 
ence to the FBI and their investigation of civil rights violations and 
complaints, testified before this committee that the FBI was drag- 
ging their feet? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, I have every respect for you and 
every respect for this committee, but I wonder if any member of 


this committee or any member of the staff can name one FBI case 
where the FBI dragged its feet in the civil rights field? I don’t 
recall any. 

Chairman Stokes. I am referring to the testimony of a former 
FBI agent before this committee. 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t mean to discredit Mr. Murtagh in any way 
whatsoever. I have not seen his testimony. But let’s consider Mr. 
Murtagh for a minute, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Murtagh was never a supervisory agent. To the best of my 
recollection Mr. Murtagh was an agent assigned to the Atlanta, 
Ga., office. He was never assigned to FBI headquarters in Washing- 
ton, D.C. Mr. Murtagh had no overall knowledge of the FBI and its 
responsibilities. Mr. Murtagh had no responsibilities or knowledge 
of the immense field of civil rights investigations, only those in 
perhaps his narrow sphere of category of Atlanta or the surround- 
ing area. 

To be an expert witness, and I am not alluding to the fact that I 
am an expert witness because there are many things that I don’t 
know that may have happened at that time, but to be an expert 
witness and make sweeping statements before this committee, he 
had to have had knowledge or supervisory responsibility or knowl- 
edge of the overall responsibility of the FBI which he did not have. 
He was 1 agent of some 8,500 agents assigned to the field at that 
time. I had never heard of Mr. Murtagh before he started volun- 
teering to testify before various committees. 

Chairman Stokes. Wouldn’t you agree that this is not necessarily 
an area where one must possess expertise if one is testifying as a 
result of his having been an employee stationed in that particular 
branch of the FBI, testifying before this committee as to his own 
personal knowledge and observations. That doesn’t require his 
being an expert in that area, does it? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, it would depend entirely upon why 
that individual wanted to testify, what was his reason for testify- 
ing, or whether he had an ax to grind against the FBI. Had he 
written a book previously? Did he want publicity? What was his 
reason for testifying? 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Murtagh was a former agent who retired 
under honorable conditions. He is presently a professor of constitu- 
tional law at a university who twice or three times during his 
testimony before this committee broke down and professed his love 
for the agency and the fact that he disliked having to testify to 
these type of events that occurred in an institution that he loved. 

Mr. DeLoach. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not attempting to dis- 
credit Mr. Murtagh in the least or his background. I do question, 
however, his background of knowledge concerning the FBI consid- 
ering his very narrow jurisdiction and responsibilities in the orga- 

Mr. Fauntroy. If you will yield, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DeLoach, do you question his knowledge of the fact that the 
FBI committed 15 agents in the Atlanta office to the task of run- 
ning an electronic surveillance operation out of a hotel on Dr. 
King? Do you question his knowledge? 

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of the incident. 

Mr. Fauntroy. But do you question his knowledge? 



Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know whether I can question it or not. I 
am not familiar with the incident. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you question his knowledge that the request 
was made of him to find an informant and get copies of the SCLC 
stationery and copies of the handwriting of Andrew Young so that 
it might be used against him in his effort to be elected to Congress? 

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of the incident you speak of. I am 
only aware of Mr. Murtagh’s background or assignment as an 
agent and the fact that he had no overall knowledge of the FBI. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you question that he had specific knowledge 
of what was happening in that office that perhaps you were not 
aware of? 

Mr. DeLoach. Certainly there are things I am not aware of Mr. 
Fauntroy, but I question his knowledge concerning the sweeping 
allegations he has made. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware the FBI was spending the time 
and money of 15 agents full time to surveil Dr. King and the 

Mr. DeLoach. I have no knowledge of that, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, let me ask you, do you agree 
that the campaign which you referred to that Mr. Hoover had 
against Dr. King included efforts to convince the public as well as 
members of Government that Dr. King was a person who should be 
held in low esteem? 

Mr. DeLoach. There were incidents ordered by Mr. Hoover 
which would have caused that, Mr. Chairman, in various isolated 

Chairman Stokes. Would you agree that this campaign included 
efforts to convince these same groups that Dr. King was a traitor 
to his country and to his race? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, Mr. Chairman. I don’t recall 
any statements by Mr. Hoover or by agents that Dr. King was a 
traitor, or a traitor to his race. I do recall at the meeting which a 
member of this committee, Mr. Fauntroy, was present, and I was 
present in Mr. Hoover’s office when they met, that Mr. Hoover 
made the statement that Dr. King being the symbol of leadership 
for millions of Blacks in the United States should be very careful 
in picking his associates and his personal conduct because of that 
very symbol of leadership. 

Chairman Stokes. Now, even prior to the notorious liar state- 
ment by Mr. Hoover, you were aware, were you not, of the intense 
dislike Mr. Hoover had for Dr. King? 

Mr. DeLoach. Your report, Mr. Chairman, says it was a hatred. I 
don’t think Mr. Hoover ever hated anyone. I think he was incensed 
that Dr. King would cast aspersions upon the integrity of FBI 
agents and particularly an organization that he, himself, had de- 
voted his life to and more or less had sacrificed his life to. 

I think that that overrode Mr. Hoover’s judgment to some extent 
and colored his supervision of these particular matters. But I don’t 
think there was any deep-seated hatred on the part of Mr. Hoover 
against Dr. King as exemplary of the meeting between the two 
men which was very peaceful. 

Chairman Stokes. Would you agree that when the Bureau first 
began its electronic surveillance of Dr. King it was for the purpose 


of monitoring the influence of others over him in terms of any 
Communistic infiltration of the civil rights movement, but that 
subsequently what the Bureau did was to utilize the information 
obtained through that electronic surveillance for the purpose of 
discrediting Dr. King? 

Do you understand the question? 

Mr. DeLoach. There are two parts, I believe, sir, and I will try to 
answer both of them. 

Former Attorney General Katzenbach has testified that in his 
opinion the reason for Attorney General Kennedy first requesting 
the investigation and later on authorizing the electronic surveil- 
lance was to determine the extent of Communist influence over Dr. 

The second part of it was usage of the information. I do recall 
the request of high ranking Members of Congress to obtain infor- 
mation concerning Dr. King and Mr. Hoover approving giving this 
information to those high ranking Members of Congress. 

I do recall that Mr. Hoover from time to time not only furnished 
information to the Attorney General but to the White House con- 
cerning Dr. King. 

Chairman Stokes. In terms of this COINTELPRO operation, you 
had a specific role, did you not? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, not a specific role. I would like to make 
the record clear in that regard, Mr. Chairman. This program was 
initiated while I was on the administrative side of the house. I had 
nothing to do with the initiation of this program. It was initiated 
by Mr. William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director of International 
Intelligence, and Alan Belmont, Assistant to the Director at that 
time. They supervised and operated that program under Mr. 
Hoover long before I became Assistant to the Director. 

After I became Assistant to the Director and inherited this pro- 
gram under Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover, up to that time I was not 
privy to all aspects of this particular program. 

Chairman Stokes. The program started August 25, 1967. What 
were you doing at that time? 

Mr. DeLoach. The program started to the best of my recollection 
long before 1967. 

Chairman Stokes. Well, the program, but not the COINTELPRO 
aspect of it, the security aspects started long before, that is right. 

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, and I 
could be corrected, but the program started long before that, the 
COINTELPRO part of it. 

Chairman Stokes. Did you at any time become a part of the 
COINTELPRO part of it? 

Mr. DeLoach. Occasionally Mr. Hoover would give me certain 
assignments to handle in that area, yes, sir, and I operated strictly 
under his orders. 

Chairman Stokes. Part of the assignment given you by Mr. 
Hoover was for you to participate in an operation where you would 
discredit Dr. King in the press and in the general public; isn’t that 

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, I 
recall one incident — there may have been others — one incident 
where Mr. Hoover ordered me to, by memorandum sent through 

39-935 0 - 79 -4 


him and then down to my office, to give one matter to the press. I 
don’t recall any others. There may have been, but I don’t recall. 

Chairman Stokes. Didn’t you have a role in attempting to block 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from being able to 
obtain funding? Did you have a specific role in that? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Would the clerk furnish the witness with 
MLK F-449A, F-449B, F-449C, F-449D, and F-449E? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Have you had a chance now to review those 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Having reviewed them, does it refresh your 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall any of the memoranda previously, 
Mr. Chairman, but I have reviewed them. 

Chairman Stokes. I am sorry? 

Mr. DeLoach. I say I do not recall having previously seen these 
memorandum, so much time has passed, but I do appreciate the 
chance to review them. 

Chairman Stokes. Having reviewed them, does this now refresh 
your recollection as to the question posed to you? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, I don’t recall these incidents at all, Mr. 

Chairman Stokes. These memoranda that I have just shown you 
do refer to a campaign to block the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference from receipt of funding by virtue of disseminating de- 
rogatory information regarding Dr. King; does it not? 

Mr. DeLoach. I believe all these memorandum originated with 
the domestic intelligence operation. They were sent to my office 
and I sent it to Mr. Hoover in view of his orders that he wanted to 
see anything pertaining to Dr. King and his organization. 

Chairman Stokes. I am not trying through my questions to give 
you personal responsibility for it. All I am trying to do is get you to 
testify to the campaign that was under way at that time. That 
seems to me very simple to do. 

Mr. DeLoach. I am testifying to the best of my ability, Mr. 
Chairman, and I will get to that. 

On one of these memorandum I believe I put on the bottom of it, 
“I doubt this would be of any purpose.” 

On the memorandum dated October 26, 1966, 12 years ago, it is 
designated as D-31 MLK F-449C, that appears to be my memoran- 
dum, Mr. Chairman, where I talked with Mr. John Bugas who was 
the vice president of Ford Motor Co. and discussed with him the 
facts contained therein. 

Chairman Stokes. Was the purpose of your discussion with him 
to block funding for SCLC? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, as recommended by the Domestic Intelligence 
Division and approved by Mr. Hoover, yes, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, also didn’t the campaign include 
a dissemination of derogatory information to Senators, college 
presidents, and others to keep Dr. King from receiving honorary 
degrees and awards? 


Mr. DeLoach. I believe on one occasion, sir, a very high ranking 
Senator of the United States asked Mr. Hoover for information, if I 
recall correctly, and Mr. Hoover directed me to see this Senator 
and give him the facts concerning Dr. King’s background. 

The Bureau’s feeling at that time was that Congress had the 
right to know. That is sheer speculation. 

I also recall to the best of my recollection, Mr. Chairman, that on 
one occasion a high ranking Senator of great seniority called down 
and requested that a college president that he would send down to 
FBI headquarters be advised of Dr. King’s background. 

Chairman Stokes. Weren’t there other universities that were 
approached, given derogatory information for the purpose of stop- 
ping Dr. King from getting honorary degrees from those universi- 

Mr. DeLoach. That could be, Mr. Chairman, but I don’t recall 
any such incidents. 

Chairman Stokes. If that was done, that had nothing to do with 
national security, did it? This was totally for the purpose of dis- 
crediting Dr. King, wasn’t it? 

Mr. DeLoach. As I said previously, Mr. Chairman, it was part of 
the orders issued by Mr. Hoover in connection with the feud with 
Dr. King. 

Chairman Stokes. Didn’t you also sit down with Speaker McCor- 
mack and give him certain derogatory information about Dr. King? 
Didn’t you go to the White House, sit with Walter Jenkins, give 
him derogatory information about Dr. King? Isn’t that part of the 
role you played? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall any such incidents with Speaker 
McCormack. It could have happened. If I did so, it was done strictly 
at the orders of Mr. Hoover. 

Insofar as Mr. Jenkins, I do not recall the incident, but Mr. 
Jenkins was the highest ranking staff officer to the President and 
it is possible that the FBI at Mr. Hoover’s instructions sent infor- 
mation concerning Dr. King to the President and that I would have 
delivered them, serving in a liaison capacity to the White House as 
I was at that time. 

Chairman Stokes. If I understand your testimony correctly, you 
don’t deny that you did those things? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; Mr. Chairman, I do not deny it. I have no 
recollection of it. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, didn’t the Bureau respond to 
Dr. King’s criticism of the Vietnam war by using that to further 
justify the campaign to neutralize and discredit him? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Will the clerk please furnish the witness with 
Martin Luther King exhibits F-458, F-441B, F-450B? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Have you had a chance now to read those 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Having read them, do they refresh your recol- 
lection as to the question posed to you? 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall the memorandum, Mr. Chairman, 
but I have reviewed these memorandum. 


Chairman Stokes. I am sorry? 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall at the time, 11 years ago, having 
seen these memorandum, but I have reviewed them. These memo- 
randum emanated from the Domestic Intelligence Division and 
were sent to Mr. Hoover through my office. 

Chairman Stokes. With your initials appearing thereon, it would 
indicate at that time that you had seen those documents. 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Therefore, you would have knowledge of the 
information contained therein; isn’t that true? 

Mr. DeLoach. It indicated that I had knowledge at that time, 11 
years ago, Mr. Chairman, yes, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. And now seeing it, does it or does it not 
refresh your recollection as to what you learned 11 years ago? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; it has been so long ago, ancient history. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, you know that Dr. King was not 
a Communist, don’t you? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, I was not supervising the Domestic 
Intelligence Division. 

Chairman Stokes. No, no, no. I just asked you a very simple 
question. The question is — I think you can answer this yes or no, 
and if you want to elaborate, I am not going to shut you off, but 
let’s be honest here — the question is: You know he was not a 
Communist, don’t you? 

Mr. DeLoach. I will answer this to the best of my ability, Mr. 

I believe this committee has had before it an FBI informant who 
testified to the fact that if Dr. King was not a Communist, he was 
certainly close to it. I know of no indication that Dr. King was a 
card-carrying member of the Communist Party. 

As I say, I was not supervising the Domestic Intelligence Division 
at the time and I was not privy to all the communications concern- 
ing this matter. Later on when I became Assistant to the Director 
in December 1965, 1 did learn more of the situation. 

To the best of my recollection there was a high ranking member 
of the Communist Party, or certainly a man alleged or reputed to 
be a high ranking member of the Communist Party, who had great 
influence over Dr. King. Whether or not this means Dr. King was a 
puppet for the Communist Party, or for this man, I am not in a 
position to state. That would take a legal mind to do that Mr. 
Chairman. I only carried out my orders as given by Mr. Hoover. 

Chairman Stokes. You have just made a very interesting state- 
ment. You told us there was a high ranking man in the Communist 
Party who had great influence over Dr. King. 

Mr. DeLoach. As testified previously by an informant who ap- 
peared before your group. 

Chairman Stokes. You are not testifying from your own knowl- 

Mr. DeLoach. I will testify from my own knowledge, Mr. Chair- 
man. I don’t know, frankly, in my own opinion whether Dr. King 
could be classified as a “member” of the Communist Party or not. 

Chairman Stokes. And with reference to your statement about 
someone high in the party exerting influence over him, do you 
have any knowledge of that? 


Mr. DeLoach. I recall, to the best of my recollection, there was 
such a man, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Would you tell the committee, then, how you 
know that this man had influence over Dr. King? 

Mr. DeLoach. I was told, Mr. Chairman — and, again, I am testi- 
fying from facts of 10 or 11 or 12 years ago and even beyond that, 
Mr. Chairman — that this man wrote speeches for Dr. King, that 
this man gave financial advice to Dr. King, that this man made 
policy decisions for Dr. King, and consequently having been told 
that, there certainly would have been some association between 
this individual and Dr. King. 

Chairman Stokes. Are you familiar at all with Dr. King’s intel- 
lectual and educational attainments? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have read some of Dr. King’s sermons, Mr. 
Chairman. From the standpoint of my own knowledge, I know that 
he was a symbol of leadership of the civil rights movement. I have 
not gone into depth as to Dr. King’s intellectual education, no, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Well, maybe it would help you if I said to you 
that Dr. King graduated from Morehouse College with honors, 
graduated at the top of his class from Prozier Theological Semi- 
nary, and acquired a doctorate in philosophy from Boston Universi- 

Now, on what do you base the facts that someone else has 
influenced this man who has this kind of educational attainment? 
What evidence is there? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, I am not contesting Dr. King’s 
brilliance in the least or his symbol of leadership. The only way I 
can answer your question is that the facts given to the Department 
of Justice and the Attorney General of the United States, and he 
felt they were sufficient to determine on the basis of electronic 
surveillance, not initiated by me because I was not in domestic 
intelligence at the time, or had supervision over that, but I was 
told the Attorney General had approved it, based upon those par- 
ticular facts, that he wanted to find out further the extent of 
Communist leadership over Dr. King. 

Again, I was not in a supervisory position at that time so my 
memory is quite hazy based upon facts determined so long ago. 

Chairman Stokes. Well, with reference to infiltration of the civil 
rights movement by the Communist Party, you are aware, are you 
not, that they did not infiltrate the movement? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that the Commu- 
nists desperately tried to infiltrate the civil rights movement but 
failed miserably. 

Chairman Stokes. Failed miserably? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. I still believe that. 

Chairman Stokes. And their failing miserably, the only credit 
that could be given for their having failed miserably would be both 
to the leadership of the civil rights movement and the people 
involved in the movement and not the FBI; isn’t that true? 

Mr. DeLoach. I think the FBI investigation in internal security 
matters and in civil rights matters assisted greatly at that particu- 
lar time, Mr. Chairman. But as to the specific answer to your 
question, as to the FBI preventing the Communist Party from 


infiltrating into the civil rights movement, yes, I think the FBI 
assisted there. I think the FBI investigative efforts assisted greatly. 

Chairman Stokes. What did they do to stop the infiltration? 
They were running around bugging Dr. King’s home, SCLC’s head- 
quarters, and Dr. King’s hotel rooms. What did they do to stop the 
infiltration of the civil rights movement by the Communist Party? 

Mr. DeLoach. Well, I think the FBI communications both to the 
Attorney General and to the White House on occasion caused the 
Department of Justice to brief civil rights leaders as to the dangers 

To the best of my recollection — and I am not clear on this, Mr. 
Chairman — I think the FBI communications to the White House 
caused the White House officials on occasion to brief the civil 
rights leaders of the dangers involved. In my opinion, even at this 
late date it certainly would have assisted the civil rights leaders in 
knowing who was trying to undermine and infiltrate them and it 
caused them to be worried. 

I think Mr. Hoover’s meeting with Dr. King where Mr. Hoover 
indicated he should be very careful of his associations with certain 
people assisted Dr. King from then on in being wary of such 

Chairman Stokes. Then you really feel that a man who had the 
education and intelligence that Dr. King had, that he needed Mr. 
Hoover or somebody else to tell him about the dangers of the 
Communist Party infiltrating the civil rights movement in Amer- 

Mr. DeLoach. Not that isolated example, Mr. Chairman, but I 
feel that men with equal brilliance over the years have been taken 
in by the Communist Party and by Communist supervision. I do 
feel there have been unfortunate incidents in our society where 
great men of stature have been taken in and have possibly even 
become Soviet espionage agents. 

Therefore, I say, with some gratification that the Communists, in 
my opinion, failed miserably to take over the civil rights movement 
or make a dent in the civil rights movement. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, you were familiar with the con- 
ditions existing in this Nation that brought about the civil rights 
movement, aren’t you? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. You know that in that period of history all 
over the South that Blacks and whites were segregated by law, 
they had separate drinking fountains for Blacks and whites in 
public accommodation places. Blacks had to get on the back of 

You are aware of Selma when dogs were put on the civil rights 
marchers and cattle prodders were used on them and things of that 

You don’t think, do you, that a race of people subjected to that 
kind of condition in this country needed Communists or anybody 
else to tell them about their status in this country, do you? 

Mr. DeLoach. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman. That is why I say 
the Communist attempt failed miserably. 

But let’s look at the facts, Mr. Chairman, over the years in our 
society. The Communist Party has attempted to undertake any 


campaign or to enter into any venture which is going to, at an 
emotional moment particularly, gain them any stature in the 
United States, particularly from a political and philosophical 
standpoint. That is why they were so interested in the civil rights 
movement as they were any movement that would give them added 

Chairman Stokes. I am really intrigued by your giving the 
Bureau some credit for what you describe as this miserable failure 
to infiltrate the civil rights movement. 

Did you ever participate in any briefing where Negro leaders 
were being briefed and given this kind of information about the 
Communist Party? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. And do you want to name some of the leaders 
that were briefed? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall the leaders specifically, Mr. Chair- 
man, but I do know that on one or two incidents I talked to Black 
leaders. I don’t recall their names. I know Mr. William C. Sullivan, 
the Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Divi- 
sion, on occasion talked to Black leaders. 

Chairman Stokes. Do you know anything about the tape that 
was mailed to Mrs. King, a letter that was sent to Dr. King 
subsequently from the FBI suggesting that he commit suicide? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. I heard it rumored that 
there was such an incident. I have seen such an account in the 
papers, but those tapes were not in my possession and consequently 
I had nothing to do with it and have no recollection of the situation 
to the best of my knowledge. 

Chairman Stokes. You had attended a meeting between Dr. King 
and Mr. Hoover. There is a memorandum which indicates that you 
suggested to the Director that there was no need then to further 
transcribe other tapes which, at that point, had not been tran- 
scribed, and that the Director even after that meeting indicated 
that he thought differently and that he felt that the tapes should 
be transcribed while they were still fresh in the agent’s mind. Do 
you recall that? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Hoover was a strong man, wasn’t he? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hoover was a strong man. 
He was a genius in many respects. I think he created the best law 
enforcement agency in the world, but I think he stayed on in office 
too long. 

Chairman Stokes. And you and other agents, knowing of his 
intense feeling about Dr. King, carried out his orders with a cer- 
tain degree of fear? 

Mr. DeLoach. Certain degree of what, sir? 

Chairman Stokes. Fear. 

Mr. DeLoach. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would answer that on the 
basis that unless you didn’t carry them out, you would lose your 
job, yes, sir. But I would like for the record to clearly state, clearly 
reflect, that on two different occasions I did disagree with Mr. 
Hoover and did cause in one instance, cause him to refrain or at 
least not attack Dr. King, and I would hope that men with Mr. 
King would have caused the same thing toward Dr. King, because 


in my opinion it was a most unfortunate feud. But when he repeat- 
ed the second time that in his opinion Dr. King was the most 
notorious liar in the world, I asked him to recant that and he did. I 
did fail in the women’s press conference that I testified about 

Chairman Stokes. I know you did. That was the occasion when 
you sent him three notes asking him to refrain from such an 
accusation. He finally even said to the women present that Mr. 
DeLoach has advised me on three separate occasions not to make 
this statement, but I am going to make it anyway. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is basically correct, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. So to go back to my original question to you, 
your answer, then, would be yes, that with the knowledge that 
even if you stood up to him, when he made the final decision, and 
that the rest of you would react out of fear for the loss of your jobs 
if you did anything different? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, he was the Director and we had to 
follow his orders or else we would not stay in our positions. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. DeLoach. I have nothing fur- 

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DeLoach, I gather that your theory on assassination is that 
James Earl Ray was the lone assassin and that his motive was 
racism. It would have to be pretty hard racism to cause him to 
track Dr. King across the country at a time when he was an 
escapee and had a long prison sentence hanging over him should 
he be picked up at any moment. 

Certainly there is considerable evidence in the record of James 
Earl Ray’s racist attitudes, but it has been somewhat troublesome 
that there is evidence which I think the FBI was aware of that 
seems to cut the other way. It would seem to show that he was not 
such an intense racist, that is, the motive could have been some- 
thing else, for example, money. 

For example, I believe the FBI was aware that he had frequented 
a bar in Los Angeles for some period of time when he was there 
and that that bar was about a one-third Black clientele. Apparent- 
ly he visited there regularly without expressing any racial feelings. 

There is evidence of a liaison with Miss Morales in Mexico, 
possibly with Miss Marie Martin in Los Angeles, both of whom 
appear to be women of color. 

My question is: Did these incidents raise any questions in the 
minds of the FBI concerning racism as a motive? Do you consider 
those consistent with racism as a motive for the killing? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Preyer, I don’t remember those specific inci- 
dents. I do remember that Dr. King, while in prison, according to 
the investigation to the best of my recollection — I am sorry, sir, 
when James Earl Ray was in prison, to the best of my knowledge, 
he refused to go on work orders out on the prison farm with blacks 
because of his dislike of blacks. 

I think, also, that to the best of my knowledge that on one 
occasion he told an inmate in prison that he was going to get Dr. 


King. He did have a general reputation, I believe, in prison as 
being bigoted, anti-Black. 

As to specifically answer your question, then, and I would like to 
do that, sir, if I had the knowledge, but I don't recall the specific 
incidents you mentioned such as frequenting bars, Black women, or 
attempting to engage in social activities with Black women. I don’t 
recall that, sir. 

In my opinion, he definitely hated Blacks. He definitely was a 
loner. He was a bumbling yet at the same time a very cunning 
individual. I think because of being a bigot, a racist, that he 
wanted to kill, in his opinion, the biggest man he could find in 
order to make a name for himself as more or less suggested by the 
fact that his brother on one occasion told, whether it was FBI 
agents or not I am not sure — he said: “Why is the FBI making all 
this fuss trying to find my brother. All he did was to kill a nigger.” 

This, in my opinion, expresses the anti-Black feeling not only of 
King but that of his family. 

Mr. Preyer. I would certainly grant you there is ample evidence 
of that sort of racist attitude and there is evidence from his prison 
experience of the kind that you mentioned. There is also evidence 
on the other side from his prison experience indicating that he was 
not as intense a racist. 

But I gather from your answer that the question of intensity of 
his racism, whether it was sufficient to motivate a killing, would 
seem to be against all of his interests as far as staying out of jail 
and it was not a matter that was discussed with the FBI. 

You knew of no evidence going against the idea that he was an 
intense racist? 

Mr. DeLoach. As of this late date I don’t recall that, those 
particular incidents, Mr. Preyer. I do hope they were fully investi- 
gated by the FBI. I am not aware of the fact whether they were or 
not to tell you the truth but I don’t recall the matter. 

Mr. Preyer. Just one other area. 

The Ray brothers, you mentioned earlier, there is evidence that 
John Ray visited James Earl Ray the day before he escaped from 
prison, that Jimmy Ray on two occasions made statements tending 
to show that there was a conspiracy involved, and perhaps most 
important, that one of the brothers or that James Earl Ray when 
he exchanged his rifle for a heavier rifle and made the statement 
that it was done on his brother’s advice. 

Those statements would seem to indicate a considerable involve- 
ment of the brothers in James Earl Ray’s activities. Did the FBI 
ever attempt to link the brothers of James Earl Ray in the assassi- 
nation? Do you recall any discussion in the FBI concerning these 
remarkable coincidences in James Earl Ray’s activities? 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired, but 
the witness may respond. 

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Preyer, I recall the intensive efforts to interview the broth- 
ers and all members of the family as exemplified by the fact that 
they were uncooperative to some extent. One woman refused to 
testify or refused to give us any information, and further the FBI 
felt so strongly about it that they recommended to the Attorney 


General the electronic surveillance that I testified to previously 
here today. 

So to answer your question, at all times the FBI had this in mind 
in my opinion and attempted to get corroborative evidence from 
the brothers, but that has not come to light. 

Mr. Preyer. Thank you. 

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. 

Mr. Devine. Mr. DeLoach, for purposes of the record, could you 
outline for the committee the jurisdiction of the Bureau as it 
relates to Dr. King, both preassassination, during assassination, 
and postassassination? How did the Bureau get involved? Start 
with the preassassination. Was that purely on a security issue? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, Mr. Devine, and the orders of 
Attorney General Kennedy to establish the electronic surveillance. 
The investigation did go on prior to that, but that culminated in 
the authorization by Attorney General Kennedy. It was conducted 
as a security investigation or what I believe was security matter — 
C, security matter — Communist, to determine the extent of infiltra- 
tion by the Communist Party. 

At the time of the assassination, of course, as has been testified 
to earlier, the Department of Justice gave the FBI jurisdiction by 
order of the Attorney General under the civil rights statutes that 
Dr. King’s civil rights had been interfered with and consequently 
the FBI should determine who had perpetrated this particular 
incident — the assassination. 

The FBI could, as I testified to earlier, Mr. Devine, could have 
done a fugitive investigation under the Fugitive Felon Act, as 
passed by the Congress, giving the FBI the authority to investigate 
a fugitive case when local law enforcement officials determine that 
a felony has been committed and possibly the fugitive has crossed 
State lines. They may step in and ask the FBI to investigate the 
matter and the FBI does that at their specific request. 

Mr. Devine. Was it true Mr. DeLoach, that following the appre- 
hension of James Earl Ray that the Bureau virtually lost interest 
in the case? I ask that question on the basis of that chart to your 
far right showing FBI activity both as far as dollars are concerned 
and automobile mileage are concerned, that measurably, dramatic 
drops occurred in Bureau activities following the apprehension. 
Would you care to comment on that? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, Mr. Devine. 

With all due respect to the committee, I believe that would be a 
gross exaggeration insofar as possible loss of interest is concerned. I 
am not with the FBI today and I have not been for 9 years, but I 
think the FBI is still interested in this case and will still carry out 
any leads with respect to conspiracy, not only this case but the 
Kennedy case and any other major case. 

To my knowledge that case is still pending in the FBI and will 
never be closed as long as leads are being received. 

But the fact that the fugitive investigation has been completed 
certainly would curtail some use of automobiles and curtail to 
some extent expenditures. It does not mean the FBI has lost inter- 
est in the case. It means that one phase of the case has been 


completed and they are still working on other phases of the case 
such as conspiracy angle. 

Mr. Devine. While you were still in the Bureau, and still in the 
high supervisory capacity, did you issue any orders or direct any 
orders from Mr. Hoover to discontinue active participation in the 
investigation of the King case following the apprehension? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, Mr. Devine. 

To answer your question, I believe that Inspector Joseph Sulli- 
van, who was the major case inspector, was called off for other 
duties following the location of James Earl Ray because the FBI 
felt he was the man who assassinated Dr. King. 

Whether any other curtailment of activities went on at that time 
or not, I don’t recall, but definitely the case was still kept in a 
pending status and every lead was still investigated very thor- 

Mr. Devine. On another issue, Mr. DeLoach, earlier I think you 
testified that you never heard of Agent Murtagh prior to his ap- 
pearance before this committee. 

If I accurately recall some of Mr. Murtagh’s testimony, he said 
that he had never met Mr. Hoover personally, although he had 
been in the Bureau for 10 or 11 years. But he did at one time 
describe Mr. Hoover as a maniac. 

I would ask you, Mr. DeLoach, as one of the highest officials in 
the Bureau under Mr. Hoover’s supervision — probably there was no 
one much closer to him than perhaps Mr. Tolson and then you in 
your capacity as Assistant to the Director — would you care to make 
any descriptive analysis of Mr. Hoover during the time you were 
under his direction and control? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. I testified previously, Mr. Devine, that I 
think Mr. Hoover was a genius in many respects, that he created, 
in my opinion, the best law enforcement agency in the world. I 
think, however, he stayed on too long. I believe Mr. Hoover should 
have retired some years earlier than he did. I believe Mr. Hoover 
had somewhat of a towering ego as a lot of men have in our 
society, but by the same token I think he was a humanitarian to a 
great extent. 

I have seen Mr. Hoover break down and almost cry on occasions, 
at moments of emotion, when cases were solved, or when an agent 
had a tragedy happen to him. I think the man was a deeply 
religious man in many respects, but at the same time he was 
somewhat egocentric in his handling of matters and his personal- 
ity. He came from a very strict religious background and he was a 
prime mover in his church, always had been, in the Boy Scout 
movement, and many other activities. 

I think that Mr. Hoover in creating the FBI and giving his life to 
it sometimes mistakenly felt that this was more or less his baby, to 
put it crudely, or his agency. He overreacted to any allegations 
that concerned the organization. 

Mr. Devine. I think you have responded to the inquiry, Mr. 
DeLoach. Just one more question, please. 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Devine. I think you made reference either in your direct 
testimony or during the questioning by someone that a meeting 
was arranged between Director Hoover and Dr. King and I think 


Mr. Fauntroy or Dr. Abernathy and some others. Would you please 
tell the committee for purposes of the record who made the actual 
arrangements for the meeting and what brought about the meet- 

Mr. DeLoach. I did for the FBI, sir. 

Mr. Devine. You made the arrangements personally? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Devine. Do you recall what year this occurred roughly, how 
long before the assassination perhaps? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, I don’t recall a specific incident, Mr. 
Devine, but it was some period of time prior to the assassination. 

Mr. Devine. What brought about your arranging the meeting? 

Mr. DeLoach. I told Mr. Hoover, and I believe the FBI records 
will reflect this, that I felt this feud was very unfortunate, that I 
felt there should be a meeting with Dr. King, and for both of them 
to discuss the matter and to possibly come out with some basis of— 
I didn’t say friendship, Mr. Devine — but some feeling of mutual 
trust insofar as this name calling was concerned. 

Mr. Devine. I would suggest the date of December of 1964. 
Would that refresh your recollection? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall the specific date, but it could have 
been, Mr. Devine. 

Mr. Devine. Do you recall who was there specifically, Mr. 
Hoover, Dr. King, Mr. Fauntroy, Dr. Abernathy? 

Mr. DeLoach. Dr. Abernathy and I believe the current Ambassa- 
dor to the United Nations. I was with Mr. Hoover at the time and 
took notes on the meeting at his specific orders. 

Mr. Devine. Would you say the meeting was reasonably cordial 
and no hostility was displayed? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have termed the meeting before Mr. Devine as 
more or less of a love feast. The men discussed matters very 
cordially; they parted very cordially. Dr. King went to Mr. Hoover’s 
reception room and gave out a press release indicating accordingly. 

Mr. Devine. Finally, you have heretofore testified, I believe, 
before the Warren Commission? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I did not testify before the Warren Com- 

Mr. Devine. Before the Church committee in the Senate? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir; I did. 

Mr. Devine. Before any other investigative agencies on the King 

Mr. DeLoach. I believe before a Federal grand jury, Mr. Devine. 
I’m not certain. Since I left the FBI — I might state for the record, 
Mr. Devine — I have been down here for approximately — to the best 
of my recollection — 17 times, to testify to the activities of the FBI 
during the time I was in the FBI. Most of the testimony has been 
duplication, time and time again. I’m always glad to help out. 

Mr. Devine. You testified before this committee here in execu- 
tive session at an earlier time? 

Mr. DeLoach. That’s correct. 

Mr. Devine. That’s all, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


May I request that the witness be provided with MLK exhibits 
F-437A, F-438A, F-438B, F-442J, F-442K, F-444A, F-444B, and F- 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fauntroy, do you wish me to review these one 
at a time, or do you wish me to read all of them? 

Mr. Fauntroy. I think perhaps we can probably have you to 
scan them as I bring them up. 

Mr. DeLoach. All right. 

Mr. Fauntroy. MLK F-437A is, of course, a response to a re- 
quest by Mr. Hoover that the agency initiate an investigation into 
Communist influence in the civil rights movement among Blacks, 
and this memo — as it indicates — is Mr. Sullivan’s synopsis that the 
Communist Party has not influenced the civil rights movement. 

This memo and several others are designed to refresh your 
memory on when the FBI began its campaign with respect to Dr. 
King, and I was just wondering if you recall discussions with Mr. 
Hoover during this period, this memo dated August 23, 1963, just 
prior to the historic March on Washington, at which a response 
was tendered by him similar to the one which appears on this 

It is in his own handwriting, that this reminds him of a memo 
that Mr. Sullivan did on Castro and suggesting that he go back and 
do a better job. 

Were you aware of that at that time? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I was not, Mr. Fauntroy. 

As you can see from this memorandum, this was not sent 
through me, going up to Mr. Hoover; so, therefore, I had nothing to 
do with it. After Mr. Hoover reviewed it, sent it back to Mr. 
Belmont, and to Mr. Mohr, and other individuals, it was later sent 
to my office simply for information. I do not recall the memoran- 

Mr. Fauntroy. Turning to exhibit F-438A, were you aware of a 
conference which was called, in a memo dated Christmas Eve in 
1963, a conference held in the Atlanta office with the seat of 
government personnel which had as its purpose how best to carry 
out an investigation to produce results without embarrassing the 
administration, the Bureau, and how to come up with a complete 
analysis of the avenues and approaches to neutralize King as an 
effective Negro leader, and concerning some development of his 
continued dependence upon the Communists? Were you aware of 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, Mr. Fauntroy, I was not. 

As you could observe from the memorandum, this was not sent 
through me for consideration or approval and was only sent to my 
office later on, for review or just simply for information, after Mr. 
Hoover had already approved it, or after the action had taken 

Mr. Fauntroy. MLK F-438B is a list of questions to be explored 
at that conference in 1963. Are you aware that these questions 
were posed: 

Can colored agents be of any assistance to us in the Atlanta area, and if so, how 
many will be needed? 

Could we convert any of their weak points to strong points for us? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; Mr. Fauntroy. 


As observed by the previous memoranda, I was not on the inves- 
tigative side of the house at the time; I was strictly on the adminis- 
trative side, and had little or no knowledge, or wasn’t consulted, 
regarding such matters. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I am trying to refresh your memory. 

You were not aware at this period? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. They asked: 

What do we know about King’s housekeeper? Can we use her? What do we know 
about the background of people presently employed in the office of SCLC and can 
we use any of them? Are there any disgruntled employees at SCLC and/or former 
employees who may be disgruntled or disgruntled acquaintances? 

You weren’t aware that they were considering those things at 
that time? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I was not a party to that. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware of any comment or memo after 
the march on Washington that Dr. King’s speech was a demogogic 
one and proved that he was dangerous to the country? 

Mr. DeLoach. Which exhibit is that, Mr. Fauntroy? 

Mr. Fauntroy. That is actually exhibit F-437B — I’m sorry — 
which you do not have and which I will not trouble you with. 

Mr. DeLoach. All right. 

Mr. Fauntroy. But you don’t recall Mr. Sullivan ever having 
expressed that view, or Mr. Hoover? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you recall 438D? 

Mr. DeLoach. “D” as in David, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. “D” as in David, which references 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t see that, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Sorry. We do not have 438D; and I won’t trouble 
you with that, save to reference a memo of January 8, 1964, which 
began, “It is your responsibility as Assistant Director in charge of 
and having the DID to report to you,” a reference to the impor- 
tance of developing a new leader once you had discredited Dr. 
King — not you, but the FBI — according to the memo. 

It might be important if you have 438D, to provide it to the 
witness, because here in Mr. Hoover's writing he indicates that he 
is glad to see that Mr. Sullivan has finally seen the light, though it 
is dismally delayed, that he struggled for months to convince him 
that the Communists had very definite influence over Dr. King. 

I would like to move now, Mr. 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fauntroy, before you move on, this memo 
apparently was not sent to me, and I was not a party to it. 

Mr. Fauntroy. So you were not aware of it? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; it was sent back to my office, for informa- 
tion apparently after Mr. Hoover had ordered the action to be 

Mr. Fauntroy. But now you are aware, at least from the record, 
that a campaign was underway at that time? 

Mr. DeLoach. From what you told me, yes. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I would like to turn now to 442J. You mentioned 
the fact that electronic surveillance was approved by Mr. Kennedy. 
Were you aware in January of 1964 of this memo and the intent to 
install microphone surveillance of’ Dr. King at the Willard Hotel 


when it was reported through Mr. Sullivan that Dr. King had 
plans to stay there? 

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Fauntroy, I was 
not aware of this situation. Again, this memorandum was not sent 
through my office and was simply apparently sent by Mr. Hoover 
over to my office for information after the action had been ordered. 
In other words, I was a party after the fact. 

Mr. Fauntroy. But were you aware of it? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Even though the memo was sent to you, you 
weren’t aware of that happening? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware that once the transcript, memo- 
randa, from that surveillance was prepared, that a memo came 
from Mr. Sullivan indicating that they should hide this fact from 
the Attorney General, lest he inform Dr. King of the kind of 
surveillance that was being accorded him? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall any such incident, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You don’t remember this language: 

The attached document is classified “Top Secret” to minimize the likelihood that 
this material will be read by someone who will leak it to King. However, it is 
possible despite its classification, the Attorney General himself may reprimand 
King on the basis of this material. If he does, it is not likely we will develop any 
more such information through the means employed. It is highly important that we 
do develop further information of this type in order that we may completely 
discredit King as a traitor of the Negro people. 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall any such language. Again, I was not 
on the investigative side of the House, would not have been privy 
to such planning. 

Mr. Fauntroy. They sent no copy to the AG. Were you aware 
that the practice was, on matters like this, to hide it from the 
Attorney General? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall any such practice, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You see the note on the bottom of the memo 

Mr. DeLoach. Which exhibit are you referring to now, sir? 

Mr. Fauntroy. F-442K. 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir; I see that. But, again— — 

Mr. Fauntroy. Is that Mr. Hoover’s handwriting? 

Mr. DeLoach. That looks like Mr. Hoover’s handwriting, Mr. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Of course, you weren’t talking to him, so you 
weren’t aware of that? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall this. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Now I would like to move to efforts to discredit 
Dr. King at a time when you were officially the Assistant to the 
Director and had at least Mr. Sullivan to report to you. 

Are you aware of 444A? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have it in front of me, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. It was an effort to publish an article apparently 
written by the FBI in an effort to discredit Dr. King. You will note 
that it says, “Can be given to a friendly newspaper contact such as 
David Lawrence, who is the editor of the U.S. News & World 

You were aware of 


Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall this, sir. It obviously was emanated 
by Mr. Baumgardner and sent — after approved by Mr. Baum- 
gardner — was sent to Mr. Sullivan for approval as Assistant Direc- 
tor in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, which handled 
the program, and then was sent to my office, and this does appear 
in my handwriting: “U.S. News & World Report will not use article 
of this nature. Suggest Ray McHugh of Copley Press.” 

It was sent on to Mr. Hoover and Mr. Hoover apparently ordered 
the action be taken. 

Mr. Fauntroy. So you now recall that you were aware of it and 
that you did pencil it at that time? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall the memorandum or the action, Mr. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Is that your handwriting there? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, it is; but I don’t recall the action. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You don’t recall that 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. But you don’t deny this is your handwriting, that 
you wrote it? 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not deny it. 

Mr. Fauntroy. 444B has reference to an article which the FBI 
wanted circulated that would try to create the impression that Dr. 
King was attempting to blackmail the Teamsters Union into giving 
contributions to SCLC because of some 450,000 members of Hoffa’s 
union who were Black. 

Were you aware of that effort to circulate 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I don’t recall this specific memorandum. It 
has been 12 years ago, Mr. Fauntroy, and it appears that this is a 
memorandum that, again, was initiated by Mr. Baumgardner, his 
idea, went to Mr. Sullivan; Mr. Sullivan approved and sent it to my 
office, and I sent it in to Mr. Tolson, who sent it to Mr. Hoover; 
and Mr. Hoover apparently — I don’t see Mr. Hoover’s initials on it; 
I see Mr. Tolson’s initials. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Why did they send it to you? 

Mr. DeLoach. Because I was Assistant to the Director at that 
time, and the natural flow of mail would go through my office, on 
into Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And you made no judgments on the advisability 
of these things? 

Mr. DeLoach. Well, I was under instructions on such matters to 
always send them in to Mr. Hoover for approval. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You were instructed by whom? 

Mr. DeLoach. By Mr. Hoover. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I see; and you don’t recall these now; but you do 
recall that you did not send them with your recommendations? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I made no recommendation on this partic- 
ular memorandum. 

Mr. Fauntroy. OK. If you will look at MLK F-450A, this is 
another memo which suggests using an article written by a Black 
newspaper editor discrediting Dr. King, and you wanted to expand 
the coverage of that by disseminating it to friendly news sources? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is not correct, Mr. Fauntroy. You say “You 
wanted to expand it.” This is a memorandum that was initiated by 
Mr. Brennan 


Mr. Fauntroy. I’m sorry. Please forgive me. I didn’t mean you. I 
meant the gentleman, Mr. Sullivan, apparently? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Brennan was under Mr. Sullivan’s supervi- 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Sullivan was under Mr. Hoover’s supervision; 
is that it? 

Mr. DeLoach. Supposedly, yes, sir. At times I wonder, but sup- 

Mr. Fauntroy. Sometimes then they sent you memos and you 
had no input on them? 

Mr. DeLoach. But this is a memorandum that Mr. Hoover ap- 
parently approved, because he said, “OK. H” and Mr. Hoover or- 
dered that Mr. Wick and the Crime Records Division handle the 

Mr. Fauntroy. But the instruction that it was felt if this article 
is given widespread publicity on how thinking Negroes would feel 
about King, that you would accomplish two objectives: One publi- 
cizing King as a traitor to his country and race and, second, it 
reduces income from these shows because he has five more perfor- 
mances to give — in reference to Harry Belafonte’s concert designed 
to raise funds for SCLC? 

Mr. DeLoach. I am not familiar with the newspaper article, Mr. 
Fauntroy, but apparently that was Mr. Brennan’s idea. 

Mr. Fauntroy. But you were aware of the effort to portray Dr. 
King as a traitor to the country? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I don’t recall. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Even though it appears frequently in memos at a 
period when you had some responsibility for at least overseeing the 
work of DID, whence this memo came? 

Mr. DeLoach. I think you’ll agree, sir, that the majority of the 
memoranda reflect that I was on the administrative side of the 
House at the time and therefore would have had no decisionmak- 
ing policy in connection with that? 

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. DeLoach, one of the things that the commit- 
tee is seeking to determine is whether the FBI created a moral 
climate in which the assassination of Dr. King, as unthinkable as it 
is, became not only thinkable but also could be thought of being 
justified in the Nation; and I wonder if you think the FBI officials 
should have known their conduct in not only writing articles like 
this and seeing to it that they were disseminated around the coun- 
try could have unjustifiably risked the life of Dr. King? 

Mr. DeLoach. What was the last part of your question, sir? I’m 

Mr. Fauntroy. Is it your opinion that the FBI should have 
known that the kinds of activities to which we refer in these 
memos would unjustifiably risk the life of Dr. King? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fauntroy, I think it would be absolutely ridic- 
ulous to assume that any of the FBI’s few attempts to discredit Dr. 
King, as ordered by Mr. Hoover, Mr. Sullivan, or whoever partici- 
pated in that, caused an atmosphere which would have resulted in 
his assassination — I doubt if James Earl Ray had ever seen any of 
the articles — that Mr. Hoover had wanted two or three articles to 

39-935 0 - 79 -5 


be put in the newspaper which you have explained to me here 
today. No one has shown me the articles. I don’t know whether 
they appeared or not, to tell you the truth; but I doubt that James 
Earl Ray — or I doubt that anyone to amount to anything — had ever 
seen the articles, if they did appear, that would have been perpe- 
trated by the FBI or knew of a discreditation program to any 
extent. Consequently, in my opinion, the facts would overwhelm- 
ingly indicate that the FBI did not create any atmosphere which 
would cause harm to Dr. King from a physical standpoint or, in my 
opinion, any other standpoint. 

Mr. Fauntroy. In your testimony, Mr. DeLoach, you alluded to 
the fact that over the years the FBI compiled files on death threats 
directed at Dr. King. Is it fair to say that at the time of this period, 
between 1963 and 1968, that it would not have surprised you that 
Dr. King received death threats? 

Mr. DeLoach. I wouldn’t have been surprised, sir. I think almost 
any individual in the public limelight, as Dr. King was, or any 
public leader in our society today, receives death threats. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Again, in view of those death threats and in 
retrospect, didn’t the release of derogatory and inflammatory infor- 
mation describing him as a traitor to the race and the country run 
the risk of further poisoning the minds of people who might vio- 
lently oppose what Dr. King stood for? 

Mr. DeLoach. Again, sir, I was not on the investigative side of 
the house at the time that language was used and, frankly, I am 
not aware of the fact that such language was ever given out from a 
public standpoint. That appears to be Mr. Sullivan’s usage of in- 
flammatory language, and whether or not it was given out or not, I 
am not aware of that fact, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I just read to you, and you have before you, 
Martin Luther King exhibit F-450A, which has to do with the 
Houston article. 

Were you not 

Mr. DeLoach. I don't recall the article, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You don’t recall? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You don’t deny the FBI did that, do you? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t deny that Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Brennan, 
made this request, and that Mr. Hoover ordered that it be done; 

Mr. Fauntroy. Is that your initial at the end of that memo? 

Mr. DeLoach. It is, sir; yes, sir. In the natural flow of mail, it 
went through my office, and then on in to Mr. Tolson, and then on 
in to Mr. Hoover; and in these particular cases Mr. Hoover indicat- 
ed that anything pertaining to this matter he should see personally 
and make the decision. 

Mr. Fauntroy. So you didn’t read this? 

Mr. DeLoach. I beg your pardon? 

Mr. Fauntroy. You didn’t read this? 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall reading it. 

Mr. Fauntroy. What does your signature mean? 

Mr. DeLoach. My signature? 

Mr. Fauntroy. I mean your initial. 


Mr. DeLoach. My initial means that this piece of mail was 
received in my office and I read it, and I sent it on in to Mr. 
Tolson’s office, approximately IIV 2 years ago. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And it doesn’t mean approval? 

Mr. DeLoach. It means that I thought that Mr. Hoover should 
see this piece of mail. That was my duty, to weed out mail which 
he should not see and to approve it and send it on my own, or else 
send it on to him for final approval. 

Mr. Fauntroy. So, finally — Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate the 
extent on which you have allowed me to go on — in your view, the 
FBI was not sensitive to the possible implications of the derogatory 
information it attempted to disseminate around the country about 
Dr. King as a traitor to the race and to the Nation for his own life? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, Mr. Fauntroy, I simply stated this, that the 
few attempts on the part of the FBI to discredit Dr. King, as 
ordered by Mr. Hoover, did not result, in my opinion, in an atmos- 
phere which would have caused physical harm to Dr. King. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I appreciate that opinion, but that is not the 
question I asked. 

The question is: Whether you believed it or not, were you or any 
of the other persons responsible for these kinds of memos and the 
carrying out of this campaign against Dr. King — were you aware or 
sensitive to the fact that this might result in creating a climate 
within which Dr. King’s life might well be taken? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fauntroy, I can’t answer that question be- 
cause, as I testified previously, the greater majority of these memo- 
randums took place prior to my assuming any supervision of the 
Investigative Divisions of the FBI; but I am not aware of any 
overall feeling of hysteria as a result of the FBI’s actions; just 
sheer speculation at this late date. 

I am trying to testify to the best of my ability. 

Mr. Fauntroy. But you recall never having anyone — either in 
discussion or by memo — expressing some concern about the effect 
that this campaign could have upon Dr. King’s life? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have no such recollection, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

I would like to have the clerk provide the witness with MLK 
exhibit 438E, please. 

Mr. DeLoach. Do you want me to read the entire memorandum? 

Chairman Stokes. I just want you to refresh yourself and then I 
will refer to certain parts of it. This is a memorandum prepared by 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. It went to Mr. Mohr? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct. He was my superior at the time. 

Chairman Stokes. And the date of the memorandum? 

Mr. DeLoach. Is December 2, 1964. 

Chairman Stokes. The subject matter? 

Mr. DeLoach. Is Martin Luther King. Appointment with Direc- 
tor 3:35 p.m., December 1, 1964. 

Chairman Stokes. Bearing upon the part of your reply to Mr. 
Devine with reference to how the meeting came about, would you 
read us the first paragraph of that memorandum. 


Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

At Reverend King’s request, the Director met with King; Rev. Ralph Abernathy, 
Secretary of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Dr. Andrew 
Young, executive assistant to King; and Walter Fauntroy, SCLC representative here 
in Washington, at 3:35 p.m., 12-1-64, in the Director’s Office. 

Chairman Stokes. The memorandum goes on in the next para- 
graph and makes reference to the fact 

Mr. DeLoach. May I interrupt just one second? I would like the 
privilege of stating, despite the fact this specifically reads at “Rev- 
erend King’s request,” I made overtures to Mr. Hoover to have this 
meeting take place, as I have testified to the best of my recollection 
previously. I still insist on that. 

Chairman Stokes. What overtures did you make to Mr. Hoover 
to try to get him to comply with Dr. King’s request for such a 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. That too took place, but prior to that I 
made the suggestion that such a meeting take place. 

Chairman Stokes. I am sort of at a loss as to why you would, in 
your own written memo, say at Dr. King’s request. 

Mr. DeLoach. Only for the record, Mr. Chairman. Obviously Dr. 
King initiated the request also for a specific date and time. 

Chairman Stokes. Wouldn’t it be logical in these circumstances 
that you would say pursuant to my request to the Director, or 
something of this sort, rather than at Dr. King’s request? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. Not on the basis of the telephone call that 
I received in my opinion — again I am testifying to something that 
is about 14 years ago — telephone call, to the best of my recollec- 
tion, I received from the current Ambassador to the United Na- 
tions, Mr. Young, who asked the meeting take place, and they 
wanted it to take place, and I previously tried to contact Dr. King 
personally, and Dr. King had not returned my calls but obviously 
had Ambassador Young call me. 

Chairman Stokes. Be that as it may, it also appears to me from 
the way your memo reads that it seems to give further weight to 
Dr. King having made the request, because in the second para- 
graph you mention the fact you met King and associates in the 
hallway and attempted to rush them into the Director’s office 
through the reception room. “King slowly posed for cameras and 
newsmen before proceeding.” 

Then you say: 

Upon being introduced to the Director, Reverend King indicated his appreciation 
for Mr. Hoover seeing him and then stated that Reverend Abernathy would speak 

And then you tell us what Reverend Abernathy told the Direc- 
tor. Then your next paragraph — why don’t you read the next para- 
graph for us, paragraph 4. 

Mr. DeLoach. 

Reverend King spoke up. He stated it was virtually necessary to keep a working 
relationship with the FBI. He wanted to clear up any misunderstanding which 
might have occurred. He stated that some Negroes had told him that the FBI had 
been ineffective, however, he was inclined to discount such criticism. Reverend King 
asked that the Director please understand that any criticism of the Director and the 
FBI which had been attributed to King was either a misquote or an outright 
misrepresentation. He stated this particularly concerned Albany, Ga. He stated that 
the only time he had ever criticized the FBI was because of instances in which 


special agents who had been given complaints in civil rights cases regarding brutal- 
ity by police officers were seen the following day being friendly with those same 
police officers. King stated this, of course, promoted distrust inasmuch as the police 
sometimes “brutalized Negroes/’ 

Chairman Stokes. Then, of course, on the second page Reverend 
King goes into telling the Director he personally appreciated the 
great work the FBI had done in many instances and refers to what 
they had done in Mississippi, and so forth, In the next paragraph 
he specifically states he had never made any personal attack upon 
Mr. Hoover; is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. Which paragraph are your referring to now? 

Chairman Stokes. Paragraph 2 on the second page. That is the 
paragraph that reads 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, I see that. 

Chairman Stokes [reading]: 

Reverend King stated he had never made any personal attack upon Mr. Hoover. 
He stated he had merely tried to articulate the feelings of the Negroes in the South 
in order to keep a tradition of nonviolence rather than violence. He added that the 
Negro should never be transferred from a policy of nonviolence to one of violence 
and terror. 

Mr. DeLoach. Excuse me, sir, which page are you reading from? 

Chairman Stokes. The second page of the memorandum, 438. 

Mr. DeLoach. I have the same memorandum but — are you refer- 
ring to the second paragraph or the first paragraph? Mine starts 
off: “The Director told Reverend King that the FBI had put the 
Tear of God’ in the Ku Klux Klan.” 

Chairman Stokes. That is the third page. You don’t have the 
second page. 

Mr. DeLoach. It is the second page of my memorandum, Mr. 
Chairman. I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, that may be an error with respect 
to the Xerox machine. My second page is a blank. 

Chairman Stokes. We will take a moment to get this straight- 
ened out. 

[Additional copy handed to witness.] 

I think they have given you now the correct second page which 
starts out, “Reverend King stated he personally appreciated the 
great work of the FBI which had been done in so many instances.” 
Is that the way your first paragraph of the second page reads? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Chairman Stokes. Prior to making reference to this next section 
on that second page, I would like to have the record clear that this 
committee has not received any evidence whatsoever or testimony 
from any informant, as you stated earlier today, relating to the 
fact that such an informant had said to this committee Dr. King, if 
not a Communist, was almost a Communist. There has been no 
such testimony before this committee. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of that, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Since you were dictating this memo, I think it 
is important for us to make reference to the fifth paragraph there, 
which I would ask you to read: 

Mr. DeLoach. Certainly, sir. 

Reverend King stated he has been, and still is, very concerned regarding the 
matter of communism in the civil rights movement. He stated he knew that the 
Director was very concerned because he bore the responsibility of security in the 


Nation. Reverend King stated that from a strong philosophical point of view he 
could never become a communist inasmuch as he recognizes this to be a crippling 
totalitarian disease. He stated that as a Christian he could never accept commu- 
nism. He claimed that when he learns of the identity of a communist in his midst 
he immediately deals with the problem by removing this man. He stated there have 
been one or two communists who were engaged in fund-raising for the SCLC. 
Reverend King then corrected himself to say that these one or two men were former 
Communists and not Party members at the present time. 

Shall I read the names? 

Chairman Stokes. I think we can leave it blank. 

Mr. DeLoach [reading]: 

He then identified (blank) as an example. He stated that he insisted that (blank) 
leave his staff because the success of his organization, the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, was more important than friendship with (blank). 

Chairman Stokes. This is what was said there in your presence; 
is that correct? 

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, sir, I took copious 
notes of what was said in my presence. 

Chairman Stokes. I have nothing further at this time. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I had to step 
out for a previous commitment. 

Mr. DeLoach, was the Justice Department modus operandi differ- 
ent in the King case from other special investigations? 

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, sir, I believe there 
was more emphasis placed on this major case than on previous 
major cases because of the importance of it. As to the modus 
operandi, I believe that the FBI, trained as it was in investigative 
matters, carried out very much the same procedures that they 
would in any case of a similar nature or matter pertaining to this 
or a similar nature. 

Mr. Fithian. During counsel's questioning much was made of the 
potential failure, I guess, to convene a grand jury and interview 
the Ray family, et cetera or even interview Ray later. The implica- 
tion at least I gather from the staffs question was they thought it 
would have been a good idea, particularly regarding John Ray, 
Jerry Ray, and so forth. As a law enforcement official, what was 
your view? Do you think it would have or would not have? I am 
not asking now whose jurisdiction it was or the territorial turf 
question. I am really not interested in that at all. 

Mr. DeLoach. In my opinion, Mr. Fithian, I think the matters at 
this particular stage in the fugitive investigation, which was char- 
acterized as a civil rights-type investigation but looking at all 
phases including conspiracy, I think a grand jury would have been 
very laborious, inefficient, and I think it would have slowed down 
the investigation. 

Mr. Fithian. That is the conspiracy thing you think would not 
necessarily have been furthered by the grand jury? 

Mr. DeLoach. Not in my opinion. 

Mr. Fithian. Tell me, have you ever worked with or supervised 
or been associated with or known about a conspiracy investigation 
conducted by the Bureau? 

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall when I was an agent in the field — 
and I came up from the ranks just like every other agent in the 
FBI does — ever working on a conspiracy case, Mr. Fithian. When I 


became Assistant to the Director I don’t recall any, but I am sure 
there must have been hundreds of them passing through my office 
where I read the memorandums. 

Mr. Fithian. As a career porofessional, if I were a new agent and 
I was being indoctrinated in working with you, and so on, and I 
asked you how would we be going about conducting a conspiracy 
investigation in case X, Y, or Z, what kind of steps would you 
recommend that I undertake if I am to conduct the investigation of 
a conspiracy? 

Mr. DeLoach. First I would want you to tell me whether or not 
there were any facts which would lead to a conspiracy rather than 
wasting the taxpayers’ money and the time of the FBI going on a 
fishing expedition. If you could give me facts, then certainly it 
should be investigated very thoroughly to determine if there was a 
conspiracy involved. 

Mr. Fithian. That didn’t answer my question, though, did it? 

Mr. DeLoach. No. I am sorry, that is the best I can answer it. 

Mr. Fithian. You said if there were facts, then you would give 
me some advice. Setting aside the preamble, give me the advice. 
How would you conduct a conspiracy investigation? That was the 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fithian, I think that all parties should be 
interviewed to determine the proof or negative aspects 

Mr. Fithian. All parties would mean what? 

Mr. DeLoach. All parties involved in the possible or potential 

Mr. Fithian. So if you had a prime suspect or even had him in 
hand, or you were on his trail, and somebody said this job couldn’t 
have been pulled off by a single person, let’s simultaneously as we 
hunt for him conduct a conspiracy investigation, or now that we 
have him in hand let’s conduct a conspiracy investigation. How 
would you go about it? 

Mr. DeLoach. Again you would interview all parties concerned 
with it. 

Mr. Fithian. By parties you mean whom — his acquaintances? 

Mr. DeLoach. If you had indications indicating they were in- 
volved in a conspiracy, yes, sir. 

Mr. Fithian. You said you wouldn’t go on a fishing expedition. If 
I thought that you were engaged in a crime and you had friends, 
contacts that might have helped you escape from prison or conduct 
this crime, I don’t think I would have to have any evidence that 
your friend there might have helped you. I would go sort of sur- 
veilling him or start questioning him or bringing him in for inter- 
rogation. Isn’t that the logical way you would go about it? 

Mr. DeLoach. If you start surveilling him, Mr. Fithian, you 
would certainly be violating his civil liberties. If you start an 
investigation without any facts, you would be wasting hundreds of 
thousands of dollars considering the fact that the FBI at that time 
had over 300,000 investigative matters. 

Mr. Fithian. What you are saying is even if you had reason to 
believe there had to be a conspiracy involved, you wouldn’t do 
anything until somebody gave you the evidence that there was 
conspiracy involved? 


Mr. DeLoach. Not necessarily, I think I would first look to see if 
there are any facts indicating whether or not there was a conspir- 
acy. In the particular instance you are talking about, as the com- 
mittee report reflects, there was intense emphasis put 

Mr. Fithian. Let me cut you off there. You said the first step 
would be to interview all the parties potentially involved? 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct. 

Mr. Fithian. What else would you do? 

Mr. DeLoach. Based upon the knowledge or information you 
gained there, you would determine the next step of the investiga- 
tion, and that would be the possibility of going to the Department 
of Justice and presenting the facts to them to see what they would 
suggest if a grand jury was necessary or any other type of investi- 
gative activity. 

Mr. Fithian. So then, if you really thought there was a conspir- 
acy involved, you might have used a grand jury in case X. I am not 
talking about the King case. I am not a lawyer and not a law 
enforcement person. I would like to figure out how people in your 
profession would track down a conspiracy. 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fithian, the former Attorney General of the 
United States has testified, as has the Assistant Attorney General 
in charge of the Criminal Division that they feel a grand jury 
would be laborious, inefficient and ineffective. 

Mr. Fithian. So you would not have used a grand jury? 

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. 

Mr. Fithian. But you would have interviewed anybody that you 
thought might have been involved or any acquaintances? 

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir. 

Mr. Fithian. Would you have done anything else? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know anything else that could be done, 
unless you had proof of the fact that they were certainly involved. 

Mr. Fithian. Let me sketch out for you what it looks like to a 
layman. A man escapes from prison, he might have been able to do 
that without any help; right, possibly? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Fithian. He sustains himself over a very long period of time, 
and the FBI did a marvelous job, by the way, tracking down how 
much money he had spent here and there. I compliment you for 
whatever part you had in that. I think it was a superb investiga- 
tion on that level. 

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Fithian. But the man did sustain himself a considerable 
period of time and spent a considerable amount of money over that 
time. Shouldn’t it have loomed in someone’s mind that he had to 
get that money from somewhere? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, and it did in our minds, Mr. Fithian. I 
allude to the possibility of a bank robbery investigation in Illinois, 
and there was an intensive investigation by the FBI to determine 
whether or not James Earl Ray was involved in that bank robbery. 
As a matter of fact, to the best of my recollection, several witnesses 
indicated that his physical characteristics very closely resembled 
one of the bank robbers in that bank robbery. Again, if I may 
complete this, excuse me, but to the best of my knowledge there 
was some $44,500 involved in that bank robbery, or even more, 


which would have given him ample funds to carry out his various 
travels in stalking Dr. King. 

Mr. Fithian. So is it your best guess that is the way he financed 

Mr. DeLoach. That is my opinion, Mr. Fithian. 

Mr. Fithian. And the passport that he managed to manufacture, 
that did not raise any problem for you? 

Mr. DeLoach. If you will recall, sir, in Canada at that time — the 
law has since been changed — but it was very easy to get a passport. 

Mr. Fithian. So you don’t think there had to be any assistance 
on that score? 

Mr. DeLoach. Not as far as passports are concerned, no, sir. 

Mr. Fithian. You made one request to surveil family members, 
as I understand it, with electronic surveillance. I didn’t quite un- 
derstand. Are you saying that if you suspect person X in having 
been implicated in a crime, that you couldn’t do a stakeout without 
violating his civil rights? 

Mr. DeLoach. No; my answer did not allude to the Ray brothers, 
Mr. Congressman; it referred to any instance where the FBI might 
initiate a physical surveillance without having ample proof as re- 

Mr. Fithian. I understand that. You are saying, then, that you 
could not have said, you know, I think he had some help from the 
family, so let’s put a couple agents out there in that neighborhood 
to just kind of watch and see what happens and watch his or her 
motions? You couldn’t have done that legally? 

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, that could have been done, in my opinion, 
legally, and whether or not it was done I don’t recall. I know that 
when I was in the field in a bank robbery and espionage cases we 
previously had stakeouts. 

Mr. Fithian. What other kinds of things could you have done, 
what other observations could you have made on the Ray brothers 
without having violated their constitutional rights and their civil 
rights that might have shed light? It’s difficult 10 or 15 years later 
for us to go back and reconstruct that. It seems to me it would 
have been easier at the time, with the thousands of agents you had 
in the field, to do, quite frankly, considerably more than I believe 
you did. 

Mr. DeLoach. I believe if you will read the record, Mr. Fithian, 
you will find that hundreds and hundreds of interviews were con- 
ducted not only with members of the Ray family, as the committee 
indicated in their report, in an intensive effort to get information 
from them, but all associates of that family that were known to the 
FBI, hundreds of interviews. An intensive effort was made in that 
regard to find out if there was conspiracy involved or if there was 
any effort to assist their brother; furthermore, to find out the exact 
location of James Earl Ray. 

Mr. Fithian. Two other questions, Mr. Chairman, if I may. 

One: Is it then your opinion that if James Earl Ray robbed a 
bank in Alton, he did it alone? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know that, sir. To the best of my knowl- 
edge — 

Mr. Fithian. Didn’t the police cite two individuals involved? 


Mr. DeLoach. Yes; to the best of my knoweledge, there were one 
or two other individuals, but, you see, James Earl Ray had a record 
of — again to the best of my knowledge — attempting to rob grocery 
stores with other individuals, to do this and that. He had a record 
of crime. So I wouldn’t put it past him to have lined up other 
individuals to assist him in this regard, if in fact a man closely 
resembling him committed the robbery as our witnesses indicated. 

Mr. Fithian. Did you pursue the possible participation of John 
or Jerry in the bank robbery at all? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir. I feel the record will reflect 
that but I am sure — I can’t say I am sure but I certainly think it 
would have been a logical investigative lead for the FBI to follow. 

Mr. Fithian. Finally, then, what is your best judgment; do you 
think that James Earl Ray killed Martin Luther King, and if so, 
that he did or did not have any assistance in that whole matter? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fithian, I think the evidence is overwhelming 
to prove James Earl Ray killed Martin Luther King, and to the 
best of my knowledge there are no facts to indicate a conspiracy at 
this date in time. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 
Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask Mr. DeLoach 
at least two questions. 

Mr. DeLoach, I am sure you will recall in 1965 and 1967 you and 
I worked with the President’s Crime Commission, you representing 
the Bureau and I was a consultant to that Crime Commission. 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. At least my concern in that Commission was on the 
Crime Task Force. 

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct. 

Mr. Blakey. I am sure you recall that. That task force recom- 
mended to the Commission and the Commission ultimately adopted 
a recommendation that said that the investigation of sophisticated 
conspiracies required the integrated use of compulsory process in 
the context of a grand jury, community techniques and electronic 
surveillance. I am sure you recall those recommendations. 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall them specifically, Mr. Blakey, but it 
sounds logical. 

Mr. Blakey. You have testified here this morning that you were 
satisfied with the contours of development of the King conspiracy 
case even though it did not involve, except perhaps for one small 
suggestion, the use of the grand jury, it never involved any effort 
to secure testimony through immunity grants, and the only elec- 
tronic surveillance was the one that was suggested by the Bureau 
but not adopted by the Department, they could not have obtained 
lawful evidence of a conspiracy. 

That is correct, isn’t it? 

Mr. DeLoach. I have given my opinion concerning that, Mr. 
Blakey, yes. 

Mr. Blakey. I am sure that you may also recall with me that in 
1968 the Congress passed the Crime Control Act of that year. It 
gave to the Department of Justice a fairly extensive immunity 


power in 18 U.S.C. 2514, and wiretapping authority in 18 U.S.C. 
2516. Do you recall that? 

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, no, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Would you accept my statement that it, in fact, did 

Mr. DeLoach. Certainly, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Suppose I were to tell you, Mr. DeLoach, that this 
committee, since it began its investigation of this year, utilizing its 
executive session as if it were a grand jury, and utilizing its con- 
gressional subpena power as if it were a grand jury subpena power, 
and utilizing the immunity techniques that were granted to the 
Congress by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, was able to 
pick up on information that reasonably could have been available 
to the FBI in 1967, and, utilizing those techniques recommended by 
the President’s Crime Commission in 1967 but not utilized by the 
FBI or the Department of Justice together or separately in 1968, 
was able to develop even 10 years after the fact the outlines of a 
conspiracy case, that may well have involved individuals who plot- 
ted the death of Dr. King and may well have involved actually 
bringing about the events in Memphis. 

If that were true, would that lead you to reconsider your judg- 
ment that what was done in 1968 was satisfactory? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Blakey, I have testified to the fact that to the 
best of my knowledge I know of no conspiracy involving the assassi- 
nation of Dr. King, and to the best of my knowledge, also in my 
opinion, definite opinion, James Earl Ray committed this crime. I 
am not aware of any conditional facts and you have not given me 
any additional facts which would indicate there is a conspiracy. 

Mr. Blakey. Let me see if I can’t go back again. Suppose I 
suggested to you that this committee had been able to obtain that 
kind of evidence, utilizing in however a fashion in a congressional 
context those techniques — in other words, I am telling you in fact 
that that evidence was developed — would that lead you to reconsid- 
er your judgment that you are satisfied with what happened in 

Mr. DeLoach. If you could show me any facts which indicated a 
conspiracy, Mr. Blakey, I would certainly be glad to reconsider. But 
as your report indicates, you have no evidence indicating a conspir- 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. DeLoach, I am not aware that report indicates 

Mr. DeLoach. You would not rule out a conspiracy but you did 
not indicate that you had facts indicating a conspiracy, to the best 
of my knowledge, after scanning your report. 

Mr. Blakey. I suspect the record will have to speak for itself on 

In response to Chairman Fauntroy’s question, you indicated that 
you did not feel that the FBI’s harassment or propaganda cam- 
paign directed at Dr. King in fact so created an atmosphere that 
the assassination may have occurred as it did in Memphis because 
no evidence had been brought to your attention that James Earl 
Ray or others that he may have been associated with had ever 
been reached by that propaganda. 


Suppose I were to tell you that this committee has, in fact, 
developed evidence that to some degree at least, that circle of 
people who may have plotted the death of Dr. King and whose 
actions may have contributed to James Earl Ray’s conduct in Mem- 
phis were, in fact, touched by the FBI propaganda campaign? 

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of that. 

Mr. Blakey. But, Mr. DeLoach, the question is, suppose I told 
you that this committee has developed that evidence; would that 
lead you to reconsider the degree to which the FBI may be respon- 
sible in some degree for Dr. King’s death? 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Blakey, if you can show me indisputable facts, 
certainly I would reconsider. But you have shown me no such facts. 
You asked me for my opinion and I gave you my opinion. 

Mr. Blakey. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, you have indicated there were 
certain documents that you would like to provide for the record 
and have included in the record here today. 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, it is only a letter which I read 
from Attorney General Clark, and I would certainly be glad to turn 
that over, and any other letters that I have, plus a statement from 
Mr. Hoover concerning my personal handling of this case along 
with Mr. Rosen and others, but I see no need for it unless the 
committee wants it. I read the letter to Mr. Clark, and that is 
sufficient, in my opinion. But you are certainly entitled to have 
this if you wish. 

Chairman Stokes. It is up to you. If you would like to have it 
included in the record, we would be glad to mark it appropriately 
and have it entered into the record. 

Mr. Devine. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have it included in 
the record. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, then, the documents will be 
marked appropriately MLK F-530, F-531, F-532, F-533, F-534, and 
F-535 and made a part of the record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-530 



December 2, 1965 


Dear Deke: 

A fine news manager you are — leaking the story 
of your own promotion to Ben Bradlee. 

Seriously, let me offer my wannest congratula- 
tions on your promotion. I know that in your new position 
you will, as you have in your present position, bring great 
credit to the Department, the Bureau and yourself. 

Best wishes. 



Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach 
Assistant Director 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Washington, D. C- 

MLK Exhibit F-531 





December 6, 1965 

Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach 
Assistant to the Director 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D. C. 

Dear Deke: 

I was delighted to learn that the Director 
intends to promote you to the position of Assistant 
to the Director. Heartiest congratulations and 
best wishes. It is a tremendous job but I know 
you will come up with a top flight performance. 

Whenever we can be 
please let me know. 

Good luck and with 

I am 

of any assistance here 

best personal regards, 
Sincerely: yours. 

J. Walter Yeagley 

MLK Exhibit F-532 

A ; s svwr «->rro*«4rr GchMm. 

S ecu * , nr D>v>i<QM 

^cpartmriii of Justice 

205 30 

DEC 6 1955 

Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach 
Assistant to the Director 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Washington, D. C. 20535 

Dear Deke: 

I could not let this occasion pass without extending 
to you my sincere congratulations on your new appointment 
to the position of Assistant to the Director. 

In you, once again Hr. Hoover has selected a dedicated 
and devoted public servant to assist him In the maintenance 
of the high standards which has made the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation great. 

Best of luck and Godspeed to you and your family in 
your new assignment. 


wohn F. Doherty 
First Assistant 

MLK Exhibit F-533 




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MLK Exhibit F-534 



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MLK Exhibit F-535 



Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Beeson. 

Mr. Beeson. Along those lines, Mr. Stokes, if I could ask official- 
ly at this time that Martin Luther King exhibits F-441B, F-507, F- 
508, F-509, F-510, and F-511 be incorporated in the official record 
of this hearing. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into 
the record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 

MLK Exhibit F-441B 






Hr. W. C. Sullivan- 

C. D. Brennan 




1 - Hr. U. U.j-DeLoach 
1 - Ur. J. P. llfthr 

DATE; April 10, 1367 

1 - Ur. R. E. Rick 
1 - Mr. R. C. Sullivan 
1 - Ur. C. D. Brennan 
1 - Liaison 
1 - Ur. Shackelford 
1 - Ur. 0. U. Re 11s 

^ — ' 

A t \Yl 

l r r 

To obtain authorization lor high level dissemination \ 

1 0 f a document captioned as above which shows the degree of fj' r 
communist influence on Martin Luther King. _ 

* V~'- ~ 

Enclosed is a document captioned as above, which ^ r 
depicts communist influence in the civil rights field, y 

emphasizing the key role of Martin Luther King, Jr. This 
document is a current revision of the previous analysis J .Lu. 

■ captioned "Communism and the Kegro Movement - A Current Analysis . 

1 prepared anc cissemnatea xn novenber, Zu uuu«LlJLi«g 

we have emphasized these areas: (1) continued reliance of King 

upon former Communist Party, USA, members, particularly 
; (2) facts relating to Ki r.g * s T X- 

land (3» 

(i * I 

King f s strong criticism and condemnation of the 

) Administration's policy on Vietnam in a speech he mace at Xew Ycrv 
on d/4/67 shows how much he has been influenced by communist 
advisors. Kis speech was a direct parallel of the communist 
position on Vietnam. 

It is felt that the President would be interested is 

1 a summary on King which shows the degree of communist influence 
on him. The attached paper constitutes a complete picture and 
strong indictment of King in that regard. 

RECorxarDATions : 

It is recommended that 

(1) The attached letters, with enclosures, to the 
TThite House and the Attorney General be forwarded to Assistant 
to the Director Do Loach for transmittal to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, 
the Vhite House, and the Attorney General . /An JJA-f. 0 -- ' 

V BEC-71^ 


.* m W:cn ii- 


Enclosure'/ ' 


RLS : DlTrf/j uv/cs t . _ f 

5 6 ^yzziizh 

' tliscwaa* 


• . 

Memorandun to Sir. Sullivan 


(2) The attached letters, with enclosures, to 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Director of the Secret Service be forwarded to the Liaison 



'O/ , 2 ^ 3 


The Attorney General 


Hay 13, 1968 



m 1-* Mr. D eTaarh 

Director, FHI 1-Mr. Rosax 

7 1 - Mr, McGowan 


James Earl Bay has been Identified as the subject in the 
case Involving the murder of Martin Lather King, Jr. 

Extensive Investigation las been conducted, and no Information 
has been developed Indicating his present whereabouts. In order to 
possibly assist in locating and apprehending the subject. It would be 
of extreme vanxe to know if the subject has made any contact, either 
personal or by telephone, with his sister, Carol Pepper, as well as 
his brother, John Larry Bay. 


i iiwL In view of the above. It Is requested that you authorize 

ft**’ installation of a technical surveillance at the residence of Carol 
Pepper and at the Grapevine Tavern, owned by Carol Pepper and 
operated by John Larry Bay. It Is also requested that you authorize 
installation of microphone surveillance on the resldenceof Carol 
Pepper , aj 2fthn Larry Bay, as well as the Grapevine Tavern. 

These installations could assist In the early apprehension 
of the subject, which could possibly be instrumental in reducing the 
stresses and tension placed on our national security subsequent to 
the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. • 

s J 

BEL*ez / 

on or- 

NOTE: See memorandum^. Rosen to Mr. DeLoach dated 5*9*68, 

captlo pMDRiaiy - RE arg. EX-J25 ^ 3S <yj 




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{fHEl 5CW9S83 


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MLK Exhibit F-507 


MLK Exhibit F-508 

• rsasEL. p.rg 




70 r Director, 7BX 

datk: 10/11/68 

““ ^ «— Phi* (44-1887) (P) 

• / . 

subject: ^rrewTir • 

Enclosed are two Xerox copies of a letter and 
envelope addressed by subject JAMES EARL RAY to Mr. ARTHUR 
SHANES, SR. f Attorney, 617 Prank Kelson Bid*. , Birain*baa*J 
„Ala. Tbls letter vas written by RAT, 10/3/68, while Incar- 
cerated In Shelby County" Jail, Memphis, Tenn. 

Copies of tbls letter' are furnished to the Bureau 
for Information only.* 


- <2 

\2 3 Bureau (£nc.-2) 
He aphis 

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MLK Exhibit F-509 

| ^tthTstates l vernment j 

* ■' -Memorandum # 

■ : A ^6,Z; 

70 : Director, FBI - ^(44-38861) V- 

/ a: 

/*) / '•’-‘SWlSr * * *. ■ > 

ne ^W SAC, , Memphis (44-1982) (P) ■ 




Submitted herewith for the Bureau* s informat ion are 
two copies of an Order issued by Judge If. PRESTON BATTLE, 
Hemp his, Tenn., relative to seating accommodations in the 
courtroom in anticipation of forthcoming trial. 

Also submitted are two copies of an "Order on Scire 
Facias," Issued by Judge BATTLE. 

BATTL?, ] 

. In addition to the above Orders Issued by Judge 
there are enclosed two copies each of the following: 

. Letter prepared by subject JAHES EARL HAY to his 
brother JERKY, dated October 14, 1968. 

-Letter dated October 9, 1968, addressed to subject 
by his brother, JERKY RAY, St. Louis, Mo. 

latter dated October 14, 1968 from subject to Attorney 

6> - Bureau (Enc, 
1 - Memphis 

REC 53 

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JS OCT 25 ^52 



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MLK Exhibit F-511 

12 / 



20, 1968 



vm , 

While talking to Attorney General Eamsey Clark on another matter, 
ha asked bow the Jamee Earl Say Investigation locked taw. 1 said Z fhnnghi 
It was more or leu stymied ia legal technicalities la Great Britain as it has 
to go through a lccg process oa eatr adit Ion. 1 commented that, of course, the 
lawyer who has goat over to repr*3£at Ha/ la a loranr FBI Agent; that ha la 
no good and fU the attorney la the Mrs. Viola Lhasa case, tut, cf course, 
we get convictions la that, hut His lawyer has always hesa strongly pro- K3 an. 

1 raid ha was LLijgt of Birmingham* Alabama, at oas time end at that time 
ha was a strong supporter ol "Bali" Cosaox tad Z thought it eigallicaat that 
Bay get a ZeXLjs who certainly a strong &rrrii q£ j jj - y ^rian about Mwv 

X said be denies that ho la a fflssarran or that he ever alttaicd any o t their 
meetings and he claims he docs not know how Hay came to ask for him as his 
lawyer, I said that Ha/ claims he reml about him la the a rasps per when ha 
was is the penitentiary la lOsaoorL Hie Attorney General said he does act 
see how Bay would remember that, 1 agreed 2 nd told the Attorney General 
that the lawyer and his son, who la a partner, west over to England and we 
alerted our London OCXce to alert the British as to his background Wo they 
would know with whom the/ are dealing. . 

tbs Attorney General ashed how Zcsg ago the fallow was with the 
Bureau sad Z stated it must have been before tha war. The Attorney General 
then asked how long he was with the Bureau and I told him abcut three years 
and that he weuTIhto the practice al law and got Into politics la Birmingham 
end, as I had said, ha was a vary strong supporter of "Bull" Connor In the use 
of police dogs, ct cetera, ia civil rights matters. X said he was the lawyer 
la the Lhzzao won ia the local court and then it went into the Federal 

court on civil rights and he lost, I said he has made maay jtthlic statements 
against Jdartia Latt e r when gfag was living and he has strong animosity 
-j. _ ictmy «fv4 Kennedy, X St was that ho Is the 

airway selected by Kay to represent 2dm la the trial la this country, X said 

: = ? ’=*E& 6 

•N . 


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v.'SuB 25 sa 



Memorandum for Meurs, Talson, Loach, Romo, Bishop Jon * 20, 1963 

he does not tat end to ash for a change of rexaie if he Is to be tried in Memphis* 
The Attorney General asked if we vers getting any evidence that Bay had 
somebody helping him and supporting him and I told him acne whatsoever. 

X said we were gHrV<^ various lines as to Bay and Slrhan Slrhan in the 
Bobest J. Banned/ ease as to the mysteries* woman in the pantry of the 
Ambassador Hotel and so far they have all fallen through* X said the girl * 
la the Sir baa case has refused to take a He detector test, but I thought the 
police were going to give her one although so far she has refused to taka oca* 
The Attorney General asked if this were the woman in the polka dot dress and 
X told Mm It was the one who claimed she saw the woman In the polka dot dress* 
the Attorney General said he had read the report on her and got the feeling 
she was unbalanced. X commented that she was seeking publicity* . 

I continued that we are also checking a a to who was with Slrhaa 
Slrhan at the rifle range when he was practicing with the revolver as well 
as persons with him when he bought the ammunition* I stated in these 
Instances they were men* * 

X stated that In Bay v s case, we have net found a single angle that 
weald Indicate a conspiracy. I said the only significant thins is the money 
he had end which he spent freely in paying bills and I thought that could have ' 
been obtained from a bank robbery* The Attorney General said that If we 
could show he robbed the bank at Alton, it would be helpful* I said we aro 
working on that because he was paying his bills with $50 bills up to his arrest* 

I said on the other hand he stayed at flop houses and never stayed at a first* 
class hotel but at the same time he spent, X thought, 51200 or more iabpjisg 
guns and the car, which I thought was $1500, and then betook dancing less on s, 
bartender lessons, and lessens in picking locks, and that is why X think security 
is so exceedingly important not only in Knjland but on the way back to this . v , 
country and when he gets hero*. * ' > . * :•/. 'J 'V? 

The Attorney General commented that he hoped my men can bring 
him tack and asked if that were satisfactory* X told him it was and that! V. 
would be strongly of the opinion, unless there is a compelling reason to the 
contrary, that ha ought to be brought back by military plane; that 1 could not 
see any difference between a military plana, a Cunard liner, or Pan Americas; 
and on the Military plane we would have cur Agents end hare Bay c o n f ined with 

~ 2 - 


Memorandum lor Messrs* Xolicn, De Loach, Rosea, Bishop Ana 20, 1003 

leg Irons and handcuffs. I said he is a dangerous individual and is act a damp 
fool; that he Is desperate and will make an j effort to .escape that he can* 1 
said X thought he should be lasted at the Naval airport in Memphis and not 
the regular airport* The Attorney General a sk ed IX we should have a repre- 
sentative of the Memphis Police Department on board or not, and I said I 
would act think do. I said 1 would think we would be responsible for taking 
him from the British and arrange with Frank Holloman to have the Memphis 
Police at the airport In Memphis on arrival, but to do it almost on an "eyes 
only" basis so there will be no leak as to where or when he U coming In 
because we will be plagued b7 the press, as they are trying everything they 
can In England to get a Has cn when he Is being moved. X said I noted the 
lawyer says he expects to be advised exactly when and where he will depart. 

The Attorney General commented that he will know when he gets In* 

I said there Is a military airport In London and I thought that is 
wture the military plane should land if it goes from this country with 
absolute silence on the part of the Commanding General as to its departure; . 
that tha first knowledge In thin country would come when he Is delivered to 
the Memphis Police with sufficient time to get him into Jail* I said the 
plane should a rr i v e so u not to allow them to go through the City in the daytime 
but to arrive around 2:00 or 5:C0 in the morning. The Attorney General said 
he was sure that was exactly right* I said otherwise there will be Gloria to 
UU Mo if there is a conspiracy and If there is no conspiracy, the supporters 
of Dr. King will do everything in their power to kill him. X said the same 
th i r tf ta true in tha case of Sir ban Sir ban In Los Angeles because the feelings 
on behalf of the Kennedy followers is so strong that they will have to taka 
great precautions to see he is not killed. X said it would be a horrible thing 
as tt would be charged it was done by the Federal Government or so me t hi ng 
Uka that mod for that reason it mast he very carefully handled both as to 
transportation of Hay from London and incarceration. If he Is ever extradited - 
as X think tt Is going to drag on for five or six weeks* I said what 1 am afra id of 
HUol there Is going to develop In this country criticism on tha part of ihs British 
in getting this fellow back hare. I said people have aakod how soon ho will be 
brought back and I have told them it is up to tha British as tt Is not our re- 
spoosihiUty as wa have done everything so that ho has le^al representation. 



Memoranda^ for Mesin« Thlsoe, ©•Loach, Rosea, Bishop 20, 1963 

The Attorney General stated that Assistant Attorney General Fred 
Fiasco, Jr., will be going back over to England idooday nig h t as the Boms 
Secretary and oar Ambassador asked that he come back* Be said that we hare 
wa ge d In every way that it be speeded up because of toe strong feeling In this 
couatx j about it. • - : 

• * . * -• >.:• *: v . 

The Attorney G«n&ral asked then if I tho u gh t a military pl ane is 
better than leasing a commercial plane sod I said 1 did because whan you 
lease a commercial plane, you would here s crew, unless ycu put a military 
crew cm It, but there would be no purpose putting a military crew on a 
commercial plane, I said 1 could not see any legal difticulty as the method * 
of getting him back does act make much ciiiereac* as to the legality of the 
thing or the image of it. Toe Attorney Gvotrai commented that he had been 
ttiA other way. X said he is a dangerous pan and has proven himself 
to be vary clever as he headed fur various parts oi the world as I thought 
be was headed for Brussels to Jo m the mercenaries sod he had pirns to go 
to Rhodesia be was in where ha laid around for soout a week sod 

came back to London. X said the London Police have never been able to pick 
up what he was doing far the tM lance of the time. 1 said he is a slippery, 
shrewd individual ani ho is most coots in passer and actios with 
the prison auihrupftiAi* over there. I said ftnMVfv scout the British is 
that they are not tight on security as they do not search & parses unless he is ; 
convicted sad they uo sot search anybody visiting someone in Jail, but that ~ 
is the old British procedure. The Attorney General commented that it is 
absolutely wrong. I said I thought any person visiting a prisoner might to be 
necsched. Tbs Attorney General he Hv*>yhi my men talk ed them Into doin g 
*h**\ l said they finally did, but they always talk about traditions over than. 
The Attorney General commented that they wen aboil as strict as anybody oq 

r * 1 n iA i we have a very serious problem in moving this fellow 

and we ought to do it with very carefully laid out plans and take him into the 
Naval airport la Memphis and arrange to turn him over to Holloman and then '■ 
announce he is In the custody of the Idomphls Police. The Attorney General 
yaid he hoped my men were working on that so we will be ready and X told 
him we were. 

- 4 - 


Memorandum for Mesirs, Toleon, DeLotch, Boms, Bishop June 20, 1908 

1 told the Attorney General that the men who were In London were 
back here, aa one man's father had a serious heart attack* I said one is 
Special Agent Zeiss, whom he may remember, and the Attorney General said 
he did, that he was a close Mend of his father's and his son knows him, too* 

1 said he will be on the plane and so would John X. Mlnnlch, The Attorney 
General cfwr.Trwnt.Td this would be Ideal, 

The Attorney General asked bow we thought Bay got the three names 
he need* 1 said this again shows his astuteness as all three are Lying people 
residing in Canada who never knew him and never heard of j said on 
the other hand. Bay spent last year, when he was wandering around the country, 
a great portion of the time In Canada and I thought he was planning this thing 
asd seeking a doable Ideality like Sneyd, Galt, and Brldgemaa and checking 
out these names so U there were any check made on his application for a birth 
certificate, they .culd ascertain such a person existed. I said this shows his 
shrewdness* I said I think we are dealing with a can who is net an ordinary 
criminal in the usual sense, but a man capable of doing any kind of a sly act. 
The Attorney General said he was exceptionally clever# 

I said SIrfaan Slrfaan is a different individual as he is a fanatic and 
killed Robert Kennedy because he spoke In favor of Israel and this fellow 
being an Arab became intensely bitter against Kennedy and felt he should be 
killed, which he did, but he is a fanatic and Ray Is not a fanatic In that sense* 

I said 1 think Bay is a racist asd detested Hegroes and Martin Luther King 
and there is indication that prior to the Memphis situation, he had Information 
about King speaking in other towns and then picked out Memphis* I said I 
thick ha acted entirely alone, but we are net dosing our minds that others 
m ig h t be associated with him and we have to run down every lead, 

X said we are getting more crank letters and letters about other 
people woo are going to be killed who are in high office, such as Senator 
Edward Kennedy, et cetera* X said one does not realise how many nuts 
are loose in this country until we have a cane like this. The Attorney General 
said 11 bring! them out* i said we have to be careful of all of them; that we 
taka about three awaj a week who coma to my office who complain about 
persecution asd sometimes they are armed and we send them to the hospital 
ana then they are sent to &t, Elizabeth's and in two or three months they are 
back on the streets* The Attorney General said we are going to have to 
find new ways to deal with that problem as it la net lixectivo now* I said it 

8 - 


ltenoranrtam for Uem*. Tolsca, Dt Loach, Bomb, Bishop An* M, 1963 

Is & problem lor the psychiatrists bet they are apparently rifting little to can 
frhc»r-i t tut they are mentally unbalanced. The Attorney General said It is a 
public safety problem sow. X said X do not favor the view that the country 
la depraved and all X i we have a great block oof line people 
to this country; that there may be some depraved citizens, bat it is sot a 
depraved society. The Attorney General said he tho ag b t there was too much 
emphasis today la the press that society Is sick; that it is the fashionable 
thing to do. ^ 

X said X hoped the new Comm Us ion the President has appointed 
will keep a balanced viewpoint as to that because the other Commission 
went far astray in regard to white racism. X said there is racism bat not as 
predominantly as the Earner Commission found U to be* The Attorney 
General said he had never it so* X said as an example taka the meeting 
yesterday (Solidarity Day); t^* 3 * more than 3C% of those who attended were white 
and it was not predominantly Negro* The Attorney General said that was 
surprising to him and ha felt better to see it that way. X said this shows 
frai white racism is cot as predominant as we have been led to believe. 

I X hope the Eisenhower Commission when they get around to their 
findings view it with an unemotional a tt l t cd e . The Attorney General said 
there are some good people on the Commission. X said It seems It fibroid 
be docs without emotionalism or crying fire. I said X get annoyed with the 
editorials about cur sick society as X do not believe there Is such a t h ing 
In country although there are some sick citizens* The Attorney General 
ffgjM ^ 2 fmM T r-riir» iht* fa Law Enforcement Dnil&tin on the 
Director 1 * page, ha thought It would be helpful* X said I have been working 
on that Just recently; t^t the Iri** was given to me by KcGill of the A tl anta 
Constitution* t said he had a line editorial about the attacks ca the FSX 
because we bad i v>t found tbs Kiag murderer after two months and the cracks 
t**»» were not trying to find him and then he quoted several verses of the 
Bible which portrayed Christ as not Interested lathe poor, bat It showed 
again there la always on effort to tear down and destroy. I commented 
that X there was a tendency to debusk our Patriots In history* X said 

It was that sort of that i thought drove President Johnson from running 
tor a second term and the Attornay General agreed* 

• 6 «► 

39-935 0 - 79 -7 


Itosearaatoua for Mean*. Tolaon, PcLoach, Rosen, Bis bo; . jaa* 20, 1983 

Z mentioned the Students for & Democratic Society as a minority ' 
group dominating and tbs Attorney General said it was a tiny group. X said . * 

It Is a bad group sad it played a big part yesterday at this meeting as they 
attended hot It was just Ills tbs Columbia University thing. I said that was staged b; 
only about thirty individuals who closed tha salvers ity which has thousands of 
stadeats. 3Ba Attorney General said they are a pretty clever and elZectty* ■ 
gr o u p and have to be watched carefully. I said they are more effective tbaa 
out and cut coonaaists. Thu Attorney General said they are doing nor* 
bans. I said they are storing into every area they can tad we bare bees 
watching them closely sad we have some good Informants. The Attorney • 

General said he tboaght that is really vital becaase they are a daagercss . 
group. . . V; . , . v 

The Attorney General expressed his appreciation and said he would 
They me posted on this registration of guns. 

Very truly yours. 

t Jobs Edgar Hoover 

sent nott a, a 



• I- 

Chairman Stokes. It would also be appropriate to enter into the 
record the following additional materials, having to do with the 
Bureau’s COI NTELPRO news media efforts, at this time. 1 They 
will be designated MLK exhibits F-515, F-516, F-517, F-518, F-519, 
F-520, F-521, and F-522. 

1 These and other materials bearing on the FBFs use of the news media to- further COINTEL 
PRO efforts are found in the section of the committee’s final report which discusses the 
Bure?’’’'" ~-eafw*oRination investigation of Dr. King. 



S ,9 ISIS'S gB-iS|||s-teC"i it 

iiiia asiS I is3 ILlsii^ J 

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si 3 p=s ? *82§. ISBsal. 53 
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MLK Exhibit F-515 


MLK Exhibit F-515 — Continued 


MLK Exhibit F-516 

7 m**w»Um)hmu I I 



3 : "**" ( DIRECTOR, FBI 

date: 6/28/68 


^ 9 1 

4ms. ./lOQ-^1213) P 

At'*/ Lit T 


ReBulet to Albany, 5/10/68* 


r y> 

New Left activity In the St. Louis Division is 
concentrated in the headquarters city, principal organizations 
involved in this movement are as follows: 


Action Committee to Increase Opportunities for Negroes 

Students for Democratic Society <SDS) ; 

St. Louis Draft Resistance (SLDR); 

The Committee to Support Draft Resistance (CSDR) . { 

- A CTION is basically a racial typeorgan ization. It 

consists of a small group of r^fviduaXs'vho split from the 
St. Louis Chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) 
several years ago in belief that CORE was not sufficiently 
Militant. Its activities*^ re Irregular, depending almost 
entirely on its dhainaaa fe^^^Sj^^^ Communist Party efforts 
to cultivate him have so iSr appear ea unsuccessful; however, 
some Influence Is exerted through O RVI L LE LEACH , veteran Communist 
Party member, who is chairman of the. Community Relations Committee 

An immediate Counterintelligence Program concerning 
the latter three organizations would be restricted because these \j 
organizations are all campus-type organizations and Washington 
University and St. Louis University will close for summer 
vac^ions in the first week of June. JThese organizations will 
be virtually out of existance untii^the schools reopen in September. 

U*- Bureau (#ri) ®EC- U . y V 1 ’ I 

!•- st. Louis • r- 7 • — ■ ivJJs 

Bureau (A/7J 
1*— St. Louis 
BCJ :ajb 


Rtf 31' 

: JUL 5 

V.S. Ssvin£i Bends Kept Istty** jif Ysjroll Savings Fl> 


SL: “100-2i2l3 / 


** St. Louis has 'pending investigations on these four 

organizations and their leadership and will be,^).ert to an y 
circumstances or conditions .Which might be utilized to good 
advantage tor Counterintelligence purposes. 

In the past this office has used to good advantage 
anonymous sailings in connection with communist Party Counter- 
intelligence. However, at this time the off ice- has no specific 
publications in mind which might be suggested^for Bureau approval. 

- The f eeding_pf_jell . chosen jLn,fpraatiQn._to _the J3t . Louis 

Globe Democrat^ a~local newspaper, whose edit nr and ass ocilpLi 
editor , are- extremely fr iendly tn the Bureau and the fit. Trouts 
QfULcg, tras also been utilized in the past and it is contemplated 
that this technique might be^ used to good advantage in connection 
with this program. 

With specific regard to the St. Louis Draft Besist ance. 
which is a one-man organization headed bj 
, Washington University graduate student, the iol lowing 
circumstances occurred: 

t urned In his Selective Service draft card at a 
public meeting' on Investigation at his local board 

determined that a tew days later he wrote to the board requesting 
a duplicate card. If this type of information could ha ve been 
publicized. It might have pointed out the insincerity of 
Nothing, however, was done at the tine because of the confidential 
nature of draft board records and the fact that public ity may 
have jeopardized prosecution presently pending against 

J St. Louis will carefully analyze these organizations 

/under this program in an effort to affect the disruption of the 
I Hew Left and specific suggestions of Counterintelligence action 
f will be submitted to the Bureau for approval by separate letter. 



MLK Exhibit F-517 


MLK Ex F-517 

' SAC, St. Louis (100-3X213) 

) . 7 -■ — 



" Dlraetor. 

/ ' 

1BI (100-449698) 



B«uralrt«l 10/4/68 eaptlosad •'Stud.ntV for a SeaocratLc . 
Eoclsty, IS - BBS." 

Authority la granted to contact *r 

in the event information la received that a specific high 
school is being targeted for organising by the SDS. This say 
be done only in the event that such a contact *111 not Jeopardise 
your investigation of SDS or your sources therein 

Enclosed herewith are one copy of a pamphlet entitled 
dents for a Democratic Society, Front Bunner of the Few 
ft" and ten coplea of a leaflet entitled ^Campus or Battle- 
ground? Columbia is a Faming to All Amer i can gnlyerglti ea." 
As these publications say be of value to 
providing him *iih background on the SDS, you nay furnish 
copies of this material to bin at that tine. 




.*-! EE j 

t — Rl 


During your contact vltb « 

you Bbould 

Impress upon bin that the Bureau's interest In this natter Is 

** ** ln " trlct * 9t conf “ enc# * y - - 7 

nelosureo - 11 X 

HH: jes 


;»! a 



Luster to SAC, St. Louis * Cj :, '• 

1- S3: COINTELFHO r* SET LSFT .. .* „ -!• * 

^00-449698. .-.V.- >■/ ’ if. 

A* * • ♦ . * * 


witbtbe Bureau In the past. Its publisher Ur. WBSSp ^mm 

i* on the Special Correspondents List - The inioraatlon 
* contained In onclosure^egrtiiiin bacJtground on SDS which can ‘ ir 71 
''be ot valne to contains public ..source -*';*-^**y 

:¥« i y» i *e pref lonely -cua subadttod these docuneote to outside .£ 


- 2 ^ 


In - H-7& f^ 5 

this conversation are not known* £HB5Sf* aB transferred ~-\ 7 . 
to Detroit ahort l v aft er hi s return from the National 1 ‘ 

Convention nnd^S^^^^^^^pears to have dropped from the 
local Party 

•"• w _ 

( Possi ble additional counterintelligence action ) 

against has been considered carefully and discussed / 

among speSflBTagents conversant with local Party activities* ( 
Consideration is being given to requesting Bureau authority 
for a published feature article in the ”St. Louis Globe- \ 

Democrat” , St. Louis dally newspaper. Appropriate background \ 
information and suggested questions would be furnished to an ) 
SAC contact who has cooperated previously in this program. ^ 

The Bureau will be advised when it is felt the time 
is propitious for such action. In the meantime, inner Party 
activities will be scrutinized carefully and continually 
for possible other type counterintelligence action. 

- 2 


MLK Exhibit F-519 

UNITED SfATES c' {ERNMENT EX ' F" 5 1 1 ClQl ^^ ^-^TlAj- 

> Memorandum ^ ^ 

• * 

: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-104-42) Datx: 7/14/66 ^^; 

SAC, ST. LOUIS (100-16708) 



Be St. Louis letters to Bureau 4/14/66 and 6/15/66, 
St. Louis alrtel to Bureau 7/12/66, Bulet to St. Louis 4/26/66 
and Burad to St. Louis 6/21/66. # / 


E3SSBI described in St. Louis letter 4/14/66 as a 
recent refeasftoi the Missouri State penitentiary where he 
reportedly served tlaeg gran arcotlc violation, has now been 
iden tified as He has been using the nxse 

CE?£QaDgea blv . The Kansas City Division 
was released from the Missouri State Penitentiary 
11/26/65 where he^was 

robbery . Ho dispositions 
are abound 

I lt appears therefore that information which was 
irculatlng among Communist Party (CP) members that he served 
ime for a narcotics violation is not true. Other Information 

ha* been ,daYft?qnf?d ,no^-casts *Qm& doubt on. statements hr 

£ £ jjl received his Initial indoctrination in Marxism at a class 

^^S-Hej^rin the Missouri State penitentiary. It may be n oted th at*" 
o I 7 £M he Kansas City Division in its letter 6/16/66 states gjgs s a ^ 

9 c I served part of his robbery sentence at reformatories ana away 
H t. plrf 013 the Missouri State penitentiary. ^ 

S % li ? activities in the CP will be followed closely 

for possible counterintelligence action based on his past 
criminal record. ^ awViP / . 

• e &San*,\ 

E^ecp, i,^rut 

^JL ~ Bureau 
1 - St. Louis 



f l<^> 
n K. iQRfi 


rA-:.:.r.'=is? njraygg 8 06 

j^&^siz^zzjiT.'i^rso •• 

WI23S SHS'JH 1 1 ■■ <— 


- /C -raS 

We will continue to watch tha C P*» involvement 
In The St. Louis Citizens tor Peace in Yletnaa. A caalnfU 
investiga tion is bei ng conducted regarding this organization 
s been very active in this group and has 
otKSr members to be similarly active. 

m 1 1 u i £i<**adllia£Si 

i.vnKLLidcfcJ Am a* 

containing a photograph of RONALD LAND BERG , DCA Coordinator and 
C? aenber, with the headline "DuBois Van’ Attends Red Convention 
Ronald Landberg Observer at Party Meeting in § k .Y. n The article 


J 6* - 

states LANDBXRG adulated representing 8t . Louis at a Kational 
DCA Convention in Chicago and then traveled to the CP Con* 
vent ion In Hew York as an "unofficial" observer. The article 
contains an insert "See Editorial Page 2F”. 

An editorial In this issue of the newspaper Is 
titled "The Communist Line” and states the Implications of 
the LANDBEHG story are clear; that they forecast the CP 
line for the next few months in DCA "and other organisations". 

Zt appears possible that adverse publicity of thle 
nature may well stifle efforts of DCA to launch units in the 
St. tails area, particularly at the local colleges and universities. 

In a recent press Interview following LAJpBERG’s^ 
return to St. Louis, he announced that he has beftg transferred 
.ta-Dg-trPit. by j£4« He in effect conceded failure in the St. 

Louis area, complaining of an excessive number of right-wing ' 
organizations and local conservatism 

Zt Is not known to what extent, if any, our counter- 
intelligence action may have been instrumental in his decision 
to leave St. Louis. . 


MARCH 30-31, 1368 

MLK Exhibit F-521 

- Ctm. • ta M. tr 



\ 1 

; Mr. Sullivan 

:K«»\t G. C. Moor< 

DATE: 3/28/68 




A sanitation workers strike has been going on in 
Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a 
march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets 
of Memphis* King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. 

As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke 
out including the breaking of windows in stores and some 

looting. 71 

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called 
nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same 
thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience^ .■* 
for Washington in April. „ ~ — ~ ~ ^ j k 6 f~ 

APT OT: EX-105 J AP^l^W^ 

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing^ut- the 
above, which if you approve, should be made available by 
Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources* (j^ 

'Enclosure , / ft / 

TDR:fhd '(S) M/L( *]/[!&■ ^ - 

TDRtfhd (<5) 

1 - Mr. DeLoach 
1 - Mr. Sullivan 
1 - Mr. .Bishop 
1' - Mr* G. C. Moore 
1 - Mr* Deakin 

/i f: 



a fk 

v hi <mis 7 aw-ffliwMk#-"* 1 


Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the 
sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the 
result of King’s famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, 
looting, and riot. 

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, 
called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. 

Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of 
the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble 
began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the 
marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and 
looting broke out. 

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up 
the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to 
activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his 
much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 
1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded 
militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in 
Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis^raay only be the 
prelude to civil strife in our Nation’s Capitol. 



4 V368 


39-935 0 - 79 -8 


MLK Exhibit F-522 

An Editorial 


The St. Louis Globe-Democrat and the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch are unmistaka- 
bly opposed philosophically; i.e. on mat- 
ters of government, especially fiscal 
responsibility; on matters of welfare, 
particularly where immorality is in- 
volved, and on other notable issues. 
Many fine newspapers throughout the 
nation share the views of The Globe- 

The Globe-Democrat accepts the Inev- 
itability that reasonable persons, and 
thus, reasonable media organizations, 
will differ. Difference of opinion Is 
Indigenous to a rational world. 

Thus, The Globe-Democrat has re- 
frained, as a matter of policy, from 
commenting — favorably or unfavorably 
—on the conduct or opinions of other 
members of the media. 

In Wednesday's issue, the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch publlshed.a cheap shot, a 
biased and slanted item about The St. 
Louis Globfe- Democrat. In its normally 
hypocritical manner, the Post-Dispatch 
presented material about The Globe- 
Democrat as a news story, when in fact 
it was an editorial in a bogeyman's 
costume. Had the Post-Dispatch had the 
Journalistic character and professional- 
ism to publish its Federal Bureau of 
Investigation story as an editorial. The 
Globe-Democrat would have respected 
tbe afternoon paper’s prerogative to 
express its opinion, and we would not 
have commented about it. 

The Post-Dispatch editorialized story 
said The Globe-Democrat in recent years 
had published news material about stu- 
dent dissidents, especially In St. Louis 
County at Lindbergh High School; The 
Post-Dispatch story said the student 
dissident stories were ''planted'* by the 
FBI and implied they were the result of 
"conspiratorial" ties between The Globe- 
Democrat and the FBI. The story bla- 
tantly implied a nefarious alliance be- 
tween The Globe-Democrat and the . FBI 
for unworthy purposes. 

It is most certainly true that The 
Globe-Democrat has published news sto- 
ries in the past about dissident student 
activities; In the St. Louis area. In the 
Midwest and throughout the United 
States and the world. To the best of my 
knowledge and recollection, these stories 
originated in the normal manner incident 
to any news story: from an interested 
reader who notified the city editor, a 
parent, a student, a witness or scores of 
other sources. 

For the Post-Dispatch news story to 
state that the FBI arranged stories In 
The Globe-Democrat through contacts 
with the publisher of The Globe- Demo- 
crat Is a villainous lie typical of the 
depraved thinking of a Communist “Big 
Ue" technique — designed to undermine 
the fabric of a country. It Is true that I 
personally knew J. Edgar Hoover, the 
long- time, respected director of the FBI, 
and enjoyed an hour or more visit with 
him In Washington only a few days 
before bis death In May of It7?. It Is a 
privilege to Identify Clarence M. Kelley, 
pi jsent FBI director and former chief of 
p’ice of Kor'.ps City, as a Mend. 
Neither Mr. Hoover nor Mr. Kelley at 
any time provided me any hdormatioa 
relative to any news stones, past or 
present Hr. Hoover and Mr. Kelley have 
never at any time communicated news 
material to. or made any request of 
Martin L. Dfiggan, editor of the editorial 
page of The Globe-Dec rat, or George 
A. Kfflenberg, mnnagtng editor of The 

We are at a loss to account for the FBI 
memoranda, unless the explanation is 
that some overzealous agent sought to 
advance himself by taking credit for 
what Tbe Globe-Democrat produced in 
its normal pursuits. 

In the normal course of community, 
social and business activities and news 
work, we have known a succession of 
FBI agents in charge in the St. Louis 
office. At no time has any of these men 


of impeccable character and ability ever 
"planted" a story In The Globe-Demo- 
crat by way of my office or that of Mr. 
Duggan's or Mr. Killenberg's. Quite the 
contrary, the St. Louis office of the FBI 
has consistently maintained a frequently 
frustrating reluctance to release news 
material to The Globe-Democrat. 

The Post-Dispatch story, to the con- 
trary, emits a barnyard stench which is 
a measure of a good deal of that paper's 
pretense at news coverage: Rot. 

This is an appropriate occasion to offer 
a statement expanding on The Globe- 
Democrat’s news and editorial policy, 
expressed daily in our masthead. The 
Globe-Democrat’s purpose is to serve the 
interests of our community, state and 
nation. The Globe-Democrat’s intention 
is to be supportive, generally, of commu- 
nity institutions. It is not, as it appears 
to be with the other daily in St. Louis, 
nitpicklngly destructive, denigrating and 
demeaning by repeated irresponsibility 
and uninformed criticism. We believe in 
the United States of America. 

We believe in the integrity and the 
future of the United States, including the 
integrity and objectives of the FBI. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s 

when universities were being bombed 
and burned, and in some cases innocent 
citizens murdered; when banks were 
being bombed and burned; when a hall 
in Congress was bombed; when peaceful, 
personal access to national political 
conventions was being denied to orderly 
Americans, The Globe-Democrat be- 
lieved and still believes that it was the - 
do fy of the FBI to apprehend those 
threatening the internal security o'f the 

If The Globe-Democrat played a con- 
structive role during this period, this 
newspaper Is proud of Its participation 
and coalrtbutlca. 

Tbe Globe-Democrat cherishes its rale 
as a supporter of the American system. 
The Globe-Democrat suggests that the 
frequently slanted news coverage la tbe 
Post-Dispatch, most especially its recent 
lPfart, Page One Dw£;aaa series paying 
tribute to North Vietnam's oppressive 
and dehumanising leadership out of 
Hanoi, la a. shameful disservice to St. 
Louis and America. 

Wa prefer pro-Americantsm. 


SL Loub Glebe-Democrat 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, at the conclusion of a witness’ 
testimony before our committee, the witness is entitled to 5 min- 
utes. During the 5-minute period either the witness or his counsel 
may address the committee and in any way amplify or further 
expand upon your testimony before the committee. I would extend 
to either you or your counsel at this time 5 minutes for that 
purpose, if you so desire. 

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, I simply would like to state I 
appreciate the respect shown me by this committee, and I hope I 
have been able to be of some service to the committee and to the 
Congress, and that is all I have to say, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. We certainly thank you very much, Mr. De- 
Loach, for your appearance here and for the testimony you have 
given us. 

There being nothing further at this time, you are excused, sir. 

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair at this time desires to make a 

During the Kennedy assassination hearings, when we turned to 
evidence of association and its implications for conspiracy, it oc- 
curred to me that it might be appropriate to discuss certain gener- 
al principles that seem applicable. “Conspiracy is founded in associ- 
ation,” I said then, “but more than association is required to estab- 
lish conspiracy.” I hoped at that time to assist those who followed 


our hearings or read our record to understand the significance of 
what we were doing. 

It seems to me now that it would be appropriate to discuss for 
the record the moral or legal standards the committee might want 
to use in evaluating the evidence on the ultimate question, as it 
has been put to us, did the FBI kill Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.? 

Our earliest legal traditions, those rooted in English common 
law, reflect an abhorrence of the unjustifiable taking of a human 
life. Lord Coke, a 17th century textbook writer, formulated the 
classic definition of murder: 

When a man of sound memory and of an age of discretion unlawfully kills any 
reasonable creature in being and under the king’s peace with malice aforethought, 
either expressed or implied by the law * * * 

Much of our legal learning on homicide has been based on the 
concept of malice aforethought. The distinction between murder 
and manslaughter turned on it: unjustified killing with malice 
aforethought constituted murder; unjustified killing without malice 
aforethought constituted manslaughter. Behind all of this legal 
thought has been our traditional Judeo-Christian teachings; they 
are the bedrock on which our law ultimately rests. Men act freely, 
and they are responsible for the results of their actions. They 
ought not harm one another, and the ultimate harm that you do to 
another is deprive him of his life. 

Modern legal thinking treats homicide accordingly. The model 
penal code of the American Law Institute embodies generally ac- 
cepted definitions of the elements of criminal homicide — state of 
mind, conduct, causation and result. These same elements are re- 
flected in mature moral thought. 

Homicide is not a simple concept. Questions of degree are in- 
volved. Degrees of legal homicide are based, to begin with, on state 
of mind. A death that is consciously brought about — a murder, in 
the traditional sense — is termed intentional homicide. Reckless 
homicide, that is, a death not intended but consciously risked, 
when it does occur, is what has traditionally been called man- 
slaughter. And there is a third classification in modern law: Unjus- 
tifiable conduct, under circumstances where death might occur, 
should have been foreseen, and does occur; it is called negligent 

On this last point, additional comment is necessary. There are 
sound reasons in morality and law not to permit the imposition of 
personal or criminal liability based on a standard of negligence. I 
recognize, of course, negligence is a familiar standard for the impo- 
sition of civil liability — money damages assessed for harm done, 
even wrongful death. 

But civil liability is a thoroughly different matter from criminal 
liability. It often embraces little more than a shifting of the burden 
of risk of injury, a risk that can best be met by insurance. Some- 
one, usually the person with the deepest pocket, may pay damages, 
but no one goes to jail. Yet personal or criminal liability, it is 
argued, ought to rest on subjective factors, that is, intent or con- 
scious risk taking, and not be assessed on an objective standard, 
that is, a standard that speaks in terms of what a person should 
have known. 


It is not necessary to belabor the argument. Suffice it to say that 
these considerations have not carried the day in our society, so the 
concept of criminal negligence is part of our legal framework. It is 
widely employed, particularly where deaths occur in the operation 
of motor vehicles. 

Getting to the subject at hand — the role of the FBI in the King 
assassination — the facts that have been developed before the com- 
mittee are literally unprecedented. Never before has an agency of 
our Government, least of all a police agency, apparently set out to 
destroy a prominent citizen, perhaps not directly to kill him, but to 
destroy his moral standing nevertheless. Heretofore, our law in the 
area of reckless or negligent homicide has dealt with the conduct of 
private citizens, usually engaging in ordinary occupations, such as 
operating an auto on the highway, hunting with a dangerous 
weapon, providing medical treatment, and so on. 

Unusual cases have, of course, been brought before the courts 
that have involved operating a night club where numerous patrons 
die in a fire; playing Russian roulette, where players are held 
responsible for the death of another; participating in a drag race in 
which a death occurs. 

Analogies between these usual or exceptional cases and the evi- 
dence in these hearings are strange and uncomfortable, but com- 

Can it legitimately be said that the FBI, like the night club 
owner, consciously risked or should have foreseen, not a fire in a 
firetrap, but that others might be inflamed by its unlawful propa- 
ganda and do what the Bureau itself did not do: Fire a deadly shot 
into Dr. King? 

Can it legitimately be said that the FBI, like the player of 
Russian roulette, consciously risked or should have foreseen not 
that one chamber of the revolver would be loaded but that others 
might be encouraged by its unlawful participation in another kind 
of roulette in which the stakes included Dr. King’s life? 

Can it legitimately be said that the FBI, like the participants in 
a drag race, consciously risked or should have foreseen, not that 
high speed racing can culminate in a fiery accident, but that others 
might be encouraged by its unlawful participation in a dangerous 
political contest to take Dr. King’s life by violence? 

I do not know how far these general principles should be ex- 
tended here, but I do feel that they are applicable. We face an 
unprecedented challenge. We have no clear-cut guides available. 
Yet we must decide. 

Other factors, too, must be considered. Apart from state of mind, 
the nature of one’s conduct in the commission of a homicide can 
also affect how responsibility is assessed. The law has always taken 
very seriously the consequences of conduct that is unlawful, and it 
has easily, perhaps too easily, found responsibility for ensuing 

If the conduct is otherwise felonious — as in the case, for example, 
of an armed holdup — and it results in a death, it is termed a 
felony-murder. If, on the other hand, the conduct is only a misde- 
meanor, a resulting death is termed a misdemeanor-manslaughter. 

How do we apply these principles here? Do we place special 
emphasis on the illegal character of the FBI conduct? 


The basic meaning of causation is not difficult to comprehend. A 
human being must always be held responsible for the consequences 
of his conduct, even when his conduct is not the sole factor in 
bringing about a result for which he can be held legally responsi- 

The possibility of joint responsibility has always been recognized, 
although difficult questions are raised when more than one individ- 
ual’s conduct contributes to the result, say a death. Should it be 
held that the death was jointly caused? Or should the conduct of 
the actual perpetrator be held to be the intervening and, therefore, 
the sole cause? 

Responsibility for a death is always assessed based on the inter- 
play between state of mind, conduct, cause, and result. These ele- 
ments have been applied consistently to all persons in that they 
stand equal before the law. Given a certain age and a degree of 
mental and physical capacity, every person has to be held to the 
same minimum standard of responsibility. 

This being said, however, certain classifications of people have 
been held to a higher degree of responsibility: Parents with respect 
to their children; guardians with respect to their wards; trustees 
with respect to their beneficiaries; Government officials with re- 
spect to citizens. This is merely another way of saying that larger 
responsibility goes with higher authority. 

What I have outlined here are some of the moral and legal ideas 
upon which our moral and legal concepts of responsibility are 
based. They are raised here with the thought that they may be 
appropriate as a framework for questions we ought to try to 
answer as the committee analyzes the evidence presented in these 
hearings: Did responsible officials of the FBI intend by their con- 
duct to bring about Dr. King’s death? 

Did FBI officials recklessly engage in provocative conduct, con- 
sciously risking Dr. King’s death, even though they did not intend 
to bring it about? 

Can we say that these FBI officials should have known that their 
conduct was unjustifiably risking Dr. King’s death? 

Should the committee take special note that the conduct of the 
FBI in this conspiracy of harassment of Dr. King was not only 
unjustified as policy, it was also illegal and unconstitutional? 

Did the conduct of the FBI contribute in any significant degree 
to the sequence of events that occurred in Memphis and led to Dr. 
King’s death, that is, did they help create the moral climate in 
which such an act was not only thinkable, but could be thought of 
as a justifiable course of conduct? 

If so, to what degree did the conduct of the FBI so contribute? 

Should the actions of those persons who may have actually plot- 
ted Dr. King’s assassination and carried it out be considered inter- 
vening causes in the chain of events that could be tracked, even in 
part, back to the FBI itself? 

Would they have acted as they did without regard for the con- 
duct of the FBI? 

I realize, of course, that I have posed questions that are easier to 
ask than to answer. I know, too, that we have no precedents here 
to give us firm guidance and the answers that we give will be 
debated for years to come. 


Yet we have no choice but to do the best we can with what we 
have available to us. I hope that these standards and questions 
may serve as an acceptable moral or legal framework for our 
analysis when the committee comes to grips in its final delibera- 
tion with the ultimate question which might well be rephrased: 
Should the FBI bear some responsibility for the death of Dr. King? 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. 

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have no prepared remarks, yet I would like to point out that I 
think this select committee has operated with great harmony 
during your chairmanship. I would hope that we could continue in 
that category. 

I don’t necessarily take exception to the statement of the chair- 
man. However, I did want to point out that this does not necessar- 
ily represent the conclusions nor necessarily the views of all mem- 
bers of the select committee. 

I would hope that the media in handling this and that the 
American people listening to these hearings recognize that the 
chairman in making this statement was primarily posing questions 
that must be resolved ultimately by the whole committee. 

Now, in listening to this, and the chairman did afford me the 
courtesy of showing me this statement prior to making it, I would 
describe the statement as a scholarly dissertation replete with 
professional theories of law, morality and rationalization. 

I would hope that no one would come to any thought that this 
select committee may have arrived at conclusions and are now 
seeking through testimony and theories to justify any such a con- 

There are, however, what I would consider provocative wordings 
in these rhetorical questions such as “responsibility for a death is 
always assessed based on the interplay between state of mind, 
conduct, cause, and result,” et cetera, of mature moral thought. 

A question was asked, but it almost was in the terms of a 
conclusion which I am sure the chairman did not mean to convey 
that any conclusions have been reached, but it does mention the 
fact that conduct of the FBI in this conspiracy of harassment was 
not only unjustified as policy, it was also illegal and unconstitu- 

I would like to have the record quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that 
this was put in the form of a question that we must resolve rather 
than a conclusion of the Chair or of the select committee. 

Chairman Stokes. I would certainly concur with the gentleman’s 
statement and underscore the fact that the Chair nor members of 
this committee have yet had an opportunity to deliberate on these 

What the Chair hoped to do was to put into some perspective the 
scope of the discussion and dialog which I feel that the committee 
must ultimately come to grips with in terms of its firm conclusions. 

If there is nothing further at this time, the Chair would like to 
announce that the committee would like to meet for a very brief 
open session in room 304 immediately, it will be open session but it 
will be immediately after we recess here, in room 304. It should not 
take us very long at all. 

If there is nothing further before the committee at this time, the 
Chair will adjourn until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. 

[Whereupon, at 1:14 p.m. the committee adjourned, to recon T ~ 
at 9 a.m., Tuesday, November 28, 1978.] 



House of Representatives, 

Select Committee on Assassinations, 

Washington, D.C. 

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:11 a.m., 
in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes 
(chairman of the select committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney, 
Fauntroy, Sawyer, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. 

Also present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; 
Peter Beeson, staff counsel and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. 


Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Over the past 4 days of hearings, the committee has heard evi- 
dence relating to the performance of the FBI. The committee, 
however, must go beyond the FBI and examine the conduct of the 
Department of Justice, for the Bureau is ift law, if not always in 
fact, a subsidiary agency of the Department. 

The committee has taken a hard look at how the Department — 
more specifically the Attorney General — exercised supervision over 
the FBI in the surveillance of Dr. King and the investigation of his 

By way of background, the position of Attorney General was 
created by law in 1789; its incumbent was to be the chief legal 
officer of the U.S. Government. Not until after the Civil War, 
however, did the role of the Attorney General begin to acquire its 
modern institutional forms. Since the post was (and is) appointive, 
the Department of Justice was established in 1870, to insure con- 
tinuity from one administration to another. Over time, the Depart- 
ment has increasingly taken the lead in major Federal prosecu- 
tions and other Federal legal matters. 

Yesterday the committee heard a summary of a staff report on 
the FBI investigation of the King assassination, one that identified 
a variety of possible deficiencies in that investigation. The purpose 
of today’s hearing is to consider the extent to which the Depart- 
ment itself must share the blame for investigative failures, if such 
are found to be the case by the committee, lack of concern for 

( 117 ) 


individual rights and organizational problems. Copies of the report 
have been made available to today’s witnesses. 

The report raised a number of questions, although, obviously, 
how they are settled is up to the committee. 

For example, the investigation was apparently hampered from 
the beginning by a strained relationship between the FBI and 
Justice. No formal mechanism was established for the transfer of 
information, and unilateral decisions were made by Bureau person- 
nel, to name but two particulars. Cooperation is, of course, a two- 
way street, but the responsibility for it, or its lack, must fall 
heavily on the agency of higher authority. 

Some other problems that might not have occurred, had the 
Department and the Bureau established a better working relation- 
ship, and had proper leadership been exercised, are: 

One, little regard was apparently shown for the constitutional 
rights of the defendant or his family. Ray’s relatives were the 
target of proposed illegal electronic surveillance during the man- 
hunt, though it was apparently never instituted. 

After James Earl Ray was arrested, his communications with his 
lawyer were intercepted, apparently by local authorities and passed 
on to the FBI. Subsequent to his conviction, Ray was interrogated 
without being informed of his Miranda rights. 

Two, following Ray’s arrest, the investigation came to a virtual 
standstill, although questions of conspiracy at least remained open 
and some leads were followed out. But evidence that might have 
led to the discovery of a plot was in fact largely ignored by the FBI, 
or not imaginatively sought. 

Three, not used were those investigative resources peculiarly 
available through the Justice Department, including interrogation 
under oath in Federal grand juries, immunity grants, and lawful, 
court-ordered electronic surveillance. 

At the time of the assassination of Dr. King, the Attorney Gener- 
al of the United States was Ramsey Clark, who, when word first 
was flashed from Memphis, declared an intention to be directly 
involved on a daily basis, given the importance of the case. 

He assigned responsibility for the investigation to the FBI, and 
he ordered that responsibility within the Department be shared by 
two Assistant Attorneys General, Stephen Poliak of the Civil 
Rights Division and Fred Vinson of the Criminal Division. 

It would be appropriate at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter 
into the record MLK F-514, and appropriately display a depart- 
mental organization chart, and appropriately display MLK exhibit 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it will be entered into the 
record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 


Mr. Blakey. Until Ray was arrested in London on June 8, 1968, 
departmental attorneys were little involved in the case, even 
though the department had within it a tradition of successful col- 
laboration in conspiracy investigations in the antitrust and orga- 
nized crime fields. When it was necessary to extradite Ray from 
England, Mr. Vinson went to London to oversee the proceedings, 
although it is somewhat unusual for the Department to handle 
extradition in a State murder case. It did so because there was an 
allegation of conspiracy to violate civil rights, a Federal crime (18 
U.S.C. Sec. 241) and because two States — Tennessee and Missouri — 
were active in the case. 

From Ray’s apprehension forward, the role of the Department of 
Justice was most conspicuous for its absence. 

In January 1969, the Nixon administration came to power. While 
stated policy was to pursue conspiracy leads, Attorney General 
John Mitchell, in fact, apparently did not participate actively in 
the case. Mitchell apparently did not argue with the FBI’s lone 
assassin conclusion, and Ray was, after all, in prison. 

Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard of the Civil Rights 
Division did propose that Ray be interviewed in connection with a 
conspiracy investigation. But no representative of his office was 
present for FBI interviews, and a suggestion by Leonard that Ray 
appear before a grand jury on the conspiracy charge was never 
followed through. 

Ramsey Clark is a key official whose exercise of responsibility as 
Attorney General must be carefully examined. 

Mr. Clark was appointed in 1961 Assistant Attorney General in 
the Land and Resources Division of the Justice Department. Even 
in this capacity, he worked extensively in the Kennedy administra- 
tion’s high-priority civil rights program in the South. 

Mr. Clark was named Deputy Attorney General in 1965 and 
Acting Attorney General in 1966. He held the top position in the 
Department from 1967 to the change in administration in January 
1969. He is now in private practice in New York City. 

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to calls Mr. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Clark. 

Will you stand, raise your right hand, and be sworn? 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this 
committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 


Mr. Clark. I do. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. 

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Mr. Peter Beeson. 

Mr. Beeson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Clark, will you state your full name for the record, please? 

Mr. Clark. My full name is William Ramsey Clark. 

Mr. Beeson. Would you give the committee a brief rundown on 
your professional background up until the time when you left the 
Department of Justice in January of 1969? 


Mr. Clark. Well, I finished law school at the University of 
Chicago, December 1950; returned to Texas, took the bar and began 
practicing in 1951; remained in general practice in Texas until 
1961 when I joined the Kennedy administration as Assistant Attor- 
ney General. I remained Assistant Attorney General until Febru- 
ary of 1965 when I became Deputy Attorney General. I remained 
Deputy Attorney General until September, roughly, of 1966. I 
became Acting Attorney General. I was nominated to be Attorney 
General in February of 1967. 

Mr. Beeson. From that time until the change of administrations 
in January of 1969 you were Attorney General of the United 
States, right? As Deputy Attorney General from February of 1965 
until September of 1966, who was the Attorney General at that 

Mr. Clark. Nicholas Katzenbach. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, I would like to direct your attention to 
the time of the assassination of Dr. King in April of 1968. I wonder 
if you would give the committee a brief description of your initial 
official reaction as Attorney General of the United States on hear- 
ing the news of Dr. King’s assassination in Memphis? 

Mr. Clark. Well, it is hard to have an official reaction to such a 
tragedy. My recollection is that we were having a staff meeting in 
my office discussing the usual miscellany. A phone call came in 
which is fairly rare. You know, when I have all these people in 
there they don’t interrupt these meetings all the time. 

I was told that Dr. King had been shot and seriously wounded. I 
think that call was from Jim Lowry who was a young man working 
in the Community Relations Service. 

We stayed in the office for what seemed an awfully long time 
and received numerous calls, including a number of calls from the 
hospital in Memphis, if not directly or indirectly they were being 
communicated to us contemporaneously and we finally were told 
that Dr. King had died. 

Mr. Beeson. What action, if any, did you take to investigate the 
matter, Mr. Clark? 

Mr. Clark. I authorized an immediate Federal investigation 
under the then Section 241, Title XVIII, which was we believed a 
rather inadequate statutory provision. We had congressional rec- 
ommendations to enlarge it at the time. 

We sent a formal letter that evening, I believe, to the Director of 
the FBI to make an exhaustive investigation and during the course 
of the evening which I spent in my office at the Department I 
decided to go to Memphis personally. I flew down early the next 

Mr. Beeson. You mentioned that the statutory provision, 18 
U.S.C. 241, you described it as somewhat inadequate. Do you recall 
any significant concern on your part or the FBI’s part that there 
was not a clear statutory jurisdictional basis for Federal investiga- 

Mr. Clark. We had an obligation to proceed by law. I think 
throughout the investigation the lawyers particularly were con- 
cerned about the factual adequacy of our investigation under the 
laws that existed; 241 required evidence of conspiracy among other 
things, but it seemed so inherently a civil rights matter in a 


nonlegal sense at least, this great leader of our civil rights move- 
ment assassinated, that I don’t believe any legal concerns that we 
had impeded our pursuit of the facts. 

Mr. Beeson. You mentioned that the next morning you went to 
Memphis. What was the purpose of that trip and who did you go 

Mr. Clark. The purpose was to be sure that everything possible 
was being done in a fairly difficult context and to be sure that 
people understood we cared. The people that went with me were 
Roger Wilkins who was the Director of the Community Relations 
Service; Clifford Alexander who is the Chairman of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission; Deke DeLoach who was an 
Associate Director of the FBI. 

I called Mr. Hoover early that morning, maybe two or three, to 
tell him I wanted to take a high official of the FBI with me. 

That is all I can remember right now. 

Mr. Beeson. For purposes of the record, Mr. Clark, I believe Mr. 
DeLoach’s title was Assistant to the Director and not Associate 
Director. Mr. Tolson was Associate Director at that time. 

Mr. Clark. They use a little different terminology. I never both- 
ered to get it straight. 

Mr. Beeson. Do you recall a news conference at the airport in 
Memphis after arriving there, Mr. Clark? 

Mr. Clark. I recall a sea of press and being involved in the 
middle of it. I don’t recall a stated press conference in the sense 
that it was preplanned. I think it was unavoidable, the focus of the 
country’s attention was on that place and matter. 

Mr. Beeson. You were reported to have stated during the meet- 
ing with the press at the airport that: “All of our evidence at this 
time indicates that it was a single person who committed this 
criminal act.” This was a statement that you were making on the 
5th of April, the day following the assassination of Dr. King. 

Do you recall making that statement or one similar to that? 

Mr. Clark. There were several meetings with the press on that 
day. I think during the course of that day probably more than once 
I stated that from the evidence presented to me there was nothing 
indicating more than a single actor. That remained my evaluation 
of the evidence through various encounters with the press over the 
next several days. 

Mr. Beeson. What was the purpose of making a comment on the 
state of the evidence at such an early stage? As I imagine you 
know, that comment and similar comments have been referred to 
by some as an initial official effort by the Government to hide 
involvement of others. 

Did you consider comments of that type possibly backfiring in 
that way when you made it? 

Mr. Clark. The considerations were quite different at the time. I 
believe in the importance of the integrity of the investigation. I 
also believe in the public’s right to know something that concerns 
it desperately and the public’s desperate concern about the murder 
of Martin Luther King which was one of the finer reflections on 
our national character in my time impelled me to tell them what I 
knew. I believed it was important then. Hindsight does not change 
my view. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, I would like to read to you from a copy of 
an article in the Washington Star that appeared on April 28, 
between 3 and 4 months following the assassination. This article is 
found in MLK exhibit F-512 if the committee clerk will give Mr. 
Clark a copy of it. 

[The information follows:] 

. Qr$i) 



Mr. Beeson. I misspoke myself. It was 3 or 4 weeks after the 

If you could read with me, the article is headlined “King’s Mur- 
derer Is Viewed as Loner,” dateline, reads: 

Attorney General Ramsey Clark said yesterday there is no significnt evidence 
that the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. “goes beyond the single actor” 
who fired the fatal shot. 

Clark made the statement in reply to a question concerning reports of a possible 
conspiracy of southern businessmen who might have been involved in the King 

Do you consider this article an accurate reflection of your views 
of the evidence as the case developed and in this case approximate- 
ly a month after the assassination itself? 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Mr. Beeson. At any time during the assassination investigation, 
did your views change on the status of the evidence concerning the 
conspiracy issue? 

Mr. Clark. I don’t recall any presentation of evidence, as distin- 
guished from circumstances, that ever implied direct involvement 
of another person, and simultaneously I believe I saw an enormous 
amount of evidence of the direct participation of a single person 
whose identity was fairly consistently established because I felt I 
should go on the facts available rather than the circumstances. 

Mr. Beeson. Let me ask you this, Mr. Clark: You stated before 
the day of the assassination an official authorization was transmit- 
ted to the FBI to investigate this matter under 18 U.S.C. 241, 
conspiracy to violate Dr. King’s civil rights. 

Approximately 2 weeks later, on the 17th of April, Eric Starvo 
Galt, an alias for Mr. Ray, was formerly charged in Alabama under 
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 241. The complaint read essentially 
charging Mr. Ray and a person alleged to have been his brother 
with a possible violation of — the conspiracy to violate Dr. King’s 

In view of your agreement with the April 28 article that the 
evidence demonstrated no significant signs of conspiracy, and your 
feelings throughout the investigation that that was the status of 
the evidence, could you explain the factual basis and the purpose 
for filing the Federal complaint on the 18th of April charging a 
possible conspiracy to violate Dr. King’s rights? 

Mr. Clark. I can tell you why I did it. To me it was of great 
importance that there be the most thorough possible investigation 
and the apprehension of the murderers. And I did not have a great 
deal of confidence in that happening without Federal investigation. 

We had one statement, hearsay, that was the basis for the Feder- 
al complaint that was filed insofar as I can recall, and that was a 
statement attributed to the person who bought the rifle in the 
hardware store in Birmingham, by the personnel in the store from 
whom he purchased it, that he and his brother were going hunting 
in Wyoming, or that his brother did not like the gun sight, or 
something like that. 

Now that was the factual basis on which I was able to sign that 
complaint or authorize its signature. I do believe that I was person- 
ally directly responsible for its being filed whether I signed it or 
not. Without that allegation, I don’t know what I would have done. 


That was the basis on which I invoked Federal jurisdiction and the 
authority to continue the FBI in the investigation. 

Mr. Beeson. Would it be fair to conclude that you did not credit 
the factual basis underlying the complaint? 

Mr. Clark. I thought it was at the very least suspicious, but I 
didn’t think I had to be the judge and jury and executioner on that 
issue. I believe then and now, always, in a healthy skepticism and 
try to avoid being misled by assumptions. 

Mr. Beeson. Again, to clarify the record, the statement of the 
Aeromarine clerk attributed to Mr. Ray was, as it was reported 
initially to the FBI, that Mr. Ray stated when he exchanged the 
rifle and bought a more powerful rifle that was ultimately found 
outside of the rooming house, that he exchanged the rifle after a 
conversation with his brother, hence the reference to the brother, 
reflected in an FBI interview of Mr. Wood, the clerk at the Aero- 

Do you recall any additional evidence of references by Mr. Ray to 
a brother surrounding his trip East to Atlanta, Ga. approximately 
weeks before the assassination of Dr. King, or at any other time 
during the pre-assassination period which might have — which were 
consistent with — this reference to a brother by Mr. Ray in the 
Aeromarine Supply Co.? 

Mr. Clark. I have a broader recollection than you state for the 
record of what was said about a brother in the hardware store. 
Whether it has just grown or turned in my mind or whether it is 
an accurate recollection I can’t say, but it was a fairly elaborate 
story as I recall being told to me that he was going hunting in 
Wyoming or Montana, but I think Wyoming was mentioned, with 
his brother. 

Mr. Beeson. To be fair, there are several versions, in interviews, 
of that brother story. 

Mr. Clark. Beyond that, I recall, apparently being told, because I 
recall thinking that I knew that he had brothers. That they — like 
he had some history of maybe petty crime, that they were a part of 
his awareness, that he referred to his brothers, talked with his 
brothers from time to time. 

Specifically, I don’t think I can recall being told or knowing that 
he had said he was going to Atlanta to be with his brother. I 
probably knew it, that that had been alleged. But the only aware- 
ness I retain is that he had brothers that he referred to from time 
to time and that we were not able to find any proximity between 
them and him before the time of or after the assassination in terms 
of days or weeks. 

Mr. Beeson. Do I characterize your testimony fairly in saying 
that the possibility of family involvement in the assassination 
never appeared to be significant to you during the course of the 

Mr. Clark. I think you do. I think that is right. The feeling that 
I have now is that it was one of those sad and troubled families 
that had members that got caught up in things like that. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, do you recall any dissent within the FBI 
on the conspiracy issue or is your recollection that their view of the 
evidence was essentially consistent with yours? 

39-935 0 - 79 -9 


Mr. Clark. I don’t recall anyone from the FBI suggesting evi- 
dence or even a strong view that there was a conspiracy. 

Mr. Beeson. Would you characterize the FBI’s willingness to 
investigate conspiracy possibilities in this investigation? Were they 
open to pursue conspiracy leads in the investigation? 

Mr. Clark. The thing that I recall — and these things do get 
embellished in your mind — is suggestions very early on of every 
conceivable type of conspiracy. I remember the suggestion that a 
Soviet freighter had landed in Mobile and somebody slipped off the 
side to come up and kill Dr. King. 1 remember suggestions that his 
close associates had done it, the Ku Klux Klan had done it, the FBI 
had done it, pick your favorite target. 

The nature of the events and the emotions involved conjures all 
that up. I would be sure that the major purpose of the FBI was to 
try to catch the person who pulled the trigger. 

I think simultaneously, however, it was concerned and investi- 
gated the possibility of economic support and even direct participa- 
tion, although the evidence of any direct participation was so no- 
ticeable by its absence. I think that particularly Steve Poliak of the 
Civil Rights Division expressed a continuing concern that there be 
a full conspiracy investigation and I assume that until this day 
from time to time, the FBI goes out and tracks down some allega- 
tion of conspiracy. 

Mr. Beeson. Let me shift the focus of the questioning somewhat. 

As we have established, this was investigated as a possible civil 
rights violation. You referred to Mr. Poliak as head of the Civil 
Rights Division within the Department of Justice. I believe that 
Mr. Fred Vinson, who was the Assistant Attorney General of the 
Criminal Division, was also brought into the case at an early stage 
to review reports along with you and Mr. Poliak. 

Do you recall any other Department of Justice attorneys who 
carried significant responsibilities within the assassination investi- 

Mr. Clark. Well, I think there were a number who spent a great 
deal of time on it. I am sure the Deputy Attorney General, Warren 
Christopher, was fully and contemporaneously apprised, as were 
the three of us, myself, Mr. Vinson, and Mr. Poliak. I think their 
principal assistants, Bob Owen, perhaps Telly Kozsak, in the Crimi- 
nal Division were constantly involved and concerned. 

Mr. Beeson. What did you consider to be an appropriate role for 
the Department of Justice attorneys to play in the ongoing investi- 
gation of the FBI? 

Mr. Clark. This seemed at the time to be the largest, most 
urgent, and perhaps difficult investigation within my experience. 
Unlike President Kennedy’s assassination, there was not an imme- 
diate apprehension of the person accused. The country was in a 
turmoil. We spoke of 100 cities where pain from the murder had 
caused rioting. The manpower of the FBI was enormous, and in my 
judgment, as far as I can tell, certainly my desire was unsparingly 

My opinion as to both the proper and most effective way to 
pursue such an investigation as this was to spur the FBI on as 
effectively as we could and review what they did as quickly as 
possible. The capacity to suggest is fairly limited realistically — 


alternatives, different courses of investigation. But it seemed to me 
to fall in the general area of a criminal investigation, in which the 
FBI would ordinarily pursue and complete an investigation before 
it refers it to the legal staff, so to speak, for prosecutorial determi- 

Here I thought it was important that we have a more contempo- 
raneous opportunity to evaluate its progress and try to establish 

Mr. Beeson. The investigative files reviewed which were devel- 
oped during the investigation indicate that, can be taken to indi- 
cate that, on a day-to-day basis the FBI’s field investigation was 
directed and focused out of FBI headquarters in Washington. The 
Department of Justice attorneys and yourself received a substan- 
tial amount of paperwork in the form of monthly reports from field 
offices, formal letterhead memorandums, which would sum up the 
resolution of certain investigative leads. 

The paperwork which appears to have passed on a daily basis is 
far more superficial than that which came periodically on a month- 
ly basis or after the resolution of some specific lead. 

Would you agree with the assessment of the investigation which 
I have given to you, the fact that day-to-day conduct was exclusive- 
ly or primarily in the province of the FBI with the Justice Depart- 
ment and yourself remaining in the background to be informed but 
not taking an active part within the investigation? 

Mr. Clark. I think that is certainly correct. I don’t think the 
memos necessarily reflect the true nature of the flow of communi- 
cation. I doubt if on a working day — and they tended to run six or 
seven a week — went by from the April 4 to the June 9 in which I 
did not have some direct oral communication about the progress of 
the investigation. I have not seen government by memorandum 
working too well. 

Mr. Beeson. Did you ever consider the possibility of having a 
departmental representative review the incoming AIRTEL’s, 
memorandums, along with the FBI in order to maintain a more 
contemporaneous idea of the investigation? 

Mr. Clark. No. 

Mr. Beeson. In retrospect, would you consider that an advisable 
thing to do? Do you think that would be a wasted effort? 

Mr. Clark. Knowing what I know tells me it would have been 
helpful and it would have probably been costly in terms of already 
strained relations. 

Mr. Beeson. In terms of appearing to attempt to supervise too 
closely the ongoing FBI investigation? 

Mr. Clark. In terms of directly injecting or more directly inject- 
ing lawyers into the progression of FBI investigation. 

Mr. Beeson. On the same general line, Mr. Clark, let me ask you 
a few background questions and then get into specific questions on 
the use of the grand jury in this investigation. 

How extensively was the grand jury used during your term as 
Deputy Attorney General and Attorney General in the criminal 
investigations generally? By this I mean as a means of investigat- 
ing the case, as opposed to a receptable for the presentation of 


Mr. Clark. It is hard to know how to characterize it. It would 
vary with the type of crime. I would say in an antitrust violation 
they might use a grand jury fairly extensively. In a bank robbery 
not at all. We had investigative usage of grand juries, but over- 
whelmingly they screened evidence, developed and even packaged 
long before a lawyer at the Department of Justice ever heard of 
the alleged crime. 

If you went through the 90-odd Federal judicial districts, I would 
assume that the vast majority of the grand juries in their daily 
operations did no real investigative function. They reviewed evi- 
dence that was developed by investigators and presented to them 
through witnesses. 

Mr. Beeson. What do you consider the ideal characteristics of a 
case which would merit grand jury investigation? 

Mr. Clark. Well, I think it is rather hard to determine facts 
sitting around in a room talking. It is certainly hard to find fugi- 
tives that way. So what the grand jury has really come down to is 
the use of coercion to testify. The grand jury has one advantage 
over the investigator and it may have some psychological advan- 
tage, but one — and a disadvantage to others is quite possible. 

But the one clear advantage is that it can cause punishment to 
be inflicted for refusing to answer like granting immunity where 
the fifth amendment is invoked or by simply referring for con- 
tempt where that does not become an issue. 

So its utility is where you have recalcitrant witnesses, sometimes 
where you have great difficulty getting documentary evidence, ana- 
lyzing documentary evidence because of its completeness, where 
you believe people are concealing things and documents and the 
intimidating quality of the questions before the grand jury might 
elicit that. 

Overwhelmingly, I believe the purpose of the grand jury is the 
protection of the innocent from the overzealous prosecutor. 

Mr. Beeson. If evidence of a crime were in the hands of people 
with criminal backgrounds not prone to cooperate in a field inter- 
view with the FBI, would this be one situation where a grand jury 
might be effectively utilized? 

Mr. Clark. Yes; where you have a recalcitrant witness. Some- 
times it helps. Sometimes they will do as Sam Giancanna did and 
just sit in jail for 18 months. 

Mr. Beeson. Specifically in a case such as the murder of Dr. 
King, if there had been indications of involvement of hate groups, 
or hate-type organizations, again you are dealing there with indi- 
viduals who will probably not cooperate in a field interview; is that 

Mr. Clark. Well, assuming your hypothesis, yes. 

Mr. Beeson. So, again, assuming the hypothesis, that would be 
an appropriate area for a grand jury investigation? 

Mr. Clark. Yes; if those were the facts, if you had people who 
were not talking because of some affiliation or association. The fact 
here, as I recall, is that there was never any suggestion that the 
grand jury would have any utility, that someone was not talking. I 
recall no requests that a grand jury be utilized. We were running 
all around the country trying to find somebody and we were not 
going to find them in a grand jury room. 


Mr. Beeson. Do you consider evidence reliable which is taken 
under the grant of immunity? 

Mr. Clark. I think it is very difficult evidence. It has a potential 
for distortion. It is involuntary. An individual under those circum- 
stances may not, either unintentionally or intentionally, give you 
the full truth as they see it. 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, I believe that during your administration 
as Attorney General you developed what was known as the strike 
force approach to the investigation of organized crime cases; is that 

Mr. Clark. That is right. 

Mr. Beeson. Is it not one of the components of the strike force 
approach to achieve early involvement of attorneys along with 
investigators, in the evaluation of evidence, the formulation of 
strategic decisions, the targeting of individuals in the investigative 

Mr. Clark. Yes; the theory of the strike force is that there has 
been some corruption or infiltration of some agency’s criminal 
justice and therefore you need a coordinated team approach to 
liberate, so to speak, the captured elements. That involves the 
selected use of Federal, State and local police and investigative 
agencies and quite frequently a high and early use of a grand jury. 

Mr. Beeson. Would this be an investigative grand jury? 

Mr. Clark. Preponderantly, yes. 

Mr. Beeson. Did you ever consider implementing the strike force 
concept within the Civil Rights Division of the Department of 
Justice for the purpose of investigating conspiracy cases? 

Mr. Clark. I think it was February 8, 1968, at Orangeburg, S.C., 
3 students of the South Carolina State College were shot and killed 
and 27 were seriously wounded that we know of because they were 

We discovered it and several hundred law enforcement personnel 
were involved, including the presence of the FBI, National Guard, 
State police, county sheriffs, local police. 

After considerable difficulty and finally learning of the involve- 
ment of the FBI, we took that particular investigation essentially 
away from the FBI and investigated it with young lawyers and 
others from the Civil Rights Division. So we had direct experience 
in that sort of thing. 

I would not recommend it in many cases. It is a very, very 
difficult thing to do. The capacity of the entire Civil Rights Divi- 
sion did nothing else. It is very limited. Its experience in investiga- 
tion was hardly extensive. But in Orangeburg it was essential 
because the failure of the FBI to reveal candidly its early presence 
and the horror of the scene. 

In an investigation as sweeping as the murder of Dr. King, the 
decision that you could not use the FBI would have left you in 
extreme difficulty. 

Mr. Beeson. If I understand the Orangeburg situation that you 
are describing, that was not a classic example of a strike force 
approach so much as a step that you took to remedy a specific 
problem in that case. 

Mr. Clark. That is the reason that we did it. The strike force 
approach, as far as I know, is as such limited to organized crime. 


Mr. Beeson. But the strike force approach would assume cooper- 
ation between the FBI and Department of Justice attorneys in the 
organized crime investigation and not a replacement of the FBI? 

Mr. Clark. Sadly, the history of the FBI’s role in strike forces 
tended to be nonparticipation. It is a fairly well known history. Mr. 
Hoover gave many reasons, but those that seemed to have the 
greatest strength were unwillingness to risk his manpower with 
other personnel, particularly where corruption was involved, and 
the sharing of the fame, success. 

Mr. Beeson. Then would it be fair to conclude that one reason 
that the strike force concept did not spread was because of a 
perceived reluctance on the part of the investigative arm of the 
FBI to participate in that type of approach? 

Mr. Clark. Well, it may have spread further even with that. I 
think as time went on the FBI tended to get onboard because at 
least in the early years it seemed to be a winner. Indictments were 
returned and successful prosecutions completed. Still, it was very 
difficult for the FBI to engage in that sort of sharing arrangement. 

Mr. Beeson. Was the heavy involvement of the Department of 
Justice attorney successful in the Orangeburg case? 

Mr. Clark. No. I say that with the greatest respect for all that 
were involved, but the prejudice — my interpretation — the prejudice 
was so powerful we had great difficulty persuading the Federal 
judge to convene a grand jury. Two successive grand juries did not 
obtain an indictment, although we had testimony of officers empty- 
ing six-shot service revolvers at helpless students yards away. 

I signed an information, a painful comedown from the dimension 
of the crime, and some very able young lawyers in the Civil Rights 
Division went down to try the case but were unable to secure 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, let me shift to one other possible investi- 
gative technique available in 1968, that of electronic surveillance. 
Will you start off by giving your views in general on the use of 
electronic surveillance in criminal investigations to the committee? 

Mr. Clark. Well, I opposed, as Attorney General, the use of 
electronic surveillance as un-American, if you will, as inconsistent 
with the idea of individual freedom, as an improper way for the 
Government to proceed against its people, against the meaning of 
human dignity. 

President Johnson sent up a Right to Privacy Act which we 
struggled to secure passage for that failed that would have prohib- 
ited wiretapping. As Attorney General I had little knowledge of the 
actual practice until I became Acting Attorney General. 

I think as far as I can tell, I essentially succeeded in eliminating 
the use of wiretapping in what you might call domestic affairs and 
in greatly curtailing its use in international or foreign national 
security affairs. 

Mr. Beeson. Did you perceive of any investigative losses involved 
in that decision? 

Mr. Clark. Well, we try to tell ourselves we are right so I 
perceived just the opposite, substantial gains across the board. 

My view was and is that in addition to being unacceptable as 
contrary to the spirit of the American Bill of Rights, it was terribly 
wasteful, inefficient, and finally corrupting investigative tech- 


niques, the idea of having grown people sit around listening days 
on end to what other people may or may not be talking about, 
hoping they will say something they should not, is not the way to 
prevent or control crime, that in fact it is wasteful of resources. 
They could be out protecting the people. 

Mr. Beeson. Isn’t it a fact, though, Mr. Clark, that the nature of 
certain criminal offenses, and specifically conspiracy which is often 
based really on conversations, requires the use of electronic surveil- 
lance, or to state it otherwise, isn’t it at least far more difficult to 
prove an offense which is based solely on conversations together 
with an overt act, of course, without the ability surreptitiously to 
overhear these conversations? 

Mr. Clark. Well, the crime is the overt act, not the conversation, 
because we have a first amendment. I would prefer to see us 
investigate the overt acts and proceed on acts. Conspiracy may be 
hard to prove anyway. 

It is my judgment a testament to the intelligence of the Ameri- 
can jury that most of the major conspiracy prosecutions of the 
Nixon years failed on the conspiracy counts. They could not get 
convictions in Chicago; they couldn’t get convictions in Harrisburg, 
Gainesville, or any of those places. There is something insidious 
about that use of conspiracy law and wiretap tends to compound it. 

I have looked at the logs of more wiretaps than a person who 
cares about freedom ought to have to, both in office and since. I am 
constantly amazed at the religious fervor of those who favor wire- 
tapping because I don’t see the evidence that it is effective if you 
are willing to engage in worse than a dirty business. 

Mr. Beeson. In your experience as a prosecutor, you have no 
recollection of cases where the evidence was based substantially on 
the interception of conversations through wiretapping, and in fact 
cases that could not have been brought without the use of wiretap- 

Mr. Clark. I don’t know of any such cases. No one has pointed 
any out to me. It is interesting to observe, and this can be read 
several different ways, that of the literally dozens of cases in 1966 
and 1967 in which lawyers in the Department of Justice went 
before courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and said to our great embarrassment, we have discovered the pres- 
ence of illegal electronic surveillance or wiretapping — and there 
were at least 35 such cases on remand to consider whether the 
wiretap produced evidence or leads that tainted the trial — we did 
not find a single case. 

Maybe we should have, but I prefer to believe that the FBI was 
fair about it and that there was in fact no utility. All it did was 
jeopardize good prosecutions. 

We ought to believe we can find facts and move on them and not 
have to sit around and listen to people’s conversations to enforce 
the law. 

Mr. Beeson. Approximately 2 months after the assassination of 
Dr. King, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was 
passed, which provided a statutory basis for legal or authorized 
electronic surveillance — electronic surveillance which would have 
been conducted under the scrutiny of a Federal magistrate or 
district judge and with the authorization of the Attorney General. 


Following the passage of title III, were your views on the utility 
or the propriety of electronic surveillance in any way affected, or 
did they remain the same? 

Mr. Clark. Well, my views remain the same. My conduct may be 
questionable. I refused to use title III, did not authorize its use, 
during my remaining time as Attorney General. I justified it legal- 
ly by saying it was discretionary. I was not mandated to use 
wiretapping, that I would either follow the law or resign if I were, 
but that in the exercise of my discretion I declined to use it. 

Perhaps there really wasn’t an exercise of discretion, in the 
sense that I looked at the case to decide because of a predisposition 
against the use of wiretapping. 

Mr. Beeson. Had the FBI considered the use of the provisions of 
the new statute in this investigation or any other criminal investi- 
gation, you would have prevented that use, is that correct? 

Mr. Clark. I think so. If we wanted to conjure up all the horri- 
bles we can think of, you might come up with one where I would 
authorize it, but I doubt it. But the FBI hadn’t waited for title III. 
There were a number of occasions in which it asked me to approve 
wiretapping or electronic surveillance of Dr. King before his assas- 
sination, including, I believe, as close to the assassination as April 
2, 1968. I declined in those cases. 

Mr. Beeson. We perhaps will get into that area a bit later. 

Let me ask you to refer to Martin Luther King exhibit F-507, if I 
could. This is a copy — I believe you have seen this document before, 
Mr. Clark — it is a copy of an FBI memorandum to you, Attorney 
General, on May 13, 1968, approximately 5 weeks into the assassi- 
nation investigation, in which they request your authorization for 
the use of electronic surveillance during the investigation of the 
assassination, essentially in order to ascertain the location of the 
fugitive, James Earl Ray. 

When I asked about it previously, you didn’t have any specific 
recollection of receiving this request. Is that still the case now? 

Mr. Clark. That’s a hard question. I mean, you are talking about 
mental processes. You know, I have no doubt that I had this sitting 
in my desk drawer for some time. 

Mr. Beeson. Was it ever your practice to solicit the views of the 
FBI on the legality of proposed electronic surveillance that they 
submitted to you, to ask them to analyze the legality of electronic 
surveillance before transmitting a request to you? 

Mr. Clark. There were several things that I did: I told them to 
always consider the relative importance of prosecution and discov- 
ery. This is in the national security field, obviously, because that 
was the only place that I was really considering wiretapping, be- 
cause an authorization could well destroy the possibility of a legal 
prosecution, and sometimes I would override them on that ground, 
that I didn’t think it was important, as we know — that we know 
certain information that we preserve a right to prosecute, why, 
there was some indication that there might be a serious Federal 
crime committed. 

As far as just asking them for their view of the legality of a 
wiretap, I guess I felt as competent as they to evaluate that. 

Mr. Beeson. Did you ever feel it would be useful to have them, 
by some sort of internal regulation, go through the process at least 


of analyzing the legality of specific proposals before submitting it 
to you, to acquaint them with the laws, to force them to face the 
possible prejudice caused by a specifed wiretap proposal? 

Mr. Clark. We did that in a number of areas. I can recall, I 
think, John Doar working at great length on the law of arrest, 
which is such a critical and difficult area, and a number of others. 
Particularly in the urban riot situation, the use of deadly force, we 
spent a great deal of time with them, trying to narrow and disci- 
pline the circumstances under which enforcement officers were 
authorized to use “deadly force,” as it is called, which means shoot 
somebody or hit them hard and in a way it might kill them. 

As to wiretapping, before the Omnibus Crime Control Act, June 
1968, the legality was so very ambiguous, anyway, that the utility 
of an effort to train or discipline on the law would be rather 
meaningless. As Attorney General, I had a hard time explaining 
how you could justify under the Constitution of the United States a 
wiretap on a foreign embasssy — as an illustration — except by prece- 
dents. They have done it since Robert H. Jackson. So I don’t know 
where that would have gotten us. 

I rather think there was considerable legal work in the Criminal 
Division, and with the FBI, on legal procedures under title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control Act after it became law. 

Mr. Beeson. This specific proposal came before title III was 
enacted. A review of FBI files indicates that they did perform an 
internal analysis of the legality of the proposal, the constitutional- 
ity of it, and possible prejudice that it might do to the case, and 
came to the conclusion in the memos — I believe it is a fair sum- 
mary of Mr. DeLoach’s testimony yesterday — that in fact, at least 
according to the FBI’s internal analysis, that proposal would, if 
implemented, have been unconstitutional and illegal as to the tar- 
gets of the electronic surveillance. 

Do I take it from your testimony that there were at least no 
internal procedures in effect in the Department of Justice in May 
of 1968 which were violated by their submission of that proposal to 
you, notwithstanding their own analysis of its illegality, or in sub- 
mitting the proposal to you and withholding their analysis on its 

Mr. Clark. I assume at all times, for all people knowingly recom- 
mending the violation of constitutional rights is unacceptable, and 
I don’t know what kind of Ten Commandments you put out to 
prevent that. 

The cause was probably this: The FBI’s reputation was on the 
line because of its failure to apprehend someone more quickly, and 
that was the source of enormous agitation; and it may well be that 
this memo reflects greater interest in apprehending someone so the 
FBI has done its job than in a successful prosecution, because I 
think by May 13 the press was beginning to react unfavorably 
about the failure of the investigation to find the person that at 
least I had said earlier we had on the run. 

Mr. Beeson. Just one final line of questioning, Mr. Clark. 

You have referred previously to strained relations which existed 
between the FBI and the Department of Justice at the time of the 
assassination investigation, something which at least would have 
been a consideration, had you ever considered inserting a depart- 


mental representative into the FBI to review incoming communica- 
tions from the field. What was the cause of the strained relations, 
and how did it manifest itself? 

Mr. Clark. That’s kind of a big question. 

I guess I believe that there was always considerable tension 
between the FBI and the lawyers in the Department of Justice. 
“Time dissipates to shining ether the solid angularity of fact,” and 
it became popular in later years to say that the relationship be- 
tween Mr. Hoover and my father was always a bed of roses. But 
not only do I remember otherwise, from teenage experience, I have 
heard otherwise, both from my father and from Mr. Hoover. It’s 
not all unhealthy and I would say here, as I have said other places 
many times, that more often than not Mr. Hoover was right about 
it, because he was dealing in highly sensitive information about 
people that had to be used with absolute integrity if we were to 
have a system of law, freedom under law. 

I came to the office of Attorney General after Robert Kennedy 
and Nicholas Katzenbach, and those were fairly turbulent times 
between — in the relationship between the FBI and the Department 
of Justice. I came in particularly at a time when we were going 
through the very painful process of disclosing illegal FBI electronic 
surveillance in scores of cases — I referred to it earlier — and nobody 
enjoyed that, but least of all the FBI. 

I came in with a Director who was Director of the FBI before I 
was born, and I think he rather wondered who this new kid was, 
saying you can’t wiretap here and you can’t blackbag here. I had 
never heard the phrase “blackbag” at the time; but they wanted to 
enter some places without a warrant. I said you can’t do that 
because there is a fourth amendment to the Constitution, and I 
think there was some resentment about that. 

But then, at least as I sense the epoch now, for all the turbulence 
of the early sixties, it had a glorious quality about it. I mean, the 
civil rights movement was in the ascendency and there was a belief 
that we would overcome, and in the years when I was Attorney 
General, riots and violence and the fear of crime were high; and I 
think those things combined to make for a very difficult relation- 
ship between the FBI and the Department of Justice. 

I think it can be overstated. I think at many levels there was a 
fine working relationship. I think at many levels there was a 
respect and, efficiency with Mr. Hoover, my relationship was 
always cordial, although we both understood profound differences. 
I think he understood my belief that whatever his contributions 
earlier, he had stayed on the job too long. 

Mr. Beeson. In reviewing the history of the investigation, there 
is an absence of at least some investigative approaches which 
would have required close cooperation and collaboration among the 
Department of Justice attorneys and the FBI. For example, grand 
jury immunity, perhaps participation of the Department of Justice 
attorneys in significant interviews, such as the interview of Mr. 
Ray after his guilty plea, no evidence of an attempt to implement 
the type of strike force concept of earlier involvement, and closer 
involvement, of attorneys. 

Is that situation understandable in terms of the strained rela- 
tions that you are describing now, or is it simply a fact that to the 


best of your recollection this investigation just did not warrant 
those investigative approaches? 

Mr. Clark. Well, you lumped a whole lot together there. 

As I said earlier, I do not recall any suggestion that a grand jury 
would have utility, any proposal that a certain person be put 
before a grand jury. The impression I had was that we had hun- 
dreds, maybe even thousands, of FBI agents trying to act like 
hippies — which they couldn’t do, because they came from a differ- 
ent background — to see whether they could pick up a trace of a guy 
who led us to believe he might be in hippie areas of different 
towns, of hundreds of agents looking through millions of passport 
applications, and things like that. 

I didn’t see a grand jury utility. It never — nothing I ever heard 
or saw or have seen indicates it would have had any utility. 

On your other questions, I don’t — I don’t know what we could 
have contributed by having lawyers closer in than we did. The 
average FBI investigation is turned over to the Department of 
Justice lawyers as a fait accompli. You walk into the attorney’s 
office with the file and say, “Here’s the file. This kid stole a car” 
whatever it is. This is not an analogy, merely to show a practice. 

Now, here you had the need to have the most highly motivated 
investigation that you could have, and to create any disruptive 
quality by trying to inject people in, like you lack confidence in 
what they are doing and/or you are trying to overdo, my sense was 
our need was to motivate them to show our great concern, to 
review what they did, if we had ideas or suggestions to let them 
have them, but above all to have them out on the streets looking 

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of the 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel. 

At this time the full committee will suspend for about 5 minutes, 
for the purpose of permitting the King subcommittee to conduct a 
meeting in the same room here, which will be a public meeting. 

So we will ask at this time if the witness will just remove himself 
from the witness table for a few moments, until we can transact 
this other business. 

The full committee is in suspension. 

[Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the proceedings were suspended.] 

Chairman Stokes. The full committee will now come to order. 

The Chair would request the witness to resume his place at the 
witness table. 

[Whereupon, Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the 
United States, having been duly sworn previously, resumed the 
stand and testified further as follows:] 

Chairman Stokes. The procedure at this point will be that the 
Chair will yield himself such time as I may consume, after which 
the committee will resort to the 5-minute rule. 


Chairman Stokes. Mr. Clark, let me first establish your period of 
service within the Justice Department. My understanding is that 
during most of 1965 and 1966 you were Deputy Attorney General 
under Attorney General Katzenbach. In the latter part of 1966 you 


became Acting Attorney General, and in early 1967 you were con- 
firmed as Attorney General, and you held that position until Janu- 
ary of 1969; is that correct? 

Mr. Clark. That’s correct. 

Chairman Stokes. Now I would like to focus questions on the 
activities of the Department’s major investigative agency, the FBI, 
during that period. 

You were, of course, aware that the FBI had a Domestic Intelli- 
gence Division, that the responsibilities of that Division included 
investigation of individuals and organizations posing threats to 
national security within the United States; is that correct? 

Mr. Clark. That sounds correct. I am just puzzled about whether 
another division had some jurisdiction over threats to national 
security within the United States but that is essentially right. 

Chairman Stokes. Would you tell the committee what steps, if 
any, you took in order to remain informed of the day-to-day activi- 
ties of the Domestic Intelligence Division, if you took such action? 

Mr. Clark. You mean generally? 

Chairman Stokes. Yes, sir. I guess, essentially what I am re- 
questing of you is whether you set up some procedure whereby 
they were to keep you informed of their activities, whether or not 
this would have been on a daily basis of some kind. 

Mr. Clark. Well, they informed me of their activities essentially 
through the Director, I would assume, that what they chose to tell 
me came through memos that were at least processed through the 
Director’s office. 

I don’t recall any distinct method of communication for any 
division of the FBI, except with reference to particular cases where 
there would be necessary communication between, say, the Crimi- 
nal Division and the Internal Security Division and agents working 
on the case. 

I think all the divisions reported as to their general activities 
through the Director. 

Chairman Stokes. Did you know Mr. Sullivan who was head of 
that division? 

Mr. Clark. I came to know him at some time. I certainly knew 
the name. Whether I would recognize him if I saw him is question- 

I endeavored early as Attorney General to establish a system of 
regular meetings with assistant directors, and Mr. Hoover ex- 
pressed his desire that that not be done. My hope was that the 
assistant attorneys general and the assistant directors would have 
regular lunches in my office, with Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson, so 
we would get to know each other better. 

Mr. Hoover said that he thought that would be difficult for him 
and a bad policy, and I dropped the idea. 

Chairman Stokes. Did you read into that anything other than 
what he said? 

Mr. Clark. No. I thought it was his view of administration and 
the relationship that he thought most effective between the FBI 
and the Department of Justice. I disagreed, but I didn’t believe that 
while he was Director I could meaningfully establish a relationship 
over his opposition. 


Chairman Stokes. Mr. Clark, were you confident during your 
years as Deputy Attorney General and Attorney General that you 
had a thorough knowledge of the operations of the Domestic Intelli- 
gence Division? 

Mr. Clark. I never thought about it that way certainly, but if 
any Attorney General was ever confident that he had a thorough 
knowledge of what the FBI was doing, I would question his intelli- 
gence. I knew the six preceding Attorneys General and for reasons 
of affinity and consanguinity had great respect for them, and had 
occasion to ask them from time to time how much of their atten- 
tion they were able to devote to the FBI; and none of them ever 
suggested more than 5 percent. 

The FBI was running 700,000 or 800,000 investigations a year 
when I was Attorney General, to 7,500, 7,700 agents, and it would 
have been impossible, if you did nothing else, to know what the 
divisions were doing. It’s a rare Attorney General, literally, who 
could sit down and name the divisions of the FBI. 

Chairman Stokes. And that would be a situation you would 
think that nothing could be done about? 

Mr. Clark. I think something could be done about it probably. I 
shouldn’t distinguish the Federal Bureau of Prisons from the FBI 
or the Immigration and Naturalization. I would say our ignorance 
of the Immigration and Naturalization substantially exceeded our 
ignorance of the FBI. It has to do with the nature of the Office of 
Attorney General and the capacity of an individual in a short and 
hectic period of time to master a huge bureaucracy, that there was 
not enough knowledge, was and is, in my judgment. 

We tried to correct that in a number of ways. I think the major 
effort was an effort to institute what we called then the PPBS, 
Planning, Programing, and Budgeting, something that came out of 
Mr. Hitch’s activities over at the Department of Defense, and was 
urged generally on executive agencies by the then-called Bureau of 
the Budget; and while Planning, Programing, and Budgeting didn’t 
really fit precisely into law operations, it had high utility in help- 
ing you find out what you were doing, and why, where your re- 
sources were allocated. 

We tried to initiate PPBS and we believed — I say “we”; I certain- 
ly believed, and, I think, the handful of people that were involved 
with me — that it would help us learn more about the FBI and 
indeed help the FBI learn more about the FBI; and we started 
down that road, but not a great deal of progress was made. 

Chairman Stokes. Well then, if I understand your testimony, 
essentially you are saying that it pretty much leaves the FBI and 
some of these other agencies to operate under their own autonomy 
and without real supervision or jurisdiction of the Attorney Gener- 
al’s Office; would that be correct? 

Mr. Clark. In the daily activities, that’s correct. 

Chairman Stokes. Then, again speaking in general terms, were 
you aware, during your years as Attorney General and Deputy 
Attorney General, of the counterintelligence programs, of CO- 
INTELPRO conducted by the FBI? 

Mr. Clark. The COINTELPRO came into my vocabulary in the 
early or midseventies. The idea that the FBI ever engaged in 
disruptive activities never occurred to me, and had it, I think I 


would have acted. It is something I feel pretty strongly about; it is 
no proper function of Government. 

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask, how did the COINTELPRO pro- 
gram come to your attention? 

Mr. Clark. Through the press, I believe. People started talking. 
There were documents leaked, both selectively and unselectively, 
and it became a part of the vocabulary. 

Then through a number of lawsuits and investigations, publica- 
tion of a little paperback called “COINTELPRO," as I recall, I 
came to know more and more about it, or at least have more 
information, accurate or not, about it. 

Chairman Stokes. Now, Mr. DeLoach, who was assistant to the 
Director in the FBI, was your primary source of contact with the 
FBI, was he not? 

Mr. Clark. For daily activities he was. 

Chairman Stokes. And in the course of this liaison between the 
Bureau and yourself, in his capacity as the liaison person, then are 
we to assume that Mr. DeLoach never briefed you about the CO- 
INTELPRO program? 

Mr. Clark. I have no recollection, and every confidence that my 
recollection is adequate, that there was ever the mention of the 
word “COINTELPRO" or any description of any of the disruptive 
or illegal activities of COINTELPRO made to me by Mr. DeLoach 
or anybody else while I was in the Department of Justice, from 
1961 to 1969. 

Chairman Stokes. I would like now to direct your attention to 
the FBI’s investigation of Dr. King and his organization, the South- 
ern Christian Leadership Conference. 

When did the FBI’s use of electronic surveillance against Dr. 
King and the SCLC headquarters first come to your attention? 

Mr. Clark. I have not been able to establish the date clearly. 
The occasion I remember vividly. I was Deputy Attorney General 
and it was late in the evening, and I was sitting up in my office, 
and John Doar came up, handed me an FBI memo and said, “What 
do you make of that?" And I looked at it and said, “Well, I guess 
you’re saying it looks like this must have been picked up by elec- 
tronic surveillance?" 

He said, “That’s what it looks like to me.” And I said, “I’ll go up 
and talk to the Attorney General about it." 

I had been around for a long time, even before 1961, in a sense, 
but I must say the idea that the FBI would have wiretapped Dr. 
King was unbelievable. I worked for 4 years with Bob Kennedy, 
loved the man, had the highest respect for him, but this just was so 
inconsistent with my perception of how he saw Dr. King, how the 
FBI functioned, that I couldn’t believe it. 

I went up, however, and talked to Mr. Katzenbach, showed him 
the memo, and he said, roughly, “Well, there has been a problem. 
It’s cleared up now and you don’t need to worry about it.” My 
guess is that that was August or September of 1965, and having 
plenty of problems and being told that this one was over, and that 
apparently being the fact, I didn’t worry about it anymore until the 
disclosures came out. 

When I became Acting Attorney General, I found some of the 
files in rather chaotic condition, and particularly those relating to 


how the Attorney General retained information about authorized 
electronic surveillance. 

My impression, roughly, was that Bob Kennedy must have been 
sitting there in the Attorney General’s Office and the secretary 
would come by and Bob would sign something, put it in his pocket 
or stick it in his desk. We would find them all over the place. 

The problem I have is, how do you know what has been approved 
and what is going on? 

We began to organize them, even though it was my belief — I had 
been told by the President I wouldn’t be Attorney General, but it 
seemed like I could do something while I was sitting around; and 
one of the things we tried to do was organize those files, and 
discovered the authorization of wiretap on Dr. King, as I recall, in 
October of 1963, and some others. 

Chairman Stokes. Did it ever, Mr. Clark, come to your attention 
that the FBI was briefing Members of Congress, the White House, 
members of the press, private citizens, on the activities of Dr. King, 
based upon wiretaps? 

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, from early youth I had witnessed how 
the FBI would operate on the Hill and with the White House — I 
remember the Harry Dexter White case well — and knew its rela- 
tionship with the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittees 
of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Appropri- 
ations Subcommittees of the Senate, others. 

Apparently many people knew — for whom I had and have the 
greatest confidence and respect — Bob Kennedy, Burke Marshall 
and others, became aware in 1964-65 that there had been prepara- 
tion of memorandums and dissemination of them, perhaps playing 
of tape recordings. I don’t know why. I guess I was just down 
working on something else. I don’t think I was aware of it until I 
read about it in the papers later on. 

Chairman Stokes. In 1966, after becoming Attorney General, I 
believe that you systematically reviewed all wiretapping done by 
the FBI in the recent years and found additional evidence of elec- 
tronic surveillance on Dr. King. Would that be correct? 

Mr. Clark. That’s correct. As best I recall, I found three one- 
page memos that appeared to have been authorized, that is, signed, 
by the Attorney General, in 1965, bugs, as I recall, as distinguished 
from wiretap, and on hotel rooms. 

Chairman Stokes. In uncovering this evidence, were you made 
aware of the stated purpose for which these bugs were being 

Mr. Clark. The memos themselves said very little, I’m sure. I 
had come to believe — and I am sure it was from conversations with 
some of the principals — that it related primarily to a belief in the 
FBI that the Communist conspiracy, so to speak, was infiltrating 
the civil rights movement, and particularly the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, and influencing Dr. King, and that for a 
variety of reasons that involved protecting the civil rights move- 
ment, protecting Dr. King, and perhaps placating the Bureau, and 
perhaps avoiding a controversy before an election year, 1964, that 
the original wiretapping was done. 

My view has always been that when Bob signed that — Bob Ken- 
nedy — that he must have intended to take it off soon. Within a 


month, his brother was murdered, and he just didn’t think about 
things like that for a while; so it stayed on for quite a long period — 
1965, when I assumed, and I think 1 had the impression from 
conversations and all relating to the same sort of thing, although 
the nature of them had an inherent improbability about it, very 

Chairman Stokes. How about after you had become Attorney 
General, did the FBI come to you with requests that they be permit- 
ted to put electronic surveillance on Dr. King in his Tiome at 
Atlanta, on the SCLC in Atlanta? 

Mr. Clark. They sent memos out. Mr. Hoover didn’t like to be 
told no, directly, which is understandable, and when he thought he 
was going to get a “no,” he would send them over; and rarely 
would he go to battle. 

I can only remember one time when he asked me to reconsider 
breaking and entering. I don’t believe he ever asked me to recon- 
sider a wiretap directly and personally; but I got, I would say, at 
least four requests from the fall of 1966 through April 2, 1968 to 
authorize electronic surveillance of Dr. King. 

I imagine it was on his quarters, his home, or his church; but I 
cannot tell you at this moment that I specifically recall that. 

Chairman Stokes. The last request would have been 2 days prior 
to his assassination? 

Mr. Clark. If that’s the date — and I think it is — that is available 
to the committee, I’m sure. 

Chairman Stokes. What was your reaction to these requests? 
What action did you take relative to the requests? 

Mr. Clark. I guess I didn’t like it at all. There were many 
requests that I turned down, and the range — I can only go on 
memory; somebody could look — was quite wide and in various in- 

I have learned that apparently I turned down a request on Fred 
Hampton, for instance. At the time, and until his murder, I think 
probably the name meant nothing to me. I turned down in the low 
scores altogether, and some it would be very difficult to explain, 
like Abba Eban, and things like that; but the King one was special, 
both because of the shock that I had when I had learned that he 
had been earlier wiretapped, my disbelief that there could possibly 
be any justification for it, and it was not anything I was willing to 

Chairman Stokes. With reference to these four requests you 
have spoken of, and the last of which you believe was on April 2, 
which would have been a couple of days prior to the assassination, 
was the FBI still at that time basing the purpose upon communism 
and infiltration of Communists in the civil rights movement, et 
cetera? What is your best recollection? 

Mr. Clark. My best recollection is that at least the last several, 
or at least the last one, had to do with the Poor People’s Campaign, 
and an incredible fear of, a paranoia, literally — that wasn’t pecu- 
liar to the FBI by any means — about the possibility for violence. 

We had had tragic urban riots in 1967, Newark and Detroit, in 
the late summer. We had had major magazine articles. I remember 
Life magazine with a picture of snipers on top of buildings, saying 
this was all planned; and Spiro Agnew holding a press conference 


as Governor of Maryland saying the same people that provoked the 
riot in Newark provoked the riot in Detroit, fantasizing like that. 

I think we had hearings that Senator McClellan conducted that 
were credible in terms of the fear that they reflected and provoked 
irrationally about the potential for violence from these poor people 
coming to the Nation’s Capital. 

I think that the last request — I would be surprised if they didn’t 
have “Poor People’s Campaign” written up at the top, and didn’t 
state that there was concern that there was going to be deliberate 
provocation of violence, and there would be preventive measures. 

My view about the importance of preventing riots is pretty well 
known, and that would have been a natural appeal. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Clark, are you familiar with the press 
conference in which Mr. Hoover described Dr. King as being the 
most notorious liar in the world? 

Mr. Clark. Well, I’m certainly familiar with that incident, yes. 

Chairman Stokes. And did you ever have occasions to talk with 
Mr. Hoover, during which discussions he would describe to you his 
feelings toward Dr. King? 

Mr. Clark. I had a number of occasions to listen. I didn’t do a lot 
of talking, simply because there was some — I just had some sense 
that there was a preoccupation here by an older person, and that 
maybe you could let him let a little steam off by just expressing his 
views; but that he had a personal dislike for Dr. King was well 
known to me. 

Chairman Stokes. In terms of the dislike you describe, would you 
describe it as being intense dislike bearing on hatred? How would 
you describe it? 

Mr. Clark. Trying to analyze it, it had to me qualities of racism. 
I know that’s a hard word, but Mr. Hoover came from an older 
generation; he was raised in a southern city, if you will, segregated 
city, it came from his views of the clergy, which I would call strict, 
roughly, I guess, came from his — it’s hard to talk about a person 
like this. He was a very able man, but he had some preoccupations 
with sex, and I saw these coming together It caused him — then the 
prominence of Dr. King, the international recognition. I have often 
thought perhaps the nonviolence — he didn’t like that, really, be- 
cause in his value system power was right; but, anyway, these 
things caused him in a very uninhibited way to express a personal 
belief that Dr. Martin Luther King was not a good person; and he 
knew that I disagreed with that, but that didn’t inhibit him from 
saying his thing. 

Chairman Stokes. From expressing himself. 

Mr. Clark, we have received, during the past week or so, testi- 
mony relating to the attitude of the FBI toward civil rights viola- 
tions. We have had some testimony that in terms of investigating 
civil rights violations that they engaged in foot dragging. On the 
other hand, we have had some testimony that agents did a good job 
and that they were consciencious about investigating civil rights 
violations, et cetera. 

It seems to me you would be in a unique position to be able to 
assess the attitude and the performance of the Bureau with refer- 
ence to investigating civil rights violations. You have already made 
some reference to the Orangeburg, S.C., situation. 

39-935 0 - 79 - 10 



I would ask you at this time if you would elaborate a little more 
for us in terms of your own assessment of their performance? 

Mr. Clark. Well, first, I think that all those characterizations 
that you gave are true. You just have to realize how many investi- 
gations and how many people were involved; and, first, how the 
FBI as an institution adapted to change, to new laws, new national 
moods, and institutionally how it was structured. 

I believed at the time, and still do, that the resident agent policy 
of the FBI was a very serious handicap to its effective investigation 
of many civil rights violations. In a very rough way, the resident 
agent policy permitted some agents to opt to remain in a location, 
rather than adventure to higher opportunities. This would mean 
agents would work for 20 years in the same town, same area. 

It had some very efficient aspects. You get to know the sheriff 
pretty well and the chief of police, the judges, and all the rest; but 
it had some great handicaps, too: One, if there are prejudices in the 
community, that makes it likely that rights of some citizens would 
be violated. You will tend to identify with those prejudices. 

Second, it is hard to attack the person that has helped you in 
picking up all those Dwyer Act convictions. So the resident agent 
policy which Mr;. Hoover changed in the early sixties, particularly 
in the South, was a great handicap. You can’t change attitudes 
overnight. Many of these attitudes were deeply ingrained. 

I think the FBI came to civil rights investigation with great 
concern. To a considerable degree they were in the numbers game. 
They justified their existence by running up high statistics on easy 
marks like stolen automobiles. If they had to put a lot of manpow- 
er into a single investigation, such as whether a couple of deputy 
sheriffs beat up a Black prisoner in a county prison somewhere, it 
didn’t help them that much; it didn’t show that much; it made it 
difficult for them to appear well in the other statistics. 

Still, I believe that Mr. Hoover sensed the need to get on top of 
civil rights investigation and did some rather remarkable things. I 
always thought one of the great persuasive feats of contemporary 
American history was President Johnson’s persuading Mr. Hoover 
to go to Jackson, Miss., to open an FBI office. The meaning and 
impact of that was very important to FBI agents, and Black folks, 
and to American citizens generally. 

The investigation of the Klan — the infiltration, I guess you would 
have to say today, of the Klan — I don’t know enough about it to 
have final judgments, but rather remarkable from what I have 
seen in terms of expeditions and effectiveness. 

If I had to judge their coming to investigate, of comparing their 
investigation of civil rights cases with their investigation of orga- 
nized crime, I come to a surprising conclusion, and that is that 
they came with a little greater speed and effectiveness to the 
investigation of civil rights violations than they did to organized 
crime. It took a long time to get into — Mr. Hoover at one time 
saying there is no organized crime. Still, there would be many 
illustrations where an agent simply wouldn’t do a good job investi- 
gating a public accommodations title II allegation, and many 


It was necessary, I think, for us to keep pressure on to expand 
and extend and make more effective commitments of resources to 
civil rights investigation, but I guess I think it moved fairly well. 

Steve Poliak can probably tell you a lot more about that. 

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask you this: We have heard over the 
past several days the testimony of a prolonged and intense effort 
by the FBI, not only in the early part of the sixties but also in 1967 
and 1968 — which is during your own tenure as Attorney General — 
of their efforts to destroy Dr. King as the leader of the civil rights 
movement in this country. 

The methods that they used were immoral and often illegal, 
certainly went far beyond any legitimate investigative mandate. 

As Attorney General and head of the Justice Department, the 
FBI, at least on paper, was under your control. Additionally, you 
were personally aware of Mr. Hoover’s deep dislike for Dr. King. 
You had first-hand knowledge of their past use of electronic sur- 
veillance against Dr. King. You had received several additional 
requests yourself involving the wiretap of Dr. King throughout the 
years, your years as Attorney General, and I would ask you: In 
light of this, would this not have caused you to try and delve 
further into this kind of activity on the part of the FBI in order to 
put a stop to something that was going on in a situation where you 
were the ultimate authority, at least programmatically? 

Mr. Clark. Well, first there seems to be an assumption there 
that I was aware of unlawful conduct regarding Dr. King. That is 
an incorrect assumption. I wasn’t. 

I believed, and I am not yet fully persuaded otherwise, that the 
FBI didn’t disobey instructions. 

You know, you would often wonder, when you turned down a 
wiretap, whether that would mean some agent in the field would 
go to some local police counterpart and get them to install the 

As of this time, I haven’t found that occurring on any of the 
matters that I turned down. I believe that Mr. Hoover would be 
extremely cautious about risking the reputation of the FBI in 
unlawful activity. 

I think one thing we tend to miss is how many shared his 
prejudice, Mr. Chairman. We like to wonder why the Attorney 
General of the United States didn’t know what was going on. Why 
didn’t those Members of the Congress to whom you have alluded 
say something about it. 

Did they enjoy what they heard? Did they appreciate the confi- 
dence? What about the editors and others? The fact is that he 
was — Mr. Hoover was working in an environment of pervasive 
prejudice, and he wouldn’t have risked the thing that he loved the 
most otherwise. 

I think facts that have been revealed about conduct of the FBI 
toward Mr. King, Dr. King, show how very fragile freedom and the 
rule of law are in the United States of America. 

I hope this committee, beyond its specific assignments, will help 
enact a law to control the FBI because if investigative agencies 
don’t function in accordance with law, there is no law. 

The ability of the Presidential appointees and sometime bureau- 
crats to control all that enormous machinery is nonexistent where 


the law isn’t clear and specific, and the operations open, and the 
citizenry supportive. 

It is imperative that we recognize that. 

Chairman Stokes. I think I have just one further question I 
would like to get your views on, something I think that disturbs a 
lot of people. 

We received testimony a few days ago from a former FBI agent 
assigned to the Atlanta field office. He told us of how the news first 
came across the radio, that station, that Dr. King had been shot. 

Another agent in this same office — and this office, of course, had 
the primary responsibility of investigating Dr. King, they were 
involved in the surveillance on him — that the agent, upon hearing 
the news, exclaimed, they got Zorro, they got the SOB. 

A few moments later, when the news came across that he was 
dead, he said this man literally jumped with joy, exclaimed his 
satisfaction over the fact that King was dead. 

There is some concern over the fact that, considering this, consid- 
ering the attitude of Mr. Hoover, which was well-known through- 
out the Bureau, all the agents knew of this dislike that he had for 
Dr. King — and I guess my question goes to the efficacy of letting an 
agency which had targeted Dr. King in the way that it had, an 
agency which had him under the kind of investigation they had 
him under, then be assigned the task of investigating his death. 

Does it seem to you that under such circumstances, that such an 
agency would in fact perform a top-notch job on a man who they 
demonstrated such dislike for during his lifetime? 

Mr. Clark. Let me qualify the first by repeating that at the time 
I was unaware of the extent of the targeting that we now know 

It is a hypothesis contrary to fact to ask what would I have done 
had I known about it because I believe hopefully I would have done 
something long before. Perhaps resign had I known about it. 

My judgment under the circumstances was that the FBI would 
be motivated to try harder to solve this case than probably any in 
its career because in an unusual set of ways both its effectiveness 
and its credibility were on the line. 

The public knew that the Director had called, as I did, Dr. King 
the most notorious liar in the world. Many leaders knew rather 
directly of his great personal distaste for Dr. King. A failure to 
perform here would have had profound impact on the public confi- 
dence in the FBI. 

We ought to look at alternatives, too. There was an important 
investigation that required an enormous amount of personnel. It 
consumed a great amount of time, energy, and money. 

What could you put together and what would the losses be in 
trying to substitute alternatives. Would you put the Secret Service 
on it? Put the Border Patrol on it? GSA’s custodian employees? 
What would you really suggest out of the 20-odd Federal investiga- 
tive agencies? 

You know, I read in the paper that your committee had faulted 
the FBI’s investigation here. I think it made an extraordinary 
effort. Nothing that I have seen has changed that view. 


It arrested a man finally, as to whom there is very substantial 
direct evidence that he was at least in the environs and had done a 
lot of things that seemed to be related to the possibility. 

I enjoy admitting mistakes. I can’t tell you that I am able to say 
that this was one. I believe that the judgment was right, that the 
FBI pursued this with keenest desire and made a prodigious effort, 
and without a lot of breaks that you often get, finally apprehended 
someone who pled guilty. 

I regretted at the time, I regret still, that there was a plea of 
guilty. I thought history was entitled to more. Although I think an 
individual has a right to plead guilty if he chooses that the public 
can’t deny to satisfy its concern for history. 

I would like to see that trial happen. I would like for history to 
be more assured. But history is rarely assured about assassinations. 
There is something in us that finds some so horrible and unaccep- 

I think the FBI was probably the only available agency. To sit 
here now and think of the appearance of conflict of interest is to 
ignore some overwhelming facts: That it had the confidence of the 
vast majority of the people of the United States — that is my judg- 
ment — to a higher degree than it had mine; that it had the confi- 
dence of the President of the United States; that it had some 7,700 
agents that were pretty darned good investigators. 

We needed them in an emergency. We used them. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much. 

I have no further questions. 

At this time the Chair recognizes the gentleman from North 
Carolina, Mr. Preyer. 

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is good to have you here today, Mr. Clark. 

I wanted to clear up one point for the record which I may not 
have understood correctly in the first place. 

You mentioned that when Robert Kennedy was Attorney Gener- 
al he had a habit of signing papers and you would find the papers 
stuffed in his pockets, or in drawers, in his desk. Is that right? 

Mr. Clark. Let me restate that and say that it iis probably an 
unfair characterization. He was a bundle of energy and impatient 
with details. Filing wasn’t one of his personal strengths. 

My impression coming in later — and it was augmented by what I 
had seen — I had seen him walking around with paper sticking out 
of his pockets, you know, and they looked kind of crumpled. 

But the characterization that I made was based upon coming in 
more than 2 years after he left office, and trying to reconstruct his 
methodology in approving wiretaps and bugs. 

That became a fairly significant and essentially, I think, unrelat- 
ed reason, that there was a controversy at the time between Mr. 
Hoover and Robert Kennedy as to who authorized all these bugs 
that had been placed on people that were allegedly involved in 
organized crime. 

I felt an obligation to the Department and the former Attorney 
General and the Director to find out what I could about it. 

We found copies of these things scattered hither and yon. I 
mean, as I recall, we found some in a desk that he had used. We 
found some in files where they would never have been found 


except by careful review. There was no systematic treatment of 

The reason in part I think was, you see, unlike all the other flow 
of material that would come through the Attorney General’s office, 
where all the secretaries and everybody would have some obliga- 
tion to stamp them and initial them and everything else, approval 
of wiretapping and bugs would come directly from the Director of 
the FBI to the Attorney General. 

Usually in his day I think they were carried over by Courtney 
Evans probably. So, it was just the two of them there. Mr. Evans 
was going to return back to his office in a few minutes, and Bob 
signed the thing without anybody present except himself often — 
himself and Mr. Evans. 

Then he would leave hurriedly to go to the White House or 
someplace and he would stick it in a drawer. There was no system- 
atic filing or recordkeeping. He kept no ledger, for instance, that 
we ever found that said I authorize this such and such a date this, 
such and such a date. 

So, I don't know how he could tell what he had done except by 

Mr. Preyer. Well, the only question I wanted to clear up was to 
make sure there was no implication that some of these orders 
which he may have signed he was reserving final judgment on, 
that he put them in his pocket, say, or in his desk drawer in order 
to give them more attention or more consideration. 

You are not raising any question that these orders were effective 
when you found them or you were not specifically raising any 
question that he did not intend to authorize the wiretap on Martin 
Luther King? 

Mr. Clark. No. His signature is on that. I am sure that I saw 

Mr. Preyer. I think most of your testimony is clear on that, 

Mr. Clark. I think I can help. The papers that I am referring to 
were nearly all carbons. We still used carbon in those days. The 
original would be returned to the FBI. 

It is a request — I think this is one right here, exhibit F-507. 
Usually they had a place for your signature. Maybe this is not 
really one, but they would send an original and a carbon. 

What we found in the files was the carbons. Sometimes they 
would indicate by initials that they had been signed, and some- 
times you couldn’t tell. So, I don’t, you know — as to many I really 
don’t know whether they were signed. I know they were apparently 
received, and presumably signed. 

Mr. Preyer. Thank you. 

I have just one other question, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a law school question, a hypothetical question. I put it to 
you because of your reputation as a lawyer and as a former Attor- 
ney General. You may want to think about it further before re- 
sponding to it. 

There has been evidence presented to the committee here that 
the FBI, in an unprecedented way, one agency in this country, set 
out to destroy the moral standing of a respected citizen in this 
country, Dr. Martin Luther King. 


You were not involved in that in any way, as it has been made 
clear here today. 

The question I would like to put to you, assuming this evidence is 
true, that the agency set out to destroy a prominent citizen by 
destroying his moral standing in the community, and assuming, 
further, that the person or persons involved in the assassination of 
Dr. Martin Luther King were influenced by this FBI propaganda, 
do you think the agency, the FBI, should bear some responsibility 
for the death of Dr. Martin Luther King on the grounds of criminal 
negligence; that is, by analogy to the case of Russian roulette, 
where the players are guilty of murder, even though they do not 
fire the actual shot? 

Mr. Clark. Responsibility is a difficult word. Criminal negligence 
seems the wrong analogy because there was conduct, there was 
malfeasance, but it is primarily not a legal question. 

I see it this way. There are moods in the life of a nation that 
create higher probabilities of good and bad conduct. In the intensi- 
ty of the sixties, with all the potential for violence, a deliberate 
effort to destroy the moral standing of an individual could be a 
causative factor, weighted with many others in enabling an individ- 
ual to assassinate that person. 

If I had a particular hatred, if that hatred was reinforced by 
public expression and private conduct of a highly respected person 
or agency, my self-justification in committing such an act could be 

But it seems to me that the most important thing is not trying to 
weigh that responsibility, because I don’t think we have the capac- 
ity to sort out all the elements and attribute weight to them. 

The important thing to me is that in a society that seeks freedom 
for its people under the rule of law such conduct by a government 
agency is absolutely intolerable. 

Those who care about government of the sort that we preach of 
should work now to see that we practice as we preach, that public 
funds never again be expended to investigate and destroy the char- 
acter or seek to destroy the character, because I believe more than 
ever now the American public understands and respects Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. for the enormous moral force that he was. 

He told us that social change was essential to justice, that non- 
violence was the only acceptable and humane way of achieving it. 
Those seem to me to be the two great lessons we need to learn. 

But for government to be involved in an effort of that sort is 
totalitarian and impermissible. 

I queried as long ago as 1950 in a book called “Crime in Amer- 
ica” that I wrote whether — and this was just based on the belief 
that there had been private communications to the President — the 
history of the civil rights movement, which to my lights is the 
noblest quest of the American people in my time, more so than the 
peace movement, it was a quest for equality, motivated by princi- 
pal — whether the history of the civil rights movement was altered 
and its purpose severely damaged by conduct of the FBI in inform- 
ing, misinforming the President about Martin Luther King, Jr. 

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Clark. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. 


Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Clark, you have made some very interesting answers here 
today. I want to make sure that I understood you correctly. 

I believe in response to a question by our chairman, Mr. Stokes, 
relative to whether or not the FBI was reluctant to investigate civil 
rights matters, was your response generally to the effect that as 
times changed, and the Bureau found it necessary to change its 
posture, that they moved more rapidly in investigating civil rights 
matters than they did, for instance, in organized crime? 

Is that an accurate assessment of your remarks? 

Mr. Clark. Very nearly. What I was really trying to say was not 
with reference to specific investigations but the totality of the 
commitment of the Bureau. 

I believe we could demonstrate with a study which I have not 
made that the FBI moved with greater speed and effectiveness into 
a new field, investigation of civil rights violations, than it did into 
another new field, investigation of organized crime activities. 

Mr. Devine. Thank you. 

Now the other thing that I made a note about — and I want to 
make sure was accurate — you said that the FBI was motivated 
harder to solve this case than any other case, due to its reputation. 

Is that an accurate assessment of what you said? 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Mr. Devine. Mr. Clark, do you feel that you were intimidated by 
J. Edgar Hoover? 

Mr. Clark. I never thought so. 

Mr. Devine. Do you think any Attorney General, any of the 
Attorney Generals were? I am quite sure your father wasn’t. 

Mr. Clark. No, I don’t think my father was. 

Mr. Devine. The reason I ask this question is when you look at 
the chart over there, the FBI was an arm, simply an arm of the 
Justice Department. You also had jurisdiction of the Bureau of 
Prisons, Immigration and Naturalization, U.S. attorneys, U.S. mar- 
shals — LEAA now. 

Isn’t it a fact that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation serves at the pleasure of the Attorney General, whoever he 
or she may be? 

Mr. Clark. The fact, no. 

Mr. Devine. Pardon. 

Mr. Clark. It is not a fact, no. It may be the law. 

Mr. Devine. Well, let’s get back to intimidation. What do you 
mean by that? 

Mr. Clark. I mean I think some Attorneys General weren’t at all 
pleased. But they had the technical legal power. I suggested — and 
it has been recorded before — to President Johnson — I felt that Mr. 
Hoover had been in office too long. I came to believe that in the 
early, midsixties. 

Later on I suggested that the need to coordinate and standardize 
the various Federal investigative agencies was such that it might 
be helpful to have Mr. Hoover end his service by reviewing all of 
the agencies, as to jurisdiction, performance, and the rest, and 
move him up and out of the FBI. 

Mr. Devine. Well, maybe 


Mr. Clark. That wasn’t at all acceptable to the President. I don’t 
believe he really seriously considered it. 

Mr. Devine. There are a number of people who feel that Mr. 
Hoover served too long, perhaps beyond the time that he should 

But if memory serves me correctly, he was appointed as Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by Harlan F. Stone, who at 
that time was Attorney General of the United States, and that 
each succeeding Attorney General renewed that appointment. 

With the inherent right to appoint is the inherent right to 
remove. I was just wondering why, if these Attorneys General prior 
to and succeeding you did not move in that direction, were you not 
intimidated in some way? 

Mr. Clark. First, I don’t think that they were in any technical 
sense reappointments. I recall no reappointment. The only question 
that I recall is that when Mr. Hoover became 70 there was a 
requirement for him to remain in office, that the President waive 
some Civil Service rule, that he had done I think with General 
Hershey, and perhaps some others — did not do with James B. 
Bennett, I remember — and that was done. 

Mr. Hoover had become an institutional force. The power of an 
Attorney General in political terms to remove him was very limit- 
ed, if it existed. 

Finally, in performing your duty under the law, you have an 
obligation to recognize the power of the President, too. If the Presi- 
dent in fact wanted Mr. Hoover as Director of the FBI, he had the 
power to effectuate that. 

Mr. Devine. I think we all recognize that Mr. Hoover had a 
powerful influence on the Congress, on the President, and on the 
American people. Any move by an Attorney General to have him 
dismissed would have probably created quite a problem across the 

I was wondering if in your knowledge whether you or any of 
your predecessors or any of your successors ever made a recom- 
mendation to the President that he be removed or step aside. 

Mr. Clark. I am not aware of any. There was a widespread belief 
that after the 1964 election President Kennedy might have re- 
■moved him, or not renewed his — I think that is the same — about 
the same year that he reached 70 — not waive the requirement of 
the Civil Service law. 

But I am not aware of any recommendation of any sort about his 
removal except the one that I mentioned, about creating a new 
position and putting him in it for his final year. 

Mr. Devine. Again, in another vein, my final period of inquiry 
has to do with your aversion to electronic surveillance or wiretaps. 

Is your objection to that, in addition to the waste of manpower, 
the fact that although there may be a legitimate national security 
reason or an effort to solve a serious organized crime problem that 
an electronic surveillance picks up extraneous material that is 
unrelated to the offense and, therefore, is an invasion of the priva- 
cy of the American citizen? 

Mr. Clark. That is only part of it. Basically it is the practice of 
Big Brother. I don’t believe that that is the American way. 


I think we can solve crime and prevent crime without engaging 
in such methods, and that the very acceptance of the methods will 
undermine our commitment to freedom finally. 

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes. 

Mr. Clark, as one who was deeply involved in the movement of 
the sixties, you know that I know that you enjoyed the reputation 
for integrity and sensitivity to the goals of the movement. 

Certainly your statement about Dr. King’s relevance to this cen- 
tury before this committee is indicative of your feeling now and 
then that he was perhaps the most important man with the most 
important message for this, the most violent century in the history 
of mankind. 

You have stated that while you were not aware of the COINTEL- 
PRO program, as you have since come to learn of it, you were 
aware of what you call — some of the intolerable practices of the 
FBI with respect to Dr. King in April of 1968; were you not? 

Mr. Clark. Well, I think you would have to tell me what you 
meant by some of the intolerable practices. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You were aware that electronic surveillance and 
coverage of Dr. King had been effected by the FBI, that they had 
produced documents and tapes and were attempting to persuade 
public officials and the press to utilize them. 

Were you not aware of that in April of 1968? 

Mr. Clark. I was aware that there had been authorized wiretap- 
ping and bugging. As I stated earlier, I do not believe I was aware 
of the use of tapes, the playing of tapes, although I think others 
were and had endeavored to put an end to it — Burke Marshall, Bob 
Kennedy — at an earlier period. 

Now, why 

Mr. Fauntroy. You were not aware of efforts to approach Mem- 
bers of the Congress, White House personnel, members of the 
press, to suggest things that would destroy Dr. King’s effectiveness 
as a civil rights leader by FBI people? 

Mr. Clark. I was aware that the FBI was in various ways ap- 
proaching for various purposes many Members of the Congress and 
that it was always vitally interested in the press and what the 
press said about it. 

I was not aware of any organized effort, any repetitious effort. I 
think I would have assumed that they appealed to the prejudices of 
some. But I had no notion that there was a campaign systematical- 
ly conducted to destroy his reputation. 

In fact, I rather believed that after the confrontation with Bob 
Kennedy that that had pretty much dissipated. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You were aware of Mr. Hoover’s practices with 
respect to Members of the Congress on other matters. You were 
aware of what I think history will record as the pathological con- 
tempt and hostility that Mr. Hoover had for Dr. King. 

Did you have any indication of that in 1968? 

Mr. Clark. I was very much aware of Mr. Hoover’s very low 
opinion of Dr. King. I was aware of his personal inability to stop 
talking about it. 


Mr. Fauntroy. I take it it was for that reason that you felt that 
an FBI investigation of the assassination would be rather thorough, 
for the reason that you felt the FBI would feel obligated to do it to 
protect its reputation. 

Mr. Clark. I think that was an augmenting motivation. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, then, how do you explain the failure of the 
FBI to pursue the conspiracy aspects of the assassination, if be- 
cause of their past reputation with respect to Dr. King they had 
something to prove about their innocence in this question. 

We have a chart there which shows the amount of money and 
amount of mileage committed by the FBI to the investigation of 
the death of Dr. King. It shows enormous amounts of money and 
time spent up until James Earl Ray was apprehended, and then a 
dramatic dropoff. 

Our investigation indicates that the FBI did a thorough job in 
terms of identifying the suspect and bringing him — and arresting 
him and bringing him to the country. 

If the motivation which led you not to feel that you had to take a 
hand as Attorney General in this was that you felt the FBI would 
do a thorough job to protect its own reputation, how do you explain 
that they did such a poor job in the conspiracy aspects of the 

Mr. Clark. First, I hope that nothing I have said has implied to 
you that I decided not to take a hand. 

I believe that I had said, although it might have been in the 
executive session, that I spent more time and commitment on this 
investigation than any other by far and established essentially 
unique procedures for it, in which there were daily oral reports 
unprecedented in the history of the Department of Justice. 

So, I did not not take a hand. I took a very direct hand and 
personal interest. But I didn’t think I was Sherlock Holmes, and I 
wasn’t going to take over the investigation and try to run it myself. 

Now, second, you state as a conclusion that they did such a poor 
job on investigating conspiracy. You know all that you have heard. 
I don’t know. I don’t know what you base that conclusion on. 

The charts mean nothing to me except that they spent a lot of 
money until they caught James Earl Ray. Perhaps they thought 
they had the case essentially solved then. That is a possibility. 

Psychologically, I would say that once they had him arrested, at 
least, they felt that their reputation was secure. I think there were 
some very anxious moments — I know there were some very anxious 
moments for the Bureau in April and May, when they were con- 
cerned about delays. 

I think that is really what is behind Mr. Hoover’s agitation about 
the talk about hot pursuit, because it highlighted the fact that they 
hadn’t caught the person they had been telling me they were going 
to catch right away. 

But the followup on conspiracy is something I can’t evaluate 
because I don’t know what you know about what was done. 

I can say this, that after the apprehension of James Earl Ray — 
and I think this is essentially unique, too — I sent a written memo 
to the Director asking him to pursue the conspiracy possibilities. 

He expressed to me orally his intention to do that. I asked and 
assigned valuable resources and personnel, including Steve Poliak, 


to followup on conspiracy because you can’t afford to leave a stone 
unturned in a situation like this, whatever the probability. 

If history has taught us anything about assassinations it is that 
at least one generation goes to its rest in disbelief. Ours won’t be 
an exception. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You indicated that obviously, therefore, that it 
wasn’t a mistake on your part in your view not to work more 
closely with the FBI in this investigation. You had no alternative, 
as you indicated. You couldn’t realistically turn to the Secret Serv- 
ice to do the investigtion. 

But I wonder why the theory of the strike force, which you 
pointed out to us earlier in your testimony, did not occur to you; 
namely, that at least in criminal investigations, where corruption 
may have been a real factor, that certain agencies may be neutral- 
ized and, therefore, you form a strike force. 

I wonder why you didn’t think of that avenue for more direct 
involvement, particularly in light of what you knew about Mr. 
Hoover and about the tactics that the agency had been employing 
with respect to Dr. King at that time. 

Mr. Clark. Let me say two things. 

None of the people that I worked closely with and respected so 
much in the civil rights movement ever suggested disability on the 
part of the FBI, that we ought to have somebody else. 

The idea of the strike force is very similar to the idea that we 
should have used a grand jury, and in my opinion they are both 
absolutely irrelevant to this investigation. 

I ought to understand what the strike force is about. I have led 
myself to believe I created the idea. It was for very special needs. 

I have to tell you right now that had I had the full support of the 
FBI in organized crime investigations, the strike force would have 
been investigated by the FBI because it had the capacity, it had the 
manpower, the skill and the training. 

The reasons for a strike force are totally absent here. I mean, it 
is a very weak analogy to say that, well, a strike force was involved 
in corruption in Government. What we are talking about there is 
payoffs for narcotics, or prostitution, or gambling, or something 
like that — the police or the jailers or whoever it may be. 

The idea that in an emergency, with a need right now, because 
someone is barreling down the road at 70 miles an hour, that you 
try to put all these people together who haven’t worked before, 
when you don’t have a leisurely chance to convene a grand jury 
and come about the thing in a slow and deliberate fashion, that 
you are going to solve this case by bringing in postal inspection or 
something, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, is just a wrong 

It is an idea of someone that was at one time enchanted with the 
strike force. But I don’t believe it has any application here. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Fauntroy. May I request unanimous consent for 2 addition- 
al minutes, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recog- 
nized for 2 additional minutes. 


Mr. Fauntroy. My final question has to do with a comment you 
made about how the FBI operated on Capitol Hill. You indicated 
that many people understand that, or understood it. 

You mentioned specifically how the FBI operated with respect to 
the Appropriations Committee chairmen of the House and the 

With proper discretion, but with an effort to at least inform this 
member and the American people about what tactics — no — what 
steps were taken by the FBI, I wonder if you would care to elabo- 
rate on that. 

Mr. Clark. You know, I am sorry I got to barreling down the 
highway at 70 miles an hour again. I didn’t get the question. You 
want me to say what 

Mr. Fauntroy. I want you to elaborate. You said, “I knew how 
the FBI operated on Capitol Hill.” What do you mean by that, 
because I am anxious to know in general terms what you meant by 

Mr. Clark. Well, nothing particularly ominous. I really believe 
in free communication, in trusting Government employees. But you 
watch how agriculture moves around the Agriculture Committees, 
you watch how the Pentagon moves around the Defense Commit- 

The FBI would move in a slightly broader spectrum. It would be 
deeply involved in some areas — supplying even agents to help com- 
mittee staff with some of its work. 

Mr. Fauntroy. What would the agents do — help them do what? 

Mr. Clark. I don’t really know. This is something that I have 
been informed of. But I think that the Appropriations Subcommit- 
tee in the House at one time had a number of agents working on 
their analysis of budget — you know, they have accountants, the 
agents aren’t people with spyglasses as far as I know — just working 
on the accounting and analysis of budget items. 

Mr. Fauntroy. They would go to the General Accounting Office 
for that, would they? 

Mr. Clark. There is a General Accounting Office; yes. Perhaps 
the chairman preferred the FBI. Anyway, he was using them for 
some reason. I think that is a fact. 

Most Attorneys General have commented on the FBI going di- 
rectly to the White House with information. A notable exception to 
the practice was Robert Kennedy. Many Attorneys General have, 
you know, expressed grief, agitation about it. 

It involves some serious problems because you can mix politics 
and criminal investigations if you are not real careful. But still I 
was generally aware that Mr. DeLoach and other members of the 
White House — other members of the FBI would talk with people at 
the White House. 

I didn’t tell the President he couldn’t have lunch with J. Edgar 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Clark. I always enjoy hearing your responses to 
the questions, as we did in executive session. 


I will limit my questions, Mr. Chairman, to two. 

I am still interested in your elaborating somewhat more on your 
belief that the Bureau did all that it could be reasonably expected 
to do in the area of conspiracy. 

This is, of course, one of the main problems that this committee 
is wrestling with. An awful lot of people have a great deal of 
difficulty accepting the fact that a fugitive from Missouri State 
Penitentiary could finance himself and do all these things, and go 
to several continents, and get passports and operate as long as he 
did, including the assassination of Dr. King, without some kind of 
assistance from somewhere. 

Now, just as a general proposition, and then more specifically, if 
you were directing an investigation of this nature, what kinds of 
steps would you have personally directed be taken with regard to 
assessing the conspiracy angle; and second, then, do you believe 
that those steps or alternative steps that could be looked upon now 
as thorough were actually undertaken by the FBI. 

Mr. Clark. Let me say first that I did not intend to convey the 
impression that I believe that the FBI did all it could reasonably 
have done in investigating conspiracy. I don’t know. You see, I 
don’t really know how extensive its investigation of conspiracy was. 

What I do think I know is that it threw an enormous amount of 
resources at solving the case, and that it was instructed and reflect- 
ed a willingness and from time to time presented matters that 
indicated it examined a conspiracy. 

But I don’t — I can’t tell you how far they went. I think they were 
enormously relieved when they got James Earl Ray. I can remem- 
ber a couple of nights not sleeping well because one night they had 
found — somebody had found a body buried in a bush at Puerto 
Villarte, and they had to take it to Mexico City to pump the 
fingers up so you could get a print, because we were sure it was 
James Earl Ray. 

Another time there was some digging over in Camden, N.J., and 
they thought maybe we lost him there. They were greatly relieved, 
and it may be there was a letdown. It may be that I sensed that 
possibility, or that others did, Steve Poliak, or Fred Vincent, be- 
cause we did send a memo over that they should continue it. 

I can’t tell you whether they did all — your investigation makes 
you privy to far more information I think on that subject than I 

Your question, what would I have done to investigate conspiracy 
is really very difficult. Naturally I feel modestly — I think I was a 
splendid Attorney General. But I can’t tell you that I have had 
vast experience in criminal investigation. I haven’t. I have had 
probably more than most who served as Attorney General, but I 
would have to begin as pretty much a beginner. 

Mr. Fithian. Well, may I interrupt to just say, did I understand 
you earlier this morning to say in response to counsel’s question 
that you didn’t think very much of using the immunity process in 
questioning witnesses in order to elicit information, which some 
believe is a fairly valid tool in dealing with conspiracy, and maybe 
one of the only ones that you can actually elicit information that 
would lead to the apprehension of the conspirators? 


Mr. Clark. Well, something like immunity is much closer to my 
experience than direct criminal investigation because when you 
start talking about immunity you start talking about the fifth 
amendment and statutes and grand juries and legal proceedings. 

I question coerced testimony. I think it is undesirable. I think it 
is wise to seek independent evidence. The use of immunity, the last 
10 years out of Government I have watched what immunity does to 
Harrisburg, or during the Attica trials — you read the corruption 
that is involved there, people dumping on each other, you know. 
You think you have got somebody going now because you have to 
make a case. 

I also believe that it is incompatible with the purpose of the fifth 
amendment, which is to compel the State to prove its case, not to 
empower it to coerce the individual to make the case. 

So, I am not keen on immunity. I suggested a study to abolish 
immunity when I was in office. We found more than 33 immunity 
statutes, and some of them were just wildly out of control. 

As I recall at that time the FTC could grant immunity in a case 
involving the assassination of the President of the United States, 
for instance. That is lawless. 

Mr. Fithian. One last question, Mr. Clark. 

Given all the information we have, and what you discussed this 
morning about the role of the FBI in discrediting Dr. King, would 
you care to summarize suggestions. 

You came on pretty strong at one point, I believe, and said that 
this committee had a distinct responsibility to recommend changes 
in the law, so that we could not have this situation develop again. 

More specifically, perhaps briefly, what are those firm recom- 
mendations that many of us would like to pursue? 

Mr. Clark. They are before the Congress in the form of a draft 
bill that is called a bill to control the FBI, that I came down as 
national chairman of the Advisory Council for the American Civil 
Liberties Union to announce. 

I will ask John Shaddock, who is the Washington representative 
of the ACLU, to provide you with it. But it is not dissimilar to — it 
contains in fact things that I had seen and worked on over many 
years earlier. 

First, investigative techniques should arise from authorization in 
law. Every form of acceptable investigation should be determined 
by the lawmakers. We have evaded our responsibility and made 
the cop on the street, the agent out there, make the tough decision. 
That is wrong. 

In a way title III was an effort to begin to regulate that. Until 
1968 we had just failed to encourage, to say whether you can 
wiretap or not. We knew there was flagrant wiretapping, private, 
Federal, State, and local. 

There were books written about it all over the place, an absolute- 
ly lawless invasion of constitutional rights. We didn’t have the 
courage to come to grips with it. 

We need that desperately about all kinds of technical devices. 
We need it about the use of informers. We need it throughout 
areas of conduct in investigation. 

Every act authorized by police and investigators should be estab- 
lished in law. There should be clear areas of prohibition and strict 


punishment for prohibition. There should be openness in govern- 
ment because without that openness, without the opportunity to 
review, you can’t find the misconduct. 

There should, in my judgment, be sometime a Federal investiga- 
tive agency review board that has the power to determine miscon- 
duct by subpena and compulsion of testimony and to take disciplin- 
ary action. 

And it should be comprised of people, including people whose 
rights are less valued in our society than the rights of others. 
There is a pretty good inventory. Some of the things are fairly easy 
and we have tended to get done. 

One of the provisions I liked best in the Omnibus Crime Control 
Act of 1968 was the final requirement that the Director of the FBI 
be approved by the Senate, because I had lived as a young lawyer 
through the McCarthy period and saw the possibility of someone 
coming in as Director there, requiring no Senate approval, no 
check or balance, and terrible consequences. 

I think the U.S. Attorney’s office should be removed from Senate 
confirmation because that vests political decisionmaking in the 
selection of the executive branch prosecutor in the area where the 
member that has that power is most interested, among his political 
contributors, and the rest. 

Those are some of them. There were 20 or 30 different elements, 
but those are the key ones. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. 

Mr. Sawyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Anything further? 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask just one 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Blakey. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Clark, this is a philosophical question that you 
and I had discussed shortly before the hearings. There were going 
to be two, and Judge Preyer did such an eloquent job of asking one 
of them, and you did such an eloquent job of answering it, I am 
really hesitant to ask you the other question lest I have to follow 
such a performance. 

Let me ask it, anyway: 

I am sure you recall in 1965 and 1967 when the President’s 
Crime Commission wrestled with some of the problems about how 
to investigate organized crime cases, and the organized crime task 
force, which you may recall that I worked for, recommended to the 
full commission that the sophisticated use of such things as grand 
jury, immunity, and wiretapping was very useful in breaking con- 
spiracy cases. I think I recall your eloquent statement against 
wiretapping in the commission. 

Nevertheless, the commission, at least the majority of them, did 
recommend to President Johnson that legislation in this area be 

I think you can recall, too, a long conversation you and I had in 
the Wiretap Commission when the Congress, in a joint Congression- 
al-Presidential commission had the opportunity to study the 1968 
act. We discussed again your philosophy. 


In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would be appro- 
priate to include in the record at this point as Martin Luther King 
exhibit F-537, a four- or five-paragraph review of the evidence 
taken by the Wiretap Commission of the usefulness of wiretap in 
homicide cases? 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 

MLK Exhibit F-537 

Electronic Surveillance 


(8) History crimes: As a rule, court-ordered 
electronic surveillance has proven useful in the in- 
vestigation of offenses which are being or are about 
to be committed. Where the offense has already been 
completed, surveillance is rarely used. As one Com- 
mission witness testified, eavesdropping “can only be 
used most effectively where there is an ongoing con- 
spiracy. Investigating old crimes and old events is 
really not what [it] is all about.” 454 Thus, crimes 
such as robbery, rape, and murder are generally not 
investigated by court-ordered surveillance. 

The primary problem with using court-ordered 
surveillance to investigate history crimes is that once 
the crime is completed, there is usually no further 
discussion of it by the participants. 445 Probable cause 
to believe such discussions will occur is difficult to 
establish, 456 as is the use of particular telephones for 
such conversations. 447 If the investigators have 
probable cause to support a surveillance order, they 
may be close to an arrest and eavesdropping may not 
be needed. 444 

On the other hand, there is some indication that 
courts will find probable cause in a homicide case 
somewhat more quickly than with other offenses. 4 *’ 
Where a history offense is part of an ongoing con- 
spiracy, probable cause about the occurrence and 
location of conversations may be less difficult to 
show. 440 This may be true, for example, of an 
Organized Crime contract killing. 441 Thus homicide 
is the history crime in which electronic surveillance is 
most frequently used. 442 

Some use has also been reported with reference tc 
locating fugitives, 443 although these situations could 
more properly be considered ongoing offenses. In 
most fugitive cases, the surveillance was deemed un- 
productive. 464 Where evidence of past events is 
developed, it usually comes “fortuitously,” 465 as a 
“serendipitous” result 444 of surveillance directed at 
a presently continuing offense. On occasion, a sur- 
veillance order may be obtained for a present offense 
with the hope that the eavesdropping will discover 
./evidence of a past crime. 447 . 

Despite the difficulties involved, surveillance or- 
ders have occasionally been used effectively to in- 
vestigate history offenses. In Nebraska 464 and 
Wisconsin, 469 surveillance orders produced crucial 
evidence in homicide investigations. In both in- 
stances the prosecutor “tickled” the suspects into 
talking about the crimes on the tapped telephones or 
in the bugged premises by questioning and then, 
releasing them. Part of the probable cause statement 
in the Nebraska case included a psychiatrist's opinion 
that the defendant would react to the stimulus of in- 
terrogation in precisely that fashion. 470 Such 
“tickling” was also used in a theft investigation in 
Queens, New York. Company employees were told 
of the thefts, taps were put on the phones, and people 
started talking. 471 


Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would like, if I could, just to read 
part of the paragraph of that summary. It said: 

Despite the difficulties involved, surveillance orders have occasionally been used 
effectively to investigate history— or the— what the commission meant at this time, 
homicide offenses. In Nebraska and Wisconsin surveillance orders produced critical 
evidence in homicide investigations. In both instances prosecutors “tickled” the 
suspects into talking about the crimes on the tapped telephones or in the bugged 
premises by questioning and then releasing them. 

These techniques, that is, a grand jury, immunity, wiretapping, 
were not employed in the King investigation. You indicated that 
you thought it was inappropriate, either to use them as a matter of 
policy, in the case of wiretapping, or that you thought there was no 
occasion for the grand jury or immunity. 

This is a long preface for what I hope is an important philosophi- 
cal question. You have suggested here today — and indeed you sug- 
gested in your “Crime in America”, that measures such as this 
could be fairly characterized as repressive, and that a free society 
ought not adopt repressive measures like this in an effort to inves- 
tigate crime, that in the long run there is no conflict between 
liberty and security, and an effort to adopt repressive measures 
like this out of fear leads to more problems than it solves, and that 
we need not pay a price in liberty or important values, that price 
being the adoption of these kinds of measures. 

That’s the preface. Let me ask you the question: If I were to tell 
you that the utilization of an executive session like a grand jury, 
and a congressional subpena, like a grand jury subpena, and the 
immunity orders authorized by the Organized Crime Control Act in 
1970 by this committee, had developed at least the outlines of what 
may well have been a conspiracy in the King case — it may well 
have been, and I am certainly making no final judgment; that is up 
to the committee — may well have identified people who could have 
been associated with James Earl Ray in Dr. King’s death and 
would argue from that that the failure on the part of the FBI and 
the Department of Justice under your leadership to utilize those 
techniques in 1968 may have led to the failure to solve the conspir- 
acy dimensions of this case, would — and this is the question — would 
not our society have paid a very dear price in paranoia, distrust of 
government, concern among Black people at the fairness of justice, 
concern among Black people that our society cared enough to 
investigate Dr. King’s death? 

The question I am asking you is, Don’t we pay a price to use 
these investigative techniques? Don’t we also pay a price to not use 
them if not using them leads to failure to solve a case of impor- 
tance to so many people as the death of Dr. Martin Luther King? 

Mr. Clark. Let me say, first, Mr. Blakey, you and I have been on 
opposite sides of this subject. In the President’s Crime Commission 
you were an insider there, and I was an outsider. In the Wiretap 
Commission you again were in the position of power and I was 
outside, just saying what I thought; and here again, I don’t — I put 
this by — question the wisdom of injecting these differences of view 
into the Martin Luther King assassination investigation. I think 
they are important public questions, but unrelated here. 

First, the “if’ that you propound is a big “if.” It is like if you 
were beating your mother. In other words, if we solved the case — 


and God knows it is important to solve the case and know the 
truth always, and here more so than always— but the FBI wasn’t 
terribly reticent about asking for things and it never suggested, 
except in the case of the family and for the purposes of pursuit and 
at the cost of the prosecution, possibly, the use of wiretap. 

But, finally, what a very sad justification for wiretap, the life of 
Martin Luther King, whom wiretapping and surveillance so nearly 
destroyed. To say that it would solve his murder and therefore we 
should authorize it, and we can control it because his life, above 
all, exemplifies the capacity for misuse— I well remember Whitney 
Young, who served on the President’s Crime Commission, who 
briefly, believed that wiretapping was desirable because he saw 
organized crime preying on his people in the ghetto by selling them 
heroin, and he hated it — he was a compassionate man — finally 
saying, after some of the revelations before Whitney died about Dr. 
King, how wrong he thought it was because, of course, such instru- 
mentalities of power will be used against the wrong people. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Clark, let me kind of ask the question and 
make a comment. You and I indeed have had this discussion on a 
number of occasions, and maybe it would be appropriate to say for 
the record, nothing that I have ever advocated in the use of wire- 
tapping would ever justify what happened to Martin Luther King, 
would it, as far as you know? 

Mr. Clark. A question between justification and cause, I guess. I 
assume you wouldn’t 

Mr. Blakey. I mean the kind of wiretapping that was authorized 
in title III would never have been permitted as against Dr. Martin 
Luther King? 

Mr. Clark. When was the last time a judge denied a request for 
an order? 

Mr. Blakey. The question is: When was the last time that they 
did give one where the probable cause was not adequately estab- 

Mr. Clark. It’s amazing how effective we have gotten. We’re 
never wrong. The judges always approve them. 

Mr. Blakey. You are quite right, that we shouldn’t inject the 
broader philosophical argument in it. 

What I would comment though is that among the motivations 
that led the House of Representatives, not the Senate, to adopt title 
III was the death of Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy. It 
was repeatedly said on the floor— and I would have to add that 
how ironic it would be if one of the legislative motivations for 
enactment of title III was the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
and then it was not employed to solve his assassination, and a 
reasonable case could be made had it been employed in 1968 and it 
might well have contributed to its solution. 

Thank you, Mr. Clark. 

Chairman. Stokes I just have one further question, Mr. Clark, 
and I want to take advantage of your legal mind. This question was 
posed by Judge Preyer, and my question, really, is a further exten- 
sion of his question: 

It seems to me that ultimately one of the questions that this 
committee must grapple with in its ultimate determination is 
whether the FBI must bear some responsibility for Dr. King’s 


death. In that vein, let me further extend the hypothetical question 
put to you by Judge Preyer. He mentioned the FBI being engaged 
in a program to destroy Dr. King. We know now from the evidence 
that that program of destruction started out firstly as an unofficial 
program and then became an official program of a law enforce- 
ment agency of the U.S. Government, but it went even further 
than that, because we have in the record memorandum and data 
that say after he has been destroyed — they talk of the condition 
that will reign in this country as relates to Negro people; it talks of 
the utter confusion, et cetera, et cetera. 

So this law enforcement agency then arrogates unto itself the 
power to choose Dr. King’s successor, the next man to lead the 
Negro people of this country. That then, to me, seems to go even 
further than destruction, when such an agency arrogates unto 
itself such unconstitutional power. 

Then add to this equation that we now have in the record memo- 
randums and data by this law enforcement agency of the United 
States in which Dr. King is described as being a traitor to the 
country, a traitor to his race, thereby attempting to set the mood of 
a person who has been a traitor to this country and therefore does 
not deserve any kind of consideration. 

Add to this that there is in the record now evidence that he was 
described as being the most dangerous Negro in this country. Then 
I would want you to place it in the framework of the legal responsi- 
bility that we know, that a parent has to a child, a guardian has to 
a ward, that a government has to its citizens. I think it goes 
without saying that we are talking about a higher degree of respon- 
sibility when we talk of those trust positions. 

So when we take it in the sense that what we are talking about 
is something that gets to the very root and fabric of a democracy, 
when an agency of a government that is charged with the protec- 
tion of the citizens utilizes all the powers of that agency to destroy 
a human being, and having set that type of mood and climate, I 
would ask you to assume one further fact in the equation: Assume 
that this attitude, this destructive targeting, is known to right-wing 
hate groups in this country, particularly those in which monetary 
consideration has been offered for the death of Dr. King, would it 
be difficult for you to legally assess some responsibility for the 
death of Dr. King on the FBI, assuming all of those hypotheticals? 

Mr. Clark. Legally, yes. 

Let me add to that a little bit: First, it became very clear to me 
that such an organization should never have the power to wiretap 
or bug. An agency with those qualities simply cannot be empow- 
ered with such potential invasion of individual dignity. 

Let me answer rather than legally, because, see, legally to estab- 
lish responsibility you would have to show that, well, perhaps as 
Judge Preyer was suggesting, that some level of negligence would 
essentially be involved in a murder, that a person intentionally 
acted in a way calculated to cause another to commit a murder. 

Now, if you had evidence of that, legally, yes, I haven’t read 
about that in the newspapers and I don’t know of that. Morally, let 
me look at it for a moment with you: In a sense it is unfair to all to 
take the FBI out of context and examine it in some isolation, as if 
that were possible. We have had pervasive racism in this society 


and we have to recognize that, and there were those who knew and 
enjoyed what seemed to be the support of the FBI for their own 

And I think it’s true of human nature that — as I tried to say 
earlier— that if I have a particular prejudice and something that 
my social contacts have caused me to respect — the church, the 
Government, patriotism— the FBI shares that, reinforces that prej- 
udice, then that compounds my commitment and my capacity to 
act on that prejudice; and I think in a sense the values of the 
Nation created the FBI and it reflected those values; and it ap- 
pealed to prejudices in us, and it in that sense certainly increased 
the probability of violence of this sort. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

Any further questions from members of the committee? 

Mr. Clark, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before this 
committee, under our rules, the witness is entitled to 5 minutes for 
the purpose of explaining or amplifying or making any further 
statement he so chooses relative to his testimony before our com- 

I would extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose, if 
you so desire. 

Mr. Clark. Well, I appreciate the opportunity and commend the 
practice, but I have already burdened you with enough of my views 
for one morning. 

Thank you. 

Chairman Stokes. I certainly want to thank you for your appear- 
ance here this morning. You’ve been very helpful to the committee. 
It is nice to have had you here. Thank you very much. 

The committee will recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the com- 
mittee to reconvene at 2 p.m.] 

Afternoon Session 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. 

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our next witness, Mr. Chairman, is Stephen Poliak. Mr. Poliak 
joined the Office of the Solicitor General in the Justice Department 
in 1961. In 1965, he became Deputy to Assistant Attorney General 
John Doar of the Civil Rights Division, and he took over that 
division in 1967. 

Mr. Poliak remained with the Justice Department until January 
1969. Mr. Poliak is at present in private practice of law in Wash- 

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair calls Mr. Poliak. 

I would ask you to please stand and raise your right hand and be 

You solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this com- 
mittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God? 

Mr. Pollak. I do. 


Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. 

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Peter Beeson. 


Mr. Beeson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Poliak, would you state your full name for the record, please. 

Mr. Pollak. Stephen John Poliak. 

Mr. Beeson. I wonder if I could ask you to give a brief rundown 
of your professional background prior to and during your associ- 
ation with the Justice Department, until you left in a change of 
administrations in 1969. 

Mr. Pollak. Yes. I began the practice of law here in Washington 
in 1956 with the law firm of Covington and Burling. I was with 
that firm until November of 1961, when I joined Archibald Cox in 
the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States Department 
of Justice. 

I served in that office for two and a half or so years and then left 
the department to serve the Task Force on the War Against Pover- 
ty, and then briefly as the Deputy General Counsel of the new 
Office of Economic Opportunity. 

In March, late March of 1965, Mr. Doar and Mr. Katzenbach 
invited me to return to the Department of Justice as Mr. Doar’s 
deputy, and I did so and served as what is now called Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General through February of 1967, when Presi- 
dent Johnson asked me to serve as his Advisor on the National 
Capital Area. 

I served in that post through October of that year, following 
approval by the Congress of a plan to reorganize the District gov- 

In October I returned to the Department of Justice and served as 
the Special Assistant to the Attorney General, and then was sworn 
in as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights 
Division in January of 1968, January 3, 1 believe. 

I served through the end of the administration. I believe I left 
office at noon on January 20, 1969. 

Mr. Beeson. So that you had been deputy — excuse me — Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division for ap- 
proximately 3 months at the time of Dr. King’s assassination? 

Mr. Pollak. Something over 3 months, that is correct. I had 
actually as special assistant carried some responsibilities with re- 
spect to the division because Mr. Doar was trying the so-called 
Neshoba case in Mississippi before the U.S. District Court and was 
not in the city. 

So, I had a role supervising the division in his absence. 

Mr. Beeson. All right. 

Mr. Pollak, there has been some testimony before the committee 
already concerning a strained relationship between the Depart- 
ment of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation at around 
the time of Dr. King’s assassination. 

I wonder if you could give the committee your conception of the 
relationship that existed between the Civil Rights Division and the 
FBI in 1968. 


Mr. Pollak. My perception of the relationship between the Civil 
Rights Division and the FBI in 1968 was a product of the experi- 
ence I had serving in the division in the previous 3 or so years. 

That was that — for a number of reasons — that the civil rights 
investigations which we requested in large, large number often 
placed the Bureau in some positions of conflict with local police 
agencies, when the Bureau was called upon to investigate possible 
charges of police brutality. 

I had the feeling at that time that the number and type of 
assignments which our requests called for led some in the Bureau 
to be less enthusiastic about those requests than they were about 
other undertakings. 

On the other hand, I had had extensive experience with their 
response to our requests, and it was my belief and conclusion that 
they carried out our requests well and that what we were called on 
to do to perform our responsibility was to draw requests that set in 
motion the proper investigation which we wanted. 

Mr. Beeson. Speaking specifically about the assassination inves- 
tigation which was predicated on a possible conspiracy to violate 
Dr. King’s civil rights, do you recall any reluctance at all on the 
part of the Bureau to investigate that case? 

Mr. Pollak. I don’t recall any reluctance to engage in that 
investigation. I might say that we understood in the Civil Rights 
Division— and I am sure throughout the department— what the 
meaning of a full investigation was. 

What Mr. Clark requested orally, and what I confirmed with my 
written request to the Director of the FBI on the evening of April 
4, 1968 was a request for a full investigation. 

That, in the terminology between the Department and the 
Bureau, meant that every lead was to be pursued, that all effort to 
carry forward the investigation was to be made, that nothing was 
to be spared. 

So that in requesting a full investigation we understood that all 
of the bells would be clanging, and the fire engine would be moving 
out there to meet the responsibilities in every possible way. 

My observation in the period of time after that request was 
made, both in oral communications and then upon receipt of writ- 
ten communications, was that the response was a full one. 

Mr. Beeson. I believe in 1968 that a situation had developed 
whereby local U.S. attorneys did not become involved in local civil 
rights investigations under Federal statutes, that responsibility for 
civil rights investigations throughout the country under Federal 
civil rights statutes fell, with few exceptions, on Department of 
Justice attorneys in Washington. 

Is that in fact correct? 

Mr. Pollak. That was our practice, Mr. Beeson. 

We have the prosecutorial and law enforcement responsibility 
under the Federal statutes, and in many of the situations I guess 
the complexity of the investigation which had to be mounted was 
such that we carried it directly in Washington. 

The only difference that I recall in that practice was stemmed 
from the southern district of New York, where I believe it was a 
succession of U.S. attorneys — and Mr. Morgenthau stands in my 


recollection — wanted to pursue the direction of the investigations 
in that jurisdiction. 

There was a man or two elsewhere in the United States and my 
memory is in Chicago and possibly one other jurisdiction, where 
occasionally the direction was in the hands of the local office of the 
U.S. attorney. But primarily and almost exclusively the Civil 
Rights Division carried that responsibility. 

Mr. Beeson. Was this solely because of the complexity of the 
cases or was it also because of the reluctance of local U.S. attor- 
neys to become involved in local civil rights prosecutions? 

Mr. Pollak. I think that my perception is that it was also the 
latter. A major portion of our effort in the period of time that I 
served in the Department, but not exclusively so by any means — 
the major portion of the effort was in the States of the Deep South. 

While we had good cooperation from the U.S. attorneys and their 
staffs in assisting us when we pursued a case, and in joining us in 
the courtroom with a case, we felt that the — I think we felt those 
U.S. attorneys and their staffs were desirous of concerning them- 
selves with other Federal law enforcement, and we considered it a 
matter which we could best handle directly. 

Mr. Beeson. The investigative files in the assassination investiga- 
tion reflect no involvement whatsoever by local U.S. attorneys’ 
offices, with the exception of the Birmingham office, which did 
receive reports because that was the jurisdiction in which the 
Federal complaint was filed. 

But outside of the fact that they were also included in the 
distribution of the paperwork of the investigation, there is no other 
evidence of active involvement by local U.S. attorneys overseeing 
in this investigation. 

Is that consistent with your recollection and do you consider that 
a defect in the investigation oi not? 

Mr. Pollak. It is consistent with my recollection, and I don’t 
consider it a defect in the investigation. 

We did not consider that the investigation of the laws committed 
to enforcement by the Civil Rights Division had been or should be 
pursued through direction of the local U.S. attorneys or with par- 
ticular participations of their staff up to the time that we had a 

I might say, just to be sure that the record reflects the picture as 
we saw it, that U.S. attorneys in pursuit of the law cases that we 
brought often played significant roles. 

U.S. attorney Floyd Buford of Georgia prosecuted the case 
against the persons charged with responsibility for the slaying of 
Lemual Penn on the highway in Georgia. 

So that U.S. attorneys stepped forward at our request and played 
important roles in law cases once they were lodged. But they had 
not done so at the stage of investigation. 

Mr. Beeson. Would you describe, please, the role which you 
yourself adopted in the investigation in Washington, the assassina- 
tion investigation, and the role which you considered appropriate 
for other attorneys within the Civil Rights Division, in terms of 
supervising or actually participating in the day-to-day investigation 
of the assassination. 

Mr. Pollak. Yes. 


I saw my role as the law enforcement official within the depart- 
ment with prosecutorial responsibility for the statute under which 
the investigation and then the complaint in Birmingham was 
lodged; that is, 18 U.S.C. 241. 

I considered that as part of that prosecutorial responsibility, I 
had the responsibility for supervising the investigation being car- 
ried out by the FBI for the vigor, completeness, and activity of that 

I considered that D. Robert Owen, and I, my first assistant, and 
the staff within the division that from time to time worked on the 
King assassination matter, were responsible for carrying forward 
the supervision of the investigation so that we would be confident 
in the event we came to prosecute, or in the event a prosecution 
was to be mounted by another jurisdiction, then our fact-finding 
was to be made available, we would have a fact-finding record 
which would be full and complete and responsible. 

Mr. Beeson. Would you give us, as specific as possible an idea of 
how you carried out your responsibilities in supervising the FBI’s 
conspiracy investigation in this case? 

Mr. Pollak. Yes. 

Of course, the investigation commenced on the 4th of April with 
the request for the full investigation. The conspiracy investigation 
was commenced at that time, since the statute that the investiga- 
tion was mounted under was a conspiracy statute. 

We saw the investigation commence. I myself made a trip to 
Memphis on the 8th of April, and met with the special agent in 
charge of the Memphis office, Mr. Jensen. 

I might say that that trip was also related in a significant 
manner to the staging on that day, which my recollection is was 
the day before Dr. King’s funeral in Atlanta — there was a march 
and considerable concern as to the situation in Memphis on the 8th 
of April, and I was there also in that connection. 

But in supervising the investigation we received the reports of 
the Bureau orally and in significant respects in writing. We re- 
viewed those reports. 

We, as Mr. Clark said this morning, were not the directors of the 
investigation. It was not either by training or by experience an 
undertaking which we made during the investigative stage, to 
direct the particular steps to be taken to solve a crime. 

We set it in motion. We received the reports. We made further 
followup requests as we thought those requests were appropriate. 
Indeed, as I did and Mr. Clark mentioned in this instance he did, at 
times subsequent to April 4. 

Mr. Beeson. In terms of actually targeting specific possible con- 
spirators in the case, identifying and then following out specific 
conspiratorial leads, would it be fair to state that that was at least 
initially solely the province of the FBI, and that your function was 
merely to review the leads that they had considered significant 
enough to follow out? 

Mr. Pollak. Certainly initially, at the earlier point, the FBI, 
through its investigation, came upon the leads and as the draft 
report, the staff report indicates, the FBI set down a 24-hour dead- 
line for following out leads. 


Until those particular leads came to be reported to us, those 
leads were not known to us. 

Subsequently, as the leads came to our attention through written 
reports and contemporaneous oral reports, we did review those 
reports and ascertained on the time frame forward into 1968 that 
various leads were followed down. 

As you know, I made additional followup requests that leads 
should be pursued and as the year wore on, made particular re- 
quests on three occasions with specific categories of leads or inci- 
dents or questions which we thought warranted further investiga- 
tion, particularly then, since Mr. Ray had been arrested, with 
respect to the possibility of a conspiracy. 

Mr. Beeson. Do you recall any specific conspiratorial leads that 
you yourself asked the FBI to pursue, independent of what the FBI 
was doing themselves? 

Mr. Pollak. I would not recall them at this point, as far away 
from 1968, and indeed I do not want to suggest that I have a full 
recall because I do not. 

But in preparing to come before the committee, and to meet with 
you and Mr. Sacco earlier this year, I sought to refresh myself by 
reviewing some of the papers. 

My recollection is as to specific requests, refreshed as I have just 
described, includes a request of some detail stemming from an 
interview of one of the attorneys in our division, Mr. J. Harold 
Flannery, with a man named Sartor in the Memphis area, who had 
been said by a man named Epps, with whom I had met in Wash- 
ington at the Vice President’s request, to have some leads. 

Mr. Flannery interviewed Mr. Sartor, a memorandum was pre- 
pared raising a number of different questions of possible conspira- 
torial background to the assassination, and I forwarded that to the 
Director, I believe, in the month of September 1968, with a request 
that those leads be pursued. 

Of course, in the month of June and again in July I had commu- 
nicated with the Director, requesting that all leads indicating the 
possibility of a conspiracy be immediately run down and reported. 

So, Mr. Sartor request was really supplemental to what they 
were currently doing. 

Additionally, I made two followup requests on November 7, 1968 
and another one on November 15, 1968 requesting that specific 
matters reported in the articles in the Look magazine by Mr. Huie 
be pursued, particularly some of those that I recall to mind include 
reports of Mr. Ray’s statements about the discussions with and 
actions with Mr. Raoul, or a Raoul, questions concerning the source 
of various funds, a question concerning the red automobile which 
had been purchased in 1967, and a number of detailed requests 
that were in those two requests to Mr. Hoover. 

Those are the matters which I recall having raised in specific 
with the Director on the conspiracy 

Mr. Beeson. Let me ask you this, Mr. Pollak. You have had a 
chance to review a draft of, the staff report of the investigation, 
which at this point has tentative indications from our reviews. 

The report does indicate that while numerous conspiracy leads 
were pursued, there was a significant failure to pursue the possibil- 
ity of family involvement, despite the possession by the FBI and 


the Department of Justice, relatively early in the investigation, of 
a substantial amount of evidence indicating the possibility of 
family involvement. 

Would you care to comment on that aspect of the report? Do you 
recall, for example, specific consideration with the FBI or within 
the Department of Justice of this possibility, and do you recall 
focusing any attention on the possibility of family involvement? 

Mr. Pollak. My recollection is that there was an enormous flow 
of facts or possible facts coming to us on paper and in oral reports 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

The situation was such that we had one person in our division 
assigned to make a name index on multiply cards so that we could 
keep track of the individuals identified in the Bureau reports, and 
the dates in which those individuals were alleged to have taken 
particular actions. 

My recollection includes reference to the family. I was certainly 
aware of Mr. Ray’s family. I do not have a recollection that there 
was any indication that ever came to my attention in the time 
until I left the Department, that the family members were objects 
of unresolved indications that they had been a member of a con- 
spiratorial plan to assassinate Dr. King. 

I am clear that it was my perception at the time, during the 
period commencing on the 4th of April and running through the 
time that I left the division, that the FBI was responding to the 
requests that were made and conducting a broad-scale and a deep 

I would say that my recollection includes a level of intensity of 
the investigation which was highest in the period until Mr. Ray’s 
arrest on the 8th of June. I consider that something over 2-month 
period to have been an investigation, both into the persons respon- 
sible for the slaying, being an individual or more than one individ- 
ual, and also, then, upon the identification of a single person 
involved, an investigation to find that single person. 

I am also aware that once the arrest occurred that the — this 
intensity seemed somewhat to be reduced. I may draw that conclu- 
sion or recollect my drawing the conclusion 10 years ago from 
several facts. 

One: The Bureau inquired of me in the month of July whether 
the complaint filed April 17 in Atlanta, the conspiracy complaint, 
could be dismissed. 

Two: In the period immediately following Mr. Ray’s arrest I 
prepared, and the Attorney General signed, a request to the 
Bureau to continue to pursue all leads with respect to the possibil- 
ity of conspiracy. 

At least in looking back on it I would conclude that I must have 
felt some need to make clear to the Bureau that it was the Divi- 
sion’s perception that the conspiracy possibility had not been run 
to the ground, and that further investigation with all alacrity 
under the heading full investigation should continue to be pursued. 

Mr. Beeson. Ultimately you were satisfied that a full conspiracy 
complaint — full conspiracy investigation was pursued? 

Mr. Pollak. 1 was satisfied that the Bureau was responding to 
the request for a full investigation and I considered that that 
investigation was ongoing at the time I left the Department. 


If I considered it had not been concluded, I would not have been 
prepared to dismiss the conspiracy complaint, as indeed in July of 
1968 I was not prepared to agree to its dismissal. 

So, I considered that the matter had not been brought to a point 
where it was incumbent on any of the men and women working 
with me to suggest to me that the time had come to close the 

Indeed, I believe it is my perception that some of the particular 
inquiries that I had made in my requests had not finally been 
responded to by the time I left office. 

But, I would hasten to say that the amount of paper coming in 
on a city-by-city or special agent in charge office basis — in other 
words, those monthly reports — were from each city where the con- 
spiracy investigation was mounted — the amount of paper was so 
great that it was not easy to identify that each of the leads had 
been finally run down without very close checking. 

Mr. Beeson. I understand. 

One final question, Mr. Poliak. 

We met once before in an interview. I believe at that time you 
stated that you were aware during your period as head of the Civil 
Rights Division of Mr. Hoover’s extreme dislike for Dr. King and of 
the security investigation of Dr. King and SCLC for possible Com- 
munist infiltration. 

My question is, did you ever consider the possibility that the FBI 
would be unable to pursue an objective investigation given that 
background of an adversary relationship against Dr. King? 

Mr. Pollak. My recollection of my awareness is this: I received 
during the period as first assistant, and then as Assistant Attorney 
General, reports of a classified nature from the FBI with respect to 
it, which appeared to me — and I believe they were so denominat- 
ed — to concern themselves with the possibility of a Communist 
influence on Dr. King and his organization. 

It was my perception that those reports must be flowing from a 
request made by some other division in Justice, and that they were 
being forwarded to me for information. 

I was aware of that. I believe that I would say that my aware- 
ness was that those reports were reflective of an investigation in 
pursuit of one of the statutes of the United States. 

I was not aware of any wiretapping or bugging of Dr. King. My 
knowledge in that respect was less than Mr. Clark has testified to 
this morning. 

I did not know, for example, that there had been previously 
outstanding requests for wiretapping and the incident he spoke of 
respecting Mr. Doar bringing the matter up with Mr. Clark, and 
Mr. Clark in turn bringing it up to Attorney General Katzenbach. 

The extent of my awareness was that Mr. Hoover had made 
critical remarks, extremely critical remarks, about Dr. King, and I 
was aware of that. 

Now, on that background, I did not feel that the full investiga- 
tion which we asked for would be carried out in less than a com- 
plete and devoted manner. 

I think that I would say to some extent I had been aware that in 
the past there had been investigative requests which were not 


pleasing to the Bureau, and they had carried those out in what I 
thought was a dedicated manner. 

I observed that — I mean, I had observed hundreds if not thou- 
sands of Bureau requests. I had observed the response to those 
requests. I had prepared lawsuits from the material they had devel- 
oped, and I had found it to be of a high quality. 

I did not consider that the Bureau’s response to the King request 
would be interfered with by an attitude of the Director. Maybe I 
should have, but I did not consider the possibility. 

Mr. Beeson. I have no further questions, Mr. Poliak. 

Thank you. 

Chairman Stokes. At this time the committee will operate under 
the 5-minute rule. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time of 
Mr. Poliak. We appreciate your testimony. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, 
Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions of Mr. Poliak 
either, but I do want to welcome him to the committee and to say 
to him, as I said to Mr. Clark, that during the decade of the sixties 
he was among the most trusted and sensitive of those in Govern- 
ment to our efforts to improve the quality of life for all Americans 
and particularly for Black Americans. 

Mr. Pollak. Might I say thank you, Congressman, very much. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. 

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Poliak, I want to compliment you on your recall during those 
trying times when you were in the Department of Justice. 

Let me try to summarize what I think were the most persuasive 
parts, or dramatic statements that you made in response to Mr. 
Beeson’s inquiry. I believe you said that you had a feeling that the 
Bureau was less enthusiastic in investigating civil rights matters 
than others, however, that they did carry out their requests well. 

I think you said you recall no reluctance to engage in those 
investigations and when you requested a full investigation, that 
your observation was that there was a full response, and, finally, 
that you were satisfied that the Bureau responded to the requests 
for full investigation. 

Does that about summarize your testimony? 

Mr. Pollak. Yes; I think those points were made by me this 
afternoon, Mr. Devine, yes. 

I might say, because it has been a background to my testimony 
here today, that in the Civil Rights Division we had expended a 
great deal of time on the so-called Neshoba case. That was the 
slaying of three young men in the summer of 1964 in Mississippi, 
three civil rights workers. That was a matter which the Bureau 
investigated at the Division’s request, using techniques which I 
observed the Bureau to use in investigating the slaying of Dr. 
King — interview techniques — and it was an extremely difficult case 
to crack, according to my observation. 


The Klan or Klan-influenced people were involved, and the 
Bureau carried that request for investigation out. It produced evi- 
dence to the Division, the Division followed up on the evidence 
with attorney interviews, and presented the case to the — my recol- 
lection is — the grand jury; but I am not clear on that recollection. 
In any event, it was tried and a guilty verdict rendered by the 
Mississippi jury. 

That was only one of the cases, Mr. Devine, that we had investi- 
gated through the techniques we requested the Bureau or antici- 
pated the Bureau would use in the King matter; but we had seen 
those techniques work, and that was our experience. 

Mr. Devine. Some question was raised, again by staff counsel, 
Mr. Beeson, relative to the participation or lack thereof by the U.S. 
attorney’s office. Isn’t it an accurate statement, Mr. Poliak, to state 
that the U.S. attorney’s office is the prosecuting arm of the Justice 
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the investi- 
gative arm, and that it is the duty and responsibility of the Bureau 
to investigate and present the facts to the U.S. attorney, who, in 
turn, may or may not authorize prosecution based on whether or 
not he feels the facts warrant prosecution? 

Mr. Pollak. That is my perception from afar of the typical 
criminal case which comes across the docket of the U.S. attorney. 
In the civil rights investigations that we used the Bureau, those 
were several different kinds, Mr. Devine. We had a range of laws 
which gave us civil causes of action, enacted by the Congress, 
public accommodations, equal employment, public facilities, voting. 
We used the Bureau extensively in those investigations and they 
would customarily be asked to make a preliminary investigation; 
and after we had a few facts that were elicited, we would make a 
determination whether there was a warrant to proceed further, 
and then we would make additional requests. 

That was primarily the way we proceeded in criminal investiga- 
tions, too, and I think our role was a more involved role than the 
customary U.S. attorney role, where the file is presented to the 
attorney at the time he is ready to prosecute. 

Mr. Devine. But the Civil Rights Division would request an 
investigation by the Bureau, which would be conducted, and rarely 
did the U.S. attorney’s office initiate an investigation by its own 
motion; is that correct? 

Mr. Pollak. That’s correct. There were some, Congressman, that 
were initiated in the field, rarely, but some, over police brutality, 
alleged police brutality, so-called 242 investigations, 18 U.S.C. 242. 

Mr. Devine. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. 

Mr. Pollak, I would just like to follow up on a question from my 
colleague there: On April 8, what was the purpose of your visit to 

Mr. Pollak. The primary purpose was to be the President’s 
representative in connection with the matters that were scheduled 
to take place on that particular day. There was a significant poten- 
tial that the State guard would be federalized because of the 
unrest, and in that situation that we had seen in 1967 and 1968, 


the President sent — in actuality the Attorney General sent — a rep- 
resentative of the President to be the direct liaison in the event 
there was a federalizing of the guard, and I went for that purpose. 

Mr. Ford. As head of the Civil Rights Division, assigned out of 
the Justice Department, were you there working with the U.S. 
attorney’s office, or working with the FBI at this time? 

Mr. Pollak. I flew from Washington, arriving in the early morn- 
ing, either — I think it would be, I think I arrived probably at 10 
o’clock on the night before and worked through most of the night, 
meeting the various miltiary officials and others who were involved 
with maintenance of law and order in that city, during this day in 
which Mrs. King and leaders of the civil rights movement were 
coming for a massive march in respect to both the sanitation men’s 
situation and in respect to the slaying of Dr. King; and there was 
considerable concern over the possibility of some sort of violence, 
and I worked with the National Guard leaders, and had an office, 
temporary office, located in Mr. Robinson’s office. He was the U.S. 

I recall, Mr. Ford, calling on Mr. Robert Jensen, who was the 
special agent in charge of the Memphis office, and discussing with 
him the status of the King assassination investigation, but that 
was not the primary purpose of my trip. 

Mr. Ford. Was that a request for the District Office in Memphis 
to get involved in the investigation of the assassination of Dr. 

Mr. Pollak. No; it was not, Mr. Ford. They had been requested 
immediately upon our request for a full investigation, and they 
were the case office in charge in the field. 

Mr. Ford. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the 
balance of my time. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. 

Mr. Sawyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Any member of the committee seeking further 

Mr. Pollak, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before our 
committee, the witness is entitled to a period of 5 minutes, during 
which time he may explain, amplify or in any way comment fur- 
ther upon his testimony before our committee. 

I would extend to you at this time 5 minutes, if you so desire. 

Mr. Pollak. No; I have nothing further to add. I’m available to 
the committee. I commend the practice of affording the witness 
time and I believe I have said as much as you people have asked 
me. That’s enough. 

Chairman Stokes. I certainly, on behalf of the committee, thank 
you for your appearance here. You have certainly been of great 
assistance to the committee by your testimony, and we appreciate 
your presence. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. 

Mr. Blakey. Nothing. 

Chairman Stokes. There being no further witnesses to come 
before the committee this afternoon, the committee will adjourn 
until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. 

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the com- 
mittee to reconvene on Wednesday, November 29, 1978, at 9 a.m.] 



House of Representatives, 

Select Committee on Assassinations, 

Washington, D.C. 

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 
345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of 
the select committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney, 
Fauntroy, Sawyer, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. 

Also present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; 
Gene Johnson, deputy chief counsel; Ron Adrine, staff counsel; I. 
Charles Mathews, special counsel; Edward Evans, chief investiga- 
tor; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Gene John- 


Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was one of the most prominent 
leaders of the civil rights movement in the 20th century. For this, 
he was hated by his enemies almost as much as he was admired by 
those who associated themselves with his vision of America. 

As we have seen, he was personally opposed by powerful Govern- 
ment officials, notably J. Edgar Hoover, and he was ideologically 
opposed by factions of Black militants for his commitment to non- 

The most extreme hostility toward Dr. King apparently lay in 
groups of white supremists and conservative businessmen who 
were convinced he was attempting to establish a new social and 
economic order in this country and that in his international stance 
he was playing into the hands of the Communists. 

It was bad enough from the standpoint of racist resistance to Dr. 
King that he would win battle after battle in his campaign for 
equality for Black Americans. It was intolerable that he would 
broaden his objective to include international peace and an end to 
economic injustice. 

Threats to Dr. King were commonplace. He narrowly escaped 
death in a stabbing incident in New York in 1958, and in the 1960’s 
FBI intelligence reveals he was the target of violence by the Ku 
Klux Klan and other hate groups. 

( 173 ) 

39-935 0 - 79 - 12 


By the time of his assassination, no less than 50 threats on his 
life had been recorded by the FBI. 

It is not surprising that literally dozens of conspiracy allegations 
have come to the attention of the committee and have been consid- 
ered in its investigation. Some of these allegations were checked by 
the FBI in 1968. Others have come to light more recently. 

In deciding which of them to pursue, the committee evaluated 
the various allegations in terms of inherent credibility and their 
temporal relationship to the assassination. 

In the case of those that seemed based on misrepresentations, or 
stemmed from the imaginations of the mentally ill, or that sub- 
stantially predated the murder of Dr. King, a followup investiga- 
tion was not made or was strictly limited. 

Conspiracy leads to which significant resources were allocated 
included the following: 

One, a report of a price being placed on Dr. King’s head in 
Atlanta in 1967. 

Two, information that a businessman with organized crime con- 
nections was involved in a conspiracy. 

Three, evidence that a narcotics trafficker might have come in 
contact with Ray from time to time in his period leading up to the 

Four, an allegation that policemen in Louisville, Ky., may have 
made an offer to kill Dr. King. 

Five, reports that a standing money offer for killing Dr. King 
had been circulated at the Missouri State Penitentiary. 

But the conspiratorial allegation that has received the most at- 
tention from the committee originated in St. Louis earlier this 
year, when the FBI advised it of a memorandum containing infor- 
mation on a concrete offer to pay money to kill Dr. King. 

Mr. Chairman, the next witness has asked under rule 6.3(2) that 
there be no media coverage; that is, no TV, radio, pictures, or 

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to enter an 
order to that effect. 

Chairman Stokes. The witness, having invoked his rights under 
rule 6 of this committee, the pertinent part of which reads as 

No witness served with a subpena by the committee shall be required against his 
or her will to be photographed in any hearing or to give evidence or testimony while 
the broadcasting of that hearing, by radio or television, is being conducted. At the 
request of any witness who does not wish to be subjected to radio, television, or still 
photography coverage, all lenses shall be covered and all microphones used for 
coverage turned off. 

In addition, the witness has further requested that the same 
provision apply to the hallway which is immediately adjacent to 
the hearing room. 

The Chair at this time requests a complete compliance with the 
request of this witness, both in the hearing room and in the adja- 
cent hallways. 

The Chair would like to also announce that the witness now 
entering the room will be under U.S. marshal security. Therefore, 
all persons in the room are requested anytime the witness is either 
entering the room or leaving the room to remain seated, in order 


that marshals may be able to execute the kind of security that has 
been requested by this w itness. 

The Chair at this time would call Mr. Byers. 

Mr. Johnson. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, that Rus- 
sell George Byers be sworn. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Byers, would you please stand, raise your 
right hand and be sworn. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before 
this committee is the trvith, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Byers. I do. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. 

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed, I would like to 
make a motion on behalf of Mr. Byers. 

Chairman Stokes. Would the gentleman please identify himself 
for the record, please. 

Mr. Hamilton. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. My name is James 
Hamilton. I am representing Mr. Byers in this hearing. 

I would like to make a motion on behalf of Mr. Byers that this 
session be adjourned to executive session. The basis for this motion 
is the committee’s rules, rule 3.3(5), which says that if the commit- 
tee determines that evidence or testimony at any investigative 
hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any persons, 
it shall receive such evidence or testimony in executive session. 

I think that it is apparent that the testimony that Mr. Byers 
gives this morning will tend to defame or degrade both himself and 

Now, I realize that the practice has been to have an open session 
after an executive session has been held first where testimony that 
might have this effect will be given. 

But I suggest to the committee that the language of the rule is 
such that it indicates that, even if there has been a prior executive 
session, whenever evidence shall have this tendency the committee 
should continue to take such testimony in executive session. 

I am sure the committee knows that there are prominent Su- 
preme Court cases — Yellin v. United States, Cojak v. United States, 
to give only two — which indicate that a congressional committee 
must follow its own rules. 

I would request that the committee follow what appears to be the 
clear language of this particular rule and adjourn this particular 
session to executive session. 

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel for the committee, Professor 
Blakey, desire to be heard on the motion? 

Mr. Blakey. Yes. 

Mr. Chairman, as I am sure counsel for Mr. Byers will recall the 
statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that very often a page of 
history is worth more than a page from a dictionary in interpreting 
legal documents. 

The provision to which Mr. Hamilton refers was placed in the 
House rules and, of course, they appear in our rules as a derivative 
of the House rules, as part of a code of fair procedure. 

In House Resolution 151, placed in the House rules on March 23, 
1955, the rules were explained at that time in the Congressional 


Record, and I am referring now to the Congressional Record of the 
84th Congress, first session. 

I would like to quote a comment made by Congressman Hardy 
and Congressman Brown of Ohio. Congressman Hardy first noted — 
and I am quoting now from page 3572 and 3573 — that “* * * the 
rule was only designed to protect an individual other than the 

So, to the degree that Mr. Hamilton’s motion relies on the self- 
incrimination of the. witness, it is inapposite. 

Mr. Brown of Ohio explained the operation of the rule in essence 
saying that the contemplated procedure was when evidence was 
taken in a public session that apparently would defame or incrimi- 
nate that the committee should go into executive session to evalu- 
ate it. 

Then he said, and I quote: 

Then if they determine that there is some ground for a charge against you, they 
can have all the open sessions they want to have. 

Later on he says, and I quote: 

What does it say here. They consider that in executive session. Then they come 
back into open session. After they have got their information and they decide that 
there is substance to the charge, or my charge against you, then they go— they can 
go ahead and have all the open hearings they want. 

I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that in light of this legislative 
history to the House rule, which would obviously also be legislative 
history to this committee’s rule, that the fact that this committee 
has heard from Mr. Byers in executive session in May 1978 and has 
had an opportunity since that time to evaluate his testimony, that 
an executive session at this time would be not required under the 
rule and would be inappropriate. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

Does counsel have anything further? 

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, may I make two brief points. 

First of all, Mr. Byers’ testimony this morning will have a ten- 
dency to defame and degrade others besides himself. The second 
point I would make is that I think that the legislative history that 
Mr. Blakey is quoting from is at best ambiguous. 

There is also a statement in the same history, the same colloquy 
before the House, by Mr. Miller of Maryland, where he indicates — 
and I am abbreviating the quotation — that: 

Certainly the language here does not indicate how it would be possible to bring 
out evidence that you knew was going to degrade somebody except in executive 
session. I do not see any language here that permits that. 

So, I think at best the legislative history is ambiguous and I 
would suggest that in any event the clear language of the rule 
should be followed and, consequently, that this session be held in 
executive session. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel for the committee have any- 
thing further? 

Mr. Blakey. No; Mr. Chairman. I think the previous remarks are 
adequate for the Chair’s rule. 


Chairman Stokes. Mr. Hamilton, I believe that you have been 
provided with a copy of the legislative history as prepared by the 
Library of Congress on this subject. 

Mr. Hamilton. That is correct. 

Chairman Stokes. All right. 

The Chair has listened carefully to both your motion and argu- 
ments in support of the same. The Chair would have to rely upon 
the legislative history as the Chair understands it, and as has been 
referred to here by counsel for the committee. 

I would again underscore the statement of Mr. Brown of Ohio on 
the floor during the colloquy which occurred on this legislation at 
the time it was considered in the House, which I would refer to 
once again, where Mr. Brown of Ohio says: 

What does it say here. They consider that in executive session. Then they come 
back into open session after they have got the information. If they decide there is 
some substance to your charge or my charge against you, then they can go ahead 
and have all the open hearings they want. 

This, it seems to me, would be determinative of the situation 
here. The committee having entertained testimony of the witness 
in prior executive session, therefore it would seem to me at this 
time that the committee can, in compliance with the statements 
made by Mr. Brown of Ohio, hold all the open hearings the com- 
mittee desires. The Chair would therefore overrule your motion. 

Does counsel have any further objections? 

Mr. Hamilton. No, Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to proceed. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

Prior to proceeding the Chair would like to make a statement for 
the record. The Chair would like to express its deep appreciation 
and gratitude to Mr. Hamilton for representing Mr. Byers here at 
this hearing today. 

Mr. Hamilton is representing Mr. Byers pursuant to a request of 
the D.C. Bar Association that Mr. Byers made in accordance with 
our committee rules. 

He was obtained by the D.C. Bar Association on very short 
notice, and we deeply appreciate Mr. Hamilton’s appearance here 
today. His appearance, in this committee’s opinion, reflects the 
highest spirit and character of the members of the District of 
Columbia Bar Association and its public interest section. 

At this time the Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, 
Professor Blakey. 

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Byers, would you state for the record your name, please. 


Mr. Byers. Russell Byers. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, have you and your counsel been supplied 
a copy of the committee’s rules? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Have you read them? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Do you understand them? 

Mr. Byers. As well as I can. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, you are appearing here today pursuant 
to subpena, are you not? 


Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, do you know John Kauffmann? 

Mr. Byers. I am going to refuse to answer on the grounds it may 
tend to incriminate me. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, would you intend to claim your privilege 
against self-incrimination to all other questions in this hearing? 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, in light of the representation of the 
witness I would ask that the order of the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia conferring immunity on Mr. Byers dated No- 
vember 8, 1978, be marked as Martin Luther King exhibit F-570, 
be inserted in the record at this point, and made available to the 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it is so ordered. It may be 
made a part of the record and provided to the witness and his 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-570 



In the Matter of the Application of ) 






Misc. No. 78—6 3 3 7 

ORDER . . 



States House of Representatives Select Committee 
on ..dLions having made written application, pursuant to Title 18 , 

United States Code, Sections 6002 and 6005, for an order conferring 
immunity upon Russell George Beyers and compelling him 

to testify and provide other information before the Subcommittee on 
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Select 

Committee on Assassinations or the full Select Committee, and the 
court finding that all procedures specified by S 6005 have been duly 
followed, it is hereby, this 5^*^ day of 1978,. 

ORDERED, that Russell George Beyers in accordance 

with the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 6002 
and 6005, shall not be excused from testifying or providing other 
information before the Subcommittee on the Assassination of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Select Committee on Assassinations 
or the full Select Committee on the grounds that the testimony or other 
information sought may tend to incriminate him. 

- > Tetri' 

■ S' 5 o,? C- 


ORDERED FURTfftlR, that Russell George Beyers appear 

when subpoenaed by said Subcommittee or Committee and testify and 
provide such other information that is sought with respect to matters 
under inquiry by said Subcommittee or Committee. 

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no testimony or other information 
compelled under this order (or any information directly or indirectly 
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against 
Russell George Beyers in any criminal case, except a 

prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise failing 
to comply with this ORDER. 

S? wg . /z 

United States District Jipfge 

Dated: NOV 6 - 1978 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would note for the record that Mr. 
Byers and Mr. Hamilton are now reading the order of the court. 

Chairman Stokes. It may be so noted. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, have you and your counsel had an oppor- 
tunity to examine this order? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Has your counsel instructed you on its legal mean- 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the court’s order be 
communicated to the witness and the witness be directed to answer 
the previous question. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Byers, in light of the order which you 
have just read, by which immunity has been conferred upon you, 
the Chair would at this time direct you to answer the questions put 
to you by counsel. 

Mr. Blakey. Let me state for the record, Mr. Byers, once again 
what the question was. 

Do you know John Kauffmann? 

Mr. Byers. I did. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that Martin Luther 
King exhibit F-571 be inserted in the record at this point and be 
appropriately displayed on the easel. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 
record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 

MLK Exhibit F-571 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, can you see Martin Luther King exhibit 
F-571 from your seat? 

Mr. Byers. You are talking about the photograph to my right? 

Mr. Blakey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Can you identify that individual? 

Mr. Byers. It is John Kauffmann. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, let me direct your attention to approxi- 
mately the spring of 1967. Did you have a conversation with John 
Kauffmann at that time in which he inquired of you whether or 
not you wanted to earn $50,000? 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Blakey. As a result of that conversation, what did you do? 

Mr. Byers. I went with him to meet another man. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would ask that 
Martin Luther King exhibit F-572 be inserted in the record and 
appropriately displayed on the easel. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered in the 
record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-572 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, can you see what has been marked as 
Martin Luther King exhibit F-572 from your seat? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Can you identify that individual? 

Mr. Byers. It looks like a picture of Jack Sutherland. But I have 
only seen Jack Sutherland twice in my life. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Sutherland? 

Mr. Byers. I did. 

Mr. Blakey. What did he say? 

Mr. Byers. He offered me $50,000 to arrange to murder Martin 
Luther King. 

Mr. Blakey. In 1967, did you know who Dr. Martin Luther King 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. Blakey. Did Mr. Sutherland tell you who he was? 


Mr. Byers. He told me he was a civil rights leader. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you ask Mr. Sutherland where he was going to 
get the money, come up with the $50,000? 

Mr. Byers. Yes. It struck me rather strange. He told me it 
belonged to a secret southern organization that could raise the 

Mr. Blakey. What did you do then? 

Mr. Byers. I declined the offer. 

Mr. Blakey. Where were you when this offer took place? 

Mr. Byers. Mr. Sutherland’s home. 

Mr. Blakey. Was Mr. Kauffmann also present? 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. He was. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you and he then leave together? 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Kauff- 

Mr. Byers. I told him I wouldn’t be interested and we dropped it 
from there. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever see Mr. Sutherland again? 

Mr. Byers. I seen him one time later at a water company meet- 
ing at House Springs, Mo. It was either House Springs or High 
Ridge. It is two little towns that is close together. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversation with him at that 

Mr. Byers. No; I did not. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, how long after the Sutherland meeting 
did you remain associated in any way with Mr. Kauffmann? 

Mr. Byers. I can’t place a date, but it wasn’t too long. 

Mr. Blakey. You subsequently broke off whatever relationship 
you had with him? 

Mr. Byers. That is right. 

Mr. Blakey. Following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King on April 4, 1968, did you tell anyone about your meeting with 
Mr. Sutherland? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, I told a gentleman about it. 

Mr. Blakey. And who was that 

Mr. Byers. You say after the meeting or after the assassination? 

Mr. Blakey. No, this is after the assassination. I will back up. 
After the meeting with Mr. Sutherland, did you tell anyone about 
that meeting? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. Blakey. OK. After the assassination — which was my original 
question — did you have any conversation with anyone about the 
Sutherland offer? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Blakey. Who was that? 

Mr. Byers. It was Murray Randall. 

Mr. Blakey. And what was your relationship to him at the time? 

Mr. Byers. He was my attorney. 

Mr. Blakey. What did you tell him? 

Mr. Byers. I told him I had had a proposition to arrange to 
murder Mr. King for $50,000. 

Mr. Blakey. Why did you tell him? 


Mr. Byers. He was my lawyer. You had to tell somebody. You 
know, it just struck me rather strange. The man got killed, and I 
had the offer. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you ask him whether you were in any way 
involved in the assassination? 

Mr. Byers. Well, I ran it by him one reason for that. He told me 
at the time the man had confessed to the killing or had been 
apprehended and he told me evidently there was no substance to it, 
just to forget about it. 

Mr. Blakey. His advice to you then was that you were not 
involved in the assassination that occurred in Memphis? 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any other reason for discussing the 
Sutherland offer with Mr. Randall? 

Mr. Byers. None that I can think of. 

Mr. Blakey. Have you ever told anyone else about the Suther- 
land offer? 

Mr. Byers. Yes; I told another gentleman about it. 

Mr. Blakey. And who was that? 

Mr. Byers. Mr. Weenick. 

Mr. Blakey. And what was his relationship to you? 

Mr. Byers. He was my lawyer after Mr. Randall became judge, 
and I was a friend of Mr. Weenick’s before that time. 

Mr. Blakey. What was the context within which you had a 
conversation with Mr. Weenick? 

Mr. Byers. Please repeat the question. 

Mr. Blakey. What was the context in which you had a conversa- 
tion with Mr. Weenick? 

Mr. Byers. I told him the same basic story that I told to Mr. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you ask him for legal advice? 

Mr. Byers. The same way; yes. 

Mr. Blakey. And what was his legal advice to you? 

Mr. Byers. Basically the same answer, because it was much later 
when I told him of the offer. I told Mr. Randall first and then some 
years later I told Mr. Weenick. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, have you furnished this committee with 
attorney-client waivers for Mr. Randall and Mr. Weenick? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, do you know John Paul Spica? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Who is he? 

Mr. Byers. He is my brother-in-law. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever tell Mr. Spica of the Sutherland offer? 

Mr. Byers. No; not until the time I got the subpena to come up 
here. When I got — the time I got the subpena, I mentioned it to 
him at that time. 

Mr. Blakey. You did not tell him anytime from 1967 until April 
4, 1968? 

Mr. Byers. To the best of my knowledge, no, because he was 
incarcerated at the time. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, do you know Robert Regazzi? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Who is he? 


Mr. Byers. Well, who he is I don’t know. He is just 

Mr. Blakey. What relationship, if any, does he have to you? 

Mr. Byers. You mean as far as being a relative? 

Mr. Blakey. Friend, business associate. 

Mr. Byers. I installed a cigarette machine in Mr. Regazzi’s sea- 
food store about 2 years ago, and that had been the first time I had 
seen him in maybe 10 years. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you know him in the period between 1967, when 
you had the Sutherland offer made to you, and April 4, 1968? 

Mr. Byers. I did, but I can’t remember, recall running into him 
at that time. I met Mr. Regazzi in about 1963, 1962, roughly. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever tell Mr. Regazzi of the Sutherland 
offer in the period of time between 1967 and 1968? 

Mr. Byers. Not that I could remember. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, do you know Dr. Hugh W. Maxey? 

Mr. Byers. I know who he is, but I do not know him. 

Mr. Blakey. Who is he? 

Mr. Byers. He was a prison doctor. 

Mr. Blakey. Do you know if Dr. Maxey had any relationship to 
Mr. Kauffmann? 

Mr. Byers. Supposedly very close friends. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, why didn’t you tell the police, the FBI or 
other law enforcement officials of the Sutherland offer in 1968 
after the assassination of Dr. King? 

Mr. Byers. Because I thought the man was crazy that made me 
the offer, and after it happened I didn’t want to be involved. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, did you volunteer this information to 
this committee? 

Mr. Byers. Volunteer what information? 

Mr. Blakey. About the Sutherland offer. Did you come to us or 
did we come to you? 

Mr. Byers. Oh, you come to me with the subpena. 

Mr. Blakey. In fact, did you cooperate with this committee when 
its investigators first contacted you? 

Mr. Byers. I don’t know what you mean by cooperating. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you tell 

Mr. Byers. I let them enter the home. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you tell them the story the first time they 
talked to you? 

Mr. Byers. No, no. 

Mr. Blakey. In point of fact, you were subpenaed before this 
committee to appear in executive session on May 9, 1978, weren’t 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you decline in that executive session to testify 
unless you were granted immunity? 

Mr. Byers. Absolutely. 

Mr. Blakey. Was your testimony compelled under a grant of 
immunity at that time? 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, did you tell the same story to this 
committee in May — on May 9 — that you are telling this morning? 

Mr. Byers. To the best of my knowledge, yes. 

Mr. Blakey. Was it the truth, then? 


Mr. Byers. That is right. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair at this time recognizes the gentle- 
man from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy, for such time as 
he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 
5-minute rule. 

Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Byers, for appearing again before the committee, 
this time in public session. 

Mr. Byers, Professor Blakey has developed from you the broad 
outlines of your story. Nevertheless, I would like to ask some more 
detailed questions. 

Mr. Byers. OK. 

Mr. Fauntroy. The first is when did you first meet John Kauff- 

Mr. Byers. When did I first meet him? That is going back a long 
ways, so I am going to give you a rough idea. I would say maybe 
1957, 1956, 1955, somewhere in that area. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And under what circumstances do you recall 
having met him? 

Mr. Byers. I was a friend of his brother's, his brother Nigel. He 
would come to his brother’s house, and that is how I met him. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Where did he live at that time? 

Mr. Byers. You mean Mr. Kauffmann? 

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Kauffmann. 

Mr. Byers. John Kauffmann? 

Mr. Fauntroy. John Kauffmann. 

Mr. Byers. The same place he lived until he died, Jefferson 
County, Imperial, Mo. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. And where did he work? 

Mr. Byers. He told me he was a stockbroker when I first met 
him. I never bought no stock from him, so I wouldn’t know. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And what other kinds of business enterprise did 
you come to know him through? 

Mr. Byers. He dabbled in real estate, just various different 

Mr. Fauntroy. Where did he live actually? 

Mr. Byers. He lived at that motel, in Jefferson County, Imperial, 

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you recall the name of the motel? 

Mr. Byers. Oh, I think they called it Bluff Acres or — he had an 
office there with a string of names on it as long as your arm. 
Probably all phony. I don’t know. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Bluff Acres Motel in Barnard, Mo.? 

Mr. Byers. That is right, Barnard, Imperial. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You say he dabbled in real estate and represent- 
ed himself to you as a stockbroker? 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Fauntroy. What was your relationship with him? 

Mr. Byers. You are talking about in 1955 or 1967? 

Mr. Fauntroy. Throughout the period, what was your relation- 
ship with him? 


Mr. Byers. Well, sometimes I would drive him to where he would 
have to go. He had sort of a bad leg. He would ask me to run 
different errands on real estate transactions. Just generally a little 
bit of everything. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you engage in any criminal activity with 

Mr. Byers. Not with him. I left some possessions there that may 
not have just been so-so. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, you know, you can be rather candid with 
us. Just sort of tell us. 

Mr. Byers. Stolen cars. I used his motel. And other stolen ob- 

Mr. Fauntroy. So that you would steal cars and leave them — 
and other things, and leave them at the motel? 

Mr. Byers. Absolutely. 

Mr. Fauntroy. With his acquiescence or with his acceptance? 

Mr. Byers. As long as I paid the rent. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. 

Do you know of any other criminal activity that Mr. Kauffmann 
was engaged in? 

Mr. Byers. I didn’t hear the last part of that question. Any other 
criminal activity he was what? 

Mr. Fauntroy. Engaged in. 

Mr. Byers. Well, I come to find out he dealt in drugs, and when I 
found out he dealt in drugs, that is when we split. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Tell me how you found that out and why you 

Mr. Byers. Well, he owned a company called Fix-A-Co. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Fix-A-Co? 

Mr. Byers. F-I-X dash A dash C-O. And he told me one day all 
the money he was making in drugs, which come as a shock to me. 
He told me that he discovered Fix-A-Co company had a drug li- 
cense and he could then buy drugs legitimately and sell them the 
other way. 

So, when he informed me of that, we had a little falling out. I 
says I will see you later. I didn’t go round anymore. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You say it was Fix-A-Co? 

Mr. Byers. That is right. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You bought a fix there? 

Mr. Byers. You get a fix with Fix-A-Co. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. Why did you split? 

Mr. Byers. Well, I am scared of the drug penalty. I am not a 
drug dealer. There is two ways out in that. Either you get killed or 
you go to the penitentiary. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. Well, do you know of any other criminal 
activity in which Mr. Kauffmann was engaged? 

Mr. Byers. Not that I can think of at the time. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Did any other people hang around his motel or 
avail themselves of the services that he provided you, for example? 

Mr. Byers. Well, he always engaged a lot of exconvicts which he 
had brought in from the Missouri State Prison. So, what their 
transactions was I don’t know. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Under what circumstances did you understand a 
motel owner would be engaging exconvicts? 


Mr. Byers. He had them work at the motel. You know, they 
would clean up, they would rent the rooms at nighttime. He had 
other pieces of real estate where they would go and do some work. 

Like I say, we never really got into that. You know, I mean 
people like that, you don’t ask their business, they don’t ask your 

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. How did you understand those exconvicts 
came to work for him? 

Mr. Byers. He had an arrangement with Dr. Maxey at the 
Missouri State Prison the way he told me. I don’t know this to be 
true, but he had an arrangement and Dr. Maxey would always give 
him one or two released at a time to him, to come to him. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And Dr. Maxey was his friend within the Missou- 
ri State Penitentiary? 

Mr. Byers. That is what he told me. That is what he led me to 

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you and the people who hung around the 
motel ever discuss criminal activities? 

Mr. Byers. I don’t believe so. I didn’t have that much to do with 
them. I would come and stay pretty well to myself. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you have the idea that you were the only one 
who was engaging in some criminal activities which he covered 
with his motel? 

Mr. Byers. At one time I thought so, until I found out he dealt in 
dope, and then I didn’t have a doubt. 

Mr. Fauntroy. When you met Kauffmann, and he raised the 
$50,000 with you, what time of day was it? 

Mr. Byers. It was in the evening. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And where were you? 

Mr. Byers. At Mr. Sutherland’s home. 

Mr. Fauntroy. That was the first time he raised it with you, at 
Sutherland’s home? 

Mr. Byers. No. He talked about $50,000? 

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes. 

Mr. Byers. It was earlier in that day. We were someplace and he 
said to me, he said, “How would you like to make $50,000.” I says, 
“What do I have to do?” He says, “Meet me tonight, and I will take 
you somewhere.” 

So about 6:30 that night I met him and we proceeded to drive in 
my car to Mr. Sutherland’s house. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And was anyone else present at Mr. Sutherland’s 

Mr. Byers. Mrs. Sutherland — she was introduced to me as Mrs. 
Sutherland — was there at the time. But we were just introduced. 
She had no conversation, no nothing, and she went to another part 
of the house. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I wonder if you could describe the house. You say 
you drove there in a car with Mr. Kauffmann. 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Fauntroy. After earlier in the afternoon he had apprised 
you of an opportunity to make $50,000? 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Tell us a little bit about the house. 

Mr. Byers. You mean about the contents? 


Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Sutherland’s house. 

Mr. Byers. OK. Mr. Sutherland met us at the door with a pair of 
like overalls and a hat. Looked like a Confederate hat, with crossed 
swords. He took us to a den with a Confederate carpet, Confederate 
flag, bugles, swords, and all the paraphernalia hanging on the wall. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. You say that the only other person you saw 
in the house was his wife, who then left and went to another part 
of the house. 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Fauntroy. So you are now in the den. 

Mr. Byers. With Mr. Kauffman, Mr. Sutherland, and myself. 

Mr. Fauntroy. The three of you. Now, did Mr. — and it is at this 
point that the offer was made? 

Mr. Byers. After a slight conversation, exchanging of a joke of 
some kind, you know, and an offer of a drink, we got down to 

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, who stated the purpose for which you 
would receive $50,000? 

Mr. Byers. Mr. Sutherland. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Sutherland. Can you just recall roughly what 
he said to you? 

Mr. Byers. Well, we got into it. We got down to business. I said, 
“What do I have to do to make this $50,000?” He says, “Either 
arrange or kill Martin Luther King.” At that point I said, “Who is 
Martin Luther King?” I didn’t know who he was. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, did he appear serious when he made the 

Mr. Byers. Dead serious. 

Mr. Fauntroy. To your knowledge, was either Mr. Kauffmann or 
Mr. Sutherland given to playing practical jokes? 

Mr. Byers. Not for $50,000. They didn’t joke like that. 

Mr. Fauntroy. So you took them as being dead serious. 

Mr. Byers. Absolutely. Why would they waste my time and take 
me at 6:30 in the evening to play a joke on me? 

Mr. Fauntroy. Are you aware of any social or political views 
that Mr. Kauffmann had? 

Mr. Byers. Any social what? 

Mr. Fauntroy. Social or political views. Or racial views. 

Mr. Byers. No. We never really got into those. I understand after 
I quit associating with the man he was a Wallace supporter. They 
had a Wallace campaign or something. 

Mr. Fauntroy. What about Mr. Sutherland? 

Mr. Byers. He was a Wallace man, too. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, do you know why Mr. Kauffmann would 
have taken you to Mr. Sutherland? 

Mr. Byers. Well, there was probably something in it for Mr. 
Kauffman if I would have agreed. 

Mr. Fauntroy. To your knowledge, did Mr. Kauffmann have any 
reason to believe that you might accept such a contract? 

Mr. Byers. Not that I would know of. The only reason they may 
have to believe is if they were looking for someone to set up in this 
position. Maybe — I don’t know. I don’t understand the whole thing. 

Mr. Fauntroy. You mentioned that you knew John Paul Spica, 
who is your brother-in-law. Do you have any reason to know or to 

39-935 0 - 79 - 13 


believe that Mr. Kauffmann knew of your relationship with Mr. 

Mr. Byers. I imagine he did. It was quite well covered by our 
friends the press at the time Mr. Spica was in trouble. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And what was the trouble in which Mr. Spica 
found himself? 

Mr. Byers. Accused of murder. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And what was the result of the court proceedings 
in that case? 

Mr. Byers. Life imprisonment. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Where? 

Mr. Byers. Missouri State Penitentiary. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you working at that time? 

Mr. Byers. At which time? 

Mr. Fauntroy. At the time of the offer. 

Mr. Byers. No, just with Mr. Kauffmann. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you have any legitimate income at that time? 

Mr. Byers. No; I was under Federal indictment for conspiracy to 
violate the Dyer Act, and I was just sort of hanging to see what 
was going to happen for myself. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I guess — and that had to do with auto theft, I 

Mr. Byers. That is correct. 

Mr. Fauntroy. And nothing more. Did you have any information 
which would lead you to believe that there was any connection 
between the offer Mr. Sutherland made to you and Dr. King's 
assassination in Memphis a few months later? 

Mr. Byers. Did I believe there was any connection between the 
offer and the assassination, is that the question? 

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes. 

Mr. Byers. I didn’t know what to believe. It struck me awfully 
funny that I get the offer and the man turns up dead. Either it was 
connected, coincidental, or everybody was out to kill him. One of 
the three. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you make any connection between the al- 
leged assassin, James Earl Ray, and his presence at Missouri State 
Penitentiary at a time when your brother-in-law was there? 

Mr. Byers. I don’t understand the question. Did I know 

Mr. Fauntroy. When you learned that James Earl Ray — or 
when did you first learn that James Earl Ray was accused of being 
the assassin? 

Mr. Byers. When he was apprehended. 

Mr. Fauntroy. In June, did you know — in your learning that, 
did you also learn that he had been at the Missouri State Peniten- 

Mr. Byers. I can’t answer that. I paid no attention to it. Of 
course I read in the paper where he had escaped from the Missouri 
State Penitentiary, like everybody else, but I did not know James 
Earl Ray. 

Mr. Fauntroy. So that you didn’t make that connection in your 
own mind? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back almost 
all the balance of my time. 


Chairman Stokes. I sensed some reservation. Mr. Byers, if I 
understand you correctly, Mr. Kauffmann took you to Mr. Suther- 
land and Mr. Sutherland made the offer of the $50,000 to you; is 
that correct? 

Mr. Byers. He made the purpose of the offer to me. 

Chairman Stokes. What do you mean by that? 

Mr. Byers. Mr. Kauffmann asked me how I would like to make 
$50,000; then he proceeded to take me to Mr. Sutherland. 

Mr. Sutherland told me how I was going to make the $50,000, 
what I had to do to make the $50,000. 

Chairman Stokes. That was to kill Dr. King? 

Mr. Byers. That’s correct. 

Chairman Stokes. And on the spot there, did you tell them you 
would not do it? 

Mr. Byers. I sort of crawfished a little; I seen too many late 
night movies, where they make you an offer you can’t refuse, and 
you jump up and shout out, “absolutely no,” and you maybe never 
leave the place. 

So I told him I didn’t think I would be interested, and when I got 
outside, I definitely wasn’t interested. 

Chairman Stokes. But after you said to them, “I don’t think I 
would be interested,” did they say anything more to you about it? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Chairman Stokes. The whole conversation terminated at that 

Mr. Byers. That evening, yes. 

Chairman Stokes. Did they ever after that — either one of them — 
discuss the offer with you? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Chairman Stokes. That means before the assassination and after 
the assassination? 

Mr. Byers. I never saw them after the assassination. 

Chairman Stokes. So other than what you have said here, when 
he told you how you could make the $50,000, and you said you 
didn’t think you would be interested, there has never been any 
further discussion whatsoever between you and them about this? 

Mr. Byers. That’s correct. 

Chairman Stokes. I have no further questions. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. 

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Byers, did you see any money? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. Devine. They didn’t proffer any cash of any kind? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. Devine. Did they make any suggestion to you that you 
shouldn’t say anything to anybody about this offer when you decid- 
ed to decline it? 

Mr. Byers. Well, naturally, when you talk to somebody — I didn’t 
decline it right on the spot; I told them I didn’t think so. You 
know, we certainly left it drop like that; and then when I got 
outside I told Mr. Kauffmann I wasn’t interested in it. 

Mr. Devine. But you were not contacted, either telephonically or 
any other way, not to mention that? 

Mr. Byers. Not to mention the assassination of Mr. King. 


Mr. Devine. Not to mention the offer. 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. Devine. Mr. Byers, do you have any record of accusation, 
charge or conviction of any crime of violence? 

[Witness confers with counsel.] 

Mr. Devine. While you are consulting with counsel, may I amend 
the question to say: prior to the assassination of Dr. King. 

Mr. Byers. Prior to the assassination of Dr. King, I have never 
been accused of any crime of violence that I know of. 

Mr. Devine. You had never been accused, charged or convicted of 
any crime of violence prior to that date in 1968; is that it? 

Mr. Byers. To the best of my knowledge, no. 

Mr. Devine. Then you don’t have any history of being a hit man 
or one that might be involved in a crime of this nature prior to 
that time? 

Mr. Byers. As far as I know, I don’t. 

Mr. Devine. Was part of this offer, as you recall, a suggestion 
that either you kill Dr. King or that you obtain someone to do it? 

Mr. Byers. Like I said, it was either arrange for the death of Dr. 
King, or kill Dr. King, as long as Dr. King was dead. 

Mr. Devine. One more question in the same line then: although 
you had not been charged or convicted for any crime of violence 
prior to April 4, 1968, were you known to have associates that 
would be engaged in crimes of violence? 

Mr. Byers. I don't know. That’s a pretty broad question. 

Mr. Devine. What I am trying to 

Mr. Byers. One person may think he is violent; the next person 
may not think he is violent. So who is going to make the decision 
on that question? 

Mr. Devine. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Byers, is just why 
were you, Russell Byers, singled out as the person that these people 
were willing to offer $50,000? What in your background caused you 
to be the No. 1 man to be selected for this particular purpose? 

Mr. Byers. I can’t answer that question for you. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Devine. I have one more question. I will. 

Did you at any time know James Earl Ray? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. Devine. Yes; I will yield to my colleague. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Was your brother-in-law convicted of a contract 

Mr. Byers. That’s correct. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you. 

Mr. Devine. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. 

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Byers, after you declined the offer of Mr. Kauff- 
mann, how long did you continue in your working relationship 
with him, that is, continue to use his motel? 

Mr. Byers. Not very long. We sort of broke off relationships 
because the dope transaction started. You know, I became aware of 
his narcotics transactions. 


Mr. Preyer. Had you become aware of this narcotics transaction 
before he made the offer to you — Mr. Sutherland made the offer to 

Mr. Byers. No; it was after he made the offer to me I became 
aware of his narcotics business, because he wanted me to partici- 
pate, and I would not. 

Mr. Preyer. Was it a matter of weeks or months that you contin- 
ued to work with him after the offer? 

Mr. Byers. Maybe it was weeks, something like that; it wasn’t 
too long. 

Mr. Preyer. No further mention was made of the offer to kill Dr. 
King during that time? 

Mr. Byers. No, sir; you know, I figured it’s time for me to leave. 
When he is wanting me to kill somebody, then he is dealing in 
drugs, it’s time to go. 

Mr. Preyer. Your final decision on the offer to kill Dr. King was 
made to Mr. Kauffman outside of Mr. Sutherland’s home, and you 
had no further discussion on it? 

Mr. Byers. That’s right. 

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. 

Mr. McKinney. Mr. Byers, do you think that Mr. Kauffman was 
aware of the fact, or did he have knowledge at the time, that your 
brother-in-law was in Missouri State Prison for committing 

Mr. Byers. I imagine he did. Like I say, the press covered it 
pretty thoroughly; it was a pretty well-known fact. 

Mr. McKinney. Did you at any time ever discuss this offer with 
your brother-in-law or with your sister? 

Mr. Byers. No. You don’t go home and tell your wife stuff like 

Mr. McKinney. What was the reaction when you turned down 
this offer? 

Mr. Byers. No big deal. 

Mr. McKinney. You drove from the Sutherland’s household with 
Mr. Kauffmann? 

Mr. Byers. Took him home, and I returned him back to his place. 

Mr. McKinney. You were in the same car, and you didn’t discuss 
it any further, after you initially refused the offer? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. McKinney. Did you feel at any time after turning down this 
offer that you were in danger because of your knowledge of the 
conspiracy to kill Dr. King? Obviously if you are offered $50,000 for 
a contract to kill someone or to arrange a contract by several 
people, that is a conspiracy; were you afraid that you might be in 
some personal danger, knowing of this? 

Mr. Byers. Not attempt to; I wasn’t afraid. I didn’t think at the 
time they made me the offer there was anything to it. You know, I 
just thought this is a guy — he has hung out his flags on the wall, 


and he put all his rugs on the floor, and he is having himself a 
good time. 

I just let it pass. Now that Dr. King got assassinated, then it 
made me sit up and think. 

Mr. McKinney. When Dr. King was assassinated in 1968 and you 
became aware of it why didn’t you contact the FBI? 

Mr. Byers. What would I tell them? What kind of spot would I 
put myself in? 

Mr. McKinney. Well, that’s what I am asking you. 

Mr. Byers. In other words, I don’t want to get involved, but I 
wound up very much involved. 

Mr. McKinney. Did you feel at the time that you would endan- 
ger yourself because of other activities you were involved in, or 
because of the King case? 

Mr. Byers. Absolutely; absolutely. I don’t think the FBI was too 
concerned that Mr. King got killed. 

Mr. McKinney. That puts it in the light. You said you knew Dr. 

Mr. Byers. Please repeat the question. 

Mr. McKinney. Did you know Dr. Maxey? 

Mr. Byers. No; I did not know Dr. Maxey. I heard Dr. Maxey’s 
name on a lot of occasions, from Mr. Kauffmann, but as far as 
personally knowing him, never. 

Mr. McKinney. Did you at any time after becoming aware of Dr. 
King’s assassination discuss with Kauffmann the strange fact that 
Dr. Maxey, a doctor at Missouri State Prison, was supplying ex- 
convicts to Mr. Kauffmann and that your brother-in-law and James 
Earl Ray were confined in Missouri State Prison at the same time? 

Mr. Byers. You say this is after the assassination? 

Mr. McKinney. Yes. 

Mr. Byers. I never talked to Mr. Kauffmann after the assassina- 
tion. I quit talking to him before the assassination and never 
talked to him since. 

Mr. McKinney. I’ll reserve some time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman reserves the balance of his 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Byers, did you know Mr. Kauffmann well enough to know 
what his attitudes were on racial matters? 

Mr. Byers. Not really. You know, I mean, we never really sit 
down and talked about it, talked it out and say, “Do you like this 
guy because he is Black, or do you like this guy because he is 
green?” We never did. 

Mr. Fithian. Did you have any indication of Mr. Sutherland’s 
attitude toward race, racial matters? 

Mr. Byers. When I see all those things hanging on the wall and 
carpet on the floor, I had a pretty good idea. Then when he told me 
that he wanted to kill a colored gentleman, I imagine he didn’t like 

Mr. Fithian. Would you describe for the committee what your 
own feelings were at that time toward questions of integration? 

Mr. Byers. At the time of the offer? 

Mr. Fithian. Yes. 


Mr. Byers. Of the assassination? 

Mr. Fithian. Before the assassination. 

Mr. Byers. I didn’t even know who Mr. King was. 

Mr. Fithian. That wasn’t the question. The question was: What 
were your personal attitudes, let’s say, toward integrating the 

Mr. Byers. I had none. 

Mr. Fithian. Sorry 

Mr. Byers. I had no feelings either which way. 

Mr. Fithian. Where did you grow up, Mr. Byers? 

Mr. Byers. St. Louis. 

Mr. Fithian. Did you have any Black friends? 

Mr. Byers. When I was in school? 

Mr. Fithian. Yes. 

Mr. Byers. No. None went to my school. 

Mr. Fithian. Could you describe a little more fully your attitude 
toward race questions? 

Mr. Byers. I have no — I’m not prejudiced. 

Mr. Fithian. And you have no reason to believe that Mr. Kauff- 
mann is prejudiced either? 

Mr. Byers. Like I say, we just didn’t discuss it. 

Mr. Fithian. Let me ask you one thing more: just a moment ago 
you said — I think I can quote you accurately: “I didn’t think there 
was anything to it — to the offer.” Was that your testimony? 

Mr. Byers. That’s along those lines; yes. 

Mr. Fithian. Fifteen minutes before that, in answer to a ques- 
tion, you said, “And I thought they were serious. Why else would 
they have me drive out to Sutherland’s home at 6:30 in the after- 

Mr. Byers. They may be serious, but I didn’t figure them as the 
serious kind, especially when they start talking $50,000. That’s 
what I meant by that. 

Mr. Fithian. My question is: Which of these statements would 
you have the committee believe? It doesn’t seem to me we can 
believe both. 

Mr. Byers. I would have them believe that Mr. Kauffmann and 
Mr. Sutherland were very serious, but me, in my mind, I just 

Mr. Fithian. Then what did you mean when you said, “I didn’t 
think there was anything to it”? 

Mr. Byers. Because I thought they were just a couple of people 
talking, is what I thought. See, my personal views and your person- 
al views may be two different things, like you have one now. 

Mr. Fithian. My question is whether or not you thought they 
were serious, and at one point you said, “I didn’t think there was 
anything to it” and at another point you said you thought they 
were serious. 

Mr. Byers. OK. 

Mr. Fithian. Let’s sort this out. 

Mr. Byers. Let’s correct it. I would say they were very serious. 

Mr. Fithian. So then you do think that there was something to 

Mr. Byers. That’s right. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 


The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. 

Mr. Sawyer. You said that your brother-in-law, Mr. Spica, was 
charged and convicted on a so-called contract or hit-type killing. 
Did I understand you correctly? 

Mr. Byers. That’s correct. 

Mr. Sawyer. What were the circumstances of that, do you recall? 

Mr. Byers. No, I don’t, really. It was a murder where he was 
offered money, and I don’t believe that they ever really proved that 
he actually committed the murder. I believe that he arranged it or 
something along those lines. I’m really not too familiar with the 
thing, except I know he got life in the penitentiary. 

Mr. Sawyer. Who — or in what category was the person that 
killed or had him killed? 

Mr. Byers. The — what do you mean by “what category”? 

Mr. Sawyer. I mean, what kind of business or occupation? 

Mr. Byers. He was a real estate man. 

Mr. Sawyer. And he was, or allegedly at least, convicted of 
having been hired by somebody else to arrange for the killing of 
that person? 

Mr. Byers. By the man’s wife. 

Mr. Sawyer. Had he had any criminal record before that? 

Mr. Byers. You mean, convictions or arrests? 

Mr. Sawyer. Let’s start with arrests. 

Mr. Byers. Oh, he had a lot of arrests, I imagine. 

Mr. Sawyer. Any other convictions? 

Mr. Byers. I can’t tell you all those questions. A lot of times a 
person is convicted of something and they kept that a secret to 
their self, and as far as I know, I would say no. 

Mr. Sawyer. Is he still in the Missouri State Penitentiary? 

Mr. Byers. No, he is not. 

Mr. Sawyer. When did he get out? 

Mr. Byers. I would say 5 years ago. 

Mr. Sawyer. Do you happen to know what the practical impact 
in the State of Missouri is of a life sentence when eligibility for 
parole occurs? 

Mr. Byers. No, I don’t. 

Mr. Sawyer. Do you know about how long he was in? 

Mr. Byers. Ten years, 11 years, 12 years. 

Mr. Sawyer. Did you have any contact with him while he was in 
the Missouri State Penitentiary? 

Mr. Byers. Yes; when he first went in, I went on a regular basis 
to visit, and then — you know how it is — time was — a great number 
of years — I didn’t go at all. 

Mr. Sawyer. When did he first go there, do you recall? 

Mr. Byers. I can only give you approximate dates. 

Mr. Sawyer. Give me that. 

Mr. Byers. Maybe 1963. 

Mr. Sawyer. And about what time, what year, was this offer 
made to you by Sutherland? 

Mr. Byers. Like I told you, the fall of 1966 or the spring of 1967. 

Mr. Sawyer. So he was in about 3 or 4 years at that point? 

Mr. Byers. I imagine, somewhere close to that. 

Mr. Sawyer. And was that still during the time you did see him 
in prison, before time had passed, so you slacked off? 


Mr. Byers. I think about the time of the offer I had to quit going 
to see him, because I got convicted myself, and convicted felons are 
not allowed to visit in a penitentiary. 

Mr. Sawyer. That would have been after the Sutherland episode, 

Mr. Byers. I would say yes, about that same time. 

Mr. Sawyer. But after? 

Mr. Byers. Yes. 

Mr. Sawyer. About how long after? 

Mr. Byers. I don’t know. I got convicted December 27 in 1967, so 
that would be the winter of 1967. It would all depend if the offer 
was made to me in the fall of 1966 or the spring of 1967, when you 
asked me how long, so you can see for yourself how long of a span 
there is in there. 

Mr. Sawyer. So then you were seeing him for a number of 
months, anyway; you were seeing Spica for a number of months, 
between the time the Sutherland offer was made to you and you 
got convicted? 

Mr. Byers. That’s correct, yes. 

Mr. Sawyer. And about how often would you see him during 
that period? 

Mr. Byers. I can’t remember that. I would imagine pretty regu- 
lar, maybe once a month, once every 2 weeks, once every 2 months, 
no set schedule. 

Mr. Sawyer. You obviously would have mentioned this offer to 
Spica, then, when you saw him, seeing as how that was the kind of 
thing he was convicted of? 

Mr. Byers. I don’t think the offer would have did him any good, 
doing life, and I did not, and I will repeat again, I did not tell him 
of the offer. 

Mr. Sawyer. But aside from whether it would do him any good 
or not, the very thing, the very setup on which he has been 
convicted, it would seem to me to be naturally conversational that 
you had been offered the same kind of deal. Wouldn’t that be a 
natural thing to talk about? 

Mr. Byers. It may be natural, but it wasn’t. 

Mr. Sawyer. You are quite sure you didn’t? 

Mr. Byers. I’m positive. 

Mr. Sawyer. And then if I put your timing right, the offer to you 
that Sutherland made was, oh, give or take a number of months, 
up to a year before King was killed? 

Mr. Byers. Fall of 1966 or spring of 1967, which ever one 

Mr. Sawyer. So it could have been, anyway, something short of a 
year elapsed, maybe just a few months, or maybe 6 or 7? 

Mr. Byers. Could be. 

Mr. Sawyer. Well, could be; is that clear? 

Mr. Byers. Yes, it depends on that time element. Like, remem- 
ber, I testified to, the fall of 1966 or the spring of 1967; that would 
put a few months either which way. 

Mr. Sawyer. I have no further questions. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his 


Mr. Byers, in reply to a question by Mr. McKinney of Connecti- 
cut, you made the statement — I think I quote you correctly — “I 
don’t think the FBI was too concerned that Dr. King got killed.” Do 
you remember making that statement? 

Mr. Byers. Yes. 

Chairman Stokes. What is your basis for that statement? 

Mr. Byers. What I read in the paper. 

Chairman Stokes. Meaning what, “what you read in the paper”? 

Mr. Byers. Well, in an article where a man said — let’s see, how 
did he put this? — the ones who harassed this man were the same 
ones to investigate his murder. That’s the story I am going along. I 
shouldn’t have said that. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Byers, at the time that you were visiting 
your brother-in-law, were you aware of the relationship between 
Dr. Maxey and Mr. Kauffmann? 

Mr. Byers. Yes. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you have any reason to believe that Dr. 
Maxey was close enough to Mr. Kauffmann to know of the avail- 
ability of money to kill Dr. King? 

Mr. Byers. If Dr. Maxey was close enough to Mr. Kauffmann to 

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes. 

Mr. Byers. That would be hard to tell without me — like, I never 
ever knew Dr. Maxey; I just heard Mr. Kauffmann talk, how they 
were friends and how Dr. Maxey would come maybe once a month 
and visit with him. 

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions. 

Chairman Stokes. Any other member? Mr. McKinney? 

Mr. McKinney. Mr. Byers, I just want to get myself straight on 
your relationship with Mr. Kauffmann. How long did you know 

Mr. Byers. Well, go back to the beginning of the question you 
asked me, 1955, 1956, 1957 — I can’t nail the year down. 

Mr. McKinney. But you were 

Mr. Byers. But I never associated with him until after his broth- 
er died, that I was friends with, and his brother died, like in 1962. 
You know, I never had no close association with him, because his 
brother was my friend. His brother was a real nice man. 

Mr. McKinney. The two of you became fairly close? 

Mr. Byers. His brother? 

Mr. McKinney. No; Mr. Kauffmann himself. 

Mr. Byers. You mean, Mr. John Kauffmann? 

Mr. McKinney. Yes. 

Mr. Byers. Not as close as I was to his brother, Gil. 

Mr. McKinney. How soon after this offer did you break off your 
relationship with Mr. Kauffmann? 

Mr. Byers. Within a short period of time, maybe like weeks or 
something like that, when I found out about the narcotics transac- 

Mr. McKinney. Did Mr. Kauffmann ever contact you and ques- 
tion why he didn’t see you, any longer? 


Mr. Byers. No; I made it very clear why I was going to leave the 

Mr. McKinney. At the time that you said you were going to 
leave the scene, did he make any mention of the fact that he had 
taken you out and gotten you a “hit” offer? 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Mr. McKinney. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Byers, one other question. I want to put 
something in perspective. Are you aware of how the FBI became 
aware that this offer had been made to you? 

Mr. Byers. Only what I read in the paper. 

Chairman Stokes. Can you tell us what that is? 

Mr. Byers. That I unconsciously had told someone of this offer, 
an informant at the time to the FBI, and the FBI wrote it down 
and misfiled it for 5 years. That’s all I am aware of. 

Chairman Stokes. This would have been in 1973 that you were 
talking with a person who was an FBI informant; isn’t that cor- 

Mr. Byers. That’s correct. 

Chairman Stokes. And you mentioned this incident to that 
individual, not knowing the individual was an FBI informant; is 
that right? 

Mr. Byers. That’s correct. 

Chairman Stokes. And then, as a consequence of your having 
stated it to him, the FBI informant did inform the FBI of it, but 
they then misfiled the memorandum in which they had put it; is 
that your understanding? 

Mr. Byers. That’s the way I read it in the paper. 

Chairman Stokes. Now, in 1973, after you had talked with this 
individual who you now know to be an FBI informant - 

Mr. Byers. No, I do not know him to be an FBI informant, 
because I don’t know who it was. 

Chairman Stokes. I see; but you do recall you talked to someone 
about this? 

Mr. Byers. Evidently I did. 

Chairman Stokes. Has the FBI ever been to you, to interrogate 
you about the story? 

Mr. Byers. Been to me to interrrogate me about the story? You 
mean, when the man give it to him in 1973? 

Chairman Stokes. My question really is, has the FBI ever been 
to you to find out from you about this incident? 

Mr. Byers. About the offer being made to me? 

Chairman Stokes. Right. 

Mr. Byers. No. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

One further question: As I understand you, you don’t know who 
it was you talked to in 1973, who was the informant; is that 

Mr. Byers. That’s correct. 

Chairman Stokes. Well, were you in the habit of talking to a lot 
of people about this incident? 

Mr. Byers. No, but maybe when I was drinking, you know, could 
have been any one of a thousand people I might have told it to, you 


know; like when you drink, you talk, and you don’t know what you 
are saying, or what you’re doing. Who knows? 

Chairman Stokes. Well, if you say you don’t know what you are 
saying, what you are talking about, what you are doing 

Mr. Byers. Evidently I told this story to someone whom I cannot 
recall telling this story to, is what I am trying to say; and I am 
trying to give you a reason for why I may do this. 

Chairman Stokes. That’s what I am trying to get at. 

Mr. Byers. Yes. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

I have no further questions. 

Any other members seeking further recognition? Mr. Fauntroy? 

Mr. Fauntroy. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel, Mr. Blakey, have anything 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, there is one matter I would like to 
follow up on. 

Mr. Byers, apart from your knowing who the informant is, have 
you ever been told who the informant might be? 

Mr. Byers. No. Who would tell me? 

Mr. Blakey. That was my question to you. Have you ever had 
any discussions with anybody as to who that informant might have 

Mr. Byers. Oh, naturally, it has my curiosity aroused. I would be 
a fool if it didn’t; but I just — I don’t know who it would have been. 

Mr. Blakey. Have you ever had any discussion with any counsel 
as to who that informant might have been? 

Mr. Byers. You mean, such as legal counsel, like 

Mr. Blakey. I am not referring to Mr. Hamilton. Any other 
lawyer, anyplace, anytime? 

Mr. Byers. Talking about legal counsel? 

Mr. Blakey. Right; a lawyer. 

Mr. Byers. Oh, I’m sure that I may have run into it by asking 
them who this may be, or who could have told such a story on me. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversations with Mr. Randall 
about the informant? 

Mr. Byers. Probably so, but I don’t remember just what the basis 
of the conversation was. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever speculate to Mr. Randall who the 
informant might have been? 

Mr. Byers. I can’t remember that. 

Mr. Blakey. Did he ever speculate to you who the informant 
might have been? 

Mr. Byers. I can’t remember that. Whenever me and Mr. Ran- 
dall talked, we just talked a lot and didn’t really say anything. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever have any conversations with Mr. Ran- 
dall in 1973 about the offer? 

Mr. Byers. About the offer? 

Mr. Blakey. And the fact that 

Mr. Byers. I had conversations with Mr. Randall a long time 
before 1973 about the offer. 

Mr. Blakey. Right, but my question is directed to 1973. 

Mr. Byers. Well, I can’t remember specifically in 1973. I may 
have had — I would say yes, but I could not swear to it. 


Mr. Blakey. Did you ever have any conversations with Mr. 
Weenick in 1973 or thereafter about the offer? 

Mr. Byers. Yes. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any discussions with him in which 
either you or he speculated about who the informant might be? 

Mr. Byers. Oh, possibly so. 

Mr. Blakey. When did it come to your attention that the inform- 
ant had given this information to the FBI? 

Mr. Byers. When a reporter from the New York Times came and 
told me. 

Mr. Blakey. When did that occur? 

Mr. Byers. After I was here at the committee last time. 

Mr. Blakey. I’m somewhat confused, Mr. Byers. Perhaps the way 
I am asking the question has confused you. 

Is it that you did not know that the informant had, until the 
New York Times reporter talked to you, and that did not occur 
until after your appearance on May 9, 1978? You couldn’t have 
speculated about an informant with either Mr. Weenick or Mr. 
Randall in 1973. 

Mr. Byers. I misunderstood your question a while ago. I didn’t 
even know an informant existed until — like I say — 1978. I wasn’t 
following your questioning a while ago. Did you ask me a while ago 
if we discussed an informant in 1973? 

Mr. Blakey. That’s correct. 

Mr. Byers. No. How could we discuss it when we didn’t even 
know there was one? 

Mr. Blakey. So your testimony is — and you would have us be- 
lieve, and it is true — that you had no discussions about an inform- 
ant until after the New York Times article? 

Mr. Byers. Oh, yes, I didn’t even know — when Mr. Conrad Baetz 
and Mr. Waxman came to my home — this is the first I knew that 
you knew anything about it. That’s the first I knew. 

Mr. Blakey. Fine. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. 

Chairman Stokes. Is any member of the committee seeking fur- 
ther recognition? 

Mr. Byers. It may be necessary for the committee to call you 
back later today. For that reason, we would ask that you remain 
available this morning and a portion of the afternoon. 

For the time being, this does conclude your testimony before the 
committee, and at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony, either the 
witness or his counsel may make a statement to this committee 
during a 5-minute period. During that period you may amplify or 
explain your testimony in any way or make any further comment 
you so desire on your testimony before this committee. 

I would extend to you — to either you or Mr. Hamilton — at this 
time 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so desire. 

Mr. Byers. I can’t think of anything I would like to add. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Hamilton? 

Mr. Hamilton. No comments. 

Chairman Stokes. Then at this time the Chair would once again 
admonish all persons in the room to please remain seated until 
such time as the witness has left the hearing room. 

Thank you very much and you are excused, Mr. Byers. 


The committee will take a 2- or 3-minute recess. 

[Brief recess.] 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. 

In light of the testimony that has just been received before the 
committee, which tends to relate to a conspiracy, the Chair thinks 
it is appropriate at this time that I make certain comments rela- 
tive to the testimony of this witness and subsequent witnesses over 
the next 3 days. 

When we got to this point in the Kennedy hearings, I thought it 
appropriate to make certain general remarks. Here, too, certain 
things should be made more explicit. 

The committee will be hearing testimony over these 3 days deal- 
ing with what the committee has found. In presenting this evidence 
to the committee, the staff will not be trying to prove or disprove 
any particular theory. The purpose of these hearings is not to try 
to establish or refute particular theories but to consider the evi- 
dence available on the various points. That evidence may either 
prove it, disprove it, or be insufficient to make a judgment either 
way. Nevertheless, because these hearings are legislative in charac- 
ter and not a judicial trial, the committee has a duty to make what 
it has learned public, even if it falls short of what everyone might 
wish to know on the crucial question: Was there a conspiracy 
involved in the assassination of Dr. King? 

Let me make another important point: It may be helpful for 
those following our hearings if something is also said here about 
the quality and the quantity of evidence available to the committee 
as it has moved through each of the phases of its deliberations and 
the need to recognize how to use each kind of evidence. 

In certain aspects of our work the committee has had available 
to it the hard stuff of science. The quality of the evidence available 
to the committee was, therefore, unusually high, even if it did not 
materially assist us, as it did in the Kennedy investigation. 

As the committee turned to assessing the performance of the 
agencies, principally the FBI, less scientific evidence was available 
to the committee and it was necessary to rely more on documents 
and human memories, principally those of public officials. 

Now as the committee’s attention turns directly to the question 
of conspiracy, it will be necessary to move away from the hard 
evidence of science and documents and consider more oral testi- 
mony. The shifting nature of the balance ought to be explicitly 
noted and commented on. 

Those who follow our hearings must recognize the difference in 
the quality and the quantity of the evidence available to resolve 
issues in this most difficult area. Human perception and memory, 
to say nothing of bias or motive to lie, sharply qualify human 
testimony, making it less reliable than scientific analysis or docu- 
ments written not for litigation but as an accurate record of actual 

That oral testimony, moreover, will be about events that oc- 
curred over 10 years ago. It will in some instances also concern 
people who are now dead and who cannot either be examined to 
determine the truth or to defend themselves against posthumous 


As I observed in the Kennedy hearings, those who follow our 
hearings should also keep in mind some principles about the law of 
conspiracy and the special difficulties associated with its proof. 

Mr. Justice Holmes once succinctly defined a conspiracy as “a 
partnership in criminal purposes/’ That definition serves well 
enough here. Unless evidence is adduced from which “a partner- 
ship in criminal purposes” can be inferred, a conspiracy cannot be 
said to exist. A suspicion suspected must always be distinguished 
from a fact found. 

Let me say concretely what I mean. Basically, the Justice De- 
partment task force and others have concluded that James Earl 
Ray was the lone assassin of Dr. King, because they have conclud- 
ed that he was a loner and he was a racist — in short, because he 
had no significant associations other than his family and he appar- 
ently had an intensely personal motive, it was inappropriate — the 
task force found — to conclude that there was a possibility of a 
conspiracy involved in the assassination. 

What the task force and various writers have rightly recognized, 
if not always made explicit, is twofold: First, conspiracy is rooted in 
association — no association, no conspiracy; and, second, motive can 
be a key to the interpretation of conduct. 

We took up the question of motive in previous hearings. Let me 
now turn my attention to association and conspiracy. 

Because the previous investigations concluded there was no evi- 
dence of association, they were not forced to deal with the difficult 
questions posed by evidence of association as it gives rise to evi- 
dence of conspiracy. It is a fundamental principle of American law 
that guilt cannot be inferred from association alone and it is one 
that must be honored in congressional hearings, also. 

To be sure, conspirators seldom shout their intentions from the 
rooftops or publish their thoughts in the newspapers. Conspiracy 
must, therefore, usually be inferred from circumstantial evidence — 
associations, plus. As I noted in the Kennedy hearings, herein lies 
the difficulty in all conspiracy investigations, whether they are 
trials or legislative hearings dealing with conspiracy questions. 

Mr. Justice Jackson once observed of conspiracy trials, and I 
quote him: 

A defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will be 
evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his 
own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are willing to believe 
that birds of a feather flock together. If he is silent, he is taken to admitting and if, 
as it often happens, co-defendants can be proded into * * * contradicting each other, 
they convict each other. 

What Mr. Justice Jackson said about a conspiracy trial applies 
even more strongly in the context of a congressional hearing. 

As I have repeatedly said in these hearings, these proceedings 
are not a criminal trial. There is no indictment and there is no 
defendant; there is no prosecutor and there is no defense counsel. 
The normal rules of evidence do not apply. Because none of the 
elements are here present, a special burden is imposed on this 
committee as evidence is introduced before it, and on those who 
follow our proceedings, not to take the evidence so introduced 
beyond what it fairly establishes or to sensationalize it. 



This caution is particularly apt when evidence of association is 
introduced. I repeat, conspiracy is founded in association, but more 
than association is required to establish conspiracy. Reasoning that 
guilt goes hand in hand with association — the principle of guilt by 
association — is to be abhorred in a free society. 

I would caution, therefore, those who follow our hearings or read 
our record to evaluate the evidence that we will hear these next 3 
days as carefully as the committee itself will, reserve judgment 
until all the evidence is in and do not reach conclusions beyond 
what the evidence itself fully justifies. Anything else — it seems to 
me — would be bad logic. It would also be unfair to all who are 

Thank you. 

At this time the Chair recognizes special counsel, I. Charles 

Mr. Mathews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Murray Randall was one of two attorneys in- 
formed by Mr. Byers of the offer to murder Dr. King. He is present- 
ly a judge in the court of criminal corrections in the city of St. 

Further, Mr. Chairman, counsel has been advised that Judge 
Randall will be invoking rule 6, so it may be appropriate at this 
time to so order. 

Chairman Stokes. The next witness has invoked the provisions 
of rule 6, the pertinent part of which reads that: 

No witness served with a subpena by the committee shall be required against his 
or her will to be photographed in any hearing or to give evidence or testimony while 
the broadcasting of that hearing by radio or television is being conducted. At the 
request of any witness who does not wish to be subjected to radio, television or still 
photography coverage, all lenses shall be covered and all microphones used for 
coverage turned off. 

In addition, the Chair understands that this witness has also 
requested that the hallway area adjacent to the hearing room also 
be covered under the provisions of rule 6. 

Therefore, at this time the Chair requests complete compliance 
with the request of the witness not to be photographed in any 

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate at this 
time to call Judge Randall. 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair calls the judge. 

Judge Randall, will you please stand and be sworn in? 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the 
committee is the truth, nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Judge Randall. I do. 

Good morning. I would like to introduce Mr. Hilton Reed, Jr., a 
member of the bar in the city of St. Louis. 

Chairman Stokes. We are pleased to have you this morning. 

The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Professor 

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


Mr. Blakey. For the record, would you state your name, please. 


Judge Randall. Murray L. Randall. 

Mr. Blakey. I would like to express the appreciation of the 
committee and the staff, including myself, for your appearance 
here today. I know that you have taken time from a very busy trial 

It has been a professional inconvenience to you. Nevertheless, I 
am sure you realize the important public purpose your testimony 
may serve this morning. 

Judge Randall. Could I say you ought to express that for the 
State of Missouri. It cost the State of Missouri $25,000 for me to 
come, closed down my division all week. 

Mr. Blakey. The committee obviously regrets that. 

Judge Randall. The work I do, I get assigned cases each week. I 
was assigned a murder case, and I had to send it back because I 
was afraid to interrupt it and I didn’t know when to return. I am 
glad to be here. They are the ones who got inconvenienced. 

Mr. Blakey. The committee appreciates your cooperation today, 
as it does of any other State judges who disrupt their schedule to 
come to Washington. 

Judge Randall, have you been supplied a copy of the committee 

Judge Randall. Yes. 

Mr. Blakey. Have you read them? 

Judge Randall. Yes. 

Mr. Blakey. Do you understand them? 

Judge Randall. Yes, I think I do. I think I am a pretty good 

Mr. Blakey. Let me ask you this question. Do you know Russell 
George Byers? 

Judge Randall. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Blakey. When did you first meet him? 

Judge Randall. Well, I first met him on the day that he pled 
guilty in Peoria, 111. I represented a co-defendant whose name was 
Arthur Strawbridge. He was known as the “hawk.” Mr. Byers 
appeared on the same day I did and pled guilty. 

So, I met him that day. I did not become acquainted with him, 
though, until mid-1968. I changed arrangements on May 1, 1968. I 
entered my private practice and left a big firm. It was subsequent 
to that that he came to me and asked me to incorporate a business 
for him. 

Mr. Blakey. You first met him in December 1967? 

Judge Randall. Whatever date that was, sir, I don’t remember. 

Mr. Blakey. He indicated to us and, of course, the record would 
speak for itself on that. Then he subsequently came to you in 1968? 

Judge Randall. Yes. Was that what he indicated? 

Well, I thought you said he indicated, but the facts are he came 
subsequent to the time I opened my own office, which was May 1, 
1968, sir. I am guessing about mid-1968, 2 or 3 months, because 
when I opened my office I didn’t even have a secretary for a while, 
only had an answering service. 

I didn’t know what was going to happen when I went out on my 
own. It worked out fine, but I had left a good income and I started 
off very frugally. My total expenses for that year were $2,000 

39-935 0 - 79 - 14 


operating the firm. So, it was sometime after that because the 
secretary had to type the papers. 

I will tell you the filing date of the corporation papers would give 
you the date. 

Mr. Blakey. In any event, he consulted you then in a profession- 
al capacity, is that correct? 

Judge Randall. Well, only with respect to the services of draw- 
ing up the necessary forms to incorporate a business. I would say I 
saw him twice, once at the beginning and once at the end. 

Mr. Blakey. Judge Randall, I would like to ask you some ques- 
tions about your conversation with him. But before I do that, Mr. 
Chairman, I would ask that the witness be shown Martin Luther 
King exhibit F-573 and it be inserted in the record. It is a waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege between Mr. Byers and Mr. Randall. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 
record at this point and shown to the witness. 

[The information follows:] 



I, RUSSELL BYERS, hereby waive my attorney-client privilege 
with respect to any and all communications or documents 
between Murray Randall and myself concerning an offer, 
solicitation, or plan to assassinate or harm the person of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 

Dated this 

*7 11 

day of June, 1978. 

MLK Exhibit F-573 

Judge Randall. I have a copy of that, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Obviously, Judge Randall, you know, of course, that 
this waiver authorizes you in this congressional committee to dis- 
cuss what would otherwise be privileged communications between 
yourself and Mr. Byers. 

Judge Randall. That is what I think, yes, sir. 

Mr. Reed. If I may, Professor Blakey, I would like to indicate at 
this time that it is my opinion that the waiver of the attorney- 
client privilege is not an absolute matter and deals only with those 
matters which are clearly related to the matters under discussion 


So, I would not like at this time for the Judge to feel free to 
discuss any matters that might have arisen during the course of 
his representation of Mr. Byers. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Blakey. Judge, let me direct your attention back to that 
period of time after sometime in mid-1968 when you had conversa- 
tions with Mr. Byers and ask you this question: 

During the course of your conversations with him then or later, 
did he ever tell you of an offer that had been made to him of 
$50,000 to kill Dr. Martin Luther King? 

Judge Randall. Well, there was a consultation and my best 
recollection is that this happened near the end of my law practice. 
I terminated my law practice November 4, 1974. 

In conjunction with something else I did for him, could I tell you 
about that? 

Mr. Blakey. Let’s see if we can’t get the basic details of it down 
first. You say you did have a conversation with him sometime 

Judge Randall. Well, that gets 

Mr. Blakey. Excuse me, Judge, sometime in 1974 is when your 
memory is, the first time you had a conversation with him about 
the offer? 

Judge Randall. The only one. 

Mr. Blakey. So you did not have conversations with him prior to 
that time? 

% Judge Randall. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Blakey. And you fixed the date of 1974 because of an event 
you were then going to tell the committee about? 

Judge Randall. Well, I am trying to tell you, sir, that the court 
records would designate the date, you know, but my best recollec- 
tion was that it was near the end of my law practice. 

If I could tell you what that was and what occurred, then I think 
we could immediately get into it. 

The $50,000 figure, I don’t recall the amount. 

Mr. Blakey. Was the litigation having to do with his UMC 
Industries versus Russell Byers Consolidated Vending Co.? 

Judge Randall. That is probably it. Do you have the court date? 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the docket be 
appropriately marked as Martin Luther King exhibit 582 and 
shown to the witness. 

Judge Randall. I would love to see that. 

Chairman Stokes. Counsel asks also to make it part of the 

Mr. Blakey. Yes, would you incorporate it in the record at this 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-582 




4 0 4 £ 

Jury demand date: 

Form No. 10S TUv. 


~ALK FA. lir 

■1 «’*&&&< 


?3C 4 - 4 51 





D»« Ordar c 
Judgment Net 



Marshal's, ret.. to service of summons. etc. on deft on 6-20-73 fid, 




13 -Hi 

Answer rec'd & lodged. 


and costs, returnable Oct 3. 1973. filed, and so ordered. 

Execution issued. 


Marshal's ret. on summons to garnishee Raiffie Vending Co filed 

(executed 9-14-731. • . , 

’ . . 

“ _Q_7 


to niff's interrogatories propounded to garnishee filed. 

. . 



Plff's motion for examination of judgment debtor filed. & 

1974. at 10 a.ra. re ability to pay .judgment herein. Delivered to 

U S Marshal for service by atty for plff. 


Marshal's ret. on Execution, unsatisfied, filed (garnishment 



Marshal’s return on Citation to appear executed i-ib-Y-4 on 

Russel Byers filed, (.served Donna Byers .wife) . 


Parties appear by counsel, and plff isdirected - by the ct to 

propound questions in writing, and cause is passed to Feb 15, 1974 


Plff's interrogatories to judgment debtor, Russel Byers, fid. 

Deft's answers to interred fid. 

Judge Randall. While we are doing that, let me explain to the 
committee that for that service I made no charge. The best I can 
recall, it was an encounter at the courthouse and I appeared with 

He was going to appear alone, and I thought he had a problem, 
and I appeared with him and I made no charge for that. It was 
immediately following that that he consulted me about this matter 
you are interested in. 

I have with me my client card on Mr. Byers, which I would be 
happy to present to the committee, that shows the services I per- 
formed for him and the charge. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that that client card be 
made Martin Luther King exhibit 

Judge Randall. I have not made a copy of this, and I would 
appreciate your returning me a copy. 

Mr. Blakey [continuing]. Be appropriately marked as “MLK ex- 
hibit F-583” and inserted in the record at this point. 


Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 
record as an exhibit at this point and a copy of it made as per the 
Judge’s request. 

[The information follows:] 

Byfirs, Russell, G. 

3696 Washington Ave. 

St. Louis, Mo. 63108 ^ £3 

WO 2-671f» ' 

Fee : 0 


Expenses: $53.00 

Hry ] Jt.f 

MLK Exhibit F-583 

Mr. Blakey. Let me then direct your attention 

Judge Randall. Could I look at this first, please? 

Mr. Blakey. Certainly. 

Judge Randall. According to this, the occasion was August — do 
you have a copy of this, counsel? 

Mr. Blakey. You have my copy, Judge. I am sure I see your 
problem. The Xeroxing at the edge 

Judge Randall. It says 8-74. Do you know if that is the eighth 
month or eighth day? 

Mr. Blakey. The Xeroxing leaves something to be desired. Nev- 
ertheless, it does indicate — correct me if I am wrong — that the 
representation began sometime in 1973 and ended sometime in 

Judge Randall. That is not correct. I don’t know when my name 
got on it, but I would have to tell you what occurred. You can see it 
here from this. A default judgment was taken. I made no represen- 
tation because the client took a default judgment. 

My first and only appearance was on this date where it says 
parties appear by counsel. It says 8-74 down near the end: 

Parties appear by counsel and plaintiff was directed by the court to propound 
questions in writing and cause this to pass to February 15. 

Mr. Blakey. In any case, Judge, the litigation begins sometime 
in 1973 and ends in 1974. 

Judge Randall. But I was not involved in it. 

Mr. Blakey. Your testimony is that sometime after it began you 
became involved. 

Judge Randall. I was involved on 1 day, the day he appeared in 

Mr. Blakey. That would be sometime between 1973 and 1974. 

Judge Randall. It appears it was 1974 sometime, sir, from this 
document, because you see he took a default judgment because 
there was no defense and then the plaintiff filed a motion to 
interrogate him in open court in aid of execution and partu ’v 
they were trying to find out where the vending machines v 

That is the day I appeared with him in court and that is the 
time and you will notice I made no charge for it. 


Mr. Blakey. Fine. In any case, Judge, sometime around that 
appearance or shortly thereafter I take it you had a conversation 
with him. 

Judge Randall. On that day. 

Mr. Blakey. On that day, yes. Will you tell the committee what 
that conversation was? 

Judge Randall. Before I undertake to do that I would like to say 
something about my memory on this thing. 

This event was a wholly insignificant event to me. I never once 
thought about it again until Mr. Byers called me upon returning 
from Washington when he was questioned out here and told me 
that he had supplied my name. 

I gave it very little thought thereafter until a few months ago 
when Carter Stith, a reporter for the Post Dispatch, visited me and 
told me she had a copy of the FBI report, which was news to me, 
and she had my name. 

From that time forward I have wracked my memory on this. I 
have read all the newspaper articles. I have read the FBI report. 
All I can say to you today is that some of this new information has 
fused in my mind with what Mr. Byers told me, plus the fact I 
have wracked my memory, so I will give you my best present 
recollection. I cannot guarantee it will hold 100 percent. Do you 
understand that? 

Mr. Blakey. I am sure the committee would indicate to you, 
Judge Randall, that it would not want anything other than your 
best memory. 

Judge Randall. But do you understand it is blended with some 
other things. 

Mr. Blakey. With that preface, would you tell us as best you can 
what he said to you and what you said to him? 

Judge Randall. Very well. As a result of the problem he got into 
over the collection thing where he was going to appear alone and I 
appeared with him and he took the fifth amendment because of 
some problems connected with it, he then, we went into the corri- 
dor and we First talked to the attorneys on the other side and they 
offered to settle a $50,000 judgment for $1,000, the attorney’s fee. 

He never came up with that money before I left the law practice, 
and that is the reason I know it was near the end. As a result of 
that, he said to me, he had me cornered and it was all free, he said 
I have something else I would like to consult you about. 

He said, I have this story that I think is out and I may be 
questioned by the Federal Government about it. I would like to 
know the ^procedure for claiming immunity. He didn’t think it 
incriminated him, but he was concerned about claiming immunity 
because I told him that was a public hearing. 

You know, in order to get immunity you go before the grand 
jury, go before open court and get immunity and you go back. He 
was concerned about the publicity. Frankly, what he was trying to 
do is decide in his mind, if I am questioned about this, shall I talk 
or shall I claim immunity. 

Then he related what happened. To the best of my recollection 
the year was about 1964, about 10 years previous. I could be wrong, 
but I have a recollection it was 10 years past. 


He said that at that time he had an arrangement with the 
sheriff of Jefferson County. I do not think the privilege extends to 
my explaining the details of that arrangement. 

Suffice it to say that he said through his connections with the 
sheriff of Jefferson County he met this man named Kauffmann. 

Is that his name? My memory is it was Kauffmann, the crippled 

Mr. Blakey. There is testimony in the record about Mr. Kauff- 

Judge Randall. He was described to me as an old, little, crippled 
man who had once been a stockbroker and who had lost his license 
due to obtaining a conviction for securities fraud. 

He said how he met him was this: That the sheriff was engaged 
also in the business of peddling narcotic drugs, and in fact he told 
me that the sheriff was later indicted and convicted for it. 

He said that he was obtaining his supply of narcotic drugs from 
Kauffmann and Kauffmann was obtaining them in this fashion. 

Mr. Blakey. Excuse me, Judge. The sheriff was obtaining them 
from Kauffman? 

Judge Randall. From Kauffmann; yes. Mr. Byers denied he had 
any connection with narcotic drugs. Mr. Byers denied there was 
two crimes he never engaged in. One was murder and the other 
was narcotic drugs. 

So, he said at this time the sheriff was getting a supply of 
narcotic drugs from Kauffmann and Kauffmann was obtaining 
them in this fashion. Kauffmann had a medical manufacturing 
business located in Jefferson County in an old motel over on old 
Highway 67, just north of the Kohler City Shopping Center. 

Now, the Kohler City Shopping Center is not an incorporation, a 
municipality. It is a shopping center which has been there since I 
was a boy. I think it is in or near the town of Imperial, the 
municipality of Imperial. 

He said he was manufacturing these medicines in this motel and 
he had a narcotics license and so he was able to obtain narcotics. 
He said that he thought that it was a front for the narcotics 

He said that he had associated with him in this business a doctor 
who was employed by the Missouri prison system. He either did 
not remember his name or he never knew the doctor’s name. At 
least he did not give me his name. 

He said that both Kauffmann and the doctor were dead, to his 
knowledge, at the time he was telling me. He said that he spent 
some time, in his spare time, hanging around this motel. 

He worked mostly at night in his business, Mr. Byers did, so he 
had the daytimes to hang around there. I do not recall whether he 
ever met the doctor or not, sir, or whether he told me whether he 
met the doctor. The doctor, he thought, was dead. 

He said that in addition to that there was a farm that adjoined 
the motel. The motel was along the highway. I could picture this 
area a little bit. 

Highway 67 was no longer a traveled route. Highway 1-55 had 
replaced it. So, motels were of no use. So, they had this motel and 
he was manufacturing this medicine. 


He said there was a farm immediately adjoining it and to the 
rear of it and there was a farmhouse off away from the highway. 
He said there was a man who lived up there who ran around the 
country dressed in bib overalls and a straw hat. He said everybody 
knew him by sight. He knew him by sight, but he had not met him. 
He said he was a retired patent lawyer and that he had come to 
the Metropolitan St. Louis area from Memphis, Tenn. 

He did not know whether he practiced law in Memphis or St. 

He said that one day — and I think it was at the motel but I can’t 
be sure; as I said, this was an insignificant event to me and I am 
only giving you my best recollection— he said that one day he was 
with Kauffmann, I think at the motel, and Kauffmann said to him, 
“Would you like to earn $20,000.” Now, it may have been $50,000, 
and I may be influenced in that figure by the FBI report. I think it 
says $20,000 in the FBI report. But it was some sum of money. 

He said that he flippantly replied, “Who do I have to kill?” He 
said he had no intention of killing anybody. He never killed any- 
body in his life and he never would kill anybody, but he thought 
Kauffmann was pulling his leg and he had nothing to lose, so he 
went along with the leg-pulling contest. 

He said the man then replied, “We have to go see the old man” 
or the top man. I can’t be sure whether he said the old man or the 
top man. 

They then proceeded — I don’t know whether it was immediately 
or later — they then proceeded to the farmhouse. 

I can remember only two things he told me about the farmhouse. 
One, it was a stone house, and second, the parlor was carpeted with 
carpet that contained impressions of the Confederate flag. I don’t 
know how he knew this, but he told me that this carpet had been 
removed from some public place, a cocktail lounge or a club that 
had a Confederate motif, and placed in the farmhouse. 

He said that he was introduced to the old farmer or whatever 
you want to call him, and the man still had on his bib overalls, but 
he did not have on the straw hat. He had a Confederate Army cap 

He said they then went into the den and that he engaged this old 
man in conversation designed to needle him or find out how he 
could come up with the fee, whatever it was, $20,000 or something. 
He said the man said that he was a member of a national organiza- 
tion from which he could get the fee. I do not recall whether he 
said the organization was allegedly in on the matter or it was only 
the source of his fee. 

But he then questioned him in extreme detail about this organi- 
zation. In fact, he said this questioning constituted 90 percent of 
his conversation. 

He said the man told him by either description or name many 
alleged prominent people who were a member of this organization. 
If he related any of them to me by description or name, I do not 
recall them. I don’t think he even told me any of them. 

Then at the conclusion of this conversation he said he finally 
asked the man, “Well, if you can get the money, who do I have to 
kill?” And he said he said, “Dr. Martin Luther King.” He said that 
he laughed and said, “I pass.” 


He said a further comment in departing such as nobody can get 
by with it, or it can’t be done, or it is too dangerous, or something 
to the effect that, you know, he was leaving this because it was not 
an appropriation operation. 

He said, however, that he had no intention at any time to par- 
ticipate in any such conduct, that he regarded these people as 
being, you know, pulling his leg, taking him on a snipe hunt, very 
light. He said that he forgot about it. 

Sometime later Dr. King was killed. I don’t recall the time. If I 
am right on 1964 — you know, it was a long period of time, but I 
could be wrong on that date. He said that the only thing he had 
seen — no, there were two things — that caused him to think that 
they might be associated with Ray was that he had read that 
before Ray escaped from prison that he was transferred to the 
medical department and he escaped from the medical department. 

He said that he had also read that Ray was seen in Canada with 
a little old crippled man. 

Those are the only things that I can remember that caused him 
to wonder about whether or not, you know, there might be some 

He was not upset about it. He was not disturbed. He did not feel 
that anything was imminent. He just thought he had me cornered 
and I was free and that he might as well find out something from a 
free lawyer and, you know, there I was. 

I made no charge for that, as you can see from client’s card on 
Mr. Byers. The only charge I made was $250 for the incorporation, 
and I am not sure he paid that. That card is not a financial card. 
My receipts ledger would show it and it is possible that I did not 
enter payment on the card. 

That is all I know about the thing. That is the whole extent of 
any representation I ever had with Mr. Byers. 

Mr. Blakey. Is that the whole extent of his conversation with 

Judge Randall. As far as I can recollect, sir. Specific questions, 
you know, might remind me of something. 

Mr. Blakey. Did he say anything to you about an informant and 
make an effort to 

Judge Randall. Not at that time. 

Mr. Blakey. This is in May of 1974. You were having the conver- 
sation in May of 1974. 

Judge Randall. Sir, can you tell what this date is on this sheet? 
I can’t tell the date. Would you take it up there? 

Mr. Blakey. What I am trying to do with you, Judge, is get an 
approximate time. The record obviously will speak for itself as to 
exactly what the date was. The Xerox is not that clear as to 
exactly the month. 

Judge Randall. Let me tell you. Here is the entry — no, that is 
not the entry. The interrogatories came first, but he didn’t answer 
those. Well, I can’t tell you the date. It was the day he appeared in 
court and testified, took the fifth amendment. Obviously, it was 
sometime in 1974, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. If counsel for the committee can fix the date 
some other way, I think the Judge has given his best recollection 
on it. 


Judge Randall. That is the best I can do, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. In any event, Judge, let me clarify if I might for the 
record. You indicated that when you talked to him in 1964 

Judge Randall. 1974. 

Mr. Blakey. I’m sorry. 1974. It is your best recollection now that 
he indicated that he had been dealing or was aware of Mr. Kauff- 
mann’s dealing in drugs some 10 years earlier? 

Judge Randall. Yes. 

Mr. Blakey. Is your memory fixed or firm on that 10-year 

Judge Randall. No, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. It could be a shorter period of time? 

Judge Randall. Yes. 

Mr. Blakey. It could have been a longer period of time? 

Judge Randall. Well, it had to be before Dr. King was killed. 

Mr. Blakey. So your memory is that it is sometime prior to Dr. 
King being killed? 

Judge Randall. Very definitely. 

Mr. Blakey. He had a drug association or he knew of a drug 
association of Mr. Kauffmann? 

Judge Randall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Let me follow up on an answer that you gave. Did 
you have a subsequent conversation with Mr. Byers, that is follow- 
ing this conversation in 1974, in which you also discussed the 
Sutherland offer? 

Judge Randall. When Mr. Byers returned from out here he 
called me up, told me what he had done, told me he had given you 
people my name, and undertook to refresh my recollection, sir. I 
cannot remember what was said in that conversation. I have met 
with him once in which we talked about the informant. Those are 
the only conversations. 

Mr. Blakey. Let me see if I can’t approximate the date when you 
might have talked to Mr. Byers after his appearance here. Mr. 
Byers appeared before this committee on May 9, 1978. So it would 
be some point in time following that. 

Judge Randall. And before the investigators came to see me, 
because I told them when they came to see me that Mr. Byers had 
called me. 

Mr. Blakey. Now, would you repeat for us, if you can, to the best 
of your ability, what Mr. Byers said to you at that time. 

Judge Randall. He told me he had come out here and reported 
this, you know, told you about it, given you my name, and told me 
that he hoped I remembered the conversation, and undertook to 
refresh my recollection. And that is all I can remember, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Subsequent to that time, did you have another 
conversation about the Sutherland offer? 

Judge Randall. The only thing is the informant, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Can you tell us when you had a conversation with 
him about the informant. 

Judge Randall. Yes, sir, as best I can recall. When Carter Stith 
came to see me she told me she had information, she had the FBI 
report. She had information that I was one of two people to whom 
Mr. Byers had told this. The other one was Mr. Weenick. She asked 
me if I was the informant. So I felt a little disturbed about that. 


Mr. Blakey. Judge, could you pinpoint the time when this would 
have been? 

Judge Randall. When the FBI report was first released to the 
press, when a New York Times reporter came to St. Louis. 

Mr. Blakey. This would be sometime in July? 

Judge Randall. Sir, you know that date better than I would. I 
think the first story in the St. Louis papers, it might have been 
immediately subsequent to the first story. You can pinpoint that; I 

Mr. Blakey. Was it prior to or subsequent to the interview of 
you by our investigators? 

Judge Randall. Subsequent, very subsequent. So I decided I 
ought to try to see Mr. Byers and see if he thought I was the 
informant or if he knew who was the informant. 

I have to tell you something else. Miss Carter Stith, who was the 
reporter who visited me, told me when he examined the FBI 
report — I don’t know if she was present or if it was related to her 
by the New York Times reporter — that he studied it and restudied 
it with great care, and they were convinced he knew who the 
informant was but he would not talk. 

But, anyway, sometime after this, let’s say 3 weeks, that is a 
guess, I got home early one night and I called Mr. Byers at home 
and asked him to meet me. I met him at Gianino’s Restaurant, 
which is about 5 blocks from my home. I waited until Mr. Byers 
could get there. 

When I arrived he was parked in front, standing outside. I think 
he reserved the next parking space for me. I went into that park- 
ing space and I asked him to sit in the car. He said he was afraid 
to talk in either car for fear the FBI had the cars wired. 

We then went into the restaurant and we sat in a booth on the 
south wall. I was on the east side, he was on the west. He ordered a 
small salad. I ordered a martini. He was frightened. He wanted to 
get home before dark. He was afraid somebody was trying to kill 
him. He did not remain very long. 

I will not tell any other things; I don’t think they are pertinent. 

But, anyway, I asked him if he thought I was the informant, and 
he said no. I asked him if he could tell from the report who the 
informant was and he said yes. And I already had some informa- 
tion concerning Richard O’Hara that I need not go back into, that I 
knew he knew. He told me it was Richard O’Hara, said he could 
tell from the context. 

He had a conflict in his mind. He wanted to go to the press with 
Richard O’Hara’s name as an FBI informant, but he was afraid if 
he did that, that the FBI would have to drop him as an informant, 
and then he would become a witness against him. 

He was not concerned, especially about this report but other 
things that Mr. O’Hara could have reported on him, you see. So he 
did not know what to do. 

But I think he went to the press, because Carter Stith came to 
see me and asked me if O’Hara was the informant, and it had to 
come from Mr. Byers later. 

He asked me about the Journey case. You see, I had another case 
where there was a suspicion. 

So that is the whole story on that, gentlemen. 


Mr. Blakey. I wonder if Martin Luther King exhibit F-574 could 
be inserted into the record at this point and made available to the 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 
record at this point and shown to the witness. 

[The information follows:] 

MLK Exhibit F-574 


PLACE INTERVIEWED: __ St. Louis City Municipal Courthouse, 12th Stree t 


— y— : ~ - 





CONNECTION: Randall is a former attorney of Russell Byers 

and was familiar with John Paul Spica. 


Murray Randall was interviewed by Investigators Mel Waxraan and Conrad 

Baetz at the St. Louis City Courthouse, 12th Strett, St. Louis, Missouri. 

Mr. Randall is now a Circuit Judge in the City of St. Louis, and as such 
he was interviewed in his chambers. 

Mr. Randall advised that in the 1960’s he was an attorney for Russell . 
Byers in certain cases which Byers had in both criminal and civil court 

Judge Randall initially indicated that he would be unable to speak about 

any conversations he had with Russell Byers since it was his belief that 

uch conversations would come within the preview of the attorney-client 

' — — ■■ "a ; 

relationship and therefore it would be/violation of professional ethics 

for him to divulge the same. 



Judge Randall was then supplied with a waiver of attorney-client 

privilege signed by Russell Byer s. Upon receipt of the waiver, Judge 
Randall indicated that he would be more than willing to cooperate and 
assist HSCA in anyway possible. . ' *•-'** 

Judge Randall was specifically asked about any conversations that . . 

Russell Byers had with him concerning solicitation to. assassinate 

Martin Luther King, Jr.. Judge Randall ’stated that following the fass- 

T-aSSination of Dr. Martin Luther King, and he is unsure .of the exact 

‘"'dciLe oi year# Russell Byers advised "him during the course of a conver- . 

s e c tion - Llia L ' By erg had Been approached by Mr. John Southerland and Mr. 

: • J ohn - Ifrauff maim bume L ii t le ' ' pri or ~ r t < 0~~Dr . king's assassination and oti erect- 

" 50,000 - to aooaop - iiiuLe Dr. King; — Byers advised Judg ~e~~ Rand g‘ Xl that hd ; 


d erlSwfl d the - of for, butyhad— abked - - By er s whether lie knew who “was behind 

it->. —Byers repT -ied -^ fo "Randall that he though L perhaps it would ‘ be ' 

* ‘ . .. - . r 

K uKImtKlan since South erland _ h^d . al l ud ftd to a " - group of • S o uthern 

•b usinessmen. ** It was therefore Ra n dall*^ op-fninh. t - y.r=ic prnhahl y , 

♦ K lan related. However since it came within the p review of a^ orney- ‘ . 

. c lient privilege he could not and would- not discuss _i.t_ with,, anyone else. 

Randall also advised that he understood from Byers that a friend of one 

.of the individuals, John Kauffmann specifically, was. a doctor from 

- Missouri State Penitentiary, later identified as Dr. Hugh Maxey. Judge — 

Randall stated that it was merely speculation on his part, however he * -* 

was always under the impression that there was some relation between 

he fact that John Kauffmann had offered Byers, or rather had participated 
* - • ftor I 

in a solicitation made to Byers, to kill Dr. Martin/King and the fact 
that Dr. Maxey was employed at the same penitentiary that James Earl Ray 


TM'nr-mrrr-ra SHEET CONTINUATION ; PAGK — 3 of 3 

Ray was in- Hpwpypr P^n^al/Lyi-M -hagfnn hn. nria— f-U^-h 1-hi r- rnr mnrol y 

s peculation on his part and that had no .^nbafantUI -^nrlpnrp T^hi.r’ - h 

would link the two. . ' , — 

Judge Randall also ind icated that he knew Russell Byers* brother-in-law', 
John Paul Spica, and indicated t hat in‘the early 1960*s he had defended^* 
a woman accused of homicide sucessfully and that John- Paul Spica had 
been charged as another accomplice in the homicide and convicted! Judge ; 
Randall stated that apparently the Spica family thought that- had * they - 


Mr. Blakey. Judge Randall, this is an interview report prepared 
by Mr. Conrad “Pete” Baetz of the staff. It is his report of Mr. 
Baetz and Mr. Waxman’s July interview of you. 

I would ask that you read it over if you like and let your counsel 
take a look at it as well. 

Judge Randall. Let me add this. 

Mr. Blakey. Excuse me, Judge. I don’t mean to interrupt. If you 
would read the whole report, then I would like to ask you one or 
two questions about it. 

Judge Randall. I wanted to add something I forgot. 

He could not remember the attorney’s name at the time he 
talked to me. Of course, I told the investigator that he could not 
remember. This name was supplied by them. 

Mr. Blakey. Have you had a chance to read the report? 

Judge Randall. No. 

Mr. Reed. I have not had a chance and I would appreciate your 
forebearance for a few moments, please. 

Judge Randall. Again, they supplied the name of the doctor. 

Mr. Reed. I think we are prepared to reply. 

Judge Randall. I have now read it, counsel. 

Mr. Blakey. Would you characterize Mr. Baetz’ report as a fair 
and accurate representation of their interview with you? 

Judge Randall. I would characterize it as substantially correct. 
There are certain things that he supplied that I did not know. 

For example, names, I didn’t know names. There is one thing in 
here that is a little incorrect. I am sure he did not mean to do so. I 
did not know John Paul Spica. I knew of John Paul Spica. John 
Paul Spica and a woman named — well, I think I might as well 
explain it. There is no problem with this. Do you want me to 
explain that? 

Mr. Blakey. Certainly. Is there anything you want to add to that 
report or your memory of it? 

Judge Randall. Well, counsel doesn’t want me to get on to it, 
but this is no problem. 

Mr. Reed. I am going to object at this point. I am not quite sure I 
understand how this particular sentence ties into the subject at 
issue here. 

I may be wrong, but I am concerned, again, that Judge Randall’s 
position is such that he must be careful in terms of the kinds of 
conversations that he divulges, particularly when they have no 
relevance at all to the matter at issue here. I am merely trying to 
protect him against any unwarranted intrusion into other clients’ 
rights and all. 

Judge Randall. I appreciate the advice by counsel. He is very 
capable, but I think the problem I have is that this is an error and 
I think I ought to correct it and this has nothing to do with any 
conversations with Mr. Byers. So I don’t have the problem. 

Mr. Reed. May I consult with my client for a moment, please? 

Judge Randall. I know I have a counsel who is much more able 
than I am, but you know I have represented a bunch of lawyers in 
my day. I tried a lot of prominent cases all over America and the 
worst client you can have is a lawyer. 

Mr. Reed. I will second that. 

39-935 0 - 79 - 15 


Judge Randall. I told my lawyer when he came here, I said, you 
have the worst client in the world. 

What I was going to tell you was John Paul Spica was charged 
with conspiracy to murder a man named Myzak. Mrs. Myzak was 
also charged with conspiracy to murder. The police thought some- 
body else actually killed them. In Missouri we have no joint trials. 
They are tried separately. 

Norman London represented Mr. Spica. He was convicted and 
got life. I represented Mrs. Myzak. She was found not guilty. So I 
am kind of proud to say that. 

Now I did not know John Paul Spica. This was back before I met 
Mr. Byers. I tried the Myzak murder case in January of 1964. Paul 
was tried in 1963. 

The only thing I indicated here was that John Paul Spica’s 
father was a fine man, a court official, a constable in one of our 
courts. Everybody knows him. I was trying to say that people like 
Byers and Paul’s father felt that if I had defended him, I would 
have had the same success. The facts are I would not have because 
the evidence was different, you know. 

Mr. Blakey. If I understand your testimony correctly, Judge, 
what you are indicating is that Mr. Baetz said you know Mr. Spica 
when in fact you knew of him, but other than that, the report is 
substantially accurate. 

Judge Randall. Could I run through it if you don’t mind? 

Let me say, first of all, I was ready to go out on the bench. I had 
a jury waiting and this was a brief, hurried thing. We were all 
under pressure. Russell Byers was familiar with John Paul Spica. I 
did two legal things for Russell Byers. I was familiar with John 
Paul Spica only by reputation. “He was interviewed by these two 
investigators” and that is true. “He is now Circuit Judge in the 
City of St. Louis and was interviewed in his chambers.” 

“Mr. Randall advised that in 1960 he was attorney for Russell 
Byers in certain cases which Byers had in criminal and civil 

The criminal is wrong. I never represented Mr. Byers in any 
criminal matter. As a matter of fact, during the time I knew Mr. 
Byers he was never arrested and you have to know why. He was on 
probation and he never got in any trouble when he was on proba- 
tion. That is the reason he incorporated the vending machine busi- 
ness. He operated that. So I never represented him in any criminal 

The “sixties” is inaccurate. You know, I started in 1968 and it 
was 1968 and 1974. I don’t think these people deliberately did this 
wrong. Don’t misunderstand me. This is normal. They took no 
notes but wrote it up later. 

Mr. Blakey. My only objective here is to make sure the record is 

Judge Randall. That is the reason I want to go through it all so 
it will be accurate. 

Judge Randall indicated he would be unable to speak about any conversation he 
had with Russell Byers. It was his position that it would be a violation of profession- 
al ethics. 


That is not accurate. They immediately handed me the waiver of 
attorney-client privilege and they told me they didn’t want to hear 
about anything other than that. 

Judge Randall was then supplied with a waiver of attorney-client privilege signed 
by Mr. Byers. 

That was the first thing that happened. 

Upon seeing the waiver. Judge Randall indicated he would be more than willing 
to cooperate. He said he would try to do anything possible. 

I think I probably did that. 

Judge Randall was specifically asked about any conversation that Russell Byers 
had with him concerning solicitation to assassinate Dr. Martin Luther King. 

I don’t think it was very specific. The time was short. 

Mr. Blakey. If I might interrupt, in the interest of time perhaps 
if you read it silently to yourself and then if you found a substan- 
tial error you would just simply bring that to the committee’s 

Judge Randall. I can read aloud about as fast as I can silent. I 
probably was unsure of the date. I probably didn’t say very much 
because 1 had not given it a lot of thought at that time. 

He said that Byers was approached by John Sutherland. 

That is wrong. He approached Sutherland and I didn’t know 
Sutherland’s name. Sutherland is a patent lawyer, isn’t he? 

Mr. Blakey. There is evidence in the rec 3 rd to that effect. 

Chairman Stokes. Judge, would you suspend for a moment, 

Counsel, in light of the fact that we have the witness’ testimony 
before the committee and there appear to be some inconsistencies 
in the statement by staff counsel taken from him, it would seem to 
me that we might dispense with having the Judge have to go 
through here and pick out all the inconsistencies. 

Judge Randall. Mr. Chairman, I am sure this man did not 
deliberately do it. These are the kind of things that occur. There 
were no notes taken, you understand; they are not significant. 

Chairman Stokes. I understand that, but it seems to me that 
unless counsel has some specific purpose for introducing Mr. Baetz’ 
documents, that we might avoid this time-consuming exercise. 

Mr. Blakey. My purpose was to see if the Judge’s recollection of 
that interview was roughly what the investigators had indicated to 

Judge Randall. Eighty percent correct. 

Mr. Reed. Under those circumstances I would have no objection 
to proceeding as the chairman suggested. I think the difficulty has 
been that neither the Judge nor I was aware of the extent to which 
the verbatim language of this statement might be used in terms of 
directing your examination of him, if you understand what I am 

It may be that these discrepancies are not material. But if that is 
the case, then I think Professor Blakey can assure us of that and 
we can proceed. 

Mr. Blakey. The only question I would want to direct your 
attention to in the interview is the next to the last paragraph, the 
full paragraph beginning on page 3 which indicates, “Judge Ran- 


dall indicated that he had no other information relative to either 
Byers or Spica regarding the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. which would be of assistance to the committee.” 

Is that substantially correct? 

Judge Randall. That is correct. Of course, Spica never had any 
connection with it as far as I know, gentlemen. 

Chairman Stokes. In fairness to the Judge here since we have 
interrupted his going through and getting all the inconsistencies 
out of here, I would think that we ought to consider only that 
portion of it which he has had a chance to correct before we 
withdrew the document. Except for that portion you asked about. 

Mr. Reed. I was going to ask that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. Blakey. I have no objection to that. 

If I could shift our attention a bit, Judge Randall, let me turn to 
a different matter. We can come back to the interview later. 

I ask that Martin Luther King exhibit F-575 be inserted in the 
record at this time and given to the witness. It is an undated letter 
to you postmarked November 3, 1978. 

[The information follows:] 



MLK Exhibit F-575 






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Judge Randall. To me? 

Mr. Blakey. No, to the chairman. I wonder if you and your 
counsel would have an opportunity to read it? 

Judge Randall. I am familiar with this letter. I wrote it. 

Mr. Blakey. Judge, let me direct your attention to page 3 and 4 
and ask that you read for the record the second full paragraph on 
page 3, beginning, “Yet my testimony” and continued through the 
second paragraph on page 5 ending in “questioned by the FBI.” 

Judge Randall. To all of them except the last paragraph, start- 
ing at that point and read all except the last paragraph? 

Mr. Blakey. Turn to pages 3 and 4. 

Judge Randall. Yes, and read all of it until the last paragraph. 
Is that what you are asking me, sir? 

Mr. Blakey. Yes, sir. 

The second paragraph on page 5 ending with “questioned by the 

Judge Randall. All right. 

Incidentally, I was trying to avoid a public hearing, you know 

Yet my testimony is of no real value to your investigation. 

The remarks Mr. Byers made to me while representing him in a civil case (I never 
represented him in any criminal case) occurred several months after similar re- 
marks by Mr. Byers had been reported to the FBI. 

Mr. Byers has told me that this report was made by one Richard O’Hara, a then 
criminal partner of Mr. Byers. As with most stories fabricated by criminals, the 
remarks only involved dead persons. 

At about the time the remarks were reported to the FBI, Mr. Byers expressed 
serious concern to me as to whether Mr. — 

that was corrected to Mr. O’Hara in a subsequent letter, I made a 
mistake — 

whether Mr. O’Hara was an FBI informant. 

I believe those remarks by Mr. O’Hara were fabricated and purposely planted 
with Mr. O’Hara for the purpose of trying to learn whether Mr. O’Hara was an FBI 
informant since the only person the FBI could possibly check with was Mr. Byers 

The FBI apparently recognized them as such and did not interview Mr. Byers as 
to do so would have endangered the life of its informant. 

Mr. Byers then, I believe, told the story to me for the purpose of preparing me for 
possible representation of him in the event he was questioned by the FBI. 

That I wrote. 

Mr. Blakey. I wonder if you would elaborate for the committee 
and explain to the committee why you feel the story Mr. Byers told 
you was a fabrication? 

Judge Randall. Well, at the time, you understand, I did not 
believe that. I didn’t give it serious concern, but I was representing 
a man named Norm — 

Mr. Reed. Just a moment, please. I would like to have an oppor- 
tunity to consult with Judge Randall. 

Judge Randall. Yes, I am ignoring my lawyer. I was represent- 
ing a man who was charged with transporting stolen jewelry from 
the city of St. Louis to Little Rock, Ark. I got that representation 
right after New Year’s 1973. I tried the case, I think, about August. 
It was presided over by Bill Webster. The crime had occurred, the 
robbery. It was a robbery of an antique jewelry store in the Mary- 
land Plaza Center. 


It had occurred about August. Norman Journey was not arrested 
until January. Shortly after the arrest, the two people who perpe- 
trated the robbery — one named Petty, one named Emory — were 
arrested and identified. They had tied the people in the chairs. 

Shortly after that, Petty tried to kill Norm Journey. Let me 
finish. This is all public information, Mr. Reed. 

Then after that Petty killed Emory, near Little Rock, Ark. They 
had taken this jewelry and sold half of it to a man whose name I 
believe was McMillan, who owned the Hilton Hotel in there, in 
Little Rock. He was the son of the chairman of Central Soya Corp. 

After they sold part of it to McMillan, they chartered a plane 
from police officers who ran a chartering company and flew to 
Shreveport, La. where they are alleged to have sold the remainder 
to the top Mafia man. 

Shortly after that, the Little Rock police assassinated Petty. 
They shot him 12 times with a shotgun, as he came out of the 
store. All right. 

Then Norman Journey was not arrested with him for several 
months. Petty and Emory were living with two girls. 

Mr. Reed. Pardon me. 

Judge Randall. Well, this ties in — O’Hara — and I can’t tell it 
without it. We are getting right down to the end of it to tell. 

So these two girls, according to the reports, had been taken by 
Petty and Emory to case the place about a month before, on their 
way they visited Richard O’Hara. So, when they told their story, 
Richard O’Hara was charged in a State charge with accessory to 
the robbery along with the two girls. 

It was later nolle prossed. The suspicions were that Richard 
O’Hara was the informant. So Russell Byers came to me 

Mr. Blakey. Judge, this is the informant in the jewelry robbery 

Judge Randall. Right. Russell Byers came to me, and this was 
public information, and asked me is Richard O’Hara the informant 
in this case. I said I don’t know. I said why do you want to know. 
He said well, I have been questioned by an FBI agent about some- 
thing and I think only Richard O’Hara knows. 

Mr. Blakey. Just a second, Judge. Could we pinpoint when this 
conversation between Mr. Byers and you was? 

Judge Randall. The best I can tell you it was during my repre- 
sentation. My best recollection is that proceeded from January of 
1973 until about August of 1973, sir. That is the best. You know, I 
can’t pinpoint these things. 

Mr. Blakey. Just your best recollection. 

Judge Randall. So when we met at the Gianinos, he immediate- 
ly started in with Richard O’Hara. 

Now, you see, I gave this no thought, but there is certain things 
about the story, and I may be wrong, you know. It is only my 
opinion. You gentlemen have got to reach your own. I am not 
trying to influence yours. 

But here he comes to me sometime in 1974 and says the story is 
somewhere, and he wants legal advice. I think that it is a good 
possibility that he told that story to O’Hara thinking if I am 
questioned about it, I will know he is the informant because he was 


dealing with this man, you understand. He wasn’t worried about 
these other things. 

Now, you asked the basis of my opinion. I gave it to you. I am 
not trying to sell it to you. 

Mr. Blakey. You have no specific information that would sup- 
port that speculation as to why Byers told you the Sutherland offer 
back in May of 1974? 

Judge Randall. I have no information except what I have relat- 
ed to you. I don’t know whether you call that specific or general. 

Mr. Blakey. Did Mr. Byers ever indicate to you anything specifi- 
cally that would lead you to conclude that he was trying to identify 
O’Hara as the informant? 

Judge Randall. Oh, he told me he did identify him. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Blakey. He was trying to identify it by telling O’Hara the 
story about Dr. King. 

Judge Randall. Sir, what he was trying to find out if he could, 
whether O’Hara was an informant because he wanted to quit work- 
ing with him if he was an informant. He wanted to quit dealing 
with him. 

Mr. Blakey. Let me see, Judge, if I can clarify somewhat what 
the record is on this story. 

It is your belief that Mr. Byers was trying to identify Mr. O’Hara 
as an informant for the FBI by planting with Mr. O’Hara the Dr. 
King offer story, hoping that the FBI would check the O’Hara story 
with Mr. Byers himself, and if Mr. O’Hara and the Bureau fell for 
the ploy, Mr. Byers could then identify Mr. O’Hara as an FBI 
informant. Is that the essence of it? 

Judge Randall. Yes. That is all in my belief. It has nothing to 
do with this committee. 

Mr. Reed. It should be clearly identified as such, I think, Mr. 
Blakey, that it is only an opinion. I think it is an accurate para- 
phrase of what he said. But it must be characterized as an opinion 
of Judge Randall’s. 

Judge Randall. I think that is what Mr. Blakey says, my belief 
and opinion. 

Mr. Blakey. Perhaps, Judge, the committee might find it useful 
if you and I discuss that opinion. Would you mind? 

Judge Randall. I have discussed all I know about it. 

Mr. Blakey. OK. 

You had known Mr. Byers for some years, hadn’t you? 

Judge Randall. No. 

Mr. Blakey. Well, I mean you had some contact with him peri- 

Judge Randall. I didn’t know him very well. 

Mr. Blakey. Did you have an opportunity while you did have 
contact with him to make a judgment about his basic intelligence 
or maybe native shrewdness? 

Mr. Reed. At this point, Professor Blakey, I am going to have to 
object. I think that the questioning has now ranged far afield from 
the area from which substantive evidence with respect to this 
matter could be expected to derive. 

As a result, I think that the further questioning with respect to 
this collateral matter is inappropriate. I don’t think the judge has 
prepared, and I am certainly not prepared to advise him as to the 


area in which you are presently questioning him. I don’t see the 

Mr. Blakey. I will withdraw the question. 

Mr. Reed. Thank you. 

Mr. Blakey. OK. Let me see if I can clarify one other thing, 
Judge Randall. 

You did not give to the committee investigators your speculation 
when you were interviewed in July of 

Mr. Reed. I will object to that. 

Judge Randall. I will answer it. 

Mr. Blakey. If I may finish the question, it might not be objec- 

At least if I understand your testimony correctly to the degree 
that the interview report did not include it, and you indicated to 
the committee that the interview report was substantially accu- 
rate, do I understand your testimony today as being that you did 
not give it to the committee investigators in July because you had 
not had a — you had a subsequent conversation with Mr. Byers in 
which the informant issue arose? 

Judge Randall. Sir 

Mr. Reed. Hold it. 

Judge Randall. No, let me answer. First, I didn’t even know 
there was an FBI report. The committee investigators didn’t tell 
me about that. I learned that later. 

Mr. Blakey. That is the point that I am trying to develop. 

Judge Randall. So I didn’t have the speculation then. 

Mr. Blakey. That is right. And therefore omitting it from — not 
mentioning it to the investigators is really of no evidentiary signifi- 

Judge Randall. Absolutely none, sir. 

Mr. Blakey. Your testimony here today, then, is consistent with 
the testimony to investigators every time? 

Judge Randall. I hope so. 

Mr. Blakey. You see the point I was trying to develop, both in 
bringing out the interview report that did not include speculation 
and the speculation today. 

I wouldn’t want this record to indicate Judge Randall came up 
with speculation subsequent and could have given it to the commit- 
tee investigators at an earlier point in time. 

Judge Randall. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Reed. I don’t 

Judge Randall. All right. 

Mr. Blakey. I wonder, Judge Randall, if you would read now for 
the record the rest of your letter, beginning in the beginning. 

Judge Randall. Well, of course the purpose of this letter is I 
had requested the staff to let me testify in executive session. That 
had been rejected. 

Your committee has subpenaed me to testify publicly in a matter concerning one 
Russell Byers, who is known here to be one of the most dangerous criminals in this 
city. He has received a lot of publicity here in recent months. 

Just a few months ago in the course of an ongoing investigation. . . 

This is all newspaper stuff, as you know — 


. . . here of him by the FBI and police with respect to assaults on one Finer and 
related matters, it was reported in the public press that his principal associate in 
crime was murdered almost immediately after the associate visited an FBI office. 

I believe that this man’s murder was arranged by the person to whom he and Mr. 
Byers — 

This was all newspaper stuff— 

. . . had sold the statues stolen from the museum, and Mr. Byers is now fearful 
that this publicity is classing him as an informant and this same fate will occur to 

I had evidence of that as I met with him. He was scared. He told 
me this publicity had him on the spot. He was angry. He said he 
wasn’t going to testify before television. He was angry that the 
committee seemed to indicate he was in on the plot, which he 
claimed he wasn’t. 

I believe my public testimony and that of Mr. Byers will endanger lives, including 
my own. 

That is the rest of my letter. 

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Judge Randall. I have no further ques- 
tions at this time. 

Judge Randall. And let me tell you something else. No, I got to 
add something. I also was fearful that the FBI, if that name came 
out here, would accuse me of not reporting it to them. 

I had been negligent. I knew that for 2 months. I should have 
reported it sooner. So, I sent a copy of this to Bill Webster, FBI 
Director, because I didn’t want to appear here in public testimony 
and blow the name of an informant and then be accused of, you 
know, failing to report it. 

But then I got scared; the informant would be in danger, if you 
want to know the truth about it. OK? 

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Judge. 

Chairman Stokes. At this time the Chair will recognize the 
gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may 
consume, after which the committee will resort to the 5-minute 

Mr. Reed. If you please, Mr. Chairman, at this point I would 
respectfully ask the committee if a brief recess is in order. Judge 
Randall I think would like to refresh himself. I know I certainly 
would, and I think we would be in much better position to continue 
after 2 or 3 minutes. 

Judge Randall. If this isn’t going to take long, I am going to 
overrule you again. 

Mr. Reed. Your Honor, I won’t be overruled in this case. If you 
wouldn’t mind. Two or three minutes I think would be sufficient. 

Chairman Stokes. How much time would counsel desire, then? 

Mr. Reed. Two or three minutes would be sufficient, I think. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will now suspend for 5 min- 

Mr. Reed. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. We will be in recess for 5 minutes. 

[Brief recess.] 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair at this time recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, 
Mr. Ford. 

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


Judge Randall, I again would like to welcome you. 

Judge Randall. How are you, Congressman? 

Mr. Ford. Fine, thank you very much. 

Judge Randall, when Mr. Byers discussed with you the conversa- 
tion he had with Kauffmann to kill Dr. King, did you give him any 
legal advice as to his possible involvement in the assassination? 

Judge Randall. No, sir. The thing he wanted to know from 

Mr. Reed. Judge, you have answered that question. 

Judge Randall. He wants me to stop. You will have to ask 
another question. 

Mr. Ford. Well, why not? 

Judge Randall. Well, he didn’t ask me what to do. His only 
question was if I get questioned, he was trying to determine should 
I talk or should I insist on immunity. He asked me the procedure 
for immunity. 

You see, this is not something he thought was imminent. You 
know, he just wanted to be a little prepared. I told him the proce- 
dure was you appear before the grand jury, take the fifth amend- 
ment, go in open court, and get immunity, and went back. 

He was trying to decide in his mind if I am questioned about 
this, shall I talk or shall I insist on immunity. He didn’t like the 
immunity because he didn’t want the publicity. But there was no 
thought about reporting it. 

Hell, this was 10 years after the event, and everybody is dead. 
You know, you don’t think about reporting it if everybody is dead 
and it is 10 years old. 

Mr. Ford. Judge Randall, did you personally take any action 
upon the information Mr. Byers had shared with you? 

Judge Randall. Took the action of advising him what he should 
do if he is questioned about it, yes. 

Mr. Ford. Turning now to page 1 of this confidential letter 
addressed to Chairman Stokes, I have here I think it is your first 
paragraph, maybe your second paragraph. You talk about Russell 
Byers, who is known here to be one of the most dangerous crimi- 
nals in the city. 

Could you explain that to the committee, please? 

Judge Randall. Well, you know, I don’t want to go into all the 
stuff that is reported out in St. Louis in the press. You can read 
the press. 

Mr. Ford. But you said it in your letter. Could you tell us what 
you meant by that particular statement in your letter? 

Judge Randall. What is in the press out there, gentlemen. 

Mr. Ford. You had read it in the press. 

Judge Randall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Ford. And you included that in this letter? 

Judge Randall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield back the balance 
of my time. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. 

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. 


Mr. Devine. No questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, 
Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. No questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. 

Mr. Fithian. No questions. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. 

Judge, obviously this is a sign that you have done a very thor- 
ough job here. There are no questions from the committee. I have 

Does counsel have anything further? 

Mr. Blakey. I don't have any questions. I would once again, 
Judge, like to express the appreciation of the committee, the staff, 
for your taking time to come here. You have been of great help to 

I am sorry if my questioning sometimes seemed dense. I have 
had it said among my students in class that they didn t always 
understand what I was getting at, either. 

Judge Randall. Well, Professor, they weren’t dense to me. They 
were dense to my counsel. 

Mr. Reed. May I object in the record. 

Judge Randall. He can object to that. 

Chairman Stokes. Judge, prior to extending to you the 5 minutes 
which you are entitled to as a witness before this committee, let 
me say on behalf of our committee how very pleased we are to 
have had your appearance here today. 

We certainly regret any inconvenience caused the State of Mis- 
souri or your courtroom by having asked you to come here. But it 
was imperative that we have your testimony in this matter. 

I think it is a matter that is important to the Nation and you 
certainly made an outstanding contribution to the work of this 
committee by appearing here today. 

Judge Randall. I only have one thing to say. I take back all the 
things I said to the staff. I feel different now. If you want to know 
what they are, ask them. 

Chairman Stokes. I must officially also extend to you under the 
rules of our committee, either you or your counsel, at the conclu- 
sion of your testimony you are entitled to 5 minutes for the pur- 
pose of any statement you care to make. 

Judge Randall. I have none. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Reed? 

Mr. Reed. I have none on his behalf. Thank you again. 

Chairman Stokes. All right. We thank you both for your appear- 
ance here. You are excused at this time. 

Judge Randall. You want these copies back that you loaned us, 
is that right? 

Chairman Stokes. At this time the committee will recess until 2 
p.m. this afternoon. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the select committee recessed, to re- 
convene at 2 p.m.] 

39-935 0 - 79 - 16 


Afternoon Session 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair recognizes counsel, Mr. Mathews. 

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, Lawrence Weenick is the other 
attorney told by Mr. Byers of the offer to murder Dr. King. Mr. 
Weenick is presently in private law practice in Clayton, Mo. 

It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Weenick. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Weenick. 

Please raise your right hand and be sworn. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give before 
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Weenick. I do. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. 

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Ron Adrine. 

Mr. Adrine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 



Mr. Adrine. Mr. Weenick, would you state your full name for 
the record, please, and spell your last name? 

Mr. Weenick. Lawrence Weenick, W-e-e-n-i-c-k. 

Mr. Adrine. And, Mr. Weenick, are you currently employed? 

Mr. Weenick. I’m in the private practice of law in Clayton, Mo. 

Mr. Adrine. Now were you engaged in the practice of law in the 
early 1970’s? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes, I was. 

Mr. Adrine. And where was your practice located at that time? 

Mr. Weenick. In Clayton. 

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Weenick, have you been supplied with a copy of 
the committee’s rules? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes, I have. 

Mr. Adrine. And have you had an opportunity to read those 
rules over? 

Mr. Weenick. I read them over, yes. 

Mr. Adrine. And do you understand those rules? 

Mr. Weenick. I understand them. 

Mr. Adrine. Sir, you are here under subpena today? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes, I am. 

Mr. Adrine. Have you ever represented an individual named 
Russell G. Byers? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes. 

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to request 
that the witness be shown Martin Luther King exhibit No. F-576. 

Chairman Stokes. You are asking that it be made a part of the 
record also? 

Mr. Adrine. Yes. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 
record at this point and shown to the witness. 

[The information follows:] 



' ' t • . . . 

i : 


/":■;/ \ 

: \.V. \ ^ '■ 

I* RUSSELL BYERS* hereby waive my attorney-client privilege with 
respect to any and all communications or documents between 
Lawrence N„ Weenlck and myself concerning an offer, solicitation, 
or plan to assassinate or harm the person of Martin Luther King, Jr. 

MLK Exhibit F-576 


Mr. Adrine. Thank you. 

Mr. Weenick. The document you have in front of you I think you 
have seen before, and it is a waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
between yourself and Mr. Byers; is that correct? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes. I have seen it and I have a copy of it. 

Mr. Adrine. Is it a fact, sir, when you were first approached by 
committee investigators that you requested to see this document 
before you would talk to them about anything that occurred be- 
tween you and Mr. Byers during this time frame? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, when Mr. Baetz and Mr. Waxman first came 
to see me, I wasn’t at liberty to tell them anything; and subse- 
quently they brought this document over to me, at which time I 
discussed what they wanted to know. 

Mr. Adrine. But it is correct to characterize your reluctance as a 
concern for the attorney-client privilege; is that correct? 

Mr. Weenick. That’s correct. 

Mr. Adrine. Therefore, having seen this document, you realize 
that you are now free to discuss those matters that relate to the 
incidents that we are investigating before the committee; is that 

Mr. Weenick. That’s right. 

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Weenick, what type of matters did you repre- 
sent Mr. Byers on? 

Mr. Weenick. Oh, they were all civil matters. He had been sued 
several times, had a problem with the IRS. 

Mr. Adrine. Do you recall when your representation of Mr. 
Byers began? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, I knew Mr. Byers before I started represent- 
ing him, and I don’t know when it was. It was sometime after 
Judge Randall went into law practice, because it was my under- 
standing that Judge Randall represented Mr. Byers prior to the 
time he became a judge. 

Mr. Adrine. Did you hear Judge Randall indicate that he en- 
tered into the judgeship or gave up his private practice sometime 
in 1973 or 1974? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes. 

Mr. Adrine. Does that comport with your recollection? 

Mr. Weenick. Probably close to it. 

Mr. Adrine. Did there ever come a time when Mr. Byers spoke 
to you about the existence of a plot to kill Dr. Martin Luther King, 

Mr. Weenick. He spoke to me about an offer made to him; 
whether it was a plot or not, I don’t know. 

Mr. Adrine. And do you recall when he spoke to you about the 

Mr. Weenick. No. It was sometime after he spoke to Judge 
Randall. I think Judge Randall testified this morning that it was 
sometime in 1974, and it was after that, because I remember Mr. 
Byers told me that he had told Judge Randall about this. So it had 
to be after that time, and I don’t know when. 

Mr. Adrine. So as a result he would have had to have told you 
about this offer sometime subsequent to the time that Dr. King had 
been killed? 

Mr. Weenick. Oh, yes, quite a bit after that. 


Mr. Adrine. Several years, as a matter of fact? 

Mr. Weenick. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Adrine. Now, did Mr. Byers reveal any of the details of that 
offer to you? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, he told me what had transpired. If that’s 
what you mean by “details.” 

Mr. Adrine. That’s correct. 

Would you relate what you can recall from that conversation? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, it was a very brief conversation, and I really 
don’t know how it came up, but he told me that he had been 
approached one day by John Kauffmann, and Mr. Kauffmann had 
asked Mr. Byers if he — if Mr. Byers — wanted to make some money. 

I think the figure was $50,000, and I guess Mr. Byers said, 
“Sure,” he’d be interested in it; and Mr. Kauffmann then took Mr. 
Byers to a man’s house down in Imperial or Barnhart, Mo., a man 
by the name of John Sutherland, at which time Mr. Sutherland 
repeated the offer to Mr. Byers, to pay him the sum of $50,000 to 
either kill or procure the killing of Dr. Martin Luther King. 

Mr. Adrine. Were you told any of the details or the descriptions 
of the places where the meeting was held? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes. It was at Mr. Sutherland’s house, and Mr. 
Byers briefly described the house to me, at least some of the 
interior furnishings, which consisted primarily of a large carpet, 
either in the den or in the entry hall — I don’t recall which — which 
was made to resemble a Confederate battle flag; and the walls of 
the study or the den was hung with another Confederate flag and 
various other military-type paraphernalia. 

Mr. Adrine. Did Mr. Byers give you a personal description of the 
individual with whom he met? 

Mr. Weenick. Mr. Sutherland? 

Mr. Adrine. That’s correct. 

Mr. Weenick. No. 

Mr. Adrine. Did Mr. Byers indicate to you where the money — 
the $50,000 — was to come from? 

Mr. Weenick. No, he did not. 

Mr. Adrine. Did he give you any indication as to why he — that 
is, Mr. Byers — had been selected to have this offer made to him? 

Mr. Weenick. No, he didn’t. 

Mr. Adrine. Did Mr. Byers indicate to you whether or not he 
had agreed to the undertaking? 

Mr. Weenick. He told me no, that he refused their offer and, 
really, he didn’t really consider it very seriously. 

Mr. Adrine. Sir, did you know John Sutherland? 

Mr. Weenick. No, I never met John Sutherland. 

Mr. Adrine. Did you know of him? 

Mr. Weenick. I had heard about him. He was a patent lawyer in 
the city of St. Louis. I don’t believe I ever met him. 

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair at this time will recognize the 
gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may 

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Weenick, I want to pick up where counsel left off. 


Did you ever turn over this information to the authorities prior 
to the time you were contacted by this committee? 

Mr. Weenick. No, I did not. 

Mr. Ford. Do you mind telling the committee why not? 

Mr. Weenick. I was not at liberty to turn it over to them. 

Mr. Ford. Sir, isn’t it a fact that your client, Mr. Byers, denied 
accepting the offer to kill Dr. King? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes, that’s correct. 

Mr. Ford. Then what was the purpose of keeping this informa- 
tion privileged? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, it was not up to me, Mr. Ford, to tell 
anybody about this thing. If Mr. Byers wanted it to be known, then 
it was his duty to tell them, not mine. 

Mr. Ford. The fact that you represented Mr. Kauffmann, did it 
in any way influence the advice that you gave Mr. Byers concern- 
ing this information? 

Mr. Weenick. I think Mr. Kauffmann was already dead when 
Mr. Byers told me this, so it would not have made any difference. 

Mr. Ford. Did you ever consider going to the authorities with 
what you knew? 

Mr. Weenick. Did I ever? 

Mr. Ford. Yes. 

Mr. Weenick. No. 

Mr. Ford. Were you specifically instructed not to tell anyone 
about the plot? 

Mr. Weenick. By Mr. Byers, do you mean? 

Mr. Ford. Yes. 

Mr. Weenick. Well, Mr. Ford, any time a lawyer is told some- 
thing in his capacity as an attorney, when the client-attorney 
relationship has been established, we are not allowed or authorized 
to tell anybody what has been communicated to us, unless, of 
course, the client authorizes us to do so. 

Mr. Ford. But what about your client, Mr. Byers, did you ever 
advise him as to what he should do with the information? 

Mr. Weenick. He didn’t ask me. 

Mr. Ford. So you never advised him of what to do? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, you have to understand this was some, oh, I 
guess, 6 or 7 years after Dr. King had been killed. Mr. Ray had 
been apprehended. The thing was ended. There was no talk of a 
conspiracy, nothing of any kind or description; so there really 
wasn’t any sense to it as far as I could see. 

Mr. Ford. What type of relationship did you enjoy with Mr. 
Kauffmann when you represented him? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, I was his attorney. 

Mr. Ford. Just his attorney? 

Mr. Weenick. Right. 

Mr. Ford. You represented Mr. Kauffmann, who Mr. Byers says 
was the person that set up the meeting where he was offered the 
money to kill Dr. King. Were you familiar with that? 

Mr. Weenick. I heard him testify to that, yes. 

Mr. Ford. You heard it where? 

Mr. Weenick. Right here, this morning, I heard Mr. Byers say 


Mr. Ford. So you are saying Mr. Kauffmann was dead when you 
learned of this? 

Mr. Weenick. I believe he was, yes, because it was sometime that 
I heard about this in late 1974 or 1975, and Mr. Kauffmann died in 

Mr. Ford. But you never heard Mr. Kauffmann talking about 
this; is that correct? 

Mr. Weenick. No. I had no more dealings with Mr. Kauffmann 
after about December of 1968; and I had not talked to him since 
that time. 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his 

Mr. Weenick, let me ask you this: The testimony we received 
from Mr. Byers is, of course, very important testimony, because, if 
believed, it gives an outline to the possibility of conspiracy to kill 
Dr. Martin Luther King. In support of his testimony, we have now 
heard the supporting testimony of a sitting judge and yours as a 
practicing attorney, which gives credence to the testimony of this 
witness, and, of course, the committee ultimately will have to 
determine the credibility of this witness based upon whatever testi- 
mony comes before this committee. 

I would ask you this question: Knowing what you know of Mr. 
Byers, are you in a position to be able to tell the committee 
whether you would believe him under oath? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, let me say this to you, Mr. Stokes: Mr. Byers 
had absolutely no reason to tell me this at the time he told it to 
me, or any other time. Whether he made it up or not, I don’t know. 
There was — there seems to be no credible reason why he would 
have made it up and told it to me and to Mr. Randall, and evident- 
ly to this other person who was an FBI informant. 

I don’t know what his motive would have been. 

Certainly I can’t say for certain that he is not lying, but I 
certainly don’t know what his motive would be for doing so. 

Chairman Stokes. And that’s the precise question I was really 
addressing, is whether the witness would have any motivation to 
lie, and if so, what that motivation would be. 

Mr. Weenick. I can’t think of a reason why. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much. 

I have no further questions. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. 

Mr. Devine. No questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Mr. Preyer. Thank you. 

Following up on what the Chairman’s questions to you were, 
when Mr. Byers told you this, was he seeking legal advice relating 
to this incident? 

Mr. Weenick. As far as I can recall, he just told it to me. I recall 
it was in my office, and we had been discussing another matter, 
and it may have been around the time Mr. Kauffmann died — I’m 
not real sure — and that may have been what prompted him to tell 
me. I really can’t recall. 

Mr. Preyer. It was in your office? 


Mr. Weenick. Yes. 

Mr. Preyer. Not at a neighborhood bar or something like that? 

Mr. Weenick. No. 

Mr. Preyer. And you were discussing legal matters at the time 
when he was visiting you in your office? 

Mr. Weenick. Yes, to the best of my recollection. I don’t know 
why he would have been there otherwise. 

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have one question: I wasn’t sure, and I want you to clarify it for 
me. You said that he, meaning Byers, “told me he never took it 
very seriously.” 

Would you clarify for me what you meant by that? 

Mr. Weenick. Well, what I mean by that is that I don’t think he 
ever seriously considered accepting the offer. 

Mr. Fithian. But you were not alluding to a question of the 
seriousness of the offer on the part of those who were proffering it? 

Mr. Weenick. I would think that if they had made the offer they 
were probably serious. I don’t know. 

Mr. Fithian. Was there anything about Mr. Byers’ demeanor or 
comment, or your own observation that would shed any light on it 
for the committee as to whether you felt that when he told you this 
that he was telling you about a serious offer by these folks? 

Mr. Weenick. I think he thought they were serious at the time. 
That was the impression he left with me. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Any 
further members of the committee seeking further recognition? 

Mr. Weenick, under the rules of our committee, when a witness 
has completed his testimony before this committee, the witness is 
entitled under our rules to 5 minutes during which time he can 
explain or amplify his testimony in any way he so desires. I would 
extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so desire. 

Mr. Weenick. I have nothing further, Mr. Stokes. 

Chairman Stokes. I certainly, on behalf of the committee, want 
to thank you for your appearance here and for your cooperation 
with the staff and with this committee, and we are indebted to you 
for your testimony here today. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Weenick. Thank you. 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes Mr. Mathews. 

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, before we call our last witness, it 
is necessary, in order to clarify the record, to recall Mr. Byers for 
one additional question. 

I might note, too, Mr. Chairman, he still will continue to invoke 
rule 6. Therefore, an order may be appropriate to indicate to the 
media that the cameras, radios, tapes, et cetera, should be shut 

Chairman Stokes. At this time then, the witness having request- 
ed the invocation of rule 6, the media are asked to comply with 
that rule of the committee, which provides that no photography or 
other recording of the witness be made; and the Chair would also 


extend the application of Rule 6 to the hallway area which is 
immediately adjacent to the hearing room, as per the request of 
the witness. 

Mr. Mathews. It might be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to 
recall Mr. Byers. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee recalls Mr. Byers. 

The Chair would say further, this witness being under U.S. Mar- 
shal security, all persons are requested to remain in their seats 
anytime the witness is either entering or departing from the hear- 
ing room. 

The record will reflect that the witness, Mr. Byers, has returned 
to the hearing room and is accompanied by counsel, Mr. Jim Ham- 
ilton of the District of Columbia Bar. 

Mr. Byers, the Chair would admonish you that you are still 
under the oath which I administered to you this morning. Do you 
understand that? 

Mr. Byers. I understand it. 

Chairman Stokes. All right. The Chair recognizes Professor 



Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, after you testified this morning, Judge 
Randall appeared and testified, and he indicated that he had 
racked his memory and done the best he could to recall as many 
details about his conversation with you as he could, and he gave 
the committee his best recollection of what you said to him, and 
what he said to you. 

After comparing and contrasting his memory against your testi- 
mony, there were several items that I thought it might be appro- 
priate to clarify in the record. Nevertheless, based on conversation 
with your counsel and his representations, I would only ask you 
one question at this time. 

Judge Randall indicated that his memory was — and the record 
will, of course, correct me if I am wrong for misstating — that in the 
conversation with Mr. Sutherland you questioned him, that is, Mr. 
Sutherland, in detail, and learned — Judge Randall remembered — 
names of other members of the organization that were apparently 
going to be the source of the financing of Dr. King’s killing. 

My question to you, therefore, is: Is it your best recollection that 
you did, in fact, learn the names of other members of that southern 

Mr. Byers. No names at all, to the best of my recollection, 
nobody. If he recollects something, it’s beyond me. 

Mr. Blakey. Do you recall any aspect of the conversation in 
which Mr. Sutherland indicated that there were other members of 
the organization? 

Mr. Byers. No. When he said “secret southern society,” he men- 
tioned no names, and I pressed for no names. 

Mr. Blakey. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Any other member of the committee seeking 

Mr. Fithian. Just one clarification, if I may, Mr. Chairman. 


Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. 

Mr. Fithian. Did Mr. Sutherland refer to the southern organiza- 
tion by title? 

Mr. Byers. By what? 

Mr. Fithian. By title, by name of organization, as distinct 

Mr. Byers. No; just a secret southern society or organization that 
he belonged to; that was all. 

Mr. Fithian. But he did say he was a member of it? 

Mr. Byers. The best I remember, to phrase him, he says, “We” — 
it’s been a long time; I’m trying to remember — “We belong to a 
secret southern organization” — or “society”. He could have said “I” 
or “We.” I cannot be sure. 

Mr. Fithian. But you have the impression that he did belong to 
this organization? 

Mr. Byers. That’s just my impression, that he did, yes. 

Mr. Fithian. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. Do you recall him saying anything about 
there being prominent people? 

Mr. Byers. No; I recall nothing of that nature. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

I would again at this time, concluding your testimony before this 
committee— we will now release you from further testimony— I 
would extend to you, either you or your counsel, 5 minutes under 
the rules of this committee, if there is any further statement you 
or your counsel care to make to the committee. 

Mr. Byers. We can’t think of another thing to say. 

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Byers, I want to thank you, on behalf of 
the committee, for your cooperation with both the committee and 
our staff, and for the testimony you have given this committee 
here today. Thank you very much. You are excused. 

Also, persons are requested to remain in their seats while the 
witness departs the room. 

Rule 6 of the committee is now hereby lifted and you can resume 
coverage of the hearings. 

The Chair recognizes counsel, Mr. Mathews. 

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, following Mr. Byers’ appearance 
in executive session before the King subcommittee on May 9, 1978, 
the committee took Mr. Byers’ testimony seriously and it concen- 
trated a major share of its investigative resources and time on 
exploring the possible relation between the conspiracy manifested 
in the offer to Mr. Byers and the events in Memphis. 

Here this afternoon to present the results to date of that effort is 
Edward Evans, the chief investigator of the King task force. 

It would be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Edward 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair calls Mr. Evans. 

Mr. Evans, the Chair would admonish you that you have been 
previously sworn in these hearings and the application of that oath 
would apply at this time. Do you understand that? 

Mr. Evans. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. You may proceed. 



Mr. Evans. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the FBI 
memorandum that first brought to the attention of the committee 
the allegation of a conspiracy in Missouri to assassinate Dr. King is 
dated March 13, 1978. It relates that an FBI informant sometime in 
March 1974, reported that the informant had been party to a 
conversation late in 1973 in which, according to the informant, a 
Mr. Byers claimed to have been made an offer for $10,000 to 
$20,000 to murder Dr. King. 

It would be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to introduce that 
memorandum as MLK exhibit F-577. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 

MLK Exhibit F-577 

200001 Ba. f- 5VS 

S' f 


h 20 . 1973 


In connection with the HSCA’s Investigation Into 
the assassination of* Martin Luther Ming, Jr., the St. Louis 
Office of the F3I surfaced information during a file review 
in an unrelated matter which it is believed is of interest 
to the Committee. This information concerning a St. Louis 
informant discussing with (first name not furnished) Beyers 
several individuals who may have information germane to the 
HSCA T s investigation was furnished to FBI Headquarters, in the 
attached memorandum dated March 13, 1973. 

In order to facilitate the Committee’s evaluation 
of the information contained in above-mentioned memorandum, 
the St . Louis Office was asked to furnish background' data 
on Beyers. On Ilarch 17, 1978, the St. Louis Office 
telephonically furnished the following; 

HAKE: Russell George Beyers 

DOB: August 19, 1931 . • ■ 

- FBI NUMBER: 101-3113 

The information contained in the memorandum of 
March M3 , 1978, was discovered as a result of a file review 
conducted for- background data on Beyers who was recently 
arrested by the St. Louis Police Department for his alleged 
, participation in the burglary of aEt.-Lbuis museum.'- ' 

M Where - information" is not provided, it -is because 

. not retrievable or is not being furnished 'pursuant to ■ 

. the Memorandum, . o f Understahding . t 


L.NiTLD sTATKS 0 LlW.iTsl KNT i'>F j'l .* 

;‘tUKUAi i ; l i: r a i: or iM‘E- i Tu;.\Ti'*N 
j tsiiiMirov. im:.- 

March 13 j 1978 


20060 i 

In the course of a file review conducted at the 
St. Louis FBI Office in an unrelated matter, a St. Louis 
informant file was reviewed. This file contained a contact 
memorandum dated Ilarch 19 , 197^ , which set forth information 
relating to several criminal natters and also contained the 
following paragraph: 

-During the Fall of 1973, five or sir months ago, 
date not recalled. Beyers came to the shop inquiring as 
to whether they could get together to talk, and they later 
did so at Pizza and Cream, Clayton, Missouri, in the area 
of a Broad -Dugan Paint Store, where informant had traveled 
on business. Beyers talked freely about himself and his 
business, and they later went to informants house where 
Beyers told a story about visiting a lawyer in St. Louis 
County, now deceased, not further identified, who had 
offered to give him a contract to kill Z-Iartin Luther £ing. 

He said that also present was a short, stocky man. who 
walked with a limp. (Later, with regard to the la.tter 
individual, Beyers commented that this man was actually 
the individual who made the payoff of James Earl Ray after 
the killing. ) Beyers said he had declined to accept this 
contract. He did remark that this lawyer had confederate* 
flags and other' items about the house that might indicate 
that he was r a real rebel T . Beyers also commented that 
he had .been offered either $10, 00Q or $20,000 to .kill King.- 

... '.wv .3 Extensive, further ^research in the St. -Louis indices • 
and files failed to reveal this "information was in. any ~ Way ? 

"... disseminated and the .information simply reposes in the informant . 


Mr. Evans. As we now know from Mr. Byers’ testimony before 
this committee, the alleged offer by John Sutherland was set up by 
John Kauffmann and it was made in late 1966 or early 1967, and it 
was for $50,000. Mr. Byers said in 1974, as he said today, that he 
did not accept the offer. 

What follows is a report of the select committee’s investigation of 
the Byers allegation: 

Byers was located at his home in Rock Hill, Mo., a suburb of St. 
Louis. He initially denied any knowledge of the offer, but after 
consultation with his attorney he indicated that he might have 
information relevant to the committee’s inquiry but that he would 
only reveal it under subpena and with a guarantee of immunity. 

Following issuance of a subpena, Mr. Byers appeared before the 
King subcommittee on May 9 and he was granted immunity under 
title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 pursuant to an 
order issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 

Mr. Byers’ executive session testimony may be outlined as fol- 

In late 1966 or early 1967 — he wasn’t sure which— Mr. Byers was 
approached by John Kauffmann, a friend and business associate, 
and asked if he would like to earn $50,000. When Mr. Byers asked, 
“What do I have to do?” Mr. Kauffmann told him to meet him that 

Mr. Byers met with Mr. Kauffmann at 6:30 that evening and 
together they went to the home of John Sutherland, a St. Louis 
patent attorney. Mr. Sutherland’s home was in a rural area near 
Imperial, Mo., outside of St. Louis. 

The three men met in an office or den that had a rug replica of a 
Confederate flag. Mr. Sutherland, who appeared to be in his fifties 
or sixties, was wearing what looked to Mr. Byers to be a Confeder- 
ate colonel’s hat. 

After a short period of social conversation, Mr. Sutherland asked 
Mr. Byers if he would like to make some money. Mr. Byers said he 
was interested, and Mr. Sutherland offered $50,000 to kill Martin 
Luther King. 

In response to Mr. Byers’ question as to the source of that 
money, Mr. Sutherland said he belonged to a secret southern orga- 
nization, and they had a lot of money. 

Mr. Byers said he neither accepted nor declined the offer but 
indicated he would think about it. He further stated that he never 
seriously considered accepting it, that he never saw Mr. Sutherland 
again, and that Mr. Kauffmann never mentioned it again. 

Committee investigators then were sent out to investigate wheth- 
er such an offer had, in fact, been made. 

In his testimony Mr. Byers said he had told two attorneys — 
Lawrence Weenick, of Clayton, Mo.; and Murray Randall, of St. 
Louis, about the offer. 

After being shown attorney-client privilege waivers from Mr. 
Byers, both Mr. Weenick and Mr. Randall were interviewed and 
confirmed that Mr. Byers had told them of the offer, and the 
details they gave were substantially similar to those provided by 
Mr. Byers. Both attorneys said Mr. Byers had related the incident 
to them after the assassination of Dr. King. 


Committee investigators contacted the informant who had sup- 
plied information about the offer to the FBI. He confirmed the 
report of the conversation with Mr. Byers in 1973. 

Background checks on Mr. Kauffmann and Mr. Sutherland were 
initiated in June. Mr. Kauffmann was born April 7, 1904, and died 
April 1, 1974. He was a lifelong St. Louis resident, involved in a 
variety of business activities, including the manufacture of gliders 
and real estate development. From the early 1960’s to his death he 
owned and resided at the Buff Acres Motel in Barnhart, Mo., and 
his widow, Beulah, still lives there. 

Mr. Kauffmann’s criminal record discloses he was arrested and 
convicted for the manufacture and sale of amphetamines in 1967. 

Committee investigators reviewed the files of the Federal drug 
case that led to Mr. Kauffmann’s arrest and conviction. They 
reveal he had been operating a legitimate drug company that 
marketed a cough mixture called Fix-A-Co. Through the company 
he was ordering amphetamine sulfate powder in bulk and making 
amphetamine pills from this powder. During 1967 and 1968, the 
report shows, Mr. Kauffmann sold over 1 million pills illegally to 
undercover Federal agents. 

A Federal informant testified at Mr. Kauffmann’s trial that 
some of the illegal pills were delivered to the Missouri State Peni- 
tentiary in Jefferson City, Mo. This is the prison where James Earl 
Ray was incarcerated until his escape in April 1967. 

Mr. Kauffmann’s file was also checked for indications of a pro- 
pensity for violence. Although it was negative, it was noted that a 
Federal narcotics agent was ambushed and shot just after talking 
to an informant about Kauffmann. This incident occurred shortly 
after Kauffmann’s arrest but following disclosure that the victim 
was a Federal agent who had worked undercover on the Kauff- 
mann case. 

There were two other details disclosed in the check of Mr. Kauff- 
mann’s criminal record: (1) He told an undercover agent he had 
threatened a person who owed him money in order to scare him; 
and (2) he had been solicited to assist in obtaining parole, on work 
release, for the convicted murderer of a police informant. 

While there is no indication that Mr. Kauffmann himself en- 
gaged in acts of violence, he associated with persons who were 
capable of violent behavior and he may have played the role of a 
broker for criminal activity for these and other people. 

In addition, while the committee was unable to obtain informa- 
tion that would provide details on Mr. Kauffmann’s political atti- 
tudes, it did establish that he was associated with John Sutherland 
in efforts to establish an American Party in the St. Louis area in 
1967-1968. Examination of American Party petitions filed with the 
Missouri secretary of state for the 1968 Presidential election shows 
Mr. Kauffmann’s signature as either the circulating officer or as a 
notary public. The American Party supported the candidacy of 
Gov. George Wallace of Alabama. 

John Sutherland, a descendent of early colonists, was born in 
Charlottesville, Va., October 19, 1905; he died in 1970. He was a 
1926 graduate of Virginia Military Institute with a degree in elec- 
trical engineering; he received a bachelor of law degree from City 
College of Law and Finance, St. Louis, in 1931, and a master of law 


degree from Benton College of Law. He held a commission in the 
U.S. Army Reserve from 1926 to 1936, though he apparently never 
served on active duty. He was married in 1930 to Anna Lee of 
Atlanta, who survives him. 

Mr. Sutherland practiced patent law in St. Louis throughout his 
career. The firm of Polster & Sutherland was dissolved at the time 
of his death. He was a lifelong resident of the St. Louis area. 

Mr. Sutherland belonged to a number of social, fraternal and 
professional organizations and he was active politically throughout 
his adult life. In view of the statement attributed to him by Mr. 
Byers that referred to a “secret southern organization” as a source 
of funding for the proposed assassination, the committee searched 
for any affiliations with an organization that could be considered 
secret, southern or both. Three were examined. 

The first was a St. Louis social order with confidential member- 
ship, traditionally white; it was also once the target of civil rights 
demonstrations. No evidence was obtained, however, that would 
indicate it was other than purely social in nature. 

The second was a white citizens group, formed by Mr. Sutherland 
in the early 1960s. It had ties to a Deep South parent organization 
and its stated purpose was to promote States rights and racial 
integrity. Mr. Sutherland served as the first chairman of the steer- 
ing committee. While Mr. Sutherland withdrew from an active 
leadership role after the council’s first year of existence, he re- 
mained interested in it until his death, although there were indica- 
tions that the organization was not sufficiently activist to suit him. 
No evidence was obtained, however, that any member of this orga- 
nization was involved with Sutherland in a plot against Dr. King. 

The third was the Southern States Industrial Council of Nash- 
ville, whose president in 1968 was Thurman Sensing; he was also 
an associate and frequent correspondent of Mr. Sutherland. 

The committee’s examination of the Southern States Industrial 
Council developed that Mr. Sensing addressed the Daughters of the 
American Revolution in Washington on April 15, 1968, less than 2 
weeks after the King assassination. While Mr. Sensing called it a 
“* * * senseless, tragic crime,” and recommended that the killer— 
“* * * be apprehended if possible, and brought to trial for his 
crime,”— he also used the occasion to criticize Dr. King and those 
associated with him. He stated at one point, “It is not too much to 
say, in fact, that Martin Luther King, Jr., brought this crime upon 
himself.” Holding Dr. King to account for his attitude toward civil 
disobedience, Mr. Sensing speculated that the assassin “* * * may 
well have said to himself, ‘I think Martin Luther King should be 
killed. I realize there is a law against murder, but in this case, I 
think the law is unjust.’” 

The Washington Field Office of the Bureau, favorably impressed 
by Mr. Sensing’s speech, brought it to the attention of Director 

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to insert in 
the record a copy of Mr. Sensing’s speech, and the accompanying 
FBI memorandum, as MLK exhibit F-578. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-578 



date: 7/1/68 


A )/„ 

”T,y\\ /SAC,WFO (62-0) 




Enclosed' to Bureau two copies of speech entitled 
"A Call To Law and Order" reportedly delivered by caption 
on 4/15/68, to the National Defense Luncheon of the National 
Society Daughters of the American Revolution at the Mayflower 
Hotel, Washington, D.C. 

In his speech, Mr^. SENSING condemns Communism, 
false compassions, civil disobedience, court decisions that 
have disarmed law enforcement and man's criminal Instincts 
as the roots of riots in America. Mr. SENSING calls for 
a return to law and order. 


Enclosure furnished WFO by __ 

, an SAC contact. ~ j ^ 

Enclosure furnished Bureau in order that the 
Bureau have the benefit of Mr. THRUMAN SENSING's thinking 
on one of our major national problems. 

Re WFO alrtel to Director, dated 2/20/58, entitled 

IS-X (WFO# 100-32567-10) noting THURMAN SENSING spoke at the 

( 2 ) - Bureau (Enel 2)„*- ,; '' 

2 - WFO " 

(1 - 80-114, SAC CONTACT) /. 

WLL: f j c ^ ^ 

l(\u. t6 JUL 2 1968 

54JUU 1 1968 

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on tie Payroll Savings Plan 



WFO 62-0 

Second Annual Convention of above group held at Richmond, 
Virginia, 2/18-19/53. Mr. SENSING spoke mainly on SLtate 
Sovereignty and the need to keep the Federal Government 
from operating the states. 

ReWFOlet to Director, dated 10/16/56, entitled 
WFO 100-32942-7) enclosing a copy of a pamphlet entitled 
published by the Southern States Industrial Council, 

MARTIN J. CONDON, III, President, at Nashville, Tennessee. 

Submitted for Information. 

39-935 0 - 79 - 17 



. X 

- Thurraatfe^asi^. E xeoutlTa Vic o I'vnzid&nt 
Southern Suites Industrial Council' 

'1103-lixx S£alilinan SuiU-ug 
Nashville, Tennessee 372C1 

About three months ago, I gave Mrs. Griswold the choice of two subjects for my 
. talk to you. here today. One of these subjects was ”A Call to Law ard Order, " and that is 
the one she chose. * 

It is rather ironic now that this subject should have been chosen for this setting 
three months ago because if any city in our whole nation has needed law and order, it has 

* been Washington, D. C. , the capital of the nation, during the past several days. During 
those days smolie caused by fires set by arsonists curled around the Washington Monument, 
the dome of the nation's Capitol, and settled like a pall over the While House. People have 
been shot to death and stores have been looted right here in our Capital City - a shame and 
a disgrace for a people who call themselves law-abiding citizens. 

Naturally, this speech has been prepared for soma time because I only returned 
from a five -weeks' trip over the continent of South America a week ago, and knew that I 
wouldn't have time to prepare a tall: after I got back. Therefore, I am really going to make 
tho speech In two parts - first, as I had it prepared for delivery before my trip to South 
America — everything I wrote then still applies - and second, In view of the happenings 
during the past ten days. 

This is not a racial speech; this is not a political speech — it is a lav/ ar.d order 

• speech. It is a forthright speech and I will not pull any punches. However, the people named 
and quoted are named and quo tad not because they are black or while, not because they are 

Republican cr Democrat, but because they said v.kat they eaid and did what they die. 

We made a survey of a« the Southern Spates Industrial Council members ML 

gitirg them a list of 22 r.u».io;u*T issues, and asked them to rate the issues *ki ov-.'er of cjr.«oru 
Crime - and lawlessness was named as the Issue cf paramount concern by a vide marrin. 

* r >e 1 ivei ; od to the \X r )c^’e:> <; ? r * I-nnchecn of the I 1 ". « kj*>vs of ‘.l\> 

American Revolution at Ira Mayflower iioiel, Wy&hicgion, D. C. / April 15, it-jS. 


2 . 

People of great political influence in this country have permitted the concept of 
''freedom of speech" to be expanded to include subversion, Intimidation, sedition, and 
Incitement to riot. They have condoned the distortion of "academic freedom" to encompass 
the adulteration of young minds with Communist doctrine and the disintegration of a well 
disciplined educational system. They have allowed "freedom of assembly" to mushroom 
into disruption of peaceful activity, mob ride, riot and insurrection. 

Unless those in authority in the United States can be influenced to abandon this 
course — or unless they can be replaced by men who will — we cannot hope to restore in 
our nation the kind of domestic peace and order that have made our many generations proud 
to be Americans — living in a land of freedom, security, opportunity, and justice under law* 
The crisis we now face is the most serious, the most dangerous, In the history of 
our country. 

4 . Remember, this was written three months ago. . 

- "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, 
establish justice, insure domes tic tranquility, provide for the common defense, 
promote toe general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to- ourselves * 

• and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for toe United States 
of America." ... 

This passage comes, as you will recognize, from the Preamble to toe Constitution. 
The phrase I want to emphasize and dwell on for a while is "insure domestic tranquility." 

As you know, in many cities and towns in this country in the last few years we have had 
anything but "domestic tranquility"; in fact, we have had anarchy of toe rankest sort. This 
.was especially true during the past summer — toe "long, hot summer" we had been warned 

Actually it was a rather cool summer weather wise, but it was certainly hot so far 
, as domestic tranquility is concerned. The riot?, arson, looting and murder that have 
. occurred in many of our cities are a shame and a disgrace for a nation that c alls Itself 




Kow then, I want to suggest how v/c could put an end to arson ar.d looting, both of 
which are despicable crimes. The solution is this: Issue orders to the police or the guardsmen 
as the case might be, to shoot arsonists, looters and snipers on sight — and investigate later. 
\va have mollycoddled, we have pampered, we have excused law breakers entirely too much 
in this land of ours to maintain a law and ordor nation. 

This would not only stop the arson and looting — it would prevent it from happening 
in the first place. To give orders not to shoot under any circumstances for a period of timo, 
as was done in some of our cities this past summer, not ouly encourages lav/ -breaking, it 
also betrays the trust of the mayor or the governor, as the case might be. 

Moreover, this is not a racial solution — 7 it is a law and order solution, because 
law and order must be observed by everyone alike, both black and white, if we are to live 
in a civilized country. 

The present disregard for law and order has been abuilding for quite a number of 
years. Five causes have worked hand in hand to wreak havoc upon the fabric of America. 

The riot roots may be found, I thin!; (1) in Communism' (2) in false compassion (3) in civil 
disobedience (4) in court decisions and (5) in the criminal instinct that lies repressed in 
the heart of man. “ 

Communism, I believe, is the catalyst which has precipitated the present situation 
in this country. Anyone who has studied the details of the various riots that have taken 
place in the country must agree that they did not happen spontaneously — they were planned. 
Communism thrives on agitation ar4 revolution of all sorts, upon overthrow of the existing 
order* The Communists arc calling the riots in our streets a "war of national liberation.” 
Communists are definitely involved in the various civil rights organizations in five country 
at the present time. It is no coincidence that Stokcly Carmichael, the despicable self- 
proclaimed apostle of guerrilla warfare In die United States, turned up in Communist Havana 
at a meeting of the organization created by. the Soviets and the Communist bloc countries to 
organize revolution in both the Americas. 

If people like Carmichael and Kao Brown, the present head of the Student Non- 
Violent Coordinating Committee, better laiov.n as SNCC, arc very soon not tried for treason 


• ' L . •' .. 4> 

then we arc going to he well on our way to forfeiting our right to call our country a 
law-abiding, patriotic nation. 

By^ the way, SNCC is certainly a badly named organization. Instead of being called 
the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, it should bs called the Non-Student 
Violent Coordinating Committee, . . 

The second cause of riots is the false compassion that has been spewed out by our 
leaders in government, by some of the clergy, and other s in positions of responsibility dur- 
ing the past few years. ' • * . ' • 

It was no less than President Johnson who used the civil rights marchers' phrase, 
,r We shall overcome, " several times in one of his 'speeches, and lent them his encourage- 
ment. Didn’t he know that this was the’title of a song written for the civil rights marchers 
by Pete Seegar, a person who had been identified under oath as a Communist? iVhen Sceger 
wrote "We shall overcome” it is not hard to imagine ‘that what he meant was ,r vVe, the 
Communists, shall overcome. M 

It was no less than President Johnson who greeted an audience of students in the 
summer of 1965 as "fellow revolutionaries" and told them: "I am proud to salute you as 
fellow revolutionaries. We want change ...... I hope you will go out into the hinterland and 

arouse the masses, and blow the bugles, and tell them the hour has arrived, and their day 
is here, ” .Well, the bugles have sounded all right — in Newark, in Cambridge,, lid. , in 
East Harlem, in Detroit, in* Milwaukee, and dozens of other- cities — and the day is here. . 

And speaking of encouragement, I wonder if Vice President Humphrey cares to 
recall his remarks in New Orleans in the summer of 1SSG when he said that if he had to 
live in the slums "I think you’d have more trouble than you’ve had already, because I’ve got 
enough spark left in me to lead a mighty good revolt. 11 Well, Mr. Humphrey’s services were 
not needed — there were plenty of other volunteers* , 

And let me insert right here that it is not buildings that make slums, it is people 

who malic slums. You can take the same pecnle cut cf the slums ar.d put thorn in well built 


high rise apartments and those apartments will soon become more filthy and more dangerous 
than the slums they left. That has been well demonstrated in Nov.; York City. 



• And how about the carpet-bag Senator from New York — Senator Robert F. 
Kennedy when he said in the summer of 1955: "There is no point in telling Negroes to 
obey the law. To many Negroes the law is the enemy. " - - • “-T 

And back to President Johnson when he said in 1954: "We are going to try and 
take all of the money that \vc think is being uimecessarily spent and take it from the 'haves' 
and give it to the ’have nets' that need it so much. " What land of expectations did he think 
that he was arousing? He can look about him and find the*answer.. r . 

Behind the criminal insurrection in Detroit and elsewhere are liberal counsels of. 
appalling irresponsibility. The rioters, looters and arsonists have been encouraged in 
recent years to believe that- they were above the law. When disturbances took place in 
Southern communities, for example, hundreds of clerical carpet-baggers descended on these 
towns and cities to condemn the law enforcement authorities. Now the shoe is on the other 
foot and the home towns of the liberal clergy and liberal professors are engulfed in the 
smoke of armed rebellion against lawful government,* and Southerners cannot be used as 
scapegoats/ * * . •* •/ ■ . 

Looking back at the disastrous Detroit riot Americans may properly, I think, be 
dismayed at President Johnson's highly political reaction to the disorders. Whereas the 
. White House in the past has been quick to send federal troops into Southern states A the 

earliest opportunity, Mr. Johnson delayed and delayed sending soldiers into strife-torn 

* - .. _ 

Detroit. The delays persisted despite pleas by Republican governor George Romney of Mich- 
igan and the Democratic mayor of Detroit. - 7 ~ 

When the troops finally were dispatched into the city (and they constituted only a 
fraction of the massive force President Kennedy used to overwhelm the small town of 
. Oxford, Miss. , in 1952) he employed a nationwide TV address to explain his extreme re- 
luctance to employ federal troops. 

./Under the circumstances this explanation seemed peculiar. If there ever was an 
occasion for federal assistance, this was It. The troopers were requested by state and local, 
authorities. The havoc being committed in Detroit was equal to.what an external enemy of 
the United States might achieve In a massive bombing raid. 


. 6 . — r- 

Mr. Johnson apparently was trying to get oft the hool: with "civil rights” groups, 
but the vast majority of the American people are not political-minded "civil rights” activists. 
They are people who expect the President to assist the states in upholding lav/ and order. 

In the aftermath of the rioting, Mr. Johnson asked the country to pray for domestic 
peace. He also appointed an investigative committee to Inquire into the cause of the riots. 

* ‘ Certainly prayer is in order as a proper avenue to reconciliation. On the other 
hand, Americans cannot overlook the fact that the liberal clergy is partly to blame for the 
disorders now shaking tins nation. In recent years hundreds of liberal priests, ministers . 
and Rabbis have given their endorsement to civil disobedience and to protest movements 
winch tramp ied on municipal and state laws. In Selma, Ala. , there was an invasion of clergy- 
men from the North. One wonders: Where were these clerical voices of ’'conscience” when ^ 
the rioting broke out in Detroit and other cities? How is it that Martin Luther King didn’t 
invade the streets of Detroit to call for non-violence? There is a distinct smell of hypocrisy 
in this situation, . 

As for the presidential Investigative Committee; no doubt the members, according 
to their lights, will search for answers. It would be a mistake, however, to expect much of 
the Committee. For instance, I refer you to the Warren Commission, so-called, to investi- 
gate the death of President Kennedy. The members of this Investigative Committee share in 
general the social outlook which has prevailed in places of power in the last generation. 

That is to say, they believe that uplifting of backward people and the ending of public discipline 
problems can be solved by massive federal expenditures. Thus it would be very surprising 
if the Committee came up with anything but a recommendation for vast increases in govern- 
ment anti-poverty spending. 

President Johnson certainly has indicated his approach tp die riot problem. He 
has spoken of the riots in Detroit, Newark and other cities* in such a way as to employ these 
tragic situations as argamcnSs.icr salvaging his Great Society programs, in. other words, 
the American people have been listening to him hoping to hear a crystal clear demand for 


7 . • 

law and order, and instead they received, a stone in the form of a political message for more 
big government spending in metropolitan centers. - ■. 

The ordinary citizen in the aftermath of a period of savagery and rampant looting, 
certainly knows the score. It is likely that President Johnson will feel the sting of‘a 
real law and order backlash If he persists in trying to end street revolution by bowing to 
the blaclmiail of Negro militants who try to pressure the country by using fire bombs and 
snipers* bullets. ' ; / • ' 

The third cause of riots is the preaching of civil disobedience and so-called "non- 
violent" resistance against society. The preachers of civil disobedience have gone so far 
as to say that "society" owes the Negroes what might be called 400 years of back pay — 
and unfortunately many of the people believe them. Actually their ancestors were sold into 
slavery in the beginning by their own chiefs at the time. One of the clear thinking, clear 
headed Negroes in tills country went to Africa not long ago, and alter comparing the Negroes 
of that continent with the Negroes in this country, came back and said: "Thank God, my 
ancestors were sold into slavery. ** 

‘ Unfortunately , not many of the Negro leaders have that attitude. Too many of them 
have told the Negroes: "Obey those laws you think arc just; don’t obey those you think are 
unjust” — thus advocating that each person decide for himself what is the law. Nothing 
could cause complete anarchy more quickly. 

The fourth cause of the riots has been the invidious court decisions that have 
disarmed law enforcement and made law tiic protector of wickedness. These well known 
court decisions have dimlnshcd the law itself. Since die federal Brown decision of 195*1 
the law has abandoned its impartial majesty and become a tool of favoritism and social 



After all, what* can you expect from the courts when the President nominates a man . 
for Inc court of last resort — the Supreme Court of the United States — not because he was 


the best man available, but because by doing so he could gain a lo: of votes from a minority 
bloc in the next election. - - > 

The fifth cause of riots which I should mention is no recpector of race. It is the 
fact tJi at perhaps criminal instincts lie hidden in die heart of man. All men must struggle 
with die grace of God to overcome their baser nature. Mob rule drowns the pangs of guilt 
and the objections of conscience, and makes an individual feel, erroneously of course, that 
he is not guilty of his acts. It is a warning that white mobs may jet be set against Negro 
mobs by the calculating manipulators abroad in die land. In fact, v/e saw some of this in 
Milwaukee last summer. It may get worse, not only in Milwaukee but in many other places. 

V/e have heard and read much this past year about the "long, hot summer" ahead 
of us, indicating that it would be during that summer \vc would have riots and anarchy. No 
doubt we have many long, hot summers ahead of us. Governor Terry of Delaware told the 
Southern Governors Conference at Asheville last fall that the troubles of 19 S7 are not "any 
at all compared with what we are going to have next year. " Governor Terry offered no 
solution except to say: "We must get ready for it, be prepared for it, stop it, or we are 
going to be taken over." He referred to Black Power agitator Rap Brown's threat of "the day 
of the atom bomb" — a statement v.iiich Terry said will be the "signal" when rioters "will 
come out with guns in every city across the nation, " and that, Terry said, "will be a sad 
day unless we do something about it." He still didn't suggest what to do. 

And so I go back to my opening statement that the mayors of the cities and the 
governors of the states should now issue proclamations lead and clear that the time has come 
to be firm, to be positive, in fact, to get tough. Unfortunately, tills is die only language that 
law-breakers understand. They must proclaim that law- aV.d order must be preserved in this 
land by all people alike, that any cue caught using a Melc-tov cocktail or a sniper's rifle or 
looting a store will be shot on sight. . 



Law enforcement officers arc finally beginning to realize there is no other 
solution. The Chief of Police of Philadelphia issued such orders last fall; later the Chief 
of police of Miami, shortly before Christmas, issued similar orders, saying: 

"When the looting starts, then the shooting starts. " Since then at least two Associated Press 
stories out of Miami have related the tremendous drop in crime since that order was issued.' 
Not a single Negro has been shot by a Miami policeman since then — but crimes of 
violence have shown a 705 drop. Surely, there is a lesson to be learned from this experience. 

The time has come for action. And t by action I don't mean rushing millions of 
dollars into riot- torn areas as a corrective measure -- I mean swift, vigorous police action, 
expedited trials and convictions when supported by the facts. Detroit, for instance, had 
received $100 million since 19G0 for urban renewal, and $41 million in poverty funds. 

Detroit was a model city in those respects; yet there occurred the worst riot, the most 
people Wiled, the greatest property damage in any city in the land. 



Now wc- conic to the second part of my speech j mainly centered,, of course, 
on the burning, shooting and looting occasioned by the assassination of Martin Luther 
King Jr. , on Thursday evening, April 4th. Law and order have teen violated in more than 
100 cities of this land during the past ten days, all of it triggered by King's death. 

The man who hilled Martin Luther King, Jr. committed a senseless, tragic - 
crime. He violated law and order. lie should be apprehended if possible, and brought to 
trial for his crime. 

• However, the country seems to have been caught up in an orgy of emotionalism 
since King's death, and many people have said many things and have done many things that 
* are not supported by facts and reason. It is not too m uch to say, in fact, that Martin ..Luther 
King Jr. brought this crime up on himself. He went around over this country for years 
proclaiming his belief in non-violence and yet nearly everj'whcre he appeared and spoke 
It resulted in violence. CXie of his basic beliefs was that people were morally obligated to 
obey only those laws they thought just. He said they were not morally obligated to obey the 
laws they considered unjust. As I mentioned earlier in my talk, putting these beliefs into 
-practice leads very quickly to complete anarchy. 

What Martin Luther King should. have realized in adopting this philosophy is that 
It might work both v, -ays; in other words, his assassin: may very well have said to himself, 

*T ihink Martin Luther King should be killed. I realize there is a law against murder, but 

\ — - 

in this case, I think the law is unjust. " Anyway, we all know the result. 

As Congressman John M. Ashbrook of Cnio said in his speech to the House last 
October 4, in speaking of King: 

1 'While preaching non-violence, I believe the record clearly shows him to be 
an apostle of violence. While gaining major support from clergymen, I believe he has 
preached an expedient,, totally materialistic line, which Is the antithesis of religious teach- 
ings. He has openly associated with the most radical elements in our society. I believe ha 
•has done more for the Communist Party than any other person of this decade. " 

Mr. Ashbrook went on at length to support these allegations and many others. 

He pointed out that King made a major speech on Vietnam just a year ago this month. 

He further said, "I believe that any thinking American who v.ill study his (King's) words 
must conclude as I have that he is disloyal to the United States. He maligned his country 
• -with lies and accusations that came straight from die Communist Party line. A strange 
statement, you say. Listen to what he said. He praised Ho Chi Minh as the only true 
leader of the Vietnamese people, ljc condemned die United States as the 'greatest 
purveyor of violence in the world today' and likened our nation to Hitler's Germany. 

He threw out wild charges like the United States may have killed 1 million cliildren 

in Vietnam He said we have no honorable intentions in Vietnam and our minimal 

expectation is to occupy it as an American colony. These are a few of the wild accusations 
of the Nobel Prize winner many people have been led to believe is a man of peace. 

Even the Washington Post could not stomach King's blatant lies and propaganda. 
Roundly condemning King in an editorial headed ’A Tragedy, * the Post ended by saying: 
•'Many who have listened to him with respect will never again accord him the same con- 
fidence. He has diminished his usefulness to his cause, to his country and to his people. 
And that is a great tragedy. " 

Early tliis year, following a meeting with Stokcly Carmichael and other agitators 
In Washington, Martin Luther King promised that more American cities w'ould go up in 
flames this summer unless — and this is where the blackmail comes in — unless the 
Congress does exactly the bidding of the Black Power movement. King was unable to put 



a precise pricetag upon this blackmail, but he said it would cost somewhere between 
ten and thirty billions of dollars to do it to give every Negro in America a guaranteed 
income, a "good” home, and, of course, "open housing. " Failing to get all of this, he 
said, the Negroes of American plan to take to the streets this summer in fifteen major 
cities and countless smaller ones. "Our nation, " King threatened, in — what does he call 
it? — his non-violent way, *\vill sink deeper and deeper into the tragic vallej' cf chaos, 
and our cities will continue to go up in flames. " Stokely. 1 Carmichael, standing nearby. 

Just grinned. . .." ' ' . • 

r Were these the words of a minister of the gospel, of a man of peace, a believer 
In non-violence? The answer has to be — no, they were not. 

Two years ago I made a two-months * trip to Rhodesia, South Africa, South West 
Africa and Liberia. Now I have just returned from a five-weeks* trip to South America, 
visiting eight countries including the Panama Canal Zone. The more I study the situation 
abroad and the more I study the situation in this country, the more convinced l am that we 
are overlooking the fundamental issue at hand in our emphasis on welfare measures; 
namely, that it is not the function of government to guarantee prosperity to everybody, 
provide our citizens with a guaranteed income, provide them with government-subsidized 
housing, etc. It Is only the function of government to provide a favorable climate in which 
a citizen may prosper. Then it is up to the citizen himself to produce his own prosperity 
and provide for his own welfare. Anything that is given a citizen beyond this must be pro- 
vided by charity, not by government. 

. Appljnng this to our present-day situation, let me say that it is not the function 
of government to give a man. a job or sec that a job is given him simply in order to sec 
that a minority group is represented on a pro rata basis, or represented at all. A man 
should be employed simply because of his ability, because he is the best man for the job, 
and he should be paid accordingly. 

Let me also say at this point that one group of students in our pumic schools < 
should never be bused across the city to assure proportionate representation of citeor 


12 . 

race in our schools. Common sense and logic should prevail here, not a foolish ideology. 

Now, considering the events since April 4th, let's pick up two or three 
loose ends. * . . 

I mentioned Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown earlier in my talk. Stokely 
Carmichael made some talks in Nashville before the students of the Negro universities in 
early April 1967. It was undoubtedly these talks that triggered the riots that shortly fol- 
lowed, . the first Nashville had had. Not too long after that, Carmichael went to Cuba, 
then behind the Iron Curtain, and then to Hanoi, thus violating all passport rules as laid 
down by our State Department. .However, the Attorney General of the United States did net 
see fit to take any action concerning him when he finally returned to this country. Since 
then he has conferred with civil rights leaders and been active in many ways'— still 
nothing has been done. * 

- Rap Brown, who succeeded Carmichael as. head of the SNCC, has been in jail 

for quite a while because he violated terms of the bail granted him by a federal judge in 
Richmond, Va. , last September, lie has been under arrest for this violation, and just the 
other day the federal judge turned down his plea to release him in the interest of racial 
harmony. You will note his pica to be released was not based on the fact that he legally 
should be released, but in the interest of racial harmony. To a defense attorney's sug- 
gestion that "We may be fiddling while our cities are burning, " Judge Mcrhfge made this 
significant and courageous reply: "Assuming the cities arc burning, that makes it more 
Important that the law must be obeyed, I’m not going to be bullied by kooks on one side or 
the other. " 

The Justice Department is finally investigating Stokely Carmichael's activities 
In recent days — something they should have done and should have acted upon months ago. 
At a news conference in Washington, 14 hours after the death of Marlin Luther King, 
Carmichael sold Negroas would 'have to get *uns" and lake to the streets to "retaliate for 
tbe (Ifing) execution. *' Carmichael was on his way at the time to attend a court hearing in 
Richmond, Va. , for Rap Brown on his bail appeal. He said further: 



"When White America, killed Dr. Kin?, it declared war on us. We have to retaliate 
for the execution of Dr. King. ■ * 

"Black people know that their way is not by intellectual discussions. They kr.ov.* 
that they have to get guns. Our retaliation won't be in the court room but in the streets of 
America. ”, t 

In other words, Carmichael denied completely that the Negroes of tins country are 
controlled by the rules of law and order. However, Attorney General Ramsey Clark had 
nothing further to say about him in his TV interview on April 8 other than that federal investi- 
gators are cheeking his statements to see if "he may have violated any one of a number 

of statutes. " This seems to me to be a very weak statement, a very immature approach to 
handling two of the most militant civil rights leaders in the country. 

Now concerning federal troops, when the rioters camped on his own doorstep, 

President Johnson rather quieldy got over his reluctance to use them, as was true in Detroit 
last summer. News reports are that more than 60, 000 federal troops were called into ser- 
vice during the last several days, being mainly used in the cities of Washington, Chicago, 
Baltimore, and elsewhere in the North; Even so, in many cities for a period of time looting 
went uncontrolled, even on the main business street in Washington. It is too early yet to 
say whether the combined burning and looting and killing amounted to more than in the city 
of Detroit last summer, but there is hardly any question but that it did. . . 

The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. has been followed by an orgy of mob 
violence unprecedented in this country's history. The protest leader who espoused what he 
called a philosophy of "non-violence" left behind him a heritage of violence among his followers 
and admirers. As for flying flags at half-mast, as was clone through Tuesday of last week, 
that, it seems to me, was very fitting — not for the reason given, but because the nation has 
.been shamed by savage rampaging such as goed citizens never believed they would see in this 
proud nation. The death of one Negro soldier in the American armed forces in Viet Nam is 
a thousand times more worthy of Gags being flown at half-mast than was the death of Martin 
Luther King Jr. 


14 . 

This heritage of violence is no doubt led by a relatively small percentage of the 
Negro people; intact, joined in altogether by only a minority of the colored population. 
However, Hi at only makes the situation more tragic, in that a small part might destroy 
.the whole. What wo must all realize in this land, both blacks and whites, is that v:e must 
observe all the rules of law and order if wo arc to continue to live under the kind of govern- 
ment left us by our forefathers . , * 

All people in this country must realize that tins Is a land of liberty., not a land 
of license; that this is a land where laws must be respected, not violated; that tills is a 
land where each man is free to carve out his ov.71 destiny and choose his own future so long 
as he harms no one else in the process; that this is a land where a man’s value is not 
.determined by his race and his color, but by what he has contributed and is contributing 
toward making tills a decent, law-abiding society In a free nation. 

Mr. Evans. The committee’s investigation also determined that 
the intellectual milieu of the Southern States Industrial Council 
had been touched by the publicly expressed opinions of J. Edgar 
Hoover. Mr. Hoovers statements on the efforts of the Communist 
Party to infiltrate the “Negro movement” were approvingly quoted 
in the Council’s 1967 “declaration of policy.” 

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate to have that 
“declaration” inserted into the record as MLK exhibit F-578A. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 



- Organized in 1933, the Southern States Industrial Council officially 
represents the sixteen Southern State area from Texas toL Maryland 
inclusive. ^ L , v - ■"> C • 

* V.,-. : <;/ "• ; !*• * 

Members of the Council come from all lines of professions and of < 
business and industry in the South— large and small. It also has many 
/ members from outside its region^ The Council is operated as a non-; 
profit' business association and corporate dues are tax-deductible as a 
business expen se*v- : . •; - .’v • • J v ^y .V 

v * ' * J' r\:~-:r ■: ■■ * • -• ; 

31i© fimdameDt^ pi^bse ortlie SoutHOT Stqtes'Industrial Council." 
is' to restore and preserve to future generations the traditional American 
free enterprise system which is the basis of our strength as a nation — 
and which is the product of freedom itself. The Council is entirely non* 
partisan, dealing only with principles and not with political parties. - 

, l f- . *. v. • w -‘i - .- v *;/x ..r •.« * ■ 1 *. 

The special function of the Council is to represent the voice of free 
■j enterprise from . the ^conservative Southern viewpoint. This Southern ' 
- viewpoint has been . a. stabilizing influence in .the life -of the nation*: 

particularly iii recent years,' and bids fair to" continue so ip the y?3r3 : 1 
'ahead. *&?i*~*2 

* ; . V There, is a great body of . sound, Conservative thinking in the South -a 
that has unswervingly supported the basic principles of our form of ;. 
government— the rights of local and state governments and the freedom 
; : ,of the individual." 

i- '■% This thinkin g has not submitted to centralized government, it has hot 
been misled by federal aid, it has held fast to basic economic principles. Jr 
' It 13 this tli inkin g to which the Council gives unified utterance, x^.-. ^ '.'i; ';- 

^ ’Organized on a regional basis, the Council can only speak for the 
•‘.South as a region, but the. work it is doing is in the interest of the, whole 
nation— the preservation of free enterprise is. just as important to one’ 

... part of. the nation as a3i$ther. / > ; '-S: 

For further .information, address: Tf - > : 


> ^President 

u ‘.y.4 .i* V;. ; V . 1 103-1111 Stahlman , Building ; »*/.£< .'V." £'v* -g 

j • v.; V Nasliville f Tennessee 37201 -V. ; ’ r ' v ‘ - ‘ ' ' 





We cherish the fact that oar beloved country is deeply rooted in 
religious faith. This we attribute to the wise and virtuous men who 
established themselves upon this land through individual enterprise and 
self-reliance while unashamedly acknowledging God as the ultimate 
source of their strength and the author of all their blessings. 

- The Council is gravely concerned and disturbed at many of the 
/ changes now taking place in the life of our nation, including the grow- 
. ing secularism of .the people. 1 This lamentable trend is — in effect — 
' sanctioned and.abetted by court-directed assaults upon practice 
of religion. ' ' c •- ./ 

Therefore, file Southern States Industrial Council takes this oppor- 
tunity— -solemnly and humbly—to reaffirm its unalterable faith in Al- 
mighty God. V..’ 




; Rational Soy^eignty:;; 

j ^..Sovereignty, Nationalism^ Patriotism, Individual ... Liberty — these 
& are the living principles under which this Nation has come into being, 

" and;’ for more than a century and a half, has grown and prospered. - 

rr-f Ini recent years, we have been witnesses to.the progressive weakening 
^/and , undermining of these basic principles.. Our Sovereignty, has been 
;/■ impaired., -Nationalism has come into . considerable popular disf avorl 
f [Patriotisci is not as highly revered as it once, was. Individual Liberty 
^js' being constantly eroded . by .actions of our national government;"^’ 

;^.|: J r The Council reaffirms its unalterable opposition to these, trends. It 
commends the Senate for its, refusal to ratify the United Nations-spon- 
? sored Genocide Convention and urges it to take similar: action when, 
and ' if the Declaratiou of Human Rights— also United Nations spon- 
- soitd— -is submitted. •• ] i "• 

: §&£ TTi^'Council' also,; opposes repeal of the Connally Reservation ; re-; 
stricting the jurisdiction of •.the’. World Court and urges the Senate 
Foreign Relations Comniittee to shelve this proposal, as it did in 1960, 
^{should it be brought up ^ / r : ‘ ‘ ‘ 

-• .T { • ' '■■■ -Hr /S i - 



The United Nations: • * 

Since the United Nations came into being, ostensibly as a mecha- 
nism for promoting world peace, the government of the United States 
has made support of the U.'N/a keystone of our foreign policy. ! * 

1 The high hopes which inspired this support have ended in disap- 
pointment, and serious doubt now exists as to whether “peace’! is a real 
and foremost objective of most U.N., members. 

Lx addition, the character, composition, ant? activities of the World ' 
orga ni z a tion have radically changed/ This is due to the influx of new 
African and Asian * ‘nations.”' Each of them has the same voting power 
in ihe U.' N. Assembly as. does the United. States - and hence they are 1 
-in hpcsitionitb^dominato'-the 

Lx view of the foregoing, the. Council feels that the United States • 
should consider withdrawing totally from the U. N. and from all par- - 
■ ticipaiioh in UC'N.-sponsorbd activities .and .organizations. It alsore-r,' 
questo that UiN. headquarters he removed from ^ the-- •' 

• • ■ • :■ .. • i* ' ; \ 1 * '/ r X.' ■* 1 

Sanctions AgalnstsRhodesia: *. V ^ '■ 

.... ■ ... * -■ i VV'y : 'VV:. , i ’! ,r ‘ /' 

4" y.’ The Council condemns in the strongest "possible’ terms - tneVshamef^ 
^action of , put .otto- government in - imposing a - U*. ^-sponsored*, trade 
e mb a r go .upon Bhodesia. Spch action is pot only contrary to the Amen-T,. 
can tradition of self-determination; could easily lead to die involve-.’ 
‘ m erit of this Nation in a war in which die United States would he fighting”* 
on the side of barbarism and dxaos and against civilization. We earnest- 

r Fortign Aid:.^; ;> ::^x? < J'dc' > d r , ??$.:■& ± wit? iAv ’ £?.<■'- 

. ; -;-The .Coimcil notes with satisfaction the' growing disenchantment £/ 
-with foreign aid. It has never believed it possible to buy reliable friends^ 
{anid allies. Eurhermore, the Council specifically rejects any f urher aid iy 
to Socialist or Communist' <touxxtriM4y 

r :. _We believe our government should avoid dissipation of, thcNation’s 
resources in futile attempts to, raise die living’ standards of Vast seg-'r. 
merits of the worldV.eveigrovnng p opulation. We believe that aU'such;- 
ill-conceived attempts are foredoomed to failure, and, by raising false.; 
r i hopes, make more - enemies than friends, 

r .- -|{vx - ■ .“ v: J il* , . V; v ’ 4 * ’ ; V- V->‘ ’ ; ■ y ■ - \ ■ “ • v <* ii’v * 'fViV - ': vvf# * .• • .. * 

.; \:;y . The Council. favot 3 the substantial annual; induction of foreign-; 
^ec^ncmic aid with a view to its early elimination and a continuing re-^ 
... . view of our policy of military aid. . V-Y * • " ' ' • 


International Trade: 

The power to regulate foreign commerce is expressly and ex*-*, 
dusiyely vested in Congress by paragraph (3), Section 8, Article 1. 
of the Constitution, which says: “The Congress shall have the power 
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several, 
states, and with the Indian tribes.” 


■t-y- 1 . 2 . The restoration of Congress’ authority over tariff-making. : 

* .%' 2. El imin ation of the balance of payments deficits and the drain 
re;, ' ''' on i oar S°ld reserves. 

’.^;'3.:;‘ < An Immediate review of the entire Trade Agreements program:.*-' : 

* with a-view to such rate, adjustments and/or the imposition of • 

• “ ' y such quotas gs are necessary to protect American producers and 

workers from unreasonable and unfair competition based upon 
V ; > cheap foreign labor. This should include a prohibition against 
/ ^ dumping of foreign produced materials in this country at prices 
" • •• ! 7?, ■ ' lower than those charged in the producing home markets. , * * 

* Rejection of the idea of government subsidies for domestic in- , 
.dustries injured by the Trade Agreements program. 

t; The establishment of a joint-watchdog committee comprised, of ^ 

.t^^embers of the Ways and Means and Senate Finance commit- ' • * 
to keep constant watch over the effects of imports upon , 

•(- U. S. industries, including employment,, profits- and -prices,* ri 

i6- An immediate elimination of all trade with Communist nations. 

VThe council applauds 6ui government for imposing a Complete embargo :ytr 
on trade with Red China and urges that it be maintained. • ■ 

v Protection of Foreign Investments: ; * . 4 ; -J ' ’,..1 . 

^h^ Jnvestment.^ of United States private capital in foreign countries 
V should he protected through agreements fostered by our government. 

£ Such agreements should guarantee fair and. non-discrimmatory treat- 
Tment of present and future investments, provide firm! assurance against 
; expropriation without adequate and prompt compensation, and permit 
*7 investors to repatriate their earnings. The Council calls upon our; 

government to adopt, without delay, whatever legal measures may be: ^ ;\ 

, necessary to accomplish these aims. • V\ v ; : 7. 

7 \7V The Monroe Doctrine states in part: * . .[s . • ,• , - 

- “We owe it, therefore, to' candor and to the amicable relations 
.existing between the Uuited States, and these (European) powexa^ to 


declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend, 
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as ..dangerous to our 
peace and safety.” 

The evil and malevolent' system of Communism is now firmly en- 
trenched on the island of Cuba, from which it is spreading to other 
Latin American countries. Instead of resisting this sinister development 
with all the power at its command, our government treats Cuba as an 
inviolable Communist sanctuary and orders a wrong-way blockade 
against Fighters for Freedom instead of against Castro. v- 

The Council favors the prompt, stern invoking of the Monroe Doc-' 
trine. in the case of Cuba and otter threatened Latin American conn- • 

fn.. nn/1 onfAmm rr hi • *_> ■■ . - ‘V- T *- — _ ' ' j . V' ‘ - ■ ' . .2. 


JV -(i-'sA*. • V ■ 

•f’ Vv*' 

t. .V •- 

a V? 

Isthmian Canal Policies: 

. A major' objective of the Communist conspiracy in this hemisphere - 
is to gain control over the Panama Canal; The Council urges Congress 
not to surrender, in any degree. United States ownership of, juris- 
diction over, and: control of the Canal Zone to Panama or any other 
nation or international body. .... 


rr m ;\ 

v \s.'V StVaCV 

Immigration: >; v 

■> " Jhe test oF any uuniigrarion policy slxotdd b^ Hvhht is best for 
'America? Measured by this test, it remains to be seen whether 
the new immigration law of 1965 represents any improvement over- 
' the McCarran-Walter Act, which it supplanted. The Council doubts that 
it will, primarily because the new law contains no provision — as did , 
the McCarran-Walter Act — for a National Origins Quota System. s .; 

Viet Nam?' 

; . Xr..- • ;t.v. ' '*■ • - ' i'-U'.'Y-?. 

' r * rV" >. ’ ,~-Si * r _ ^ -V . ) • ... ; 

.i •**'*?■. y\ '■ * ♦ -v*- ‘M -“■*» v 

The Council supports the efforts of. the President to tum back and " 
defeat the Communist drjve on South Viet Nam. However the Council 
. disapproves the simultaneous diplomatic- :< ‘Peace Offensive” which 4 •:* 
weakens and sometimes contradicts the military effort there.: The oh- in- 
jective of war is not “negotiation” but victory over the aggressor, and 
judging by past U. S. losses at the conference table, “negotiation” might 
,well allow the Communists to achieve by guile what they have failed, to ;’ 
gain by force. The Council favors the use pf all appropriate means to. ; 

: destroy the Viet Cong and— if neces3arj r — to overthrow its Communist): 

* masters in Hanoi or wherever located. 



Maintain an adequate defense— strong and balanced armed forces—* 
maintain always a military superiority over our enemies. 


Any unilateral or unverified program of disarmament would be 
suicidal. The Council is, therefore, opposed to any form of disarma- 
ment, whether it be by treaty — such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty — 
» or by executive order— such as the failure to develop adequate new 
' strategic weapons systems for future defense needs in land, sea, air or 


"Test Ban Treaty Safeguards: 

Before the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, the numerous risks 
and hazards of the, pact were; admitted by the Administration then in 
- power, but strenuous promises were made that all necessary steps would 
*x be . taken .to reduce them to the lowest possible leveL Nothing of 
die soil has been done. Therefore, the Council calls upon the Johnson 
Administration to take positive action to ensure national security against 
'X-the dangem inherent in the unpoliced Nuclear Test Ban. . ^ 

■ Arms Contrbl ahtl Disaxmainent Agency:: * 

i: ; • : . • ‘V • • : - 

vi;'-;- -Tlje; Council feels that the.U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
■I Agency has .proven itself .utterly useless and futile. . It should be ' , 
. ... abolished . n - 4' : 

H -u" t'ii-*- • Js; 

;;"’pyer-E^mmiori^pf f Forces: ....... I t 

*)4; % 4The Council notes yrith' grooving concern our increasing military 
r T 'cominitments around theworld. We are:now formally committed to the ?*; 
i protection of the freedom of over 40 Nations. Secretary of State Rusk v 
has stated— in effect— that there is no limit to our role as world police- J 
man. The Council seriously questions the wisdom of any such attempted ■ ' 
v .r role and feejs that the end result could be catastrophic. . 


" J-r/ ’V . •: 1 

The' .Council;' rea£Srms its unalterable hostility to Communism, 
4-Socialism, or any foym of 'totalitarian government, and favors the ex- 
4 posure and eradication: oj similar subversion wherever, ii exists. ‘ 

W v.v-"^o<_.Oi**r V ' ;• Ur'i-.V-v. 


Loyalty Oath: . W •" ... . 

The Council is unable to discern 1 any Valid 'reason why American 
college students, whose education is being paid for. by the taxpayers, 
or anyone else receiving Federal funds, should object, to. taking an i 
oath .of loyalty to their own country. We express the hope that this oath, 
will be preserved and, if necessary, strengthened. . . ; . •- , ‘>v/, r , ' ! i 

Communist Infiltration: • :> 

The late Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activi- 
" ties, the Honorable Francis E. Walter,' once said:'”;' .; : 

(the Communists) objective remains the same: destruction of 

- ^ all free societies, conquest of the world and .the enslavement of ./;. 
"" .^ 'mankind'. ; The battlefields are eveiy:. institution and organization " ' 

' ; - of society, including the home, the church, the school and every . 
agency of our government.” '■;//. ’/i'"'"!; ^ / 

' '"-’yjjlae Cdtmcii'nrges .Cchgr^s'fo pass legislation that, wo^d compel^, 
the'suhunary' discharge of any non-elective Federal employee upon a 
. written finding and certification by the FBI to the agency concerned „ 
that reasonahle douht exists as to the loyalty of such employee to the 
IJpited States. Government employment is a privilege, not a right,' ;.;/ ;/V 

Tnfiltxationof fhe Peace. ; Mov^ent:';| : ^ 

It is apparent, to even the casual dbserver that the numerous “peace’’ in- 
groups demonstrating throughout the land are not pacifist in nature but * 
are actually in favor of a military victory by the Communists in Viet : 
Nanu When viewcd v/ithin the context of the current Communist Party ;,:' 
Line, it is also obvious that the so-called Peace Groups are giving aid / 

- and comfort to the Communist enemy. The Council urges immediate*-'; 
/Congressional investigation of the Peace Movement .: ; =■• •• 

.W.T »*.<;>' n,;.;- ....V - -O .V ^ 

- The Council further calls on the Justice Department to prosecute 

those persons who violate the Selective Service Act by urging young ;• 
Americans not to serve. in the Armed Forces. i - ( V-£>~V;£v!£' 

$ Civil Bights and Civil ‘Wrongs: • ,.y ^ 

Av The . Council ‘ views with grave ' concern the mounting violence and 
^lawlessness ostensibly carried out in support of various aspects of . the 
so-called civil rights program. It views with even greater alarm and \ 
:>• misgivings the actions/ of the President and other high officials and { . 

' ' members of Congress of both parties. and the Supreme Court in not > 

;; only failing to oppose and condemn such violence and open disregard 3 
‘ of State and local laws, but actually encouraging and condoning it.*: 


Crime: . . 

' The' Council views with alarm recent Supreme Court decisions — ' 
Mallory. Escobedo, and Miranda cases— which have had the net effect 
of barring criminal confessions under almost all conceivable circum- 
stances, thus allowing the guilty to go free. The Council supports legis- 
lation ;'to correct this situation. 

Infiltration of the Racial Movement: 

c s^Oh April 22, 1964, J. Edgar Hoover; Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, stated: . * . 

' VThf, Communist Party is attempting to ; use the Negro movement, 

• as it- does everything else, to promote its own interest "rather than the 
welfare of those to- whom it directs its agitation and propaganda. . . . 

“The number of Communist Party recruits which may be attracted 
' from &e Jarge. Negro racial groups in fiiis nation is jnot the important 
: thin^ The old Communist principle stdl holds: : 

. 'Communism must be built with non-Communist hands.* | 

fi°! Imow fliat Communist influence does exist in the Negro 
. ^movement and it , is this influence which is vitally important. Tt can he .1 
^ the meani through ^vluch large masses are lose perspective < - 
^ on fiae issues involved and, yrithout realiring it, succumb to theParty’s 

•;i|ri^aganda ; lnies^^"^.yv^ . 

The Council, therefore, urgently (alls for an immediate Congres- 
■<r sional iny^stigation into the Communist infiltration of the Negro move- ., 
"pment in the United States. ,~ r v : -' :■ : ' I " 

X.TPBl, Succession: - ' XXX :. • ’-V .I-.-* . ... • . 

supports legislation to make future appointees as Di- 
* % rector of the FBLsubject to Senate confirmation, v ' , - ; 

X-XXXi XXv-X X. 

vi -x^The Coimcn noteswith.sadnes3 andconcem the continued flagrant 
fifbias on the part of much, of the Nation’s press, radio and television - • 
^■ jmedia in reporting on , Southern race relations. In the opinion of the 
Council, such reporting— some of it thoughtless arid irresponsible — 

'^ ‘some hf it plafifiy. malicious— docs not help and frequently hurts the 
i': cause of restoring harmonious' relations between the white and Negro ., 
•' races in the South and elsewhere. It calls upon the news and opinion 
—media of the Nation to get back to honest, objective .reporting;.-. ’*• ':*'V 



..... .... _ .. . * >. . - 

Protect in every way the rights of the individual as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. These fundamental rights are inherent in every citizen and 
must be preserved inviolate. ' . - 

Unalienable Bights: /;■. . ■■■•_ 

The Bill of Rights of the U. S. Constitution is based upon the philo-* 
sophy, first proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, that all 
men are endowed by their Creator with certain, unalienable .rights. . 

This philosophy is directly contrary to the totalitarian principle 
that man’s rights are conferred upon him by government and mat what 
government gives, it may also take away.-“-y> 

’ The Council rejects as inimical to the fighls'and di^ty of man the 
whole socialistic, leveling down philosophy of the welfare state. -7 ' 

Firearms Control: •. ^ t 

The Council looks with apprehension hpon the firearms control 'and .7 
registration bills being Considered by Congress. The Council emphatic- 
ally rejects all firearms control laws, no matter at what level of govern- 
ment or what the purpose. Such laws cannot impair; die criminal’s use ~ 

. of arms. The criminal will obtain firearms illegally if he desires them, H 
whereas, the freedomoflaw-abidingcitizens to keep'' and bear armi C! 

‘ 'would be iestricted./ ; ^.’T;j^ ? 

** ^ -r -^:*iVV^ STATE^ EIGHTS 

Safeguard the rights of individual States by holding the Federal Gov- 
enanent to the delegated power as specified in the Federal CpnstUutum??'* 
' and to the statutory procedure in administering that pdwer. 

The Republic: * ;; 

, Vl « • m ‘ -ly’i/x* A- - *.■ • *,* .-v • v * - ./ v. . 

-•?. V’; Onr Constitutional fathers, familiar with the strength and weakness ^';' 

of both autocracy and democracy, with fixcd principles definitely in V . 

. ' rnind, established a representative republican form of government. They ‘‘ t* 
'"made a very marked distinction between a republic and a democracy" 7 
and said repeatedly and^mpbatically that they had founded a republic. 

1 r These men knew full well the dangers of a democracy, and never ' ’ , 

■ intended that we should have one.- Our pledge of allegiance refers to v 
: the flag “and to the Republic fox which it stands.” When Benjamin 
Franklin came out of the Constitutional Convention on Sept 17, 1787, .... 
’he wa 3 asked, “Well, Mr. Franklin, V/bat have we got?” His answer 
. ..was, “You have a Republic, if you can keep it.”. -; , ; V , . • ;•... 7 

' ; ; Thof .Council believes that- the . time is here when the American ; 

... people must reaffirm their desire to retain a Republic. 


Big Government: 

The Council notes with extreme concern the ever increasing size, 
cost and power of the Federal Government, and urges citizens in and out 
of Congress to take a determined stand against its continued expansion. 

Apportionment and Beapportionment: 

The Council supports immediate Federal legislation to withdraw 
from the Supreme Court of the United States appellate jurisdiction in 
apportionment and reapportionment cases and also to deny jurisdiction 
.. to the S, District Courts to entertain any petition or com- 
plaint. seeking apportionment or reapportionment. 

/• -j . The Council also supports Senator Diiksen’s determination to amend 
c the Conatitution tp *pxqvide that in all States having two-Hotise legisla- ' ' 
tores, members of one House may be chosen on a geographical or 
other non-population basis. ■ - ‘ 

Prayer and Bible Beading: 

The Council decries die Communist-inspired drift towards atheism, 
and urges Congress to provide that the Bible may he read and prayers 
offered in the public schools with voluntary participation. The Council 
. further believes that prayer in the public schools and public ceremonies 
> should be. encouraged ratber tbaii forbidden. - . * r ; s v 

i Another Bond to Socialism: - t . . y- • 'y—y . 

^yjfAs- bhe' mcans 'bf promoting more rapid economic growth, if has 
. been suggested that a larger share of our total earnings and resources 
v /. he channeled by the Government, into public, as distinguished from 
^ 1 private,; investment. The Council * opposes this notion as leading to ■ . 

. bigger, more centralized government, more intervention and control, - 
.1; and outright socialism as the ultimate, if not avowed, goal.. ' 

' v"' v ?.y , ; ,-y 

< y. y .yihe Council commends and pays respectful tribute to the conserva- 
five’ coalition in Congress and pledges its continued support.' It especi- -y • 
v ally commends the -coalition in the Senate for defeating repeal of Sec- 
.> tion 14(b). of the Taft-Haitley Act. ,> • ' ’ .. 

?i ' .yy -yy y 'yy " 

The Council believes that a return to the fundamentals of education 
J is long overdue,; that the , public, school ~ system should .. rem a in under v 
'.■' local control and that it, along with the home, and the church, should . 

* constitute a strong first line of defense against subversive attack from- 


Federal Aid to Education: 

The Council opposes Federal aid to education because, whatever 
may be said. Federal aid has always meant 'and will and must al- 
ways mean. Federal control which enables thought molding on a na- 
tional scale by whatever small group has control of the Administrative 
Branch of the Federal Government. The potential , evils of $nch power 
are obvious. 

■ Guide Lines: V " ■’ r - V- 

vln the opinion .of the:Coimci3,''1t^!'acdon of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare in attempting to make compliance with 
..SD'Called integration, ‘‘Guidelines” a coition of -receiving public tax 
, funds is botli dishonest and a pereision of the intent of Congres3. The \ 
Council calls upon Congress for relief from this Bureaucratic edict. - • 

Supreme Court: 

The duty of the Supreme Court is to determine what the law is, not 
to set itself up as a third legislative chamber. It also has a duty to 
avoid Federal judicial involvement in matters tradionally left to State 
legislative policy making. The Council earnestly urges Congress to: ’ 

' ' ■ L‘ / Propose a constitutional amendment vesting exclusive control of % 
the public schools in the States and tiieir political sub&visioj»;G' 3 
• >and i •> ^ ^ 

V s >2. Pass legislation to restore tb£ balance of power aiUong the three^ 
branches of the Federal Government and between the federal 7 * 
„ Government and the States. ( . ... . . . . 

- ,-ff. :r - - ; li ihW'% 

"The Council also believes that the Supreme Court is misinterpreting: , 
and mis-applying the general welfare dause of .the Preamble to the' ";’ 
Constitution, as well as the 10th Amendment reserving to the States" or r J_ 
the people .all powers not specifically, delegated to the Federal Govern- 

-The Council further holds the view that, no'oue should bp appointed, i: 
to the Supreme Court wjio has not had at least five, years, prior appellate •. 
judicial experience. - • 

.. Federal "preemption: f r :-Y-v! ^ 

The Council supports .Federal legislation to require that no act of v; 
Congress 'shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Coh-. r ? 
" grass to occupy the field. in which such act operates, to the exclusion of ; 

State laws on the same subject matter, unless such act' contains an ex-7’ 

' press provision to that effect. -'- Y’ — ' r 


Force Bills: 

The Council profoundly resents the action of Congress in passing, 
and the Supreme Court in upholding, P. L. 89-110, the so-called Voting 4 . 
Rights Act of 1965. Bom of hate, hysteria and hypocrisy, this law re- 
imposes reconstruction on certain States of the South with no appeal to 
the local courts. It does this by requiring these States to entreat Federal 
authorities for approval of local laws before they can become effective. 

As Mr. Justice Black said in his dissenting opinion: “Any State or 
States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces.” 

' The Council opposes so-called Federal civil rights legislation as a 
further unwarranted encroachment by the Federal Government upon 
the rights of the individual citizen, the State and local communities. 

.. It also opposes- — arid fop the same reason — executive action in this 

area. ■ ' - V 

Presidential Electors: 

The Council recognizes the right of the several States to appoint 
Presidential electors as they choose, but favors the principle that such 
electors shall be chosen in the same manner and upon the same basis 
, as are members of Congress. 


Promote honesty, economy and efficiency in government — Federal, 

" ^taie^ia^'loceL':-^ V, «• - ; >r ;.Va . • v. : 

. Fiscal "Policy: ‘"’’V-''; 

^'-/; The hational deht now amounts to $331 billion, up $8 billion from 
.last year; This does not include government-guaranteed loans and other 
contingent liabilities, conservatively estimated to aggregate more than . 

-triUiop,-;.\;i }[C. V f./v . . a;.'-"' V V 

t..;.: Notvvitbstanding the recent tax reduction, taxes are still far too 
highi ln sqme States having State income taxes, the combined Federal- 
? State rates actually exceed confiscatory levels. . 

In the light of these facts, the Council urges the Congress to take the 
‘following action :;. ' • . - * 

; -L ;:" Reduce .the Federal budget by reducing expenditures that are 

essential to the functioning of the government as defined in . „ 

> the Constitution, 

;V- V 2, ;j ' Avoid any further increase in the debt ceiling and’ the con- 
/L”V. :r ' 'tracting cfanyfurther obligations outside tins. ceiling. i ;. 


3. Approve an amendment to the Constitution limiting Federal 

expenditures to receipts in time of peace. , , 

4. Limit Federal income tax rates by Constitutional amendment 

except in time of war. ,, . . • r v ; 

5. Provide for a return to a convertible gold coin standard and 
the liquidation of the present managed currency system. 

6. . Approve an amendment to the Constitution requiring reduction 
in the national debt except in time of war or congressionally- - - 

. f declared state of emergency, f . .. ' . ^ .. .. w 

Inflation: . ^ 

v have had .a deficit in our national budget for 31 of the past 37 ^ 

years. This is' largely responsihls for the'58 per cent decline in the . 
purchasing power of the dollar and .this decline is accelerating. ' ■ 

„ The deficit for the current fiscal year (ending June 30) is estimated 
at over $11 biflion, while: President Johnson estimated next . year’s ” 
deficit at $8.1 billion— a figure generally regarded as highly unrealistic 
in view of the increasing costs of the “Great Society” and . the war in .... 
Yiet Nani In these circumstances, tiie.Council recommends a substantial ; 
cut-back in' “Great Society” spending. ; We ' do not believe that a tax v 
^increase would be significantly deflationary since it would only reroute 
funds from private .to public genders.' •;<; • -r : 

The New Economics: 

nivminc* <?' 

While die Council recognizes that, as with a family' going into debt 
to meet living expenses, the day of, reckoning may be postponed for a' 5 
time» it rejects the whole of the so-called “New Economics” as a cyni- 
cal, cruel and demogogic hoax designed primarny to gain votes, ' ; , " 


The Council reaffirms its opposition to this type of legislation, the 
v .cost of which will run into the, billions. It suggests that a meaningful 
solution of the problem, of depressed areas and regions will not be 
. , fonnd in subsidized federal pump-priming; rather it .will be found 
in the dynamic workings of the free enterprise system. V’ 

The Federal Deserve System: 

' " * Tohave a sound monetary, credit and fiscal policy, it is essential 
that the Federal Reserve System continue to function. as an independent 
. agency. y "^ r - : '• ' 



In general. Federal subsidies, including rent subsidies, are politic* * 
ally motivated. They also make for additional Federal controls. The 
Council believes that the general -welfare will be best served by 
the progressive elimination of all subsidies, except where necessary to 
the national defense. 

- In addition, the Council favors a fair and equitable user charge to 
. be paid by those industries which use publicly-financed facilities and 
which compete -with other industries which do not use such facilities. 

Agriculture: v . .. 

. ' V.; One of the largest and most expensive of our many ventures into 
welfare statism is the* farm program which resulted in the accumulation ; 
of vast surpluses and the loss of billions of dollars annually. Now these ' 
surpluses (except in the case of cotton and tobacco) have largely dis- 
appeared due to the food give-away programs in India and elsewhere 
and the U. S. may face a shortage of feed grains notwithstanding the 
15 per cent increase in acreage recently ordered. 

The Council feels that this situation offers a unique opportunity for ! 

" the government to make at least a beginning towards freeing the farmers 
.v from the bureaucratic stranglehold under which they have operated . 

■% these.many years. It urges prompt revision of the lavra governing -agri-;.-,.^r 
t cultural production and marketing with a view to returning control to-^r , 
: the farmer; restoring the law of supply and demand* not only for what 
V the farmer Has. to sell but for what he has to buy; and giving farmers ' 
v and consumers the. benefit of a free, unrigged market. 

,^odsei|$.' :, -f - v ' 

} ; r vlt is beyond the ability of Congress as presently organized to in- . ' 
form itself as to each of the items, in the budget and to know which 

be .eliminated. or reduced without injury to essential public services,;;;.^ 
r^Tn r^rnpfty tbiR nrifl to restore to Congres9 control of spending, the 
i* Council recommends the establishing of a joint House-Senate Commit- <.< 
.: L'tee with an adequate staff to- make a continuing study of the budget/ , 
■CP.ani advi$e ; )Congresi ' 1 • 

l^r ? ;The Constitution' of the United States provides that “no money, 

' shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations 
made by Jaw.” Notwithstanding this clear prohibition, the practice has 
^ grown in .'recent years' ’iff antborizing the heads of government agencies 
to go directly to the Treasury for their money without, further appro- > 
priations action by Congress. The Council urges an end to this uncon* 
stitutional and irresponsible practice. ■ ' • — • 


One General Expenditure Authorization Act 
For Each Fiscal Year: 

The need for reform in Congressional procedures for enactment of 
spending legislation is obvious. Congress has lost control over Federal 
expenditures and acts on spending bills without relating them to reve- 
nue and without knowing whether it is creating a deficit or surplus. 
Partly as a consequence, deficit financing has been the rule— not the 
exception — for more than a quarter of a century. The Council .advo- 
cates one general expenditure authorization for each fiscal year. 

Uses for Non-Convertible Currencies: 

; As a result of food sales and the counterpart funds generated by 
the foreign aid programs, the U. S. jGoverament now owns billions of 
dollars worth of' non-convertible currencies; Both as a meaps of. econo- 
mizing in the expenditure of dollars and to help our balance of pay- 
ments deficit, the Council favors: : 

. 1. The use of these non-convertible currencies in payment of the 
. , i cost of 'any U. S.‘ activities and otherforeign commitmentsin . 
the respective countries; and : 

2. Sale of these currencies to U, S. t tourists for use in the countries . 
....... of origin, .„ ^ 

Pepaftmehit^ of “flousing. arid XJrjb ah Developmmitf^'rr' ^ 

.. ..' The Coiincil opposed this primarily for the reason that it would 
further increase the power of the Federal Government over municipali- 
' ties. It believes that towns and cities should be encouraged to finance 
their own development and work with state governments before looking 
to Washington for assistance and planning. J. ...... .... ,< . 


Help develop :an ' equitable ^ tax-; system that will restrict the Federal , 
Government to its proper Constitutional functions, : reserve certain 
sources of taxation to the State and local government, broaden the tax 
base, eliminate the double taxation of corporate,dividends,and provide i 
"equality of taxation to all competing business:, enterprises ;• i./vn • 

Constitutional Limitation of Federal Taxes’s'^'T '* v ' .'i'll .1" 

^ ). . . The Council submits that a fixed ceiling on the rate at wb ich Fed-. ;’’ • 
J - eral income, estate, and gift taxes can be levied and collected, except. ";•• • 
on income taxes in time of war, written into the Constitution.!!. r - 
f- The unlimited power -to tax presently exercised by. the' Federal y . 
? . Government is socializing earnings, preventing the formation of risk >■ 
t.;* capital, and destroying the profit incentive. It 13 also taking away im- 
*-vTpoitaat sources of revenue which should be reserved for the State and ; - 
T < '/local governments. 


State Sharing in Federal Income Tax: 

The governors have requested the President to initiate a study of 4 
how the States should share in the Federal income tax. In the opinion 
- of- the Council, any $ueh sharing would make the States even more de- 
pendent than they now are on Federal revenues and this should be 
avoided. However, if a Federal sharing plan is adopted, the Council 
, holds that the states should be reimbursed in proportion to the amount 
collected by the Federal Government from each state. . 

Double Taxation of. Corporate. Dividends: . , 

Individuals should be exempt from Federal taxation of that portion 
f: of their income derived : from corporate dividends, since such income 
; % has already , been ta?ed ;once to the . corporation. The Council urges 
'^Congress to^take appropriate action to correct this inequity. ' > ■* 

v ' Tax Equality: ,> '* ; . 

„ In the interest of free and fair competition, the Council urges Con- 

* gress to plug the remaining loopholes in those laws which give coopera- 
tives, credit unions,' and similar businesses an • unfair tax advantage. 

, Capital Cains Tax: .'' : V •• • ■- ■ - -uC. . 

• ' v ; This tax.retards the free flow of investment, capital and has a 
" stifling effect on our. economy. r It repealed, thus permitting, 

; - such gains to remain tax free’ foy reinvestment. ' , V: : -. a:,v- 

Adequate AHowance for Depreciation: / ' 

. During a' period of inflation the cost of replacing wom-out or 
obsolete buildings and equipment is much more than the amount al- 
, lowed as a charge to depreciation under present Federal tax lawsi This 
is particularly harmful when ' taxes are taking more than 50 percent.,; 

' of the profits earned by many businesses. 

r .We urge that Congress establish a current value formula for de- ... 
^termi^ing depreeiadon based .upon the current cost of replacement. 

:• Investment Tax Credit: - ■/.. V •- 

-ivot-. ? .vThe.- Council commends the President for recommending and the 
Congress for passing a measure to restore the 7 per cent tax credit for 
• machinery and equipment and the tax benefits of accelerated depreci- • 
f ation of commercial buildings. ’ .. . , : : : > . '•••; 

Deplciion;.A]IbwariC^:\ ' J- ./• 

Tbe Council supports. the principle that industries based upon the V- 
extraction of exhaustible resources should be allowed adequate dep] e-. “ 
t ticn allowances. ‘ ‘ 

39-935 0 - 79-19 


No Censorship by Taxation: . . 

The Council believes that contributions and expenditures by busi- 
ness enterprises to support or oppose legislation at all levels of govern- 
ment should be deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses 
for Federal income tax purposes. *•>•...■ 

State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: , v _ •„ . 

He Council urges the States to get together and formulate and 
adopt uniform standards in this field. 


' . Government competition with privateenterprjse is contrary to the prin-1- 
: ciples upon which our economic system rests and should be eliminated. 

Socialization of Commerce and Industry: . 

' The Council opposes • government competition with taxpaying pri- 
vate enterprise in all fields of endeavor, including but not limited to 
transportation, home building, home financing, banking, consumer 
financing, insurance, fertilizer, and other manufacturing. In particular, 

, the Ccmncil opposes government encroachment into the'-electric power,* 
business by; such governmental agencies as the Tennessee Valley Au-; ^ 
' thority, Bonneville Power' Administration, .Southwestern, Power ..Ad- 
ministration, Southeastern Power . Administration,'; and.J Rural ' 
^Electrification Administration. ^ Y ■-./■'i y'v iy' * y ^ ^•• r . 

The Rural Electrification Administration was authorized some 30 
years ago and was empowered to make loans for rural electrification to - 
" persons in. rural areas who at ; that time were not receiving central * 
^ /station service.*' : ..V >'’■? 

The REA loans money to the Rural Electric, Cooperatives at .2%'^ 
interest and on terms tip to 35 years. Cost of thismoney is considerably 
■ less than the cost of money to the government' This means that the Rural '2 
^Electric Cooperatives are being subsidized by all the taxpayers in the * 
f - country and, in addition, they are income tax .exempt’ 

The Council urge^ongress to discontinue financing rural electric; 
cooperatives by ceasing to appropriate tax money for REA. Since 98% * 
of the farms in America now hive electricity available, there i3 no / 
reason to continue appropriating millions of dollars which this bureau- 
cratic agency, seeks in order to expand its public power operations far 
beyond what it was originally commissioned by Congress to do.*’ • 

•; y r The Council calls on Congress to phase out REA which ha3 com-;,' 
r pleted the job for which it wa3 created and, in the meantime, insist that 
it be compelled to operate within the law. ’ ' 


The Function of Profits: 

Profits and the concomitant risk of loss are what make the free 
enterprise system run, the dynamic, driving force of industrial pro- * 
gress. Without profits there would be no investment to provide new jobs 
and additional opportunities for the growing work force of an expand- 
ing population. A no-profit economy inevitably results in a socialistic 

The Council deplores the government policy of attempting to in- 
fluence wages and prices. V ' 

^Business Size and the Public Interest: 

American industry and .business. have evolved over the years in 
■"•/.response to the- changing needs and desires of the consuming public. 

,'T/ The/CouncU fayom fair;} and .effective enforcement of the anti-trust 
laws, bpt rejects the yardstick of mere size as a criterion of monopoly, 
undue concentration, or lack of competition. 

Administered Prices and Wages: . , 

There is no justification for Federal interference with manage* 
ment’s price-making procedures on the basis of company size in re- 
lation to its particular industry, or any other basis. The Council also 
believes that individual sellers should be left free to meet price and 
pother forms of competition, and that price controls of any sort including j 
^ wage and price “guidelines” are unnecessary and harmful. , ; : ' ; 

Truth in Lending and Packaging: 

The Council believes that regulation of consumer credit and other j 
so-called consumer safeguards including so-called “Regulation W” 

- controls proposed by the President and/or Congress Rre properly func- - 
tions of the States and not of the Federal Government. ‘ . . i. 

*> Natural Gss: : .y[;/ ; ■ ‘ '• ' v - 

' Since' die production 'of natural gas is not a monopoly, it is de'sir-;-;;', 
// ahle/^hat legislation he.enacted to remove producers :pf natural gas 
? t ^;from .rate,, regular with. the. principles of our free:, ,-v 

*5enterprise'system. : ;:;^:^ ; r r-. •’ ■ 

Railroads: *• 

>■ ; s. v ‘-, The usefulness of the Nation’s railroads to shippers and to national 
i defense is definitely handicapped by inequitable regulatory laws, by ~ 
discrimination - in taxation by state and local communities, and by 1 
enormous government expenditures for the benefit of other modes of 
^/'transportation, sometimes, at no cost .'to : the. mode ..of transporta- • f 
tion receiving the benefit These policies prevent the maximum utiliza- 
-'tion of one of the Nation’s most vital. resources and add billions of/ 
dollars each year to the pubhe’s Transportation bill/ Continuation of - 


present regulatory practices prevents the railroad from lowering tran 3 -_ 
porta tion rates, thereby impairing the financial health of the railroads 
by depriving them of traffic they can handle at a profit and placing an 
unreasonable burden of transportation charges on the shipping public. . 

■^1® Council accordingly requests in the national interest prompt 
action by the Congress to correct regulatory laws which impair the 
efficiency of the railroads and prevent them from passing on the bene- 
fits of lower cost transportation to the public. It further ' requests 
that the Congress and state legislatures enact legislation to recover the 
. public expenditures from the modes of transportation that receive the 
benefits from such expenditures in order.that the competitive inequality 
forced on the railroads be alleviated. ; ; -;f v C. ; i. /.’_••■ 

± that inequitable taxation be removed, particularly ^ 

. that with respect to , assessments by state and local' authorities of rail- ^ 
'■ road properties at .higher levels than the comparable properties of 
others. ‘ 

Federal l&ens^S of Coiporatiofisri 

Tie Council is opposed to the Federal licensing of corporations as v 
' 8 condition to engaging in interstate and foreign commerce as an un- - 
warranted extension of the Federal poweri*V-'-v.r'’-;ri>-'V- 

' '' ■ ‘ y 1 ■— - ;v, 

i s v • i> . ' v 

Furthermore, the Council is opposed to the Federal Communications ,r 
Commission’s so-called “fairness doctrine” concerning the presentation ’• 
2s of the conservative viewpoint over rtdio and TV, as an infringement of. < 
free speech. - :■ ;• y-y; -fitk |V ; '- u 

' ^ Aibralc Ppwer: {■ * * 

t - The Council believes that atomic plants, for generating electricity-;, 
should be built and operated by private enterprise. 

' Federal Control of the Transmission of Electric Energy: ; '; •/} 

?£■* "The Council opposes the construction of a national Fcderally-con-. 

-i ! trolled network for the transmission of electrical energy so as to inter-’S^ 
connect Federal powej£marketing agencies through the use of Federal ^ . 
• . appropriations, powCT revenues, loans or grants, or funds available to v> 
> State power authorities ' or other State or local agencies. The Council, *- 
‘ further opposes turning Federal transmission lines into so-called xom- ; 

: man carrier transmission lines. Inevitably this will lead to the require- ; 
‘vrinent'that all non-federally owned transmission lines become common- ’ : 
T ; carriers with the result that the Fedral Government will then. effectively'"'" 
^control the transmission of electric energy nationally, regardless - of : 
^source or ownership. - ; • 


The authority to preserve and protect the public lands and any 
regulations purportin g to bs issued thereunder should not be misused 
to advance the Federal power operations nor to hamper the planning, * 
construction and operation of non-Federal transmission lines. 


Oppose those government plans which destroy individual initiative and 
, self -reliance^ - '\'- 7 

Socialized Medicine: ... 

The Council continues to oppose any program of compulsory health 
' insurance, including social security-connected hospital care for the 
aged. It believes tbit Medicare will prove a serious disappointment 
' to those it is intended to benefit and will result in a general deterioration 
of the quality of medical care and increased expenses. 

War On Poverty: 

Our nation was founded on the Christian principle of individual 
freedom, the right and the responsibility of the individual to work out 
his om destiny and to choose his own future. The proper function of 
government is to provide a climate favorable to freedom, initiative and 
v growth, leaving to the individual the largest possible area for dcvelop- 
x mchtl; Furthernipre r ..ths Council believes „ that direct relief, ' yvlien. 

;; necessary, is the responsibility of the States and localities. For these , *. 
’r.Teasons the Council advocates theelimination of the Federal Govern- :, 
ment from, this field.; - ; ; . ; .y ! - - .• r ; 

Public Housing— Urban Senewal; 

Tb.e. Council opposes subsidized public housing because it uses the • ; 

-- taxes paid by all thepeople for the benefit of a few. In particular, it - 

5 condemns the abuse of the power of eminent domain to seize homes and 
. other private property, yvliich are then resold, below cost, to private 
developers. Slums are created by people and could be minimized if 
local governracnts would adopt and enforce decent housing codes. > . ; 

Unemployment and Workmen’s Compensation: > - v 

- The States should have maximum latitude in the solution of unem* 

- ploymcnt problems peculiar to their localities. The Council strongly 
opposes any Federalization cf the unemployment program, or work- 
men’s compensation program, including Federal payment, of benefits 
or the imposition of Federal standards for the payment thereof. 

Job Corps Program: /" '• M;/ ’ ’ '• ■ . 

V:,v The Council does not believe that this program will solve the prob- 
lem of untrained yemig people. The young people of America need to 


work In free enterprise organizations, not in any- form of Federal labor 
Battalions. But they must first receive at least an elementary education,, 
and some vocational training. The Council believes' that such a program 
under State control would be far more productive of the desired results 
- than temporary service in Federal job corps. . - 


Protect the rights of the individual worker and the general welfare of 
ike people by opposing compulsory and monopoly unionism and by . 
advocating State control of strikes and picketing. ..---y 

Compulsory and Monopoly Unionism — Industry-Wide i ^ , 

Bargaining — StateControl 3 of Strikes and Picketing: - ■ -uy - ; 

i - Ki. Jhc Council believes, that;. the privilege of Peeking and keeping ~ 
. -employment, with or without union affiliation, is a birthright of every 
American citizen guaranteed by the Constitution. j' ; 

Under existing Federal law permitting theimpositionof.the union - 
* shop,, the individual worker, may be compelled , to join the union in . 

order to keep his job. Present law; also permits industry-wide bargain- 
• v . ing and industry-wide strikes. This.further limits the worker’s freedom 
of choice and giYes^to a few union officials the power to paralyze the 
•<W . industrial life of the Nation*, To remedy this situation, at part, - 
’ . - the .Council- advocates >>Vy ;>• •; v.yy, y .;•>/' 

" 1. ' That the States be allowed to exercise ; their constitutional au- 

2*. '£i- tbority, to deal with striked, picketing and boycotts and that ; 
this poorer not be usurped by the Federal Government. . 

«. r ... 2. :■ That Federal anti-trust laws be made to apply, to unions as they-'. 
; r :.-.-- : rT- y.r y now apply to industry and business; . ■ • V- V : - 1 

V j '3,:. ; That strikes be made subject to control of the bargaining ' unit 
vVi ^ v' . v : hy secret ballot of membership after consideration of therein- 7 
: ployer’s last negotiated best offer;';' ; ; 

/.;• 4. That picketing for organizational purposes be made an unfair 
. labor practice; , v - . ’</ . Zld f y y*-. 

and strengtbohdd; //. ; ,yy.- -- . , * , 

f 6. That compulsory check-off of union dues be prohibited: when- 
. ever check-off of any nature is allowed, that the employee be 

- permitted to terminate the check-off agreement on exactly the 
Vy v same basis that was used in agreeing to the check-off; • ^ 

. y - ;.'- 7 . >} That all union officials be elected rather than appointed, such 
; V : • elections to be held regularly by secret ballot. 


National Labor Eolations Board: 

. The NLRB has completely lost any inclination to act as an impartial, 
judicial body. Instead it has become a policy-making tribunal which is > 
blatantly pro-union .and anti-employer and anti-free enterprise. The 
whole concept of * ‘administrative” justice is fallacious and unwork- 
able. The Council believes that the NLRB should be abolished and 
legislation passed to replace it with a labor court similar to a federal 
tax court.. - . : 

Eight to Work: 

y / The Co un cil is opposed to; all forms of. compulsory unionism, in- 
y eluding the closed, union, and so-called agency shops. It supports State 
.. Right-to-Work laws, and opposes repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft- 
^ Hartley Act, yrhich authorizes them. •• - 


The Council feels that existing Taft-Hartley prohibition against 
secondary boycotts at construction sites should be retained.. 

Strike Violence and Lawlessness: — t , - r 

The use of physical force, threats, violence and mass picketing 
interferes trith the employee’s freedom of choice and should net be 
. permitted. Conscientious and fearless enforcement of the law at State 
?and„Iocal levels would largely eliminate these evils. In many instances, 

; p ublic officials, ’ charge d under their oath of office with law enforcement, 
have been grossly J derelict in their duties. •* '•* * ; ‘ ' ‘ : V ; V 

Fair Labor St andar ds, Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Bavis Acts: ; • 

The Council opposes government wage and price fixing on principle. ■ " 
V However, so long as the present Wage-Hour law is on the books, minima ; = 
established under it should also become the minima for employees > ’ 
^engaged in v/ork on government contracts. V . 

The' maladministraticn of the Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts 
regulating the wages paid. on government procurements and construe- 
-:*tion contracts constitutes a prime example of executive distortions for 
: political- purposes. The Council believes that both of these laws should v 

■ bQ i ' y sj,;; * 'V?. 1 r ■■ , 

v . . It opposes current proposals for rationing job opportunities (shorter 
work week and double pay for overtime), and believes that the Federal ; 
•minimum wage law should be amended to peimit marginal workers, y 
, including die least skilled and the very young and very old, to obtain 
; jobs at rates they are drilling to accept and employers are willing to 
pay.; In addition, the regulations now ' applying 'to youthful workers 
.. should, be relaxed so as to permit them to work at any nen-kazardous \ 
occupation.:' ' ' 



W. M. Blount, Chairman, Blount Brothers Corp, Montgomery, Ala. 
Allen Ndcqn, President E. C Barton Co, Jonesharo, Aik: 

WiLtxur B. Bryan, Assistant Vice President, Southern Bell Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., Atlanta, Ga, : 

Chester Gulick, General Manager, Kentncky-Termegsee Clay Co., 
Mayfield, Ky. ~ 

Off <BTj:s W. WiLLACB^ Chairman, Union ■ ^Wi^.l^<xaroB v 

" • \ ♦: ^ -?r v ** Vs.% >* •£**'. r • > 

-■ TV*--* - % 

Frank G. Sui^Vice Pt^den^B'Iissisappi J^dwex &ligbi Co., Jack-' 

. son, Miss.' = 

. • r ‘ V : lv ■ -r ' v *jv jy y?r* r T :* : ki % < 

John R. Grotiths, Vice President American 2Spc Co, St, Louis, Mo.. 
Loub V. Sutton, Chairman, Carolina Power & Light Co, Raleigh; 


Mr. Evans. Despite a major effort, the committee was unable to 
identify the “secret southern organization” that Mr. Sutherland 
referred to, according to Mr. Byers, but it did establish strong 
segregationist leanings in at least two of the organizations he did 
belong to, and in Mr. Sutherland himself. Indeed, one close asso- 
ciate told the committee that Mr. Sutherland was a “diehard south- 
erner” who would “never let the Civil War die.” 

A committee investigation of Mr. Sutherland’s financial condi- 
tion revealed that he left an estate valued at more than $300,000. 

While the committee has been unable, 10 years later, to show a 
direct link between either Mr. Kauffmann or Mr. Sutherland and 
the events in Memphis, it did determine that they met the neces- 
sary criteria for being considered participants in a serious conspir- 
acy, to wit: (a) they had the motive — in Mr. Sutherland’s avowed 
social, political and economic attitudes and Mr. Kauffmann’s readi- 
ness to earn money legally or illegally; (2) they had the monetary 
means — from Mr. Sutherland’s own funds and from those of asso- 
ciates; and (3) they actively sought an opportunity to carry out 
their objective, as evidenced by their alleged solicitation of at least 
Mr. Byers. 

The committee was unable to find evidence to counter Mr. Byers’ 
claim that he declined the offer to assassinate Dr. King. 

Because of the apparent serious character of the offer to Mr. 
Byers, the committee explored the possibility that the offer might 
also have been communicated to someone other than Mr. Byers, or 
that Mr. Byers, intentionally or unintentionally, so transmitted it 
himself. The investigation yielded four theories of possible connec- 
tives between Mr. Sutherland, or Mr. Kauffmann and James Earl 
Ray, the convicted assassin. 

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that MLK Exhibit F- 
579 A be inserted into the record and appropriately displayed. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 
record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-579A 

Mr. Evans. There are a total of four exhibits here, Mr. Chair- 
man, and I would just like to enter this one at this time, and the 
total of four illustrate the theoretical connectives, though emphasis 
should be placed on “theoretical,” since the evidence available 
cannot be taken as having shown that all individuals and organiza- 
tions identified on the charts were actually involved in a conspir- 
acy to murder Dr. King. 

The charts merely are intended to depict the means by which 
word of the existence of an assassination contract might have 
reached Ray. Each theory, in turn, will be considered. 


The first chart which is displayed, is called “St. Louis Conspiracy 
(1),” shows how there could have been links from Mr. Sutherland, 
Mr. Kauffmann, and Mr. Byers via John Paul Spica, a relative of 
Mr. Byers who was a fellow inmate of Ray at the Missouri State 

The committee determined that Mr. Spica, a brother-in-law of 
Mr. Byers, was convicted and imprisoned in 1963 for the contract 
murder of a St. Louis businessman. Missouri State Penitentiary 
records show that Mr. Spica was incarcerated from 1963 to 1973, 
and that for at least part of that time he occupied a cell in the 
same cellblock and same tier of the prison as Ray. 

In testimony before the committee, Mr. Spica has acknowledged 
that he was acquainted with Ray, but he denied having had close 
contact with him. Committee interviews with prison officials and 
other inmates, on the other hand, indicate a much closer friendship 
between Mr. Spica and Ray than Mr. Spica admits. 

Mr. Spica has stated that he knew nothing of the offer to Mr. 
Byers by Mr. Sutherland and Mr. Kauffmann until Mr. Byers 
advised him of the committee’s investigation in 1978. 

As Mr. Byers has told the committee, he never mentioned the 
offer to Mr. Spica in visits to the prison. A check of prison records 
reveals that visits by Mr. Byers to Mr. Spica at the prison occurred 
after the assassination of Dr. King. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into the record 
now that which has been premarked MLK exhibit F-579B. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-579B 

Mr. Evans. This chart labeled “St. Louis Conspiracy (2)”, shows a 
possible connective to Ray at the Missouri State Penitentiary 
through Dr. Hugh Maxey, a medical officer at the prison. 

Interviews with relatives and associates of John Kauffmann indi- 
cate that Mr. Kauffmann and Dr. Maxey were associated for sever- 
al years. Mrs. Kauffmann said it was a purely social relationship, 
one that lasted from the early 1960’s until Mr. Kauffmann was 
sent to Federal prison for the sale of amphetamines. 

Dr. Maxey, who is over 80, acknowledged in an interview with 
committee investigators that he had known Mr. Kauffmann. He 
declined to discuss the association, except to say it was social. 


The committee looked into other reasons for an association be- 
tween Dr. Maxey and Mr. Kauffmann. It was learned, for example, 
that Dr. Maxey assisted Mr. Kauffmann in obtaining the services 
of parolees in work-release programs; and there were reports that 
Dr. Maxey was involved with Mr. Kauffmann in the distribution of 
amphetamines in the prison. While it was confirmed there was an 
amphetamine problem at the prison in the 1960’s, the charge that 
Dr. Maxey was involved in distribution could not be substantiated. 
Dr. Maxey also denied any participation in illegal drug distribu- 

Prison health records show Dr. Maxey had contact with James 
Earl Ray at the prison and the doctor told committee investigators 
he did know Ray, but only as a patient. 

While Ray was pushing a food cart in the prison hospital, John 
Paul Spica, in fact, worked for Dr. Maxey in the same hospital. 
During this same period Ray was disciplined for trying to smuggle 
contraband into the prison infirmary. 

Dr. Maxey said he was unaware of an offer to murder Dr. King 
circulating at the prison while he was employed there. 

Sixteen Missouri State prison inmates were questioned as to the 
existence of an offer to kill Dr. King, or any rumors that one 
existed, and most said that speculation about a reward did not 
arise until after the assassination. 

The chart labeled “St. Louis Conspiracy (3)” which is MLK exhib- 
it F-579C, I would like to have entered now, if I may, Mr. Chair- 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it will be entered. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-579C 

Mr. Evans. This chart shows a possible connection between the 
offer and James Earl Ray through a Spica associate and Ray’s 
brother, John. 

Mr. Byers told committee investigators that he was acquainted 
with a St. Louis resident named Robert Regazzi, and that Mr. 
Regazzi and Mr. Spica also knew each other. The significance of 


this is amplified by the knowledge that Naomi Regazzi, a former 
wife of Robert, was a bartender at the Grapevine Tavern in St. 
Louis from January to July 1968. The Grapevine was operated by 
John Ray at the time. 

The committee reasoned that if Mr. Byers had told Mr. Regazzi 
about the offer of money to kill Dr. King, Naomi could well have 
been aware of it and, in turn, communicated it to John Ray. Mr. 
Byers said, to the best of his recollection, he did not discuss the 
offer with Mr. Regazzi. 

Mr. Spica was questioned about his association with Mr. Regazzi. 
He said he knew him but there was no friendship between them. 
Since — as Mr. Spica has claimed — he had no knowledge of an offer 
to kill Dr. King, he could not have passed it along to Mr. Regazzi. 

Mr. Regazzi, when interviewed by committee investigators, 
claimed he had no knowledge whatsoever of the King assassina- 
tion. He said he had been separated from Naomi at the time she 
was employed at the Grapevine and he could not have communicat- 
ed an offer to her had he known about it. 

Naomi Regazzi told committee investigators she did not recall 
hearing about an offer for the murder of Dr. King. She said she 
had never talked with John Ray about Dr. King, except to ask him 
if James was his brother, after he had been identified as the 

Naomi Regazzi confirmed she was separated from Robert during 
the period she was employed at the Grapevine. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have entered into the record now 
MLK exhibit F-579D. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-579D 

Mr. Evans. This chart shows a possible connective through the 
American Party campaign for the Presidency in 1968. Both Mr. 
Sutherland and Mr. Kauffmann were active in the party, also 
known as the American Independent Party. Mr. Sutherland was a 
political activist, while Mr. Kauffmann appears to have worked in 
a supportive capacity. 

Committee interviews with officials of the American Party in 
1968 have revealed that Mr. Sutherland, who was a candidate for 
elector, was active in behalf of the party at both the local and 
national levels. Committee interviews with American Party mem- 


bers in St. Louis in 1968 indicate that support was derived from 
people who felt that both the Republicans and Democrats were too 
liberal on civil rights. 

Former associates of Mr. Sutherland also said that his strong 
support of the American Party was based in large degree on the 
party’s conservative positions on civil rights. The committee also 
learned that considerable support for the American Party cam- 
paign was drawn from a White Citizens’ Council in St. Louis, an 
organization dedicated to racial separation. As has been noted, Mr. 
Sutherland was a member of the council. 

Floyd Kitchen, a former White Citizens Council field director, an 
organizer for the American Party in St. Louis in 1968, and a 
Missouri State chairman for the American Independent Party, in- 
dicated to the committee that his AIP salary of $600 a month was 
paid by Mr. Sutherland. 

John Ray was also active in the 1968 American Party campaign. 
Investigation by the committee, as well as testimony by his own 
brother, Jerry Ray, indicate that the Grapevine Tavern was a 
distribution point for party literature. At the same time, James 
Earl Ray was engaged in party activity in California. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the overlay which has been 
marked as MLK exhibit F-579E be entered into the record. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-579E 

Mr. Evans. John Ray’s interest in politics seems out of character 
since he apparently had never evidenced it before 1968, and since a 
convicted felon, he was not able to vote. Nevertheless, extensive 
research of party activities in St. Louis in 1968 revealed that a 
woman who was extremely active in the party in the southern part 
of the city was Viola Anderson. Her home at 2105 Arsenal Street 
was only about 100 yards from the Grapevine Tavern. Though Mrs. 
Anderson died in 1977, her widower, Stanley Anderson, confirmed 
her party activities. 

Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate at this point to insert 
into the record and appropriately display MLK exhibit F-580. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it is so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 



Mr. Evans. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to have entered 
what has been previously marked 580A, 580B, and 580C which are 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into 
the record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 



MLK Exhibit F-580B 


MLK Exhibit F-580C 

Mr. Evans. Mr. Anderson acknowledged to committee investiga- 
tors that his late wife had met Mr. Sutherland, but she was not 
close to him. Mr. Anderson insisted that neither he nor his wife 
nor Mr. Sutherland were prejudiced against Black people. Mr. 
Anderson also said that he and his wife had once met J. B. Stoner 
of the National States Rights Party. He said that he did not feel 
Mr. Stoner was prejudiced against Blacks. 

39-935 0 - 79 - 20 


Although Mr. Anderson said he could not remember ever meet- 
ing John Ray, he volunteered that he and his wife and another 
party worker visited the Grapevine on at least one occasion. 

Mr. Anderson denied ever hearing of an offer to assassinate Dr. 
King, but he indicated, after repeated questioning, that conversa- 
tions critical of Dr. King’s activities occurred frequently at meet- 
ings he and his wife attended prior to the assassination. 

In an effort to gain further insight into the activities of the 
American Party in St. Louis and their connections, if any, with the 
assassination of Dr. King, the committee turned its attention to 
Glen Shrum. Mr. Shrum, it was learned, became active in the 
party in December 1967 or January 1968. He was instrumental in 
the organization in the Third Congressional District, and he was in 
close contact with Viola Anderson in building neighborhood sup- 

Stanley Anderson told the committee Mr. Shrum and Anderson 
remained in close touch for several years after the 1968 campaign, 
and relatives of Mr. Shrum, who subsequently died, said he was 
also in contact with John Sutherland. While they maintained such 
contact was minimal, other committee sources revealed Mr. 
Shrum’s activities were directed by Floyd Kitchen. 

After the 1968 campaign, Mr. Shrum continued to be active in 
the American Party in St. Louis as an official and board member. 
Along with Mrs. Anderson, he also became involved with the White 
Citizens Council, of which Mr. Sutherland had been an early orga- 

The committee contacted several American Party and White 
Citizens Council members who said that several informal meetings 
were held at the Anderson home during the 1968 campaign. Re- 
portedly, Shrum attended many of them. According to Mr. Ander- 
son, he also was a patron of the Grapevine Tavern. 

Shrum was also described to the committee as an activist with 
radical right wing organizations. He belonged to the John Birch 
Society and the Minutemen. He attended meetings of the National 
States Rights Party, and he may have been in contact with the Ku 
Klux Klan. His friends also indicated he held strong opinions on 
civil rights, leading him to be openly critical of Federal legislation 
and court actions dealing with equality for Black people. 

The committee further learned that Dr. King and his efforts in 
behalf of the civil rights movement were frequently discussed in 
meetings at the Anderson home and elsewhere. Witnesses of the 
meetings were unable to recall specific statements with regard to 
Dr. King, but they did say the general attitude was not favorable to 
the endeavors of the civil rights leader. 

Committee investigators asked the witnesses about the reaction 
at the meetings to Dr. King’s death. No one was greatly disturbed 
they said. In fact, there was an atmosphere of jubilation at one get- 
together shortly after the assassination. 

One further aspect of the committee investigation of the Byers 
allegation must be mentioned. The committee also sought an 
answer to several other questions: Did the FBI know of the Kauff- 
mann-Sutherland offer prior to the assassination? Did it know of 
the offer during the active investigation of Ray? 


Assuming it had no knowledge prior or subsequent to the assassi- 
nation, at least until 1974, should it have uncovered the offer at 
least following the assassination? This aspect of the investigation, 
as well as others, continues, but certain results may be reported 

A former St. Louis County detective has been interviewed. He 
advised that sometime in 1971 or 1972, he was not sure exactly 
when, a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter asked him to check out a 
rumor that Mr. Byers and an unidentified lawyer had been in- 
volved in an offer to kill Dr. King. The detective said he had been 
unable to develop further information on the rumor. The reporter 
himself died on February 14, 1974. 

Investigators also interviewed a man who, acting under police 
instructions, had frequented the motel owned by John Kauffmann. 
The man now occupies a respectable position with a major Ameri- 
can manufacturing company. He says, he and a number of 
“friends” who lived at the motel in 1966, 1967, and 1968, indicated 
that during that period, those “friends” had engaged in a number 
of thefts that provided them with a source of income. Kauffmann’s 
role was that of a fence. The individual also stated that he had 
overheard discussions of other income sources, including “picking 
up $10,000 or $20,000 or $30,000 from John for killing King.” 

He said he believed the “John” referred to was Mr. Kauffmann, 
though he added he had no information that any of his acquaint- 
ances at the motel had actually participated in the assassination of 
Dr. King. He said that this information had been supplied to local 
police officials at the time. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes this report. I would be glad to 
answer any questions. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will operate under the 5- 
minute rule with reference to questioning Mr. Evans. 

Mr. Evans, let me ask you this: You are an experienced homicide 
detective, one of extensive experience with the New York Police 
Department. Can you say to the committee that in terms of follow- 
ing all police leads relating to the Byers’ allegation, that as an 
experienced investigator the committee has done everything possi- 
ble to run out every possible lead? 

Mr. Evans. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. My next question perhaps either you or Pro- 
fessor Blakey might be able to respond to. It would relate to our 
exhibit F-577 which is now part of the record. 

In the FBI report over to this committee, I want to refer to the 
exact language of what it says there. It says: 

During the fall of 1973, 5 or 6 months ago, date not recalled, Byers came to the 
shop inquiring as to whether they could get together to talk, and they later did so at 
Pizza and Cream, Clayton, Mo., in the area of a Broad-Dugan Paint Store, where 
informant had traveled on business. 

Byers talked freely about himself and his business and they later went to infor- 
mant’s house where Byers told a story about visiting a lawyer in St. Louis County, 
now deceased, not further identified, who had offered to give him a contract to kill 
Martin Luther King. He said that also present was a short, stocky man, who walked 
with a limp. (Later, with regard to the latter individual, Byers commented that this 
man was actually the individual who made the payoff of James Earl Ray after the 


Now in light of Mr. Byers’ testimony here this morning where 
there was no mention of this particular allegation with reference 
to a payoff of James Earl Ray, what can you tell us about any 
information on this? 

Mr. Evans. Chief counsel will take that question, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, let me comment on both the ques- 
tion that you asked initially of Mr. Evans and respond more par- 
ticularly to your question with reference to the FBI report. 

Let me do the first first and the second second. 

Mr. Evans is quite right that this committee has utilized all the 
investigative techniques available to it as a congressional commit- 
tee to explore this allegation. We have conducted field interviews 
of everyone we have been able to identify. We have subpenaed, of 
course, through the committee, the key individuals and talked to 
them in executive session under oath, and where necessary utilized 
the immunity techniques to make an effort to break through the 
normal ring of silence that would surround a conspiracy of this 

Frankly, though, the question seemingly implied whether every- 
thing had been done that could be done. To that question the 
answer has to be no, that there are investigative techniques availa- 
ble to an executive agency to explore conspiracies of this kind. It is 
not the normal thing for a congressional committee to develop paid 
informants in and around a conspiratorial group. That technique 
has not been employed by this committee. It could be employed by 
an executive agency. It is prohibited under law and specifically 
contrary to the rules of this committee to employ either consensual 
or nonconsensual but lawful electronic surveillance. 

Those techniques could be applied in this situation to investigate 
this case if it were handled by an executive agency. Both of those 
techniques were available to executive agencies in 1968 and could 
have been applied at that time. With what results, of course, only 
educated guesses can be made. 

To answer your second question, an effort was obviously made to 
see if verification could be made of that aspect of the informant 
report that indicated that the individual probably under the cir- 
cumstances of Mr. Kauffmann was according to the informant, 
from Byers’ statement, the one who actually made the payoff to 
James Earl Ray. 

As Mr. Evans indicated in his statement, the committee has 
identified the informant involved and had extensive conversations 
with the informant. The committee, of course, has also had exten- 
sive conversations with Mr. Byers and the committee has been in 
contact with the FBI agents involved. 

The FBI agent has no specific memory, including this informant 
report. The informant indicates that he did not say that and Mr. 
Byers indicates that he did not say that. Consequently, that aspect 
of this informant report is unsubstantiated. 

Chairman Stokes. One further question. 

I notice the same FBI report says: 

Extensive further research in the St. Louis indices has failed to reveal this 
information was in any way disseminated and the information simply reposes in the 
informant file. 

What can you tell us with reference to that? 


Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, shortly after this memorandum was 
forwarded to this committee, the committee was contacted by FBI 
Director Webster and a request was made of the committee for its 
permission for the FBI to conduct administrative examination of 
why this memorandum was misfiled, mislaid or not properly dis- 
seminated within the FBI. 

That permission was given and an administrative investigation 
was conducted by the FBI. The reports based on that administra- 
tive investigation have been available, made available to the com- 
mittee, and of course are in the committee files. 

In broad outline, that report indicates that this was nothing 
more than an administrative error. All of the agents involved were 
interviewed by FBI agents and all indicated that they just made a 

The committee itself has not yet conducted its own investigation 
of the administrative issue associated with this report. Candidly, its 
investigative resources have been allocated elsewhere. 

I might note for the record that it was necessary for Judge 
Webster to ask the committee for permission to conduct this ad- 
ministrative investigation since under the memorandum of under- 
standing between the committee and the FBI, anything having to 
do with the King case will be investigated only by this committee 
and not by the Department of Justice, or more particularly, the 

Consequently, when this memorandum showed up in 1978 in a 
file review of an unrelated matter, the FBI and the Department of 
Justice, under the memorandum of understanding, did not have 
investigative jurisdiction to act on it at that time. 

Chairman Stokes. Just one further question: In his testimony 
this morning, Mr. Byers, in response to a question I posed to him, 
indicated that he has never been interrogated or talked to by the 
FBI. Is that your understanding of our investigation of the matter 

Mr. Blakey. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Evans. That is true. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

I have no further questions. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. 

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. 

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Evans, just to clarify the record, on page 10 of your testimo- 
ny, the third paragraph from the bottom, you say 16 Missouri State 
Penitentiary inmates were questioned as to the existence of an 
offer to kill Dr. King or any rumors that one existed, and most said 
the speculation about a reward did not arise until after the 

Now the 16 inmates were interviewed by whom? Our staff? 

Mr. Evans. Our staff, that is correct. 

Mr. Devine. Did any other information develop from these in- 
mates relative to either James Earl Ray or this particular offer of 
a reward? 

Mr. Evans. Well, some of the inmates indicated that James Earl 
Ray was involved in the pushing of amphetamines within the 


prison, but we were never able to specifically pin this down with 
any hard evidence, so we omitted that from our report. 

Mr. Devine. These 16 inmates, among those were some that were 
associated with James Earl Ray? 

Mr. Evans. That is correct. They worked with him on details. 
They were housed with him in different cell blocks during his 
period of incarceration. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Evans, were we able to investigate any possible linkage 
between this allegation of conspiracy and any others which the 
committee may have been pursuing, more specifically, between this 
allegation and the one dealing with Leon and Claude Powell and a 
mysterious person identified as Ralph who offered, as I understand 
it, $50,000, according to the allegation, at least one of the allega- 
tions, to them to kill Dr. King? 

Mr. Evans. Mr. Fauntroy, we made extensive efforts to hook this 
conspiracy up with other conspiracies and in particular the one 
that you are referring to in Atlanta. But to date we have been 
unable to connect the two. 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Fauntroy, it might be appropriate for the record 
to note that the information dealing with the Powell’s came to the 
committee prior to the information dealing with the Byers’ allega- 

Nevertheless, the similarity between the two offers, the similar- 
ity in the nature of the offer, the amount of money involved, and 
the apparent kind of people involved is obvious to the staff and an 
effort was made to see if all people who might be associated with 
Sutherland could be in some way identified and then compared or 
contrasted with the individual who allegedly made the offer to Mr. 

An extensive effort was made to do that; looking at photographs, 
reviewing lists of businessmen, lawyers and other associates. To 
date the committee staff has been unable to show any relationship. 

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you think further investigation of both these 
allegations could produce any more information than we have been 
able to obtain thus far? 

Mr. Evans. Mr. Fauntroy, we are continuing with the investiga- 
tion until December 31. Up until that time we are still making 
every effort to further pursue the Byers’ allegation or to under- 
stand better the implications or the facts surrounding the Powell 

Mr. Fauntroy. Two quick questions. 

You mentioned a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter who had been 
making inquiries about an allegation of conspiracy; namely, this 
one, who died. I wonder if you can tell the committee how old that 
reporter was and under what circumstances did he expire in 1971? 

Mr. Evans. His death was due to natural causes, I believe. We 
are in the process of making contact with the publishers of the 
paper to obtain his files. We are also still in the process of follow- 
ing that particular lead out. I think we will be able to better report 
on that at a later date. 


Mr. Fauntroy. Can you tell us when and under what circum- 
stances did Mr. Kauffmann die in 1974, Mr. Sutherland in 1970? 

Mr. Evans. That is correct. Natural causes, as best we can deter- 

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have a question but I do have a 
comment that maybe the chief counsel or Mr. Evans could respond 
to. I am concerned about the purpose of this summary. 

We have discussed the offer that was made to Mr. Byers and 
possibly others that might have been made to them. 

Do you think there is anything that could be forthcoming out of 
this particular area, this offer in connection with the Ray family, 
before we complete our investigation December 31 that would give 
us more information than we have at the present time? 

Mr. Evans. I am hopeful, Mr. Ford, that we will be able to 
answer this conspiratorial allegation as well as others. We are 
always open to new and additional information. We are in fact 
obtaining additional information and continuing our investigation 
relative to the allegation as well as others that we are aware of. 

Mr. Ford. We only have 30 or 35 more days. 

Mr. Evans. That is correct. 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Blakey, after of December 31 would the committee 
staff continue on beyond that? 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Ford, all things, good and bad, come to an end 
and this investigation will come to an end as well. While it is true 
that the committee can continue the investigation through Decem- 
ber 31, I think candor requires that we say on the record that the 
resources that can be devoted to the active investigation are dimin- 
ishing and that the realistic expectation of a major breakthrough 
in this area between now and December 31 is small. 

I would also make the assessment for you in this public hearing 
as I would elsewhere that a realistic possibility of a major break- 
through in this body of material by a congressional committee 
given the inherent limitations of a congressional committee in 
conducting this kind of investigation is small. 

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. 

Mr. Sawyer. Yes, Mr. Evans, I listened with some interest to the 
Judge’s speculation, knowing Mr. Byers, as I undestood what he 
said, that he thought perhaps Byers had really made this offer up 
and floated it through this gentleman named O’Hara to see if it got 
back to the FBI so he could confirm the identify of a report of an 

Did you catch that testimony? 

Mr. Evans. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Sawyer. How do you weigh that? 

Mr. Evans. Well, I know Mr. Byers and Mr. Byers would avoid 
any kind of contact with the FBI if he could. I think he would seek 
to establish whether or not the individual was an informant 
through any other way at his command rather than involve him- 


self in any sort of conspiracy allegation, conspiracy to assassinate 
Dr. Martin Luther King. 

Mr. Sawyer. But here, of course, under his story, he never had 
any meeting of minds with anyone. He rejected the proposal. He 
doesn’t become involved in a conspiracy and I am sure he is well 
enough informed on criminal law to know that when he turns it 

Both the other gentleman are dead. So he is not really running 
any danger. Would this be just an ideal thing to try out on an 
informer and you could almost be certain if he was in fact an FBI 
informer that such a thing would get back to the FBI and he would 
be questioned. 

Doesn’t that sound like an appealing ploy to you? 

Mr. Evans. I beg to disagree, sir, but what I know of Mr. Byers, 
Mr. Byers is quite active in certain kinds of activity and he would 
rather not have the FBI or the local police looking at. That kind of 
a ploy by him by its very nature would insure that he would get 
some supervision or surveillance over a period of time even after 
being brought in and confronted with that. 

Mr. Sawyer. Wouldn’t it be less surveillance than associated 
with a suspected informer? Might it not be much the better of two 

Mr. Evans. One might just cut one’s connections off with that 
particular person and he can still continue his activities, whatever 
they might be. 

My assumption, and it is perfectly an assumption, were that 
those activities were of a criminal nature. Mr. Byers is well known 
in the St. Louis area for his connections. 

My thought is that he would avoid that person rather than give 
the FBI any reason to supervise his activities or to question him. 

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you. That is all I have. 

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Evans, I take it from your report that you have surveyed 
and contacted, et cetera, about everybody that you can think of 
who frequented the Grapevine Tavern on a regular basis; is that 

Mr. Evans. Well, we made an effort in that direction, but the 
area— the Grapevine is now closed. It is called Tom’s Place and it 
has been closed for some years. The area where it was located is a 
transitory area and people frequently move. 

I had my investigators there for a couple of weeks conducting 
canvassing of the neighborhood. They were not well received in 
view of the fact that that area is still, in my opinion, mainly an 
area where people, a blue-collar worker area, and they are not 
quite receptive to this investigation, nor were they to my investiga- 

Some had doors slammed in their face and dogs were put upon 
them. Those people that did talk to us would only indicate that the 
bar was a place that they did not frequent but they knew that it 
was there and they cannot associate any activity with it other than 
there was some Wallace campaign activity in that area. 


Mr. Fithian. Then at this point you cannot really indicate how 
widely known, if this offer were indeed made, how widely known 
that would become in the area of the Grapevine and its inhabi- 
tants. Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. Evans. Well, I can’t say now what had occurred in 1968, but 
our investigation shows from other interviews that we conducted 
that there was talk and there was a rumor of a $50,000 contract to 
kill King. 

Now whether the persons that reside in the area of the Grape- 
vine Bar were aware of that or not I don’t know. As I said before, a 
lot of residents that are presently there denied that they frequent- 
ed the bar, although they often passed it. 

My investigation revealed that the patrons of the particular bar 
were persons that did not necessarily reside in that particular area. 

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further ques- 

Chairman Stokes. I just have one further question for either Mr. 
Evans or Professor Blakey. 

In the narrative this morning some reference was made to other 
conspiracy allegations that were investigated, reference just being 
made to three or four of them as I recall. I do note over the last 18 
months the King subcommittee spent an enormous amount of time 
in executive session questioning witnesses with reference to 21 
other conspiracy allegations. 

I do know that Mr. Evans’ investigators have been all over the 
country pursuant to running out those allegations. I think it might 
be good to have some comment since we have now zeroed in on 
only one of those conspiracy allegations in a public hearing, to 
have some further comment with reference to the results of the 
other 21 and what the public can expect to learn in terms of some 
final report. 

Mr. Blakey. Well, Mr. Chairman, consistent with the practice 
that has been followed in these hearings, on the whole the staff has 
not made an effort to evaluate the evidence but really has reported 
it to the committee. 

The ultimate judgment of whether these other five here that 
were mentioned as more serious and the others that have not been 
mentioned as serious but have been investigated carry weight obvi- 
ously will have to wait for the committee’s final determination in 
its final report. 

If you would want a general evaluation of them, I suspect I could 
say a lot more than the one the staff has brought to the committee 
in the public session. Obviously, as the committee has said, this is 
the one that seems the most serious. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

Is there anything further from the committee? 

Mr. Evans? 

Mr. Blakey? 

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I might ask Mr. Evans if he might 
comment on the general character of the population that did fre- 
quent the bar. You indicated the geographic character. I wonder if 
you would indicate the character of them. 

Mr. Evans. What our investigation revealed, my investigators 
met a lot of hostility in that area in view of the fact that they were 


investigating the assassination of Dr. King. Somehow, and we sus- 
pect through a local citizens council, the residents of that particu- 
ar area were alerted that we would be coming and they were quite 
lostile. I think their actions sort of reflect a racial attitude, much 
of which we found when we spoke to people in the local citizens 
council of St. Louis. That attitude was definitely anti-Black, anti- 

Mr. Blakey. I wonder if you would comment on whether or not 
your investigation indicated that any of those people who associat- 
ed together and were together at the Grapevine Bar in the period 
1967 to 1968, prior to the assassination, had criminal records? 

Mr. Evans. Yes, we found that many of the patrons of that 
particular bar did have criminal records. 

Mr. Blakey. Was that on occasion a meeting place? 

Mr. Evans. Yes. 

Mr. Blakey. Where robberies and burglaries were planned? 

Mr. Evans. Yes, it was. The St. Louis intelligence file indicated 
that it was a place where one could in the vernacular sort of find 
out what is going on in town, a place where one could hook up a 
contract and make money. 

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee is advised that immediately 
upon adjourning this open session of the committee there will be 
an executive session of the full committee in room 304 immediately 
after we adjourn here. 

There being no further witnesses to come before the committee 
this afternoon, this meeting is adjourned until 9 a.m. tomorrow 

[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene 
at 9 a.m., Thursday, November 30, 1978.] 



House of Representatives, 

Select Committee on Assassinations, 

Washington, D.C. 

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:20 a.m., 
in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes 
(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, McKinney, Fauntroy, 
Sawyer, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. 

Also present: Mark Speiser, staff counsel; Elizabeth L. Berning, 
chief clerk, and G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. 


Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When James Earl Ray appeared before this committee last 
August, the question of his participation in the assassination of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. was examined principally through the 
questioning of Ray himself. Ray’s own story was also put in the 
context of the overall investigation, and such important issues as 
the validity of his guilty plea and his alibi were considered. 

In this current set of hearings, evidence of Ray’s participation in 
the murder has been more fully explored, and the committee has 
examined facets of his possible motive. In addition, the question of 
conspiracy has been raised, as the committee has probed a number 
of puzzling issues, some of them suggesting that officials of the 
Government might have been guilty of complicity in the assas- 

Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, the committee heard evidence of a 
conspiracy that might well have led to the death of Dr. King, one 
involving certain individuals in the St. Louis area. Part of the 
report of the investigation that was presented by Mr. Evans, the 
chief investigator of the King staff, was a series of possible ways 
that word of the contract for the assassination might have reached 
James Earl Ray, the convicted assassin. 

Today the committee will look further into the question of Ray’s 
possible role in the conspiracy. In doing so, the committee is reach- 
ing the climax of its investigation of the King assassination. 

This much can be said with confidence at this time — if, in fact, 
there was a plot to murder Dr. King, as the evidence yesterday 

( 311 ) 


strongly suggested, it is logical to assume that the convicted assas- 
sin was a party to it. 

As those who have followed the hearings will recall, the commit- 
tee gave careful consideration to the conspiratorial implication of 
Ray s accounts of his dealing with the mysterious Raoul, even 
though Ray himself was unable to provide further identification of 
this individual. All leads on Raoul were pursued on the assumption 
that such a man might indeed exist. 

Nevertheless, when you come down to it, the Raoul theory that 
seems best to fit, although the ultimate question is for the commit- 
tee, is that the mysterious accomplice might actually be one of 
Ray’s brothers, Jerry or John, or a composite of the two of them. 

The committee has tested this alternative theory against the 
evidence provided in the statements of James and Jerry them- 
selves, and although the ultimate validity of the theory is obviously 
something that the committee will have to wrestle with later, it 
seems to be true that at each point where James’ movements or his 
funding during the fugitive period are explained by James by refer- 
ence to Raoul, one of the brothers is in fact either on the scene or 
in contact with James. One question the committee must explore 
today, is this more than a coincidence? 

Four charts have been prepared to demonstrate or show a pat- 
tern of James Earl Ray’s associations with Raoul, according to 
James’ own story, and with his brothers, according to Ray and 
other sources. 

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that Martin Luther 
King exhibits F-607, F-608, F-609, and F-610 be entered into the 
record and appropriately displayed. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into 
the record at this point. 

[The information follows:] 




7-18-67 Ray rents room in Montreal 

7-25-67 About a week after arriving in Montreal, Ray 
meets "Raoul" at the Neptune Tavern* 

7- 30-67 Ray goes to Gray Rocks Inn, north of Montreal 

8- 4-67 Ray tells female friend at Gray Rocks that he had 

been at the inn about a week, and that he would 
be leaving in a few days to meet his brother in 

8-5-67 Ray checks out of Gray Rocks, returns to 

Montreal where he meets with "Raoul" several 

8-18-67 Ray, visiting in Ottawa, tells female friend he 
or is working for his brother, that while there 

8-19-67 isn't much to do, he is well paid and that he 
has no problem with money, since he can 
always get some 

* According to Ray's own account 

MLK Exhibit F-607 






8-21-67 Ray receives $1 4500 paymentfrom "Raoul" at 
the U.S. - Canadian border* 

8-22-67 Ray meets with brother Jerry in Chicago 

8-28-67 Ray rents safe deposit box in Birmingham 

8-30-67 Ray receives $2,000 payment from "Raoul" in 

8-30-67 Ray purchases 1966 Mustang in Birmingham, 
costing approximately $2,000 

8-30-67 Ray receives $1 ,000 payment from "Raoul" in 

* According to Ray’s own account 

MLK Exhibit F-608 





1 2-14-67 Ray cancels an appointment with a 

or psychologist, stating his brother had found a 

1 2-15-67 job for him in the Merchant Marine based in 
New Orieans 

12-16-67 Ray calls brother Jerry enroute from 
Los Angeles to New Orleans 

12-17-67 Ray receives $500 payment from "Raoul" in 
New Orleans* 

12-21-67 Ray makes $364 payment for dance lessons, 
to 1-68 later advising instructor he had met his 
brother in Louisiana 

* According to Ray's own account 

MLK Exhibit F-609 






2- 68 Ray is told by "Raoul" to meet him in 

New Orleans in March* 

3- 2-68 Ray states intention to go to Birmingham 

to visit his brother 

3-9-68 Ray turns down a bartending job, explaining he 
is leaving Los Angeles within two weeks to visit 

3-17-68 Ray departs Los Angeles 

3-21 -68 Ray gets message in New Orleans to meet 
"Raoul" in Birmingham* 

3-23-68 Ray meets "Raoul" in Birmingham, they travel 
to Atlanta* 

3-29-68 Ray and "Raoul"go to Birmingham to purchase 

3-29-68 Ray receives $750 from "Raoul' 'and buys a rifle at 
Aeromarine Supply Company, but"Raoul"rejects 
it and tells Ray to exchange it for another model * 

3-29-68 Ray tells Aeromarine salesman by phone that, 
based on a conversation with his brother, he has 
purchased the wrong rifle, that he wants a 
Remington 760 30.06 caliber in its place 

3-30-68 Ray exchanges the rifle fora Remington 760 
30.06 caliber 

^According to Ray's own account. 

MLK Exhibit F-610 


Mr. B lakey. The first chart, Martin Luther King exhibit F-607, 
refers to Ray’s trip to Canada in the summer of 1967. Having 
arrived in Montreal on July 18, Ray claims to have met Raoul for 
the first time in a bar on July 25. Then, on vacation in August at a 
resort in the Laurentian Mountains, he told a woman companion 
about his brother who lived in Chicago, an apparent reference to 
Jerry. More significantly, he told the woman he would be leaving 
shortly to meet his brother in Montreal. And with whom did he 
meet in Montreal upon his return? According to James, none other 
than Raoul. 

Later in August, Ray visited the woman in Ottawa. He told her 
then that he was in business with his brother, and he was well 
paid for doing little. Ray also said that he had no problem with 
money, that he could always come up with some. 

The second chart, Martin Luther King exhibit F-608, covers 
Ray’s move from Canada to Birmingham, still in the summer of 
1967. He says he met at the Detroit- Windsor border with Raoul, 
who paid him $1,500 for helping in a smuggling operation. This 
was supposed to have occurred on August 21. 

On August 22, from accounts given by both James and Jerry, we 
know the two brothers met in Chicago. Ray reports two payments 
from Raoul in Birmingham in August for $2,000 and $1,000, with 
which Ray says he paid for his 1966 Mustang and some camera 

So these facts can be established about Ray in August 1967. He 
had received or was receiving a substantial amount of money. This 
we know from his own account and from his expenditures. 

He met with Jerry. Thus, the inference that Raoul, the source of 
his funds, is actually Jerry, is one that the committee must wrestle 

The third chart, Martin Luther King exhibit F-609, is for the 
latter half of December 1967. On the 14th or 15th, Ray canceled an 
appointment with a psychologist in Los Angeles. His stated reason: 
His brother had found him a job in the merchant marines in New 
Orleans. There is circumstantial evidence that the brother again 
was Jerry, for en route to New Orleans on December 16, he placed 
a telephone call to Jerry. Yet, Ray claims it was Raoul who gave 
him the $500 in New Orleans on December 17, although back in 
Los Angeles he told a dancing instructor of a recent meeting in 
Louisiana with his brother. 

In a conversation with a committee witness, who has asked for 
anonymity, Jerry Ray has admitted he was in New Orleans with 
James in December. And the fact that James received a payment 
of at least $500 in New Orleans is substantiated by the fact that, 
back in Los Angeles, he made a lump sum payment of $364 for 
dancing lessons, while prior to the trip to New Orleans he had 
been paying for the lessons at a rate of $29 to $50 a week. 

The fourth chart, Martin Luther King exhibit F-610, takes Ray 
from Los Angeles to Birmingham via New Orleans and Atlanta in 
February and March 1968. Ray claims that in February Raoul 
alerted him to a meeting in New Orleans in March. Then on 
March 2 Ray remarked in the presence of a witness at a bartend- 
ing school in Los Angeles that he was going to Birmingham to 
meet his brother. 

39-935 0 - 79 - 21 


Again on March 9, as a reason for not accepting a bartending 
job, Ray explained his intent to depart Los Angeles within 2 weeks 
to visit his brother. In fact, Ray departed Los Angeles on March 17, 
arriving in New Orleans on March 21 where, according to his story, 
he got a message to meet Raoul in Birmingham. 

After the alleged meeting in Birmingham, according to Ray’s 
account, he and Raoul traveled to Atlanta on March 23, whereupon 
Raoul took off for points unknown, leaving Ray alone until March 

On March 29, again according to Ray’s story, he and Raoul went 
to Birmingham to purchase the assassination rifle. Ray claims he 
bought a rifle at the Aeromarine Supply Co. with $750 given to 
him by Raoul. Ray claims further that Raoul rejected this rifle and 
told him to exchange it for another model, but when Ray tele- 
phoned the salesman at Aeromarine, he said he had learned he 
had purchased the wrong type of a rifle from a conversation with 
his brother. The following day Ray made the exchange for the rifle 
that was found at the scene of the King assassination. 

The witness today, Mr. Chairman, is Jerry Ray. He is the brother 
to whom James refers in all of his admitted contacts with the 
brother during the fugitive period. What is more, he has spent 
more time than anyone else with James since his arrest for the 
assassination itself. 

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Jerry 

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Jerry Ray. 

Would you please stand and be sworn? Please stand. Raise your 
right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this com- 
mittee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God? 




Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. 

Would the other persons at the witness table please identify 
themselves for the record? 

Ms. Kennedy. My name is Florence R. Kennedy. I am an attor- 
ney, 8 East 48th Street, New York, N.Y. This is my assistant 
paralegal, Betsy West, 8 East 48th, New York, N.Y. 

Mr. Pepper. William F. Pepper, attorney from Westerly, R.I, 
associated with Florence Kennedy. We have been called to repre- 
sent, and accepted the call to represent Jerry Ray, pretty much at 
the 11th hour, Mr. Chairman. In light of that, and in light of 
ensuing publicity over the course of the last 2 weeks, which we 
think has been distressingly inflammatory with respect to this 
witness, we would request an opening statement of 5 minutes, 
which is certainly within the realm of the committee’s power to 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair would state that there is no provi- 
sion under our rules for an opening statement by the witness of 5 
minutes. There is provision under our rules at the conclusion of the 


witness’ testimony for either the witness or his counsel to make a 
5-minute statement to this committee, at which time the witness 
can amplify or explain or in any way make further comment upon 
his testimony before this committee 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Congressman, let me just say for the record 
that in light of the fact that counsel for this committee has stood 
here and indicated on the record a number of speculations, a 
number of possibilities, a number of leaps of logic to this media 
event makes it very prejudicial to Jerry Ray. 

We have found this throughout this committee’s hearings that 
every truth or everything that works against the theory that 
James Earl Ray is a lone assassin has been covered by a story 
based on speculation and circumstancial evidence, and you just 
heard a perfect example of it this morning, and these people have 
taken this statement, and now you deny us the right even to make 
a statement in response to that, and this is typical of the way this 
entire subcommittee has been handling this affair. 

Chairman Stokes. Counsel’s comments will be noted for the 

At this time the Chair desires, Mr. Ray, to address you with 
reference to the scope of the inquiry that this committee will be 
conducting today. The scope of the committee’s inquiry is defined 
in House Resolution 222. It is to conduct a full and complete 
inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassina- 
tion and death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. This will enable the 
committee to examine the adequacy of existing laws, including the 
civil rights statutes, and the investigatory jurisdiction and capabili- 
ties of agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, and to 
recommend the amendment of existing legislation or the enact- 
ment of new legislation if the committee deems it appropriate 

The Chair at this time recognizes counsel for the committee, 
Mark Speiser. 

Mr. Speiser. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome you to Washington, Mr. Ray. Before I 
begin my questioning of you, Mr. Ray, I would like to ask and 
address one question to counsel, and that is, I would like to have 
counsel answer on the record whether or not he and she are or 
have been in the past affiliated with any other attorney that has 
represented a witness in the past before this committee? 

Ms. Kennedy. Would you want to name the attorneys that you 
have in mind? 

Mr. Speiser. I do not have any attorney in mind. I am asking you 
a question of a general nature. 

Ms. Kennedy. And may I ask the nature of the association you 
have in mind? You want to know whether we know any of the 
other attorneys? 

Mr. Speiser. I am asking you whether you are associated as 
counsel with another attorney that has represented another wit- 
ness before this committee? 

Ms. Kennedy. I take it you are fishing to find out if we know 
Mark Lane. I know Mark Lane. I have seen him about three times 
in 10 years. 

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy, you can comment as you choose on 
my question. I am asking you for a direct response. Are you or are 


you not affiliated with any attorney that has represented a witness 
in the past before this committee? 

Ms. Kennedy. I don’t know all the attorneys who have represent- 
ed witnesses before this committee. I know Mark Lane, and I know 
Mark Lane for many years, and I have seen him twice or three 
times in about 10 years. I have not discussed the representative, 
the representation of James Earl Ray with Mark Lane. 

Mr. Speiser. Thank you very much, Ms. Kennedy. 

Mr. Pepper? 

Mr. Pepper. Counsel, I have not been associated with any attor- 
ney who has represented any witness before this committee. 

Mr. Speiser. Thank you. 

Mr. Ray, before I begin my questioning, I would like to advise 
you of the posture which you take before this committee. This 
committee views you in a dual capacity. You are appearing here as 
a witness to assist this committee in its investigation in areas that 
are relevant and pertinent and material to this investigation. 

In addition, I must advise you that we have received information 
of an incriminatory nature which would suggest that perhaps you 
might be involved either as a coconspirator or otherwise in assist- 
ing Mr. Ray to escape from prison, harboring him once he escaped 
from prison, financing him while he was a fugitive, and, last but 
not least, assisting him possibly in the assassination of Dr. Martin 
Luther King. So I want to emphasize to you, Mr. Ray, that you 
must be aware of the posture in which we view you when you are 
testifying here today. 

Now we have called you back today not for the sole purpose of 
questioning you strictly on the areas upon which you were ques- 
tioned when you were here in executive session. Some of the ques- 
tions that will be propounded to you in fact were addressed to you 
while you were here in executive session, but the reason why that 
is being done is because, subsequent to your appearance here, this 
committee has received information, credible information, which 
would suggest that your testimony was perjurious, false, and inac- 

In addition, Mr. Ray, the second reason why we are asking you 
to appear here in public session is that new information has been 
uncovered since your prior appearance, information which you are 
no doubt aware of through coverage in the press, concerning possi- 
bly a St. Louis-based conspiracy that might be responsible for the 

In view of this, Mr. Ray, I would like to advise you that this 
committee, on November 8, secured from U.S. District Court Judge 
Charles Bryant an immunity order. This immunity order can only 
be effectuated upon your assertion of your fifth amendment privi- 
lege. Whether or not you assert that privilege is a matter that is 
up to you and a matter which I suggest that you should discuss 
with your counsel, but this immunity order will not take effect 
until you assert your fifth amendment privilege. Do you under- 
stand that? 

Are you ready to begin? 

Mr. Ray. I would like to ask one thing. You uncovered reliable 
information that I was involved in the murder of King? Is that 
what you said? 


Mr. Speiser. This committee has received information which 
would suggest that perhaps you were involved in the assassination 
directly or indirectly, or perhaps facilitated the means by which 
the assassination took place. We will get into that area at a later 
juncture in this questioning, but I just wanted to advise you of that 
fact to make you aware of the posture in which we view you here 

Mr. Ray. I was wondering 

Mr. Speiser. Will you speak into the mike, please? 

Mr. Ray. I was just wondering if it came from people like this, 
Ollie Patterson and Richard Geppardt? 

Mr. Speiser. Excuse me? 

Mr. Ray. I was just wondering if information came from people 
like this. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, later on in our questioning we will enlight- 
en you perhaps on the source of information. Now that you 
brought the matter up, I want to advise you further, Mr. Ray, that 
this is not a grand jury, and consequently we are going to confront 
you with all the information that we have, and that has come into 
our possession, because we are here seeking the truth. We are not 
here seeking to entrap you. We are not here seeking to trick you 
into making perjury. We are going to confront you with all the 
information that we have. Do you understand that? 

Mr. Pepper. Would counsel advise our client why this confronta- 
tion has been a unilateral one for the last 2 weeks in the media 
based upon leaks from this committee, rather than this committee 
and counsel waiting so there could be a face-to-face confrontation? 

Mr. Speiser. I do not think it is appropriate for me to 

Chairman Stokes. I do not think that counsel has to respond to 
that. It is not true, and counsel is out of order. 


Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Congressman, I want to know if there is going 
to be any limit to the amount of speculation, the amount of testi- 
mony referred to, information alluded to, without any support that 
can be cross-examined or even heard by this witness. And I want to 
know whether or not counsel is going to be able to indulge in any 
fantastic theory without giving defense, the witness, an opportuni- 
ty to learn whether or not an equal amount of inquiry has been 
made into other possibilities to account for what seems to be an 
effort to cover up other conjectures, other possibilities, and other 
facts which have been brought out. 

It would seem to me that if this much latitude is given to this 
committee, with all these charts which give validity to the sort of 
testimony that you heard on yesterday from a lawyer who, in 
violation of the client privilege, has indicated 

Chairman Stokes. Will counsel suspend? The Chair is not going 
to entertain some form of final argument at this time. 

Now the Chair will recognize you as counsel to represent your 
client adequately at any time you interpose objections. There is 
nothing pending before you at this time to object to. 

Ms. Kennedy. All right, Your Honor. 

I move that the entire statement just made by this counsel, 
whose name I can’t see from here, be struck from the record in 
that it involves a tremendous amount of speculation possibilities, 


and that this committee does not afford this witness an opportunity 
to respond or to hear the testimony on which this purported ques- 
tioning is based. 

Chairman Stokes. Objection is overruled. Counsel will proceed. 

Ms. Kennedy. That figured. 

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy, for your information, my name is 
Mark Speiser, so that you can refer to me. 

Ms. Kennedy. Can I have the spelling? 

Mr. Speiser. S-p-e-i-s-e-r. 

Ms. Kennedy. First name? 

Mr. Speiser. Mark. * 

Ms. Kennedy. C or k? 

Mr. Speiser. K. 

Mr. Ray, I would like you to acknowledge for the record that you 
are appearing here pursuant to a subpena. 

Mr. Ray. Yes; correct. 

Mr. Speiser. And Mr. Ray, I would like you to further acknowl- 
edge that this committee on May 4 of this year, November 7 of this 
year, and November 22 of this year sent to you letters in which we 
outlined the scope of our inquiry as it was directed towards you, 
and the urgency that you retain counsel, and bring counsel with 

Now I see that you have brought counsel with you. I would like 
you to acknowledge for the record that you have received these 

Mr. Ray. I received the letter telling me I couldn’t have Mark 
Lane as my counsel. 

Mr. Speiser. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I would choose to 
have these letters entered into evidence as MLK exhibits F-590, F- 
591, and F-592, and if Mr. Ray’s current counsel do not have copies 
of those letters, I see no problem in the clerk showing them to 
them at this time. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into 
the record at this point, and will counsel specify the basis or the 
reason for the insertion of the letters? 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-590 

... C , „ LOUI* MSM*. WOO. CMMaWM* 

ruirx. m.c. mUUcl l. Dfvwi. onto 

. wkvTM'u rAuHrmrf, ox. rrcw*irr *- »cun«ii. w*%. 

. tvohmc MATHWAirc buhki. e MJr. OWB.C5 twoh*. hob. 

tHMircmcB 4. Dooa. cowi hawqu> ». «*wvc*. micm. 

trnwu» c. roB3, tin* 

\ J, FtTHlIN, <«0. 

Select Committee on £fc4o&matton£ 
of &epre£entatibe£ 

Washington. D.C. 20313 

May 4 , 1978 

Mr. Jerry Ray 

591 Cherokee 

Marietta, Georgia 30060 

Dear Mr. Ray: 

In connection with your forthcoming appearance before 
the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Committee staff 
attorney Michael Eberhardt has advised me of your request to 
have the Committee reconsider the prior disqualification of Mark 
Lane as your attorney due to his conflict of interests in 
representing both James Earl Ray and yourself before the Committee. 
I must advise you that, while you are certainly free to petition 
the Chairman for a reconsideration of his earlier ruling, counsel 
for the Committee has determined that the facts surrounding 
the earlier ruling by the Chairman as to Mr. Lane's conflict 
of interest remain essentially the same. Therefore, counsel 
would urge the Chairman to abide by his earlier ruling on this 

Mr. Eberhardt advises me that you are perhaps contemplating 
an appearance before the Committee without the assistance of 
legal representation in view of Mr. Lane’s disqualification. 

As a general proposition, and in view of recent problems this 
Committee has faced with certain witnesses (whose identity I am 
not at liberty to divulge) where such witnesses have given the 
appearance of obstructing the investigation of the Committee by 
fabricated failures of memory as to significant matters, I would 
suggest to you that an unrepresented appearance on your part would 
be quite unwise. While the Committee has no current -reason to 
believe that you will embark upon an obstructionist course 
during your answers, it is important for you to realize that 
there are numerous and somewhat complex legal ramifications for 
such conduct. Furthermore, if you recall, the Committee has 
indicated that you are a potential subject of its inquiry and 
that an examination of you might tread upon areas involving 
criminal conduct on your part. Indeed, you have already invoked 
the Fifth Amendment and been granted immunity. Apart from your 
rights under such a grant of immunity , the Committee can foresee 
possible legal questions as to other rights and privileges which 
require your benefit of advice from counsel;. 


While you have expressed an interest in having counsel familiar 
with the facts of James Earl Ray’s case, I would recommend to T 
you that even counsel without the benefit of such knowledge could 
assist you in terms of your own legal posture before the Committee, 
Therefore, I strongly suggest that, in view of your prior indication 
as to the lack of necessary funds to retain counsel, you permit 
the District of Columbia Bar Association to appoint private inde- 
pendent counsel to represent you- Should you choose to follow 
our recommendation, please call Mr. Eberhardt and he will make 
the necessary contact with the District of Columbia Bar Association 
which in turn will arrange for counsel. 

As I am sure you are aware from the prior remarks made to 
you by the Chairman, and indeed from this letter itself, the 
Committee has no desire to deprive you of your right to counsel 
before the Committee. While circumstances have precluded Mr. Lane's 
representation of you due to a conflict of interest on his part, 
you should be cautioned that any appearance by you before the 
Committee without counsel would in our opinion be a grave mistake. 

Your appearance before the Committee is now scheduled for 
May 10, 1978 at 1:00 p.m. Please contact Mr. Eberhardt for 
further information as to the place where the hearing is to be 

Very truly yours, 

G. Robert Blakey 

Chief Counsel and Director 

GRB : meh 


S>dcct Committee on Sto^sinatiomJ 
3J.£>. &ou$e ot ftepretfeittatibeS 

Washington, D.C. 20519 

November 7, 1978 

Mr. Jerry Ray 

591 Cherokee 

Marietta, Georgia 30060 

Dear Mr. Ray: 

In connection with your scheduled appearance 
before this Committee in public session on November 30, 
1978, the Committee again wishes to advise you that 
such an appearance without legal representation would 
not, in the judgment of the Committee, best serve the 
protection of your legal rights. As you are aware, 
the Committee has urged you (to no avail) to either 
retain private counsel or accept counsel appointed by 
A the District of Columbia Bar Association ever since 

^ the disqualification of Mr. Mark Lane as your attorney 

before the Committee. Attached hereto is a copy of our 
earlier letter of May 4, 1978, on this topic. Further- 
more, given the possible perjurious nature of some of 
your testimony in executive session and the apparent 
involvement on your part in serious criminal activity 
in the past several years, it would appear necessary, 
again in the judgment of the Committee, for you to have 
the benefit of legal advice during your public testimony 
and in any ensuing actions. 


Michael C. Eberhardt 

Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

Enel :as 

lcws nwa, o*oo, oummam 

mch*m>wn pnrvcft. »*x. lAMUtt u mvinc, omk> 


? ***** ITK CAJLir. CHAMUt TWMf, tWW. 


C. rooo, TCMM. 
r ^ J. PITHtAM. MO. 

^ hr w. kooah. pa. 


MLK Exhibit F-591 


defect Committee on 2feKa**(nat(an* 
E6. lit at Jfeprmntatfbt* 


November 22 , 1978 

Mr. Jerry Ray 

591 Cherokee 

Marietta, Georgia 30060 

Dear Mr. Ray: 


Mark Speiser, Committee staff attorney, has 
advised me of his conversation with you on November 21, 

1978 in which you confirmed your intention of traveling 
to Washington by car and your securing of your own hotel 
accommodations while you are here, pursuant to subpoena 
to testify before this Committee on November 30, 1978. 

Let this letter serve to remind you, as we have 
done in prior correspondence to you on May 4, 1978 and 
November 7, 1978 that it is our firm belief that you should 
be accompanied by counsel when you appear to testify at the 
public hearings. Counsel will be in a position to advise 
you as to your constitutional and legal rights. This should 
be of paramount concern to you in view of our earlier warning 
to you that you are considered a subject of this investigation 
and furthermore, in light of the apparent falsity of 
portions of your testimony in executive session. 

Our position remains unchanged with respect to your 
representation by Mark Lane. Mr. Lane, in view of his 
serving as counsel to your brother James, would have a 
conflict of interest should he likewise appear as your 
attorney. Mr. Lane l s -disqualification in executive session 
will not be reconsidered merely because you will now be 
testifying in a public forum. 

Therefore, should you choose to bring counsel as 
we suggest you do, but are unable to afford the cost of 
such legal services, please contact Mark A. Speiser .{202 
225-8353) i m mediately so he can arrange to have independent 
counsel selected for you by the District of Columbia Bar 


Cf !>-/ v. 

G. Robert Blakey 

Chief Counsel and Director 


MLK Exhibit F-592 


Mr. Speiser. The records are being inserted for a twofold pur- 
pose: No. 1, to show that this committee has attempted to bend 
over backward to advise Mr. Ray prior to his appearance of the 
nature of the inquiry and the urgency that he retain counsel. Mr. 
Ray had advised this committee on several occasions that if he 
could not be represented by Mr. Lane that he would not appear 
with counsel, and these letters stress the fact that we would be 
willing to work with the District of Columbia Bar Association to 
have counsel appointed for Mr. Ray free of charge, in the event he 
could not afford counsel 

Chairman Stokes. Will counsel make a statement with reference 
to the conflict-of-interest issue, so that the record is complete on 

Mr. Speiser. Well, at this time, Mr. Chairman, there does not 
appear to be a conflict of interest with Mr. Ray being represented 
by Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Pepper. 

Mr. Ray had represented to this committee, in fact when Mr. 
Ray appeared here in executive session he appeared initially with 
Mr. Mark Lane, who was current counsel for James Earl Ray, 
Jerry Ray’s brother, and this counsel felt that there would be a 
definite conflict of interest in Mr. Ray, in the two Ray brothers 
being represented by the same attorney, Mr. Mark Lane. 

James Earl Ray is the admitted assassin, and Jerry Ray, based 
upon information that we have, possibly could be incriminated in 
the assassination. For that reason, in anticipation of a possible 
conflict, we felt that Mark Lane at that time and at this time could 
not satisfactorily represent the rights, constitutional, legal or oth- 
erwise, of Jerry Ray. And we want to set forth that fact in these 
letters that I have just marked and requested be entered into 

Ms. Kennedy. We appreciate your concern for avoidance of a 
conflict of interest between Jerry Ray and James Earl Ray. Howev- 
er, I am a little mystified by the arrangement that you came up 
with, which was to appoint counsel from the D.C. Bar. Does this 
mean that counsel of his own choosing will not be compensated or 
will not be approved for compensation, because if it does, it means 
that his right to counsel, a constitutional right, is seriously jeopard- 

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy, I think the question is moot at this 
time, and I would choose to proceed to the substance of our ques- 
tioning today. 

Mr. Ray, are you currently married? 

Mr. Ray. No, I am single. 

Mr. Speiser. Do you have any children? 

Mr. Ray. One. 

Mr. Speiser. Are you currently employed by Mr. J. B. Stoner? 

Mr. Ray. That is correct. 

Mr. Speiser. And is Mr. Stoner currently affiliated with the 
National States’ Rights Party? 

Mr. Ray. That is right. 

Mr. Speiser. What is his relationship with the National States 
Rights Party? 

Mr. Ray. He is the head of it; chairman. 

Mr. Speiser. When did you first meet Mr. Stoner? 


Mr. Ray. Late 1969. 

Mr. Speiser. Late 1969? 

Mr. Ray. Late 1969. 

Mr. Speiser. It wasn’t near the time that your brother was 
getting ready to plead guilty to the assassination of Dr. King, 
which was in March of 1969? 

Mr. Ray. No. It was after the guilty plea. 

Mr. Speiser. It was after the guilty plea? 

Mr. Ray. After the guilty plea. 

Mr. Speiser. Substantially after the guilty plea? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. In what capacity are you employed with Mr. 

Mr. Ray. I wouldn’t know how to describe the job. I just run 
errands and pick up the mail at the post office, and things of that 

Mr. Speiser. Since when have you been employed by Mr. Stoner? 

Mr. Ray. Since the FBI got me fired off my job at the Twin 
Orchard’s Country Club. 

Mr. Speiser. I do not know if you answered my question. At what 
point in time was 

Mr. Ray. It was when he escaped the place. 

Mr. Speiser. The escape from Brushy Mountain? 

Mr. Ray. In June 1967, 1 think. 

Mr. Speiser. Are you employed as a bodyguard for Mr. Stoner? 

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, I want to object to this whole line of 
questions that deal with any activities of Jerry Ray subsequent to 
the arrest and capture, and in this instance even the guilty plea 
offered by James Earl Ray. I want to object to this whole line of 
questioning on the basis of pertinence, with respect to the scope of 
the resolution that has established this committee, dealing, there- 
fore, with the assassination of Martin Luther King, and the events 
subsequent to that with respect to Mr. Ray; I respectfully suggest 
to the committee they are not pertinent, they are not relevant, nor 
are they material. 

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel to the committee want to be 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, I would respond to that by pointing 
out that questioning of Mr. Ray concerning his activities and ac- 
tions subsequent to the assassination are definitely pertinent and 
relevant to the scope of this inquiry. 

Let me finish, Mr. Pepper, please. 

Following the assassination of Dr. King and a plea by James 
Earl Ray, I submit that actions and activities of Jerry Ray subse- 
quent to those dates are relevant, since they serve as a good 
indicator of prior actions of Mr. Ray. 

Second, they served to establish, in the committee’s eyes, the 
credibility of the witness, namely Jerry Ray. 

For example, this committee has been furnished with certain 
information concerning the activities of Jerry Ray subsequent to 
the plea by his brother to the assassination of Martin Luther King. 
This information appears credible and verifiable. 

Now if Mr. Ray is going to sit here and deny those actions 
concerning activities he was involved in subsequent to the plea, 


then that would serve as an indicator to this committee as to 
whether or not he is telling us the truth about actions and activi- 
ties he was involved in prior to the assassination. So for those 
reasons, Mr. Chairman, I feel that the questions that I am pro- 
pounding to Mr. Ray are directly relevant. 

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel desire to be heard further? 

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, we are referring specifically and 
focusing on those questions subsequent to the capture of James 
Earl Ray, not merely subsequent to the assassination between the 
period of time of assassination and capture. We are talking about 
questions that relate to the arrest and capture of James Earl Ray. 
We do not share learned counsel’s position that an individual’s 
future actions, present or future actions, are necessarily linked in 
relevancy with his past actions or behavior, or should they be given 
the same credibility. 

We will not advise, counsel will not advise that Mr. Ray not be 
responsive to these questions, but we for the record want to note 
our objections and our exception to counsel pursuing this line of 

Chairman Stokes. Counsel’s objections are properly noted and 
the Chair rules that they are pertinent. 

Counsel may proceed. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, in view of your association and affiliation 
with J. B. Stoner and the NSRP, do you share the basic tenets and 
principles of that organization? 

Mr. Ray. Let me to respond to one thing. I never heard of J. B. 
Stoner or the States’ Rights Party until J. B. Stoner visited James 
Earl Ray in the Memphis county jail in Memphis, Tenn., and the 
first contact I ever had with him was after the guilty plea when he 
didn’t have no attorneys, and J. B Stoner offered to represent him 
for free. And since that time I have been unable to hold a job on 
account of FBI harassment, and so the only place I can work at is 
for J. B. Stoner. 

Mr. Speiser. Is your answer then no or yes? Do you share the 
principles advocated by J. B. Stoner and the NSRP? 

Mr. Ray. No, I don’t share every principle J. B. Stoner has. I 
don’t share principles you have. The only way I ever got in contact 
with him was him being James Earl Ray’s attorney. 

Mr. Speiser. So your answer is no? 

Mr. Ray. No. 

Mr. Speiser. You are aware, are you not, that the organization 
headed by J. B. Stoner advocates white supremacy and racist prin- 

Mr. Ray. Oh, yes, I know that. It is in the papers. 

Ms. Kennedy. May I just put on the record that this kind of 
prejudicial questioning is a bit absurd in a totally racist society. 
Most people are employed by people who have either capitalistic 
views or corrupt views, whether it is Lockheed or whomever, and I 
don’t understand why it will be used further to prejudice this 
witness, to try to ask him whether he holds with the views of his 
employer. I don’t really feel that this is appropriate, except to 
prejudice this witness. 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair wants to admonish counsel. The 
Chair will not indulge in statements of this type. 


In the first place, you have not even placed an objection before 
the Chair. You are merely making a statement which the Chair 
will not indulge. You are overruled. You are out of order. 

Proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to have 
introduced into the record MLK exhibit F-593. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-593 

* : ; V/the\w#£\^a ns viewpoint/ ' ; • - .• - 

BQ> 6265, SAVANNAH. GEORGIA 31405 

King Victim Of Own Terrorism 

Politicians Protect Black Revolution 

Tbr death of Martin I ucllttr 
— - _ 1 King fc Memphis was the natural 

Demands Investigation 

proclaiming defiance af (be lavs 

f • _ ak «f Iht land. Me was in Memphis 

Of Riot Protectors stjessess 

_ of (SeBbersteli violstiiig the Fed- 

Congressman John R. Rartck of Louisiana 
, is demanding an investigation of why Lyndon • 

Johnson used troops to protect the rioters 
"in stead of using them to end the rioting in 

"Earl Warren’s dream has now departed 
from loft}’ platitudes and sugar-coated force 
laws to become a nightmare for all Ameri- - 
cane," Rep. John- ft. Rarick of Louisiana’s i 
_ .Sixth District said in a speech before Con- | 
greBB yesterday. ,, - '* •- "j 

“All about us is Earl Warren’s dream j 
come true. Forced equality, court decreed 1 
laws favoring “Communism, minority pres- -3 
sure ''Control, reapportionmerrt, handcuffing j 
of law enforcement officers, and destruction 
of all States* rights — have now centralized 
all power in the hands of a few who have 
demonstrates! thetr incapability or lack 
courage to protect their -country and people,? ■ 

Rarick told his col leagues. . .. 

** America's cities are ravished by hordes * 
of revolutionaries, sacking -our land. While 
the nation’s capita] burned, the President pro- 
claimed again, “We shall overcome,** fta- ; 
rick pointed out- “His behavior raises the 
question, *Do we have a President of all! 
the people or a commander- in -chief of the 
revolution in the White House?* ** ' 

■“Hundreds of thousands of Americans 
want to kno w why some 20 hours elapsed Martin Jak 

in Washington. D. C.. before the federal rf Wt fBjtmctkl] ijsta c? 
troops w e re called to offer an image of con- . *???? * m*jat*e tuck 
cere over the wholesale burning and kxrt- 10 ^ 

rJS«ig. - **'. "***,': "IT" T.. . x - . *™r 

V : feel etrongly that the House owes a agate* * time n«t. 

." 'duty to every American citizen to ascertain ** t> * 1 * ■ 

V! why, in the federal District of Cohimbtm, ] ^ rtJ D to ) ta ^ 

five headquarters of the government of all I am* Ac 1^1 court*. 
.. our people, immediate effective action was | *“* “wsp* 

/j'Wt taken to protect life and property,’* R®* | 

rick declared. ~ .' I new* w fare* hkh to 

S-For this reason, 1 am introducing today ***< 

^..resolution calling for a special investlga- 

“ «on of this matter by a Select Committee htackiawiestoiteE 

^ composed of members of both partt©» *0 '*«»». 

^b^pouited by the’ Speaker.** Z“r'- ■ - J . 

copy of the resolution is attached. attest,, tht^Va* 

SSKs: :^ A r*ajas.; uw * ^ 

^SOLVED. -y hat there is hereby created 

>opwJHee Tolbe composed of seven ly, 

White qiaL.Wbc stool King did 
« “what ni! am tally the dury afj 
Presides! Jobnsoo. the federal I 
marshals and the U. S. Army to 
do. He upheld the Ite -md die 
dignity of tbs federal courts and 
dir exeoajve branch of govern-, 
men: by doing their duty fori 
! them. He should be glvex, thej 

card hjiucdo} .j.H!,. 

him ■ massive bl»ci 

a"** 1 ** •»* designed to^wl ] 
to rk*te* tad vfekace. 

^ *®T has TW'-ksrf 1 
to ktefe Roe *. '] 
art- ^ <Wcrt, Mfeslssippi, i 
■aniflft Vtkir p| ir , g ^ fg^ 1 

W® 6 v> d t iji tW inftnc- ^ 
^ *eten Court*, i 
|*cs*jW' ttw- that troop* ire ! 
! o#»*e twDe Wbto people j 

AW*** to totfhato* from e' 
,aoi* *wdw«l <f -Justice- 

«Wt*f<Wws MackTawfastetes" 

Coqgresstoaal Medal flf. JJa*or 
md ■ large tuuual pmstoo lari 
Ufa. pkte i Presidtsidal perdaj^ 

Wes's docL'lncof noci-vloleace 
was ody a u> ™l»i» him to 

mart: cflecxbtoly tncfu vioiatce. 
He vu bctoaUy waging band fa 
hand wttt Smtoety CarmkchaoL 
Rap- Broun and ocher nrbe 

advocate vtoknea. Kfag dearly 
rttit rtkp t(Fthco0Uot bUdi 
m«rdb on ViAinjtai wv& 
ed fa paratyxc our oachiii’s'capl- 
ul and done dow> (he federal 
fovemmtjoi veil k graund ibe 
demande d (he Mad revoto- 
draarie*. Thai meum vtohmet 
regardlev* ct too* mud Clog 
screamed -wB-vioienon.'* Hi* 
brand of noo-vloleoce ha* al- 
nya teen a tea* and a tnusL 

li Ate *ftonaa*h^(< Kite's 
dsatb Ccagrcs* passed innrhar 
sn-caTlod vldl rights IgU -thfa 

I xatef mare Coe stlaitf dial right* 
•wsy from White? and gives them 
co black beasts. The latest civil 
rights law tr know, as the Dirk- 
sen AC, because LBJ was doc 
able to pass li until bactsrabbing 
Dlrkstsj betrayed the White peo- 
ple of Ilibolf and America by 
joining with L£J to force ii 
tbroogli the Stoiate said: the sup- 
pmr of both the Democratic and 
Republican parties. 

A majority of the members of 
Ctmgresr are degenerate black 
hearted scum who were happy to 
use King’s death for passing an- 
other dvil rights law against (he 
White people tf America. There 
are only a few patriotic loyal 
Americans ir, Congress and one 
, o! them Is tin Kooorabfe Jote 
j Rarick of Louialana. The otter* 
are the dregs of creation and not 
fit to associate With decent men. 
King's death "Is being used by 
the Jew money power and jew 
financed blacks as an excuse far 
genera] lawlessness and a 
upping up of the re-voludge, 
against tus Whites. 

mayor dally pressured 

Mayor Richard Daley of Chi- 
cago knows what kind cf methods 
are necessary *> stop arsmi, 
looting and genera] insurrection. 
He gave orders to <gfy the revo- 
lutionaries by shooting to maim 
and shooting to kill, orders that 

are to support of rhr ctsnnK* 

law and American law to general 
as It has always been the ire. 

As stxn ac Mayor DUey gave 
the kind of orders to the polio: 
that would stop black rebellion, 
he was ectodemaod by Mayor 
Lindsay oC the Jew-owned CMy <W 
New York and by Ramsay Onrk. 
the lawless Anorney General of 
the Ifalted Staler. Delay's na- 
efaods would scop black rebelibrn 
by allowing the local poller to <k> 
ttelr duty and uphold the law. Use 
Jew method tcC Lindsay aad Clark 
would rrndor the local police 
helpless and then c auteur to 
protect ite black revnlnrkaarfa* 
with the Army While the black 
twusts looc. tent, ard tad 

The Thundosteli believes fa 
law and order and flanands (tea 
the black retemca be crated a* 
provided by law. Thl* means (ton 
the police should ha given ite . 
necessary arm* ao! amnumltiCB 
aad ordered ■» mow (be bleak 
rebels dow*. That U The trett- 
(local and customary way thto 
rebellksis are lerminated. Ote 
erwtse, (he White people MB 
protect them selves as they hMQ 
a right ta fa tV-Y -L h V- £■ 

•iSiMit. . 


Irk Valley 

San Gabriel, California 

"Dt jog bate Negroes'" a** the Negro man of the lady rf 

nd rightfully »-tefo( 


‘•Wen, tore ynj wuHnl mind con tr footing to a Watts 
chUdret i recreation cento.*, would you’” Uw mac says. 

Goctw d 6c women who havt r^iortod such encounter* 
recent)} to toe* poliet agencies sid *hai H*) *dined to con- 
tribute tot aoJieiior ads to um toe bathroom. When per mi***® 
ft granted, (he mac, the wooed reported, enters and d alfire 
around the inside of <ht bouse Hiking everything over. Game 
householders. cuntetuted to the dtHfrai’s sriff and M U gn ft 

As Harry Gm, E Mom* (ftj* teeasars pal It, Tl 
*u a poor approach.” 

Gift bad just gotlM borne from work recoct)} when a young 
mac using the same words called at him through fail front 
tereened door. Gist said ashegwi^tcgotetbe door, ftto 
e&Ber started id waft into bis base. Gik said be ftopped ibe 
young man and toW hare tut he did not wak to cootrtete to 
•to child's center. He then asked the man tor bfe aakdWa 

The young mat produced file tense, said Gist, tb® Gift 
said be advised the oolitfUr that tl was in (Gist**; tegnaWra 
that was written oe his E Monte license. 

Gist explained that late toE men represosting (bemaetea as 
dftfcftxgtr* of the Black Mushm 1 ! newspaper, Mtfcanond 
Speifc. were issued E Monte licenses to aeO their newspaper 
to E Monte ft is dassfied * a religious pkrijatBon. 

He said “they” canto back recteiy and wanted fee exoqit, 
permits tc wforil far the dtikfcm’s cents' to Watts. Gift Hid 
(he permits were also issued. 

Qne of toe problem* toa*. has come up ft tttoL, adhcllDfi w- 
ing this distinctive approach have bees popping up to toe 
Angaes. Whither, Gorina, San Dimas and efcewbere. Of 
eoune, the aohcitattoc fiemses are <*h good in the d B 
Mode bid unless a persoe were to read the *mafi print tn tfa* 
Ucenst he woito not be kite to to!) where (he tosat ni 

Cue possibility tor foing to E Mona fer toeir Scone 
cecdd be fiul hceoses d tou tjy» are eoy to gel to D Mate 
The Tribune checked with CouncUmac John Gtoaon's Watts 
field office and wKb Mubammud’s Mosque No r to Lea 
Angeiez. toe Black Muslim Temple. 

Black Muslim minister Herman Hasson! and a spokesman to 

toMC a diaritobte aoUdtaltoc far a Watte ctsktoa'i recreation 
center lc fad, neittier knew of a planned center at aH 

Rassou) aasd, “ll u not a legitimate solicitation as tar re 1 
jut concerned. IT we ccoW fftd out wte> la (totog fa, re reuftd 
take kgai action to pot a hah to It ” 

He said. "With toe racial sltuati® v tore aa tl b, ton ft 

|Ml«1U<hii^ tltf{ prtrtM fa y n 

The law eitfarcsnM agencies wtndh bare lad iaqufrrea 
tmn cUmbs regarding these solid ten, however, tay toft ft a 
very dtf&jdf thu« « which to tteUin a formal wmplainL 1ft* 
reason ft that the perms who art confronted either do ml ob- 
tain — wteit* informal**: about toe tebdior while be Is making 
his pilfti or would rathe- just forget It than become involved. 

Musician Gives Quarter 
Million To Israel 

One of dir nKHT popular band: with the yowiger act Is the Tla juana 
Brass. Most people chink they are Spanish, bur Herb Alpen, fcs leader, 
IS Jewish. Recall) he gave a quarter of ■ million dollars to the 
Untied Jewish Appeal. All this man) won to Israel to he used against 
the Arabs. 

AD his nawy come* from the sale Of records to White ChrUttaa 
children. Lea's eti* buying records which support Israel. 

Negro Officials 
Unable To Function 

(Continued Fran Page 8) 
biera: of governing undeveloped 
countries bsvlqg primitive pep. 
illations know Chai tog first Im- 
perative essoiUaj is STRICT 
SEGREGATION' (or separate dr- j 
veJopemetit) lr. schools, college*, j 
churche.- bousing, business, 
government and armed force*. 

It should be recalled that Aiv 
raham Lincoln Stated In 1858: 
**„J air not, nor ever bare 
been, to law of miring vo- 
ter: or juror? of negroes, nor 
qualifying them to hold office.” 
Note that the recent legislation 
permitting ill iterate negroes (and 
whites} to vote Lf just a Rod- 
inspired scheriu welcomed by 
unscrupulous politician'- to give 
political centre) tc the enemies 
of our L.&.A. The entrance tar- 
men: of unqualified raters abould 
be rescinded* 

Sure)} It is urgent to stop all 
law-defying movements, Includ- 
ing racial violence and rioting. 
All agitator*, especially those 
wuh Red affiliations, should be 
promptly arrested and given leug ' 
prisor sentences. Since this law- 
lessness li a prelude to the 
Ultimate violent revolution plan- 
ned by the Ctmummins to seize 
ccntroJ of the United States, the 
authorities of our nation, state* 
and tides should use whatever 
FORCE is necessary to preserve 

b, countries where anci da*- i 

page 9 

Stoner Speaks In Meridian, Mlts. 

LIKES KING BETTER - J. fa. Stoner, *k*<h.irman 
to the Ration*: State* Right* Party, a«M here last night to 
tba death to Marlin Luther King that *He'i been a peed 
nigger now since eia m aeven o'clock tonight.” 

-stair PftMe 


clpUne 1* enforced and all sub- 
versive activities are put down 
with an Iron band, hard-boiled 
rulers would not hesltUte to 
atop the propagation of vnvier si- 
rs bl» citizens to, compulsory 
sterilization of feeble-minded. 
incurably Insane, habitual ert- 
mtnii* and 

Should we a Doe our United 
States of America to became the 
Soviet Suies of America - 
a slave state? 

Research Department 
Grets Roots League, 

Cbarlemn. S.C 

Charges Pro-Rad 
Officials Hamstring 
Military Action 

A well tatw military expert 
Gen. Thomas A. Lane ha* an- 
alyzed America** toablUry to 
ctaauer Communis: attacks and 
states: *'There 1* cnly eve way to 
Pueblo type Incident a. 
den (X the Mfxr must 
have authority tc met wbb all 
available power to protect the 
fauereoi of tter Ebbed Slate*. 
These arrack: will ceaae only 
when the Kremlin know* that this 
authority rest* to the field com- 
manders. In days when tto United 
Staces war more respected, com- 
mander? had this authority.*' 

(Edlitr? Kore: LB.J has had 
all military declaim* rranslermd 
to a handful) of so-called drill* 
advisor? — most of whom are 
Jews. See article elsewhere to 
■his issue ai Jewiah infllrretire 
of high government posts.) 

Gen Lane else said; "Is the 
Lb bed Stetes so tearful of apo>- 
lng a new front In Kona that t. 
will condone the Pueblo piracy? 
We are weakened dot ptoysicaDy 
ton psychologically. U'aatiin#- 
too's llhialtei* about peacemak- 
ing Incite the Communlai attack. 
The enemy knows that reck 
diruns wll) he mol not with In- 
euni retaliation too with pro- 
tracted negortedon. The men set 
of negotieiteg such an Issue de- 
mand* the lb kad States and ad- 
vances (he Co 
to Ibe wortd.” 

More Violence Predicfed 
In Wake Of King's Death 

The vice dwirman of the 
“white racurt” National Suies 
Right* Party predicted here lab 
right His: Martin Luther King's 
death wiE bring more Negro de- 
monstrations and violence than 
anything since toe Civil War. 

"King's death, I predict, will 
trigger off more nigger violence 
than we have had in the las’, 
year or to toe last UO yean." J. 
B Stoner aaid. "The black 
power niggers srill no** say tha) 
non-violence has failed and that 
violence ft toe only answer " 

Stoner, who was to Meridton 
for an organftaliona't meeting to 
toe NSRP, told a small group 
that his party ft a “while racist. 
anti-Jew" argimftation. 

“We a It while racist* and at- 
ari proud to br wfute racists" 
he aaid. "TV black supi-cmisu 
are proud to br black mu 
I wsraiiU 

|^*Thr National Stain Right' 
Party adracaus an end to ell 
friendship he ween thr black 
and white men. . -an end m all 
relationship between the races" 
be said. 

Sumer chirped that King was 
no! non -violent, but that King, 
“like all nigger*.'' hated lh* 

jjBfeerocs to protest. 

^ Sumer said that bis group is 
planning marches and rallies to 
its own — beginning to May— in 
support of Ihcir “political" 

*To: many yr.irs toe FBI bas 
guarded King > tioosc and 
guarded him ■ ererywbere be 
went, and yv! hr is dead" 
Stoner said ”l'd rather die in 
combat than toying in a conren 
tration camp." 

He said ihi NSHI* nillir* and 
marches wil< sun m Mississippi 
h; M i and “V-fore tor siimmcr 
is m i r I thiid: wr -can amiv the 
majority of (he wtru pcre»e in 
Mississippi ' 

Asked about reponx Dial 
King s death might increase 
Seri. Rohm Kennedy’s chance* 
to becoming ‘tor next president. 
Stoner replied . 

"I wouldn't think so at all. . .1 . 
ttiii* the nigaere wttt going to 
toy low all sumrnrr te help Bob- 
b)‘ Kenned) . bu: now they won't 
he able to control them They 
won't tn- ahk- io control the nig 

“King was iw oun-viutefit." he 
■aid. *‘AU the time he was say 
big non-viojmee hr 1 

war was bloody and rintrm. . -hr 
wanted a blood) revolution. 

“In this hatred few u> they 
have brought about the second 
Gvil War. and that's what we 
are now In.” Stoner aaid. 

“He has been a good nigger 
now ainor S or T e'dock 
tonight,” Sunn- aaid of King s 

Hr laid IV NSRP welcomed 
tor note which are expected to 
follow and that they were glad 
■re others encouraging (ft 

• .We {Zionists; are eager 
to Joto hand: with tor Jews of 
tor Sc*rttt Journal of Jewish 
Life and Letter?* (New Vort). 
Aufnat 1H3. p. 4. 


Mr. Speiser. MLK F-593 is an excerpt from the tabloid published 
by the NSRP entitled “The Thunderbolt.” At this point I would 
just like to read a small excerpt from that magazine. This is on 
page 1: 

The man who shot Dr. King was actually upholding the law of the land and 
enforcing the injunction of the U.S. District Court in Memphis which had forbidden 
King’s marches. The white man who shot King dead did what was actually the duty 
of President Johnson, the Federal marshals, and the U.S Army to do. He upheld the 
law and the dignity of the Federal Courts and the executive branch of Government 
by doing their duty for them. He should be given the Congressional Medal of Honor 
and a large annual pension for life, plus a presidential pardon. 

Do you agree with the statements in that? 

Mr. Ray. When was that published? 

Mr. Speiser. In May 1968? 

Mr. Ray. I never heard of J. B. Stoner when that was published. 
I am not responsible for what the Thunderbolt publishes. 

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, counsel objects again to this whole 
line of questioning, particularly as it impinges on the client’s first 
amendment rights embraced by the whole process and range of 
associations. If counsel wants to proceed to the substance of this 
hearing, we suggest that you do so rather than dwelling upon any 
associations of Mr. Ray, and perhaps we can get to the heart of the 

Reading such a statement as that into record is inflammatory 
and we object and ask that it be excluded. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate counsel’s argument and 
position. However, we are trying to get at the racial attitude of 
Jerry Ray at the time Martin Luther King was assassinated, for we 
feel that that attitude was shared with James Earl Ray. 

Counsel, I would appreciate it if you would let me proceed. We 
have noted your objection. 

Mr. Pepper. But your comment, counsel, does not speak to the 
fact that Mr. Ray has already stated that he does not know J. B. 
Stoner at that time. You read an article in the record which was 
published prior to any knowledge or association with J. B. Stoner. 
On that grounds it should be excluded. 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair is going to sustain counsel’s objec- 
tion and request that counsel for the committee proceed directly 
into those pertinent questions relating to Jerry Ray. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, is it your statement that you did not meet 
or know of J. B. Stoner until after the assassination of Dr. Martin 
Luther King? 

Mr. Ray. I never heard of J. B. Stoner or the Thunderbolt until — 
the first time I ever heard when he visited James in the Memphis 
jail when Arthur Hanes was his attorney. That is the first I ever 
heard of him. 

Mr. Speiser. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would choose to have 
marked into evidence MLK exhibit F-597. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 

39-935 0 - 79 - 22 


MLK Exhibit F-597 

And did you have a conversation v/ith Jerry Ray? 

In the warden * s office at that time, 

And can you tell me what that conversation was? 

Yes, I asked him about the contract and he said he had it 

with him and I asked him if I might read it and he handed 

it to me and I read it and it was pretty lengthy, and a lot 

of things in it/more or less startled me and I said it 
will take a little time, it’s Saturday afternoon and I 
want to get a copy of this and I don’t know whether the 
warden has got somebody here to do it this afternoon or 

Jeff Factor - Excuse me, this was the contract between Hanes, Huie and 

James Earl Ray? 

Harry Avery - That's right and one of the things that interested me about 

that contract was that it was signed and acknowledged by 
Huie and Hanes a long time before James Earl Ray signed 
it. He acknowledged it after he got back to the United 
States before a notary in Shelby County in jail down there 
and this thing was gotten up in Birmingham without Jartes 

;; . - Kay having the slightest idea, that it was being 

prepared and that interested me terrifically in saying 
. to Jerry, it will take some time to get a copy on Saturday 
afternoon. He said, well I've got to go to the Noal Hotel 
and I'll be dcwn there awhile , can you tell me how to get 
down to Noal Hotel and when I get back. I'll pick it up. 

And I said well, I wanted to have some excuse for him to 
ride with me and me have, a chance to be v/ith him and talk 
with him, so 1 said I could tell you how to gut down then? 

harry Avery 
C' r Pieter 
Harry Avery 


Jeff Facter 
Harry Avery 

£ r Jeff Facter 
Harry Avery 

- but I'm sure you would get confused because they are 
building an interstate across a lot of these streets 
and they are blocked off and you have to take a sort 

of a circuitors route to get downtown from here nov;. But 
I said I 'm going to go and I * 11 be dcwn there in an hour 
or two, why not just ride with me and I'll pick you up and 
bring you back. I said what's the purpose of your trip to 
the Noal? Well, he said, I am suppose to meet Stcner down 
there and I said you mean — at that time I knew his given 
name, I had read a lot about him and his representation 
of that case in Alabama, and he said yea, and I sai d well 
tell me how he got into it, into this case. And he said 
why he's been our lawyer for at least two years before 
Martin Luther King was ever killed, 

- Could I just step you right there for a second? Are you 
positive that he said that Stoner had been the family 
lawyer for two years? 

Had been our lawyer for at least two years before King 
;Was ever killed, that was his exact words. - Now whether 

- meant chit family lawyer, whether he meant just me and 

Earl Pay, I don't khow^but he said pur lawyer. 

- And you are certain about the two years prior to this? 

W Yes sir, I'm certain about that. So I not only carried 
; “ hira dewn there but I asked him then how this fellow Hill 

‘ got into this case? I think his name is Hill, a young 
lawyer freen Q-jattanooga and he said, well you know, I got 
a daughter that lives here in Tennessee. No,. I said I 
didn't know that. Kell, he said yea, she’s not the 


Mr. Speiser. MLK F-597 represents an interview that was under- 
taken by this staff with Harry Avery, who was the Commissioner 
of the Tennessee prison system. 

Mr. Avery was interviewed by staff counsel and Mr. Avery indi- 
cated, when interviewed, that you advised him when he was taking 
you to a hotel in Nashville to meet with Mr. Stoner, that Mr. 
Stoner had been attorney for you and your family for 2 years prior 
to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. 

Is that statement accurate or inaccurate? 

Mr. Ray. It is a joke, a sick joke. 

Mr. Speiser. Did you make that statement and intend it as a joke 
or are you suggesting Mr. Avery is lying? 

Mr. Ray. Mr. Avery is lying. I don’t joke like that. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Stoner has represented you in a prior criminal 
action, is that correct? 

Mr. Ray. That’s true. 

Mr. Speiser. And Mr. Stoner has represented your brother, John 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. And at a time Mr. Stoner has represented James 
Earl Ray? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. Do you know why your brother, James Earl Ray, 
has furnished a waiver to this committee for every single attorney 
that represented him with the exception of J. B. Stoner? 

Mr. Ray. No; I thought he didn’t waive Percy Foreman. I 
thought Foreman was up here illegally making up stories and 
telling the committee a lie because James wrote a letter I think I 
got in my thing that he didn’t waive Foreman’s thing and Foreman 
just went ahead and came up here and tried to influence the 
committee and so I thought Foreman and Hanes— Foreman and 
Stoner neither one was waived. 

Mr. Speiser. In April 1968 how were you employed? 

Mr. Ray. April 1968? I was employed at the Sportsman’s Country 
Club in Northbrook, 111. 

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, does the committee have in its pos- 
session a waiver of Percy Foreman from James Earl Ray? 

Chairman Stokes. Counsel will reply to that. 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, is it 

Chairman Stokes. Just a moment. 

The Chair is taking an inquiry from your cocounsel. 

Ms. Kennedy. Thank you. 

Chairman Stokes. The answer to counsel’s inquiry with refer- 
ence to Mr. Percy Foreman is that Mr. Ray did give the committee 
a waiver and pursuant to that waiver we interviewed Mr. Percy 
Foreman on two occasions. 

Subsequently, Mr. Ray revoked all of the waviers previously 
given to this committee. 

Mr. Pepper. Is the Foreman waiver a matter of the committee’s 
record? Has it been entered into the committee’s record? 

Chairman Stokes. I believe it is a part of the record. 

Ms. Kennedy, did you have 

Ms. Kennedy. Yes, sir, I apologize for stepping on my cocounsel’s 
application, but I was wondering whether or not Mr. Ray can have 


copies of the waiver and revocation or if the record can indicate 
the dates involved in the withdrawal of the waiver for counsel’s 

Inasmuch as this has been introduced and counsel was not aware 
that this would be introduced, I would appreciate copies of the 
waivers and the revocation. 

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, I don’t think for the purposes of 
the questioning here of this witness that that is either pertinent or 

The inquiry is merely made as to whether or not he was aware 
and he has himself replied — he is the one who responded to coun- 
sel’s question in a way that is now of record. 

Ms. Kennedy. Well, Your Honor, in light of the attorney/client 
privilege, it would seem rather important if an attorney is making 
statements against the interests of a present or former counsel, 
that the waiver situation be clarified. 

I just want to make that for the record without taking any more 
of the committee’s time on that point. 

Chairman Stokes. The waiver is on the record and counsel can 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, in April 1968, you acknowledged being 
employed by the Sportsman’s Club? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. In what capacity? 

Mr. Ray. I was the overnight watchman. 

Mr. Speiser. What were your working hours? 

Mr. Ray. Eleven at night until seven in the morning. 

Mr. Speiser. What was your day off? 

Mr. Ray. I believe it was Thursday, 1 believe. 

Mr. Speiser. Thursday was your day off? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. So you would get off work at 6 o’clock in the 

Mr. Ray. About 7 o’clock. 

Mr. Speiser. Seven o’clock in the morning, Thursday morning, 
and not have to return to work until 10 o’clock or 11 o’clock on 
Friday evening? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. Is that accurate? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. When was your vacation in 1967 and 1968? 

Mr. Ray. I cannot remember that. It would be when the season 
was probably over, probably late in the year, November, December 

Mr. Speiser. Did you normally have a Christmas vacation? 

Mr. Ray. No; I worked on Christmas or somebody had to do the 
job. I was usually around there for Christmas. 

Mr. Speiser. In 1967 you did not take Christmas vacation? 

Mr. Ray. I am not saying one way or another because there is no 
way I can remember that far back. You can check my work records 
and find out. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, I would like to direct your attention to 
MLK exhibit F-598. F-598 is a copy of your visitor’s record at the 
Missouri State Penitentiary in Jefferson City, Mo., which reflects 


the dates that you visited your brother, James Earl Ray at that 
institution. That exhibit is being shown and put on the easel there. 

Chairman Stokes. Is counsel asking that exhibit be made a part 
of the record? 

Mr. Speiser. Would the clerk furnish the witness with a copy of 
that in the event he cannot see the easel? 

I will request that this document be introduced into the record. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered. 

[The information follows:] 

I Inc of RAY, Jfiaoo ^ I 

datton Ifamtha* 1 



■ i 




| Signature of Visitor ' d vJ • 


ll; 753 






— 0 















■ i 




— 1 














- - 













L " 




























— -! 

MLK Exhibit F-598 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, does this record accurately reflect the 
visits you paid to your brother, James Earl Ray, while he was 
incarcerated at Jefferson City? 

Mr. Ray. There is no way I can remember back that far, but that 
looks like — that is my signature and I can tell my own signature, 
and I visited him a few times while he was down there. I don’t 
know how many times exactly. That — it might be true, I don’t 
know, because that is my signature. 

Mr. Speiser. Do you have any recollection — let me rephrase the 
question. Did you have your own visitor's pass when you visited 
your brother James? 

Mr. Ray. I am pretty sure you can get a visitor’s pass. I think 
you had to have a visitor’s pass to get in. 

Mr. Speiser. Did you use anybody else's visitor’s pass? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t think so. I don’t remember doing it. I don’t 
think so. It is hard to remember all that stuff. That has been 15, 16 
years ago. 

Mr. Speiser. For your recollection, Mr. Ray, James Earl Ray 
escaped from the Jefferson City prison on April 23, 1967. Do you 
have any recollection of visiting James Earl Ray the day prior to 
his escape? 

Mr. Ray. I positively didn’t visit him. That is a positive. 

Mr. Speiser. Do you know if your brother John visited him on 
that day? 


Mr. Ray. I don’t know what John did because he was in St. Louis 
and I was in Chicago, the Chicago area. 

Mr. Speiser. So your answer is no, you do not know if John 
visited him the day before? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t know if John did. I know definitely I didn’t. 

Mr. Speiser. Were you aware that your brother James, prior to a 
successful escape in April of 1967, had twice previously attempted 
unsuccessfully to attempt to escape from Jefferson City? 

Mr. Ray. There is no way I can respond to that because that goes 
too far back to remember. I have heard since then about it, but I 
don’t remember hearing about it before. 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, before we proceeed too much fur- 
ther, may I just request that the witness be provided with a copy of 
this record in order for counsel to confer with him subsequently? 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Stokes. Counsel’s request will be granted. 

Ms. Kennedy. Thank you. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, do you know who assisted your brother 
James in escaping from Jefferson City? 

Mr. Ray. Do I know who assisted him? There is no way I can 
know. I am working in Chicago. I am working every night when he 
escaped that place. 

Mr. Speiser. So your answer is you did not assist your brother 
James in escaping? 

Mr. Ray. I did not assist him and there is no way — I hear 
rumors, but I am not one that pays any attention to rumors. 

Mr. Speiser. Well, setting aside rumors for a moment, do you 
factually know who assisted James in escaping from Jefferson 

Mr. Ray. The only way I would factually know is if I was there 
and seen the escape and I wasn’t there. I was working in Chicago 
and there is no way I can know who helped him. 

Mr. Speiser. Did anyone ever tell you they assisted James in 

Mr. Ray. I never — nobody has ever told me that. 

Mr. Speiser. John never admitted that to you? 

Mr. Ray. Never has admitted that to me. 

Mr. Speiser. Did you ever tell anybody that John assisted 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. 

Mr. Speiser. May I finish my question, please? 

Ms. Kennedy. No; I want to refer to the question before this. 

I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, to strike the word “admitted.” 
The word “admitted” suggests a fact and I would like the question 
to be rephrased to eliminate an implication that this committee 
has firm, factual evidence that John Ray assisted James Earl Ray 
in escaping from the penitentiary. 

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, I don’t think counsel intended 
that implication by his question. 

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy, I asked your client whether John ever 
indicated or admitted to Jerry that he 

Ms. Kennedy. I am objecting to the word “admitted.” I am 
objecting to the form of the question, and I am asking that the 
word be stricken and a less culpatory, objective word be substituted 
in the question. 


Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, did you ever tell anybody 

Ms. Kennedy. Could I have a ruling? 

Chairman Stokes. Can counsel rephrase his question? 

Ms. Kennedy. Thank you. 

Mr. Speiser. Did your brother John ever indicate to you that he 
assisted James in escaping from Missouri State Prison in April 

Mr. Ray. Not that I remember. 

Mr. Speiser. Did you ever tell anybody that John assisted James 
in escaping from Missouri State Prison? 

Mr. Ray. I have never told nobody anything like that, but I am 
positive that you can run some informants up here, ex-convicts or 
FBI informants that will say whatever you want to hear. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to have 
marked for evidence and introduced into the record MLK exhibit 
F-599 which reflects the notes of author George McMillan, taken 
in a series of interviews with the witness, Jerry Ray; attached to 
the notes is a brief letter from Mr. McMillan to an attorney on the 
committee’s staff. 

Now, on page 25 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-599 


March 16, 1978 

Dear Mr. Eberhardti 

l*m returning herewith the copy of the Jerry 
Ray interview notes you handed me in your office 
yesterday . 

And, in compliance with your request, X have 
underlined in red ink those words , phrases , and 
sentences which are my own notes, thoughts, inter- 
lineations • : , - i;.’ 

*' .* ' ' ' . . K 

I understand from your phone call this morale 
ing that you will be sending me a voucher for the V. 
expenses I incurred in coming to Washington to'be^ v ./;- r 
interviewed by you and members of your staff# r :' 

. ,r:i i 

Sincerely ji nfti > 

... • %K ^ 

: l^,/Mic£aelEberhardt 
J Select committee on Assassinations^ 
"U*Sv-House of Representatives ^ 

,3331 iitouse Office Building^ Annex 2 r : > . 
^Washington, -DC ^20515 '&&*$&£*** 



MON* DAY, JUNE 26, 1972 — 

Went only once New Orleans — Florida several -yrQCT 
tintes. He r d pull job. $1,000 — $1,000 — he’d take 
off, go Florida-, New Orleans. 

Dope started in Army 

• & 

He’d go on vacation after every hit (robbery) 
--'go California. ** - — 

He never screwed punk in prison* 

p£to&/ran prison. Nash ‘was liked. Rumor is 
Nash committed suicide (JER said) was because his 
daughter pregnant by black man. 

4 JER talked about Robert de Pugh, Minute Man, 
leader.- There arc Minute Men iu Jeff City. 

Melba was not prostitute. 

That was KK did stabbing in Jeff City. 

Some of those fellas make themselves The Klan after 
they get in. Hadn’t been in Klan before. Menards JK- — 
were Klan inside. They were dangerous, out to 

themselves. v O' 

They all pack shivs. Shivs, Jinny, Bums 
file down a spoon. Nobody bother them. - - 

He did get more bitter over, the years* 

Stuff about Knasas City, girl, signature man gTXZ T 
doesn't sound right now. * * 

J ) 

I used to sit around -<wo or 

three hundred thousand dollars -- g being 

rehabilitated -- but these dreams fell apart when. I ' 
got out -- like ll charter a plane. 

Your mind acts completely different in there 
(in jail). Different lawyers have different , 

Even old crazy Hill. 


ge Z - -Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago--Monday , June 26, 1972 

If you took something of his, he'd kill you — 
it.K was- some kind of a challenge to him. 

He's fanatic about his health (mineral oil). — 

Body — always does exercises no matter where he goes: 
walks on his hands, push-ups. Been doing it for years 
and years. 

He always like kids; when he's around — they're 
the only ones he shows afffection to, not grown-ups. 

Comes out whenever you're around him.' 1 • 

„ Don’t talk about your people in prison because^W^ 

that gets you in a depressed mood. ; 

(Escape Meet) 


The town was St. Auber — the trusties told 
JER about town. Jack missed him because JER didn't 
get there — Jack had given him pay phone and JER ; . 

called it and Jack came.. Whal^he told Huie was true -- 
a k little creek by St. Auber "u Jerry went down there 
a couple X of times. Little creek just before come in 
to St. Auber from West -- Jimmy told Jack where to 
pick him up. They went East St. Louis and then Chicago. 

Jerry wouldn't eat rice at dinner — "That's . - 

Japanese food.” Like father, like son. 

Knollwood Country Club, Lake Forest, 111. 

JER wrote Foreman 10 reasons why he wouldn't 
plead guilty. Cot from Foreman 1) hurt my social 
standing; 2) number Nixon, Wallace, Humphrey supporters 
in Memphis -- that he would never be convicted. 

JER was getting more and more depressed way 
he was locked up in Memphis. Pleaded guilty becaase 
he wanted get out of that place. 



gage 3—Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago--Tuesday , June 27, 1972 

(Atlanta Bombing) 


JER had 14th St. place in Atlanta, iuxy vas 
from Atlanta. He didn't know tfaxy-Cuy well. Met him 
in Atlanta. Guy didn't know anything about JER. He 
was racist guy, hated King, Nggrocs, '-Met him in bar. 
JER didn't trust Guy. They were gonna blow house up. 
Guy was supposed to be expert.. If expert, he must 
have been in dynamiting before. JER said Cuy lived 
around there. JER frequented this bar -- it had pool 
table — play pool with this guy. Also TV. This 
brought discussion -- some trouble with Black — - 

policeman shooting Black. This started discussion . 
between him and JER -- Guy said should give cop medal. 
Dynamiting came up. He knew Guy knew what he vas doing 
but guy talked too much. The two of them talked 
about it. They made plans. JER felt guy would be 
bragging. He was big guy. JER called him BUTCH. 

Butch vas always in that bar. He also came to JER’s 
apartment. They made plans there. The guy had the 
dynamite. Theyewasn't no money involved -- just for 
their own satisfaction. 

JER krnws all these groups -- where they are-- 
their addresses -- phone numbers. FIERY CROSS -- 
LIEERTY LOBBY. Would know must how to get in touch. 

He knew Courtney -- how to get in touch -- 

Way JER told Jerry it was simply that they 
met in bar over remarks about cop shooting Negroes. 

JER dq- gsav u f" ?. T i ow Ms — — " -» ~ 4rc would be 

listening -- know what everybody saying 3 or. 4 tables 
. from him -- whoxx was for him, who against him. 

Stoner never did have no contract with JER. 

If he had, don't worry JER would have had plenty of 
money to leave U.S. 

(Fiery Cross) 

Only organization ever mentioned was FIERY CROSS. 
JER mentioned that several times. He asked me to 
write to then -- THE SWORD and THE FIERY CROSS. This 
was before he plead guilty -- when Foreman was on case. 

-When. Stoner went sec JER he wanted criminal* 
part, not //6 k* LIFE* JER wanted Klan lawyer in Memphis- - 
Went to Ryan, even before Foreman. JER knew one guy 
belonged to Klan -- something like Stephen^ -- from 
Florida. JER met him in Alabama -- rooming house. 

Met Stephens in Alabama. In Fla. (JER said) Klan 
has kitty for legal defense. JER finally told me to 

forget about iOftt[rG -in FlcJVf C/J.U 3$ - - he, tiLtto' os&fpg 


Page 4--Jcrry Ray — 2nd Chicago- -Tucsdayy June 27, 1972 

everything except zip code. 

p 4 * / (Stevens) 

i ouTtveY - /*dt 

Son ir ij arz name was Stevens, Jacksonville, FLA* ^ 

. JER knew him while he was in ±a Biraingham— 

But they weren’t gonna do anything together. Just told 
me to get in touch to help get lawyer. 

Stevens only bar-room or casual acquaintance. 

He wouldn't have known what was on JER’s mind. 

. (Last Phone Call) 

That last phone call -- all excited and 
worked up — more anxious couldn't wait for day. 

- When talk Chicago- — or at no other time • 
in the whole year — did he mention any group or 

He wasn’t plotting nothing with Stevens 
There wasn't nothing to tell me. , . 

The only guy that I can put on any kind of 
a conspiracy is that guy in Atlanta. 

( Kennedy s) 

Only people he talked hbout were/ politicians — 
cussing Democrats -- Johnson, Humphrey -- Kennedys 
(thought they were lowest trash in world — "Ail 
three of them should meet same fate. Wiped out.") 

Also Jacob Javits. Johnson was lowest of bunch -- a 
southerner and a turncoat. His mind's on political 
stuff all the time, then and now t alks nore about 
people he hates than n co nle he _ likes'] ^Coldwat er 
would have shot down Blacks . " JER 

First tine 1 noticed anti-Black feeling was 
after he got out of Army. 

For all talking ue di<f those times, the most 
talk was about how to make-^ Of course, you can't talk > 
. to Jimmy but so long before politics comes up. lie likes 
Nixon and Agnew. 

(Chicago Meeting April 1967) 

I knew all about escape but didn't know when 
they would arrive. Jack net him because he was in 
St. Louis and I was in Chicago. I was half-way 
kaXrcc expecting phone call. I got -it. I couldn't 
leave right then. Next day I went net Atlantic 

Hotel. They had already checked in. Main reason took 
separate rooms. JER been in long time. We all got 
girls that night. One I got called Co-Co. We talked 
in Jimmy's room. I registered Jerry Ryan. Jimmy 
also registered Ryan. Don't know how Jack registered. 
$6.50 or $7.00 for a room. . 

ji if /tt was kind of strange seeing X was 

but I knew better than t^ . him. He would 
have knocked me down. 

After we talked for so long we went down to 
Victorian Hotel bar -- had several drinks. 

Then back to rooms — Then JER said "I better 
get me a head job" so we -parted for a while. 

At bar, all the talk we did, not over 20 or 25 
minutes, was just friendly -- he's serious, he's a 
businessman — - - 

Main thing we talked about was this pxa porno- 
graphic business. Him and Jack talked porno -- Jack had 
experience. Had figured out before, how to run ads. 

They were just discussing, neither telling the other. 

Jack said ads Midnight, Insider -- "The bigger the 
ad, the more the response. Put everything in that" legal. 
They send a legal picture. Then pay prostitute to make 
some real strong pictures." 

JER real interested -- said he read in prison 
how guys get rich off it. Said get Mexican girls to 
make pix — do almost anything — for nothing. 

JER said in prison didn't have equipment to 
learn how to make and develop pix. "That wouldn't be 
no problem," JER said. "Problem is to get names and 
sorting out good ones from bad ones. Have to be 
careful because federal people get you." 

'.John said, -- "Way to beat that is get pix.-- 
no fingerprints on pix or envelope -- no return address -- 
mail it at post office -- you get the money first 

His big idea was to make plenty of money. 

347 6--Jerry Ray — 2nd Chicago--Tuesday , June 27 > 1972 

He never vent all out on one thing but he 
thought he would turn that' porno into a big thing. 

But it’s a slow process -- You have to build that thing -- 
Who’s right and who’s not right and JER* s not too 
patient a fellow. 

(Chg o. Meeting — continued) 

Ke discussed where to run them ads -- w 
either in underground papers or scandal sheets. 

Woman knows if she answers ad one of those papers that 
you want everything. . \ 

When cane back Chicago after 1st Canada he 
told me about ads he had run ads in Toronto paper FLASH J 

or something like that. . He said something there about 
French culture. He got a few replies. He met one 
girl there from ad. He was surprised she was nice-looking 
woman. Met her twice. She was all hot, got head job * — 
divorcee. -- 

•’How can. person just go for one way — just 
that one thing* r — said Jerry laughing. 

Porno was the main topic that night — less 
chance of getting caught — if you did it right 
also he thought there *d be more money in it. 

He had graduated (he thought) from this 
robbery, burglary. Didn’t want to go back to that. 

c' ' # He was running dope , too, no matter what FBI says." 

We discussed that kidnapping for a while -- Him 
and me discussed that -- That’s too rough*-- They never 
Sc give up on you. v : ** ' v v 

From time he got Chicago until he was caught ’ - 

Porno was main thing on his mind. -*'-"7 ; : y 

(Dancing School -- Bartending) * * - . ‘ * .Vi >• 

Dancing School because he really wanted to learn. 

He always felt uneasy about dancing. He’s not good at 
meeting people. Ke said *- "I can’t dance, Jack^cnn’t v 
dance, Jerry can’t dance.” He thought he’d blend in 
better with people. It wasn’t just to meet ’em for sex. 


Pago 7- -Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago—Tuesday , June 27, 1972 

Didn't want to nix so much as to blend with them. 
Baseball, sports, entertainment, he” didn't feel at 
case, couldn’t get in Conversation- 

Bartending kind of same thing Even if 

you’ve got a withdrawn personality good place to 
learn to talk -- people will talk to bartender -- 
ax especially women -- would resent other men getting 
fresh and tale all kind of stuff from bartender. 

(Women) - ' m . 

» He was looking for a way to approach women. 
It’s always been on him that’s its a kind of task to 
meet women -- He’d like to meet better women. 

He wanted to be able to get a woman on his own — - 
.who liked him — it’s bad on a person's ego just to 
always be getting a woman from a bellhop. _ 

/ (Girl at Grey Rocks) 

Girl at Grey Rocks -- he was using her for 
•information — -she worked government. Had Head job 
wasn't main thing. Reason he broke off with her he 
was getting serious. lie really liked her. She 
wouldn’t give him head job. He screwed her. He got 
afraid and broke off her. First time since early 
Chicago days that he liked a girl. 

That wasn’t his aim in life, to' s any stay 
with woman. He wanted more than that. The 

• * Only 2 things lie did (in 12 months) was dope 
business and porno business — he didn’t roll nobody, 
hustle nobody. 

(Porno in Birmingham) 

Kfxxy Jerry vent down there -- JER wanted 
Jerry to go in with him -- talked about having to 
make own movies, pix of everything, girls with girls, 
boys with boys, in the rear, animals — had to have 
everything -- talked in his motel room -- 

Atlanta police 404-659-1513 . 

~ (Birmingham Meeting JER 5 Jerry, Pcmo) 
JEiTTjnet Jerry at plane ar3 we went his motel . 

He wanted me for Porno -- But he had these 
2 or 3 runs from New Orleans to L.A. Then 1 was gonna 


Page S--Jcrry Ray- -2nd Chicago- -Tuesday , June 27 , 1972 

stay put in L.A. and handle porno business — for he 
might like to travel some, -Tn l * 

He had wanted me to go down Birmingham in I 
Chicago but I was getting divoTce- | 

But I went Birmingham shortly after he got 1 
there- He paid' for trip to and from- - 

Porno was main thing- Dope thing was just 
temporary --He was gonna get away from that entirely 
iatcr on. 

me -•-**- 

lie wanted nna make dope runs with him -- go to 
Mexico with him to make movies. 

. Jerry doesn’t know of any dope or jewel 
smuggling across Mexican border. . . > • - * 

I might make first dope run to L.A. and stay there. 

1 wished I had gone with him. He could have 
done porno if he could have had just one thing on his/ 
mind- If I had gone with him, if money had really 
started rolling in it’s possible he could have forgot 
about THE BIG BOY- But I don’t know. If I’d gone with 
him (to Mexico, etc.) he might not have done anything. 

But he- couldn’t keep his mind just on Porno. 

He did get pix in Mexico, a lot. He sold a few 
in L.A. Nothing to amount to anything. 

He didn't make any movies. Just pictures (stills) 
and this vaan’t of him. It was somebody. Women and 
women — that stuff takes time -- You take even lot of 
prostitutes won’t take stuff like that. . 

He mixed that with a kind of vacation. Just 
enjoyed himself- - . 

Carried on experiments in porno — how to 
set stuff up. ' * 

Cot pix of woman and a a woman. - 

Didnt ask me come L.A- because he had just 
about given up on me and he didn’t have anybody else 
he could trust. 

(Mexico -- Los Angeles) 

When he got kxSx L.A. he started working like 

fell ftr ValTa&2;h^4op2"W'T» , £ 0 / 2 . 

39-935 0 - 79 - 23 


Pace 9- -Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago --Tuesday, June 27, 1972 

It would h drive him almost crazy to see King 
on TV but I don't think he was stalking him then. 

What doing Wallace was people in 

. Mustang to sign petition for Wallace -- Cot people ±h 
around hotel, in bars, maybe as many as 300 people. 

He never rang doorbells, just talking that stuff to 
people he ran into. ONly thing on his mind from time 
he got up until time go to bed. -- He .wasn't quiet 
about his ideas either. * 

NOTE: Did 

He still Ax talks about that till today — 
how he helped Wallace get on ballot* He thinks a± if 
Wallace president would put heat on governor Tenn* and 
commute sentence to 10 years. 

- First thing he- did in Mexico was to get lay of 
land — (this typical criminal approach, to stop and - 
think) . Went” there big reason was to make contact — 
see what he could do. 

. Same as. Canada -- to make contacts fi — to 
look situation — to feel it out — to -line things up 

He didn't mean to marry girl in Mexico -- 5 k He 
just meant to use her. He would never get married to no 
woman I / 

When he came back from Canada to Chicago he 
said he had some with him. More than enough for him — 
but don't know whether $200 worth or $2,000. lie didn't 
talk about any business in Canada then. 

He tried to talk me into going into business 
with him and when I wouldn't he left car with me. 

. The whole thing about Raoul and running drugs 
from Canada was bullshit. He didn't go Canada for 
porno either. 

It was just to Zook Canada over — see what 
things were like. 


Pago 10--Jerry Ray- -2nd Cliicago--Tuesday , June 27, 1972 


But from tine he escaped until time he vas 
caught in porno. 

Raoul was to throw HUIE off. — For some reason 
he didn't want HUIE to know about porno -- He would 
laugh in his cell about how he was throwing HUIE off. 

All the Windsor- Detroit thing DOPE was BULLSHIT. 

Mexican DOPE also bullshit. 

& ' : V 

Only thing Jerry knows about for sure about 
DOPE business is from New Orleans to L.A. . - 

It .is dangerous down there in New Orleans. 

They get pretty mean down ther. 

Stuff about in the tire — BULLSHIT — kept ‘ _'V . 

dope Tight in glove compartment. , 

. Way from New Orleans to L.A. — well, because . 
important thing, is contacts . / ->i-- 

Dope vas a minor thing to him -- I don't know - - 

exactly how much he made. It was hard stuff --’He V. 

picked up from guy a named Eddie and delivered. I 

When I called, I said: . • ■ * - • j -v 

. "Eddie?" ’ ‘ ’ 

\ . 

"Who do you want?" he said. * - 

/Then I told him JER's brother, etc. 

'•Everything's all right. Nothing for you to 
worry about." . ^ - 1% 

A very short conversation. * _ f - *' v \ i -' r ? : ; 

Usually when guys get picked up they tell everything 
Jimmy just wanted guy to know he^ hadn't talked. 

Jimmy was making run the time he came to Chicago 
from New Orleans -- He left and vent California. v 

He told me had a run to make -- 

Divorce was big (obsessive! thing to Jerry -- 
had wi tneTs eT^Tineci up, everything . Told him I*d go 
Tn with KlcPwhen I got divorce but he never asked me 


Page ll--Jerry Ray--2nd Chi cago--Tuesday , June 27, 1972 

He must have made drug contact In Canada, h’e 
knew it before he went Birmingham. * When Jerry went 
Birmingham -- JER already knew about runs. 

I think he made between $3,500 and $5,000 each 
run for two runs. 

He spent quite a ia bit of money -- hotels, 
whores, food -- 

If killed King, he didn’t figure be that much 
heat. He was going to Rhodesia. He was desperate m 
London. Had "more heat on him than he ever dreamed of . 

- He would never have been caught (he told JER) 
if he had enough money --He expected make big score 
in U.S. before he left but too much heat, he couldn't. 

If he had four thousand dollars he wouldn’t have 
been caught to this day. : . 

- He figured tine was right. Everything jelled. 
Although newly broke, he figured he could make some' 
money -- didn't realize be so much heat on him. 

Things falling into place, moved King from 
Rosemont.. . 

He knew he was coming back to Memphis. Though 
that would be a good place -- Memphis police up in. 
arms about King, town against him. 

Situation -- V /allace OK on ballot -- Porno lit, 
a flop -- only on hisHmJ- nd was King -- only 

See, it wasn’t necessarily that he would have 
to leave country after killing King — he didn’t see 
how much heat there would have been. His main idea 
was not going Canada but Mexico. He had it on his mind 
that he might have to leave country and Canada was 
best wasy to go. But if hadn't had all that heat on 
him lie would probably be living in Mexico today. 

It wasn’t his plan to abandon his car and every* 
thing. His ACTUAL - PLAN was after Memphis was to go to 
Atlanta, pick up his stuff and go to Mexico. It was all 
over news, FBI came into it right away. He heard it 
while he was leaving Memphis. 


Page 12^-Jerry Ray — 2nd Chicago- -Tuesday , June 27, 1972 

By time he got Atlanta ditched car and caught 
bus for Canada. 

He never smoked a cigarette in' his life. 

He didn’t get lost. . Took Interstate out of 
Memphis *■ — vent over into Mississippi and then turned 

Ha d King been to Memphis first -time by March 17? 

Kosc operation . He could blend into crowd in 
looks -- except tor two things; his ear and his nose. 

Laws on, asked King come -- extended invi tation. -- 
a t end of February. Did he announce it at this time? * 

"Ask him? " ' ~ ‘v *• ’ 

Lawson telephoned King on March 17 to Rive 

in hos~7Qigeles. Did King announce 
aF licTwas %oing Memphis? That day? Same day 

- briefin 


~jT ElT leTt Los Angeles 7" 

. King arrived Memphis March J L8 . 

A nnounced that night he was returning Memph is 
March 22hg l ~~ ~ . .. • ” . .* . 1 

Rnt^pwing March 21st and postponed morning of 
21st to lf8thT 

But 2Sth was bad day, riot -- King announced 
would return . 

What did King sav about his plans on March J.6 
or 17 in L.A.? ... 

Jimmy told Jerry that something went wrong in .•> 
Alabama. . . \ 

He wanted cut King off before Poor People 's March-- 
That if King went, some strong laws would be passed. 

Also he figured wouldn't be all-out manhunt 
because. Hoover hated King, didn't want him come Washingtpn 

But it worked just opposite, hated King so much 
was forced to go out and catch Jimmy. 

Even though Jimmy breaks law all the time, he goes 
by that law book. If King got laws changed, that threat 
would” - Have upset Jimmy -- more than King's publicity or 


Page 13-“Jerry Ray- - 

2nd Chicago-Tuesday , June 27, 1972 

The main thing was Alabama -- but if not there, 


(He didn't have right gun, did he, to shoot in 
Selma, didn't buy rifle until after. Selma.) 

left los Angeles he knew he was 

Rising gonna do it. 

'phone call from Memphis was only one when 
he really said anything about doing anything. 

He bought rifle because he knew it was. gonna 
have to be from a distance. . 

He took rifle out and target-practiced’ that 
day he bought in Birmingham at Aero marine * 

Also he wanted rifle* do it in one shot. 

He's an expert shot. 

Call day before -- Je just acted excited,. 

• jubilant . . 

He called Jerry about 9 (nine) times — once 
from Mexico, Memphis, Texas, New OrleansX&W/ 

That first meeting in Chicago — he wouldn't 
even talk much about N's or MLK in front of Jack. 
King didn't even come up -- if it had. Jack would 
have stopped it. *.- 

First time anything serious about King was 
that time I went to Alabama but it hadn't jelled then, 
no definite time and place. But when he talked about 
him his whole face changed. 

He had mentioned King in prison when I visited* 
him. . "Somebody ought to kill that coon." . 

He talked f definitely about killing King that - 
* tine he came Chicago from New Orleans and we talked 
Cypress Gardens. 

Still had Porno on mind when he left L.A. So he 
did still have two things on his mind even then -- ,when 
MLK had* become main thing. 

SEX MANUALS -- g Going back years, since he first 
mentioned sex, he only talked about head job. 

He night have wanted know how, in case he had to 
screw a woman -- he probably hadn't had. 

He talked about leaving country even before' 
Jeff City -- where he could start new. 

Thought about leaving country even, x before 
he had King in mind. 

■ * Mexican girls give best head jobs in the world. 

He said best he ever had. 


i „ If H£R could have got in touch with Perez -- 
he could have got money for killing MLK. Trouble is 
to get to those people -- you can't just walk in. 

Never did talk about making money from killing .-' , - 
King. Didn't try get money from Courtney. : " i: 

He said sent Jerry $1,000 and I gave 'him $900. 

Jack gave him $3,S00. 

Kept some money on him — couple thousand -- 
when he travels doesn't spend as much as people think 

he does.* , *./ ;■ 

Only money JER had: ' : ,.i * V 

1) what Jerry and Jack gave him, - 

2) Klingeman's restaurant, . v . 

3) dope. ■_ v'.- - ’-V;. v • 

$4,600 ' from prison " J ' 

7,000 drugs \ * -• 


Kent to Birmingham, establish residence, live 
there while drug runs. It was to be like Germany. He'd 
brag about being from "Wallace Country.” - 

' Jerry gonna take week off in August and visit 
JER and Jack. • ; . v .. 

About being broke at time killed MLK — he didn't j| 
realize how much heat. Thought he could go Mexico, if if 
necessary sell car. 

, Kent to Canada first time to look the place out.'* 

How to get out of country. 

Met at Cypress Tavern three times -- once before 
he went L.A., twice while working Winnetka. tec might talk 

39-935 003 : 


Pago 15--Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago --Wednesday , June 25,1972 

He was gonna leave country. ? *!le just didn't 
like United States. Not the way it was going- Way 
back in Fifties when first civil rights. 

He didn't leave from Canada first time because 
he wanted to get Wallace in and kill King. 

I don’t believe he escaped" for just that one 
thing -- killing King. He felt everybody had respon- 
sibilities -- if you don't do your duty it's not worth 
living. But he had several things on his mind. 

He had everything set up in Mexico for a life 

after killing King. 

■ • 

He must have studied photo in Birmingham. 

Porno — trace ads Toronto FLASH. He must have 
had postoffice box. hould have had to give name. Could 
check that way. 

But. he didn't place any ads to sell his pictures. 
Didn't consider Xh himself set up nor ready to go into 
business of selling. . 

What happened pix? Does FBI have any? Ste in? 
Were any in Mustang? : 

He hadn't reached stage of placing ads 
customers only for participants . 


Grace Weiss -- Neighborhood Bar — 20th and 
Hickory, St. Louis. Homer Townsley, bail bondsman, 
owned bar. 

Lonely Hearts Club was to get people for 
pictures Porno. 

/ punning is bullshit — ''comedy stuff.” ‘ 

Porno in L.A. -- made some pix in.L.A. as 
result of Free Press ad. 

Cable release was so he could have pix of 
himself getting head job. But he would never let pix 
be taken of his face. 

Call New Orleans number 3S5-7581 cited by 
We is b e rgj p V ^536^ 

He got sex magazines, sex manuals for porno 
business, studying up on all that stuff. 

He never liked sex maeazines in orison -- didn't 

want any. 

He didn’t rob market in Montreal* 

New O rl e ans police dept. 504-S21-2000 * 

April 0 

Officer BOU gfglilS 
" " Carol Goman 

Info. ofHS — SH^OOQ 

11 ao_CST. % 

* "No recordd in our detective bureau of any 
such meeting . " : 

THURSDAY. JUNE 1Q7 7: Phone conversation, office 

^aroX~G qm ^ "information office, New~Or leans police dept* • 




July 12. 1975 Interview with Jerry Kg 

Jerry bed an account at Wheeling State Bank, 111., with - ^ '**- 

$2,900 in it when Jmiomy escaped. -- : - L 

He had teen getting money from Snitty, the Jeff City guards ; 
from lo65 to 1967. That is, for. two lyezara. And it came to 
stout $2,900* • • ; . ■ ; . 

Before that. Jack got the money from Smithy. That want on ; 
atout Ivo years. Jack had something between $2,000 and $2,500 
to give Jimmy in Chicago. NOTE: Was any of thia money in Caol's ' 

tank account? # 

Smitty sent the money in* postal moneyd orders, usually 
$100 ata a time. Tbpy were togut and malledfrom Jeff City. - - 
Sometimea Smitty ^sent cash ~ a $100 till usually when be eent * ^ . 

cash'. \ ™y. : * 

It was all this one guard, Smitty. He got shook down later, an 
tit* Stadbt fired. ■ r . * ... .-4: . .. 

1 Jjmniy , s hustling wasn't all drugs. It was anything. Sandwiches, 
magazines, books drugs. SSame guard bro ght drugs in. Smitty 
hustled for about 10 gos^R-guay guys. JER paid guys in the v 
kitched for goedr-e^ food, etc. 

Jerry took the moneyd got to the Wheeling bank and 
deposited it in an account in Jerry's real name. Jerry thinks 
the-PBI knows about the account because they asked him about It- 
But in Jerry's eyes it was always, "Jimmy's account," and he 
never took any money from it for has his own use, he says. 

When they et at the Atlantic, Jerry was there only one night, 
be only had one night off. "I gave him everything in the 
Wheeling account excpt for two or three hundred," Jerry says*. 

This, later turned out to be $300. ' r 

Account name was Jerry William Hay. 

He handed JER aroynd $2,000 in $100 bills. 

. ; v 

Snitty had been sending money out to Jack before me. Probably 
from 1963. JER was hustling whole time be was in Jeff City. 

And thru the same guard. Jack at the time he received money was 
in Benaonville, Illinois, working at White Pines Gold Club. He 
had a postoffice box there. Jack handed Jimmy about §2,000 in . 

$100 bills, a few $50* s. Jack never handled any more money after 

Pepper Printing didn’t have anythnignto do with J ia~7 T 3 
hustle. Carol didn’t over, known that jimmy sacared until after he 



pace 2 — notes on July 12 . 

Int e rvl ew -with Jerry Kav 

Jimmy carried the money on him, either in hia suitbasa ax or 
in his paitta. 

Remember that he had the money he made in the £ Winnetka 
restaurant — on top of vhat Jerry and Jack gave him. That vould 
mean that he had between {4,500 and $5,000 when he vent to 

He called Jerry up when he got back from Canada, surprised 
Jerry — which means that he had not called Jerr y from^J Ianada. 

Told J erry^to^eet^im at a place that Jerry was not f amilSr " ! 

with, on North AVenue. Jeryy was living at Nort brook then, 
said he had got married, told me that h&s wife was now living in ' ' ^ 

a samall town near MorriBtown, Tennessee, and thzt ha had a 
13 - 7 ear-old son there. V : v 

The night the two of themd met on North Avenue, Jimmy did not / 
say anything about the Gray Hocks woman which makes Jerry think 
that shax he did like that woman, and he told Jerry later that he 
drid. . - . 

When Jimmy was ready to leave 
Chicago for Birmingham, he dro've them down to the Greyhound 
bus station in Chicago, got out and turned the car over to Jerry, 

NS* and left. 

In Chicago, Jimmy did tell Jerry that he had a contact in 
Montreal who put him in touch with a guy in Birmingham who put him 
in touch eventually with The Fence in New Orleans. 

In the Birmingham safe deposit box Jimmy put ^jaoney, car 
title, plus "Raynax I. D." "Remember he was switching I. D.*a 
right then," says Jerry. ... . 

The Fence offered Jerry a Job. He appare Titly estimated Jerry 
as a somewhat less high-powered operator than Jimmy. He offered* 
the job of simply pikcing up a car someplace and driving it to 
Los Angeles, or someplace else. The car would alreadyd have te 
drge drugs in a tire. But Jimmy carried the* deugs on his 
person, said Jerry, and delivered them to someone at the St. 
Francis in Los Angeles. 

Jerry said The Fence really liked Jimmy, and they got close. 
Jerry talked with ihax&sHxax The Fence twixe, the se ond time 
for more than 2 hours. He said The Fence had lots of confidence 
in Jimmy. And Jimmy had confidence in him, talkdd with The Fence 
about hustling in prison. 

About the ?Grey Rocks girl: "He had feelings for her. I 

know because he dldn f t mention her to me." 


pace 3 -- notes on July 12. 1Q75 Interview with Jerry Rav 

The gu ys name 

Reynard J. Rochon 

246 Crowder Road 
Orleans, La. 

Jerry gave m e t he address as 7080 Dr eux Avenue, but wh en 
Tc flTled gava na_t. be Crowder Ro ad- address • 

T~waa pleased to~find this confirmation, that the" guv actually 
g xl a t ed7 aft e r~^ t r o helm . 

The way a fence works. If you brought him §10,000 in 
Jewelry he would pay you §3,000 cash. Jimmy would bring in. enu£ 
for §600, §800 or even §1,000. ' * .. . * 

Jimay hauled dope to Loa Angeles. 

Tfte last time Jerry went to see The Fence, he gave Jerry 
§1,0C0. That was January 20, 1975 — this year 1 
"Jimmy wasn' t putting heat on hio, M says Jerr jr. ne ’just asked . 
him. 11 Of c our se _ t here is an implied threat that, Jimmy will 
expaoss" The ffgnce^ 

The F^nce gave Jerry §800 the first time he went to him, this 
was the time that Jerry saw Courtney, in I969 (check Courtney 
interview for exact date). 

J^mmy hauled dop9 to Los Angeles. . ' 

He knew Jimmy es Harvey Lowmeyer. * 

Of courae he, the Fence, didn't know that Jimmy meant to kill 

When Jerry went down the second time they met at Howard 
Johnson's motel. That is where Jerry was supposed to have stayed, 
but he couldn't get a room and stayed Instead at The Tamanaca 
Downtown Motel. ....... 

Jimmy saw The Fence about 15 times. Sometimes he'd get only 
two or three hundred. When you're in them places, Jewelry stores, 
you don't pick iip no §20 watches. You don't g9.t nothing out of tba t. 

Call from Mexico* He called^He was high. How youi daf? 
doin T , flavin 1 a ways. You ought be over here laying out 
with these senSrltas. 

Jerry confirmed many telephone calls. Apparently in most qf 
them Jimmy did n't say anything much more than he did from Mexico. 

It was the same kind of Jazz, nonsense, Ju9t wanting somebody to 
talk to. 

He didn't call Christmas: "Christmas was Just another day to 


Ther e wasnt anyone else that Jimmy had deals with in the time 
he was an escaped convict before he killed King. "Jimmy didn't 

have anything to do with anybody else but thia guy in Kev Orleans. 

v-v * rO ■;* > ~ * M 


pa ge 4 — notea on July 12. 1975 Interview with Jerry Hag 

We knew ( Jerry knew) that he went twice to New Orleans*-' 

He went more than that. He would get In that car and drive and 
crlve and drive. He was a good driver* 

He sent money from Birmingham In 1?67. Sometime between 
September 15 and October 15. He sent § 1 , 500 * Jerry kept It In 
a safe deposit box at the Wheeling state bank. This money kep 
by Jerry for his expenses? after Jimay^ capture. It wass this 
money that Jimmy was talking about when he told people in London 
jtfcai to see hla brother Jerry if money was needed. The sum 
was actually §1,800, for Jerry still had §300 In bank account* 

* NOTESc: On July 1$, 1975» I called the Conti nental Bank 

jr ancb^t~0~ f Har^_alr poi: t "and £s±x as kad the nota ry thereof the 

^6at~docua9nt~ha_d Il3eQn found* This 1 a ..the p_owe r 0 f attorney ^ 

Jerry gave me^fcoexamlne his bank records at th e JW.h eellng bank * 
T^talk ed rwi'tb M ia s Wendv^Roaenberpc. 0 1 Hare branch , Contin ental 
Bfl ak*~Box' gSoq7~Chlcaso, Illinois* She told me that someone 
hair found and turned . In the document, and that, after a couple 
of _daya f ah a had destoryed It, because it was a ”elgal~] 
docu ment. 11 - .• 

"5inmy kept New Orleans srfe deposit box in name of Harvey 
Lovmeyer*. It must have “just expired. 11 Might have taken it 
out Just before went Selma, that is the money in it* Jimmy 
vent to New Orlenaa Just before he vent to Selma* 

Jimmy held lup Jewelry stores. In prison he was known 
as The Hole, and The Roofer. He liked 3o go in over the roof. 

He would choose a placw ehre it looked like that e¥e»-in- even 
if the burglar alarm w nt off it m would ' take the npolice 
a few mintues to get there. You know, he considers himself a 
xp professional. 

The Fence told Jerry .that Jimmy was Just about the best 
all-around hustler he lhad ever met. 

Jerry opened the Manufacturers Trust account (of which I 
have his savings book) on February 1969 with the §300 that was 
left over from -the Wheeling Trust account. - 



Jerry Ray Interview \ - 

Monday; Memorial Day, May 29, 1972 
Page 1 . 

. Jeff City Integration- JER told Jerry on visit that 
he had been involved Incident -with Burns- Poiry had control 
prison that tice-He was con-wise# He really knew* JER • 
told Jerry Menards involved* Burns* brother was detective 
city police St. Louis-hated each other. 

JER only Drake, Burns, one of Menards was only one 
he would- Drake got out before JER escaped- Drake looked 
Jerry up-He was in that money business with JER 
** Drake in St# Loui3 now unless back in. Mother lives there* 
got out 1966# His brother in Terre Haute* 

Somebody to contact Incident had Just happened- 
n *That ends integration here, " JER 

Germany* 1948 or 19^9-made trips to Quincy from ^ 

Chicago living Quincy 214 Spring St. 

Before I went St. Charles 1950/ Ceal and old man lived 
downstairs, drahk alot so I moved upstairs, rented out 
upstairs front rooms. I lived in 2 rear rooms, also Jack. 
Little kid3 stay downstairs. I used set pins. Wouldn’t 
wake up old man- sleeps all time but can hear needle drop. 

Every time came Quincy give me a few dollars. Kidded me 
I was from mixed parents, might not be his brother* 

Would call me Nigger# Because dark complexion* 

When drinks he warms up to you lot more. Him and 
old man go out drink quite a bit. Sometimes Willie with them* 
- Came upstairs M my half-brother” He was drinking. 

Old man must know, old man end Lucille don’t go for that 
stuff (nazl) Never forget that name-Strohelm 

Told how he had worked some niggers over-Stroheim used 
go in bar where JEE went on duty KP, That * s when brought ■ 
Emmet Daniels up-They had worked some blacks over. JEE 
and Daniels got 2 Black guys in Tavern, told them to leave, 
he and Daniels worked them over. 

Jack and Jimmy didn’t see each other until I960- 
10 or 15 years later, none during Fifties 

We knew even before he went in that he meant to . % ' 

stay in Germany-old man knew that 

Stroheim asked him to Join some kind of org. * Ee 
told Stro. he was coning back U. S. disillusioned* 

Changed his whole llfe-the Army, his disillusionment. 

He was behind Stumm 100 % JEE never went to hi 3 house. 
When JER drinking he run around with Old Kan-He 
Wouldn’t see Carol if sober. He get old. man drunk* 

He don’t tell a woman nothing. 

Girl friend Chicago. Engaged. Took stock car races. # 
He talked to Mabel quite a bit until he started getting 
in trouble, still her favorite. She was high-toned. f 

I got Jail 1954. I wrote her a letter. Please send §10 v 
if you don’t I’m going tell all* 

JER told JErry at Menard Jerry tried black-nail her. 

He always had strong beliefs. Believed Germans getting r 
raw deal. 


Jerry Hay Interview ' 

Monday* Memorial Day, May 29, 1972 
Page 2 - 

Luoille told him he gonna get killed with his Ideas * 
even before he got in Army while working at Tannery. 

Mabel used send cigarettes 

He used gamble a lot over there-poker-good gambler- 
win money 

Sent money back to Mom- she took care of his money. 

She nut it In her name (in Alton bank?) 

Bought car when he got out of service (less than a' . 
year old )-ganbled, drank some-it wasn't long before money was 
gone-take old man out, play pool- . > 

He doesn't drink beer-those days nothing but whlskey- 
Screwdriver-he used to have pint of whiskey with him-mlx 
it with water- 

Only pills -goof balls -unt il after got out -of Army # 

1st "i knew was when went Jeff City- 

Jeff City- guard who used to bring JEH stuff got * 

caught-was fired-guards bring in stronger staff at Jeff City 
Number of hustlers at Jeff City. Some are known. 

They eventually get busted* If too much heat on you, 
guards don't like to fool with you. JER had hard stuff. 

Stuff yousilff, all kind of stuff. Just 2 people, 

the guard and Jimmy- JEH always known, nobody wanted 

to mess with- he's not gonna give anybody trouble, nobody gonna 

trouble him 

Guard bring stuff-in socks-JER kept stashed in. cell- 
only shakedown if under suspicion and JEr so quiet. 

When guard bring something he wants cash-Mo ney 
outlawed in 1950 *s-but all kinds money in prison 
If customer didn't have cash, JER would take 
cigarettes but charge more. . . 

$1 green worth $L .50 commissary or 6 packs cigarettes 
Little pills $1 benzies - 

Hard stuff was expensive 
. Guard only take cash ’ 

Guard could be in kitchen, in yard- 
but JER's was in cell block. _ 

No money in Kenard, can't make anything 
If hustling you first live good-keep clothes pressed - 
extra candy, orange drinks, radio, ice cream yards- 
A good hustler had everything, steaks, different 
kinds soups-lf you're a good hustler if a guy wants something 
you're supposed to have it. 

That's Jimmy's llfe-he's got to have something to do- * 
if he wasn't hustling, he’d go crazy, 

You only have so many hustlers-not everybody's got 
it in them- I haven' t-but everybody in prison knows the hustler 
in whole. prison 12 or 15 hustlers- v 

If no money in prison, no hustllng- 
as Poatiac, Menard 



Jerry Ray Interview . V. 

Monday, Memorial Day, May 29* 1972 3 

Page 3 

^X5*LiLi5Qni?h 1800 a Year 
_12_ ' „2_ Yea rs 

^55ZT 127550] 


tfhat_throws_ pe°pl e off-why _^lld h e . go tojgork ft, 'f' £t,i 
wfren^ heZ^etUSSz — He h ad h is/^re a s a na. 

John had around $3*000^' 'i&OO • * 

I had §1,000 V when JER escaped 

Guards send Jerry money Box 22, Wheeling, HI*- send 
In §100 hills In mall, nothing else in envelope 

He was el so paying lawyer in A Columbia, Mo. -Jerry 
would send him §100 or so — ^ J Xoo 

You're horn hustler, like baseball player-ever^*- 
body's born to be something-he's born to be one- 

Hustle2>-31fe a good one, he has lot of bullshit 
Jimmy quiet -everybody, bkack white know they can 
trust you -some people got that little extra- He can. get 
you this, he can get you that "" ’ 

Main thing trustworthiness 

Menard has good hustlers but there's nothing to - 

. In prison everybody would like to be one- but only 
a select few can make it. It's Just in you 

Main thing Is for guard to trust you- They 
could shake JER down sad nobody could break him— 

He wouldn't talk 

That's key-the guard's trust. # - 

You have to close-mouthed 
lazy person can't be hustler 

You have to get out -Jimmy talked to lot of people 
but he didn't have friends. 

little Menard is a hustler 
Call then Hustlers-not Merchants 
. The Hole sounds right for him 
lot of hustlers put on show-No t JER he Just wanted 
money, didn't put on no show-didn't want anybody to know hi? 

• Pill man 

-But JER dealt in everything. . -- 

probably started drugs Le 

JER sold Mustang to guard 


Jerry Ray Interview 

Tuesday, May 30, 1972 * - ; 

Page 1 

Some questions to aski A 

— — Qv&Tio N£_^ 

What were his reasons for working even though he 

had s fash 

he develop as hustler? Got Jils 

s tart at Jeff City? ___ 

If he told Iinc llTft his whilft at tannery, wha t 

were tHey~~ t h ecu^gtlthat pointy - . 

Wha t exactly 

Wh at Exactly was h is p lan? 

D id the old man heah ^Ilmmy? * 

Wha t was Old Mani l a exact abjection, to Nazi stuf £2 
luolj jg*!^ 

Did JER cheat? How exactly ? . 

- More det^ l about - how^ uaT^'^ co ntact worked with JER? 
D id JER~want^to be in Tap T pn? SKTT 
H ow much did JER get from guard for MUSTANG? 

Why did he get discourag ed about going straight? 
Chicag o pe riod~^rl l7~193^May 19 52- Get more about this , 
W ^ did~5etake Spanish Leavenwort h? T-Tq-rlca? 
What~~dld he do after ^Hl7^958-paiut for Willie? 
Until ~Octo ber~T9^9T ^ ~ : ~ 
sentenced 2o yrs* Jeff City from March I960, * 

gjggff53-1 96l» 1965^ ; 

Was on librisa bypre script log 
^d^Jerry^ reoort p. 18-1 Q Tt n i A - fomaght? . 

-waa-he going ta do? 

Comment on Hule P» 24 » 25 
Xt he had §5.QO0t ~whv_fll d he think he needed Eorft? 
Rule 25 

JER at 2731 jforth Sheffield, Chi April . 1967 
At Indian Trail S8 _I376j> . 

WhaS about nhone calls at Indian Trail p* 33 Hule 

was JER snuggling In Canada ? * 

Who was RaouS 

Honey from Jeff City- 

The Pepper print ing account was set up as a trial to 
.get money out hut it didn’t work so It was given up- 
never more than. couple hundred dollars in it* Came to rely . 
on guard- who also kited letters out* • SS: 

» »What did he say in these letters? . . * • ■ 

frame of _guard? * : ‘ : 

Guard was called Smitty* Would put §100 hill between 
pieces paper Eos 22, Wheeling, 111* no return address* * 

He also sent some to Jack. Then Jerry write short let ter v saying 
everything OK. 

Started latter part of 1963. 

I960 and 1961 Jerry and Jack worked together rolling 
Green. Jack worked on until 1965-1966 White Plains, 

Bensenvtlle, 111* 

39-935 O 

79 - 24 


Jerry Ray Interview* 
Tuesday* May 30* 1972 
Page 2 



Jack met JER In Chi and gave mon/ey- f 
Jerry gave JER money In La Salle Street hotel' next door 
Vlotorla-gave It to him Just way it had come to me- 1 
had kept It In my room. 

Jack saw JER day before he escaped. 

Jimmy asked him to come-you knew something up- Jack called • 
Jerry that night told him to expect to see Jimmy couole 
days. Prison not bugged. He told Jack where he wanted 
him to pick him up. Jack gave him phone number in case 
something went wrong. Jack went down to pick him up about 
40 miles from prison. He’d drive by right on highway, 
flash his headlights, drive on by, go on a mile and Jimmy 
come out- He did that twice. Then realized something 
went wrong. Went back St. Louis. Waited far call and 
JER did call hlm-and he picked him up. Went to East St. . 
Louis and came right up Chicago. l_me_t J.n .Chicago 

it was the next day after the escape. I was ready ^rith 
moneys PitlMh* £a$*f{e> 

We* met at/vHatel next to Victorian on South ^St. went 
in Victorian and couple drinks-down State Street* couple 
games pool. I went back Worth Brook. Jack stayed 
with him at that Hotel. 

Next night I came in and all 3 spent night together. 

Went around bar^-hopplng. JER talking about-he had bum feet* 
Said gonna rest up. Then make some plans. 

JER asked JErry-did I want to make some money. 

I knew illegal. I was gonna get divorce. Didn’t want 
to leave state said he wasn’t gonna do anything right away* 
said gonna look for a Job, get straightened out. 

We spent night together-got three separate rooms. 

We talked ’legal stuff H , Jobs we might do to make some 
money-he’d been thinking a long time-my. time hasn’t been 
wasted. He thought best way to make big bundle was kid- 
napplng-He had been over every kind to commit- safest ' 
dope but not as big money as kidnapping. . Not kidnap no name 
person with big heat. A banker, a few hundred thousand 
dollars. Told Jerry was in good position to finger somebody 
at golf course. Told me I wouldn’t have to be involved 
JER did most of talking. Jack didn’t talk much. 

Ee^din’t like dope, didn’t take it, didn’t sell it. 

JER stayed away from that while Jack was present. ^ 

X hung around Caravelle at Northbrook. 

Jack left and went back to St. Louis.^-^ (C 
Then me and JER would meet at tavern .(by train depot dt 
Northbrook. The only one where I didn’t know anybody. 

I knew everybody at Caravelle. 

FBI sent notice to Jerry telling him get in touch 
of JER 

Met several times- JER and Jerry- at Northbrook Tavern 
JER wanted know if Jerry had figured out anybody on whom 
they could make big score. I told him several people but I 


Jerry Ray Interview 
Tuesday, Hay 30, 1972 
Page 3 

didn't know anything about, family, only one I know 
anything about whose got lot of money, married, old, no kids, 

1 gave name and where he lived 

JER kept all money we gave him, didn't spend any of 
It. He was Just killing time, getting a car, title, driver* s 
license, he's not a bit lazy and he wanted to save what he 
had his stash. ' - . 

JER called Jerry many times-Jerry called JER- week 
before he left-last time saw him about 9 days before 

Said going Canada, might not be back, hadn't decided whether 
to work out a hustling angle or get passport and leave 
country-Hated to try some strange country without more morfey# 

He knows those countries don't have that much money flowlng- 
can't hustle. V : * 

Called him one time to let me know when he was leaving 
said he wasn't posit lve-then they asked him to stay at 
rest# another week. 

Called him day before left, said he was gonna leave, 
didn't know whether come back or not, depending how things - * 
go in Canada# 

Then he took off, never phoned from Canada* * - 

When he came back he* had a lot more money-he had 
me come back Chicago hotel next Victorlan-we went out /; L - 

for few drinks-we spent night at hotel, said he had 
run into some good money# Asked me if I wanted to go 
Ala# with him# Told him about my divorce, after hire 
two witnesses# Said I wouldn't go. . 

Next day he caught bus for Ala. * - 

Made mon/ey in dope. Told me he had contact, made 
it in prison. In Montreal# Some guy who had been in Jeff 
City# Guy would supjdy JEr with dope-JER had contact 
Dstroit-ran It back and forth. Dstrolt-Montreal. 

Red Plymouth, 1962. I gave It to girl I was married to. 

But before he wnet Canada, he went Quincy and seen some 
old friends- Crowley-Ted' s Place^They' ve been fliends 
for years- Also went East St# Louis and bought Plymouth 
there# . - 

Ted has connections all over. He used to run 
whore houses in Quincy, Xou can dways get a gun off Ted. 

JER has got guns off Ted in past, many times. Ted doesn't 
fool with dope. JER wanted to check on some guy who could 
be trusted-to get contacts before he went Canada. 

1 don't know how much he had when came back Canada-but - 
said plenty more to be made. 

Whore house robbery Is bullshit. What he did was 
run dope. He had decided kidnapping too risky. v 

Said he was gonna get late model car in Ala# wanted 
get car there, plates there, license- 

He had HLK on his mind. Crime is state Crlme-Wallace 
was governor- 

Killlng KLK Just didn't pop in his head. But he didn't 
talk all that much to me- Not about anything. 


Jerry Ray Interview 

Tuesday, May 30, 1972 7 

Pas® ^ • 

He knew there wasn # t any money In It, He told me 
I'd make money on dope stuff* Ee figured he was gonna 
be in Ala* long tlme-that thlnss would work out (note 1 
be_£ard pncd ) I was figuring to go with him. 

~ILLs plan was to make stash for defense, etc* 
then eventually get pardoned and remain resident of Ala* 

He had contacts down there-Underworld- 

He had between ? and 10 thousand when he went Ala* 
and he had that much when he left even after buying 
Mustang, etc# 

He called MLK BIG NIGGER-Talked about going to get 

In Bird, not Just stalking MLK. making money, also 
campaigning Wallace 

His 2 main things MLK-keeplng his eye on BIG NIGGER 
and working Wallace 

• He had contact In New Orleans 

I even flew down there my self- went for 2 reasons 
to meet this one guy- JER gave me phone number# X .met 
Courtney In park-JER told me to contact Courtney# 

Courtney, it was right after JER had plead guilty, wanted * 
Courtney to recommend lawyer, a good conservative# Courtney 
had photographer* Jerry wouldn't go pis* Said no lawyer 
touch case until Stoner withdraws# 

The other name-just a phone number-call guy tell 
him (Eddle2 everything okay from James. That * 3 all 
there was to that* This was after JER plead guilty* 

The $500 Jerry wanted from Foreman was for New 

Eddie was his dope contact in New Orleans* He 
wanted Eddie to know. he hadn't talked, wasn't going 
to talk* 

This was about 5 days after plead guilty* 

JER didn't say anything about MLK when he got Chicago* 

So happy to be out. 

JEE had woman sent up to his room. Want head Job, 
hardly ever screws 'em. 

JER didn't talk one line all the time* Mentioned 
MLK only 4 or 5 times. What really used to tear him 
up was seeing him on TV-l-iLK like Wallace on other side- 
get Blacks rlled-JER said he should have been killed 
long ago. This when JER in Chicago. 

But he would never talk that way In bars* He never 
ran off at head. Not even when crinklng. In Calif- bar 
It was girl who did talking. ^ 

First time Jerr y got feeling JER w as aerloua Ahonh ^ 
klllln^MLK wai^after _ “he left Blrm (Oct 7, 19o7) -He 
went directly New Orleans - and then up to Chicago where 
Jerry saw him at Northbrook station tavern. They talked 
3 hours. JER looked good, good complexion, dressed wall, had 
all his color back, he colors good, tie on, sun glasses, 


Jerry Ray Interview 
Tuesday, May 3°» 1972 

Page 5 / S . 

His coming surprised me. He said BIG NIGGER not 
gonna be around many more months. He was serious in 
way he had never been before. More sure of himself- 
business-like. Self- as sure d-knew what he was gonna do- 
sure of what he had In his mind-not in no Joking mood- 

That night he was talking about how gonna make mon^y 
Calf. ... 

I wouldn't go with him. I only do stuff for money. 

I don't oare that much about Wallace. Didn't want to get 
mixed up with him. Trouble was money wasn't his sole interest. 
Money not his interest. Ail that dope taking them chances ... 
for another reason-reason was King. 

At first I was serious about not going because divorce* 

But 'later, I might have done it, if looked easy. .1 
didn't ’see light. I just didn't like doing time. By time 
I got divorce I knew what was on his mind and I wouldn't go* 

He never did pressure me. He knew I didn't want to go. 

He talked that night about Wallace-How everybody ought 
to work for him. 

He had 2 reasons go Calif-l* to carry dope, .2. to 
work for Wallace. "* r 

He made at least 2 trips if not 3 between New Orleans . 
and Calf .-He was hauling dope and his supplier was in New 

When 1st got out didn't say anything about Canada. 

Jerry went Birm. flew down there- JER told could 
make §300 a week-spent nite motel near airport. 

He had contact in Birm. who supplied him-he said could 
make §300 a week. 

But there wa3 more on his mind than meking money. 

He was popping pills but he was always same, talked same 


300 was good to me and I would have gone Birm. with him 
except I knew he had something else on his mind. 

He thought HLK situation getting worse all the time- 
too many rights for Blacks, getting them jobs -what bugged 
JER Pore than anythin/? was hearing him talk ana seeing^ nfeu ‘ 

That Big Nigger has to go-more end more on his VindT 

itegaa to menolbn 1 'iLK more than Wallace- I knew some-=» 
thing changing. 

He called me all time-called me from Texas. Feeling 
good-not drunk-how's things-would ask me if I had changed 
my mind about coming with me. 

He called me one time from Mexico- before he got 
where he wa3 going, he was supposed contact me from. 

Acapulco v - 

No money in speed, bennies-they don't do that much for 
you-it was herion-that * s where money is. 

He had planned to kill MLK in Atl. by Blowing up house- 
some other guy with him-he didn't trust guy. That's why - 
house was circled. 

JER was waiting for his (JER's) time to come 



Jerry Ray Interview 

Tuesday* Ray 30* 1972 Q 

Page 6 , ” 

Never thought about doing anything King In Calif *- 
gonna do it in South-so get “trial right H -he'd rather 
for it to happen in Ala. Don't know why didn't wait* 

Talked 2 hrs Memphis after JER plead guilty. 

He said plead guilt y-fre was gonna fire Foreman 
in Court -but was afraid would have made him take public 

Was supposed take place ALa. little bit before that 
(Selma) something went wrong had to postpone 

Ala was supposed to be state where everything happened 
buying gun* and to have been killed in Selma. 

"No Jury would ever convict one in Ala for shooting 
the Big Nigger" - . 

. . _ What could have gone wrong in Selma? MLK changed 
some Qians there?- Chec k out MEK’s movements In Selma *^ 

He brought up house circling at Petros^ Was HLK^ 
in ATL at sane time JER was there-right before Memphis 
As time passed he was getting more det ermlned-you 
could see that -that's why he went ahead In Memphis 

Finally it became all King-no more ball games, nothing 
Called. Jerry core thanJack-feel closer to me-Him 
and Jack both hot-tempered-He might write Jack sarcastic letter 
Jack would never write him again* He knows I'm not gonna 
get mad at him no matter what he says Jer knew better than 
talk to Jack about it* Jack would try to talk him about it 
iJack gets his steam off by talking about it-Jimmy keeps it 
inside-JER did not tell Jack-Jack's a racist* Jack 
would help if you're in trouble-but would have tried to 
argue JER about it* Jack wouldn't object to job-but not getting 
anything out of it* Jack sore because he (jack) had put 
himself in position to get back in prison by going down there 
and getting Jimmy out* Jack's as strong against dope as 
Ted Crowley* Wouldn't allow it in tavern* JER never was in 
Grapevine. Jack never saw JER after 3 brothers in Chicago.* 

Jack a/nd Jimmy don't get along fcogether-They never got 
In fight* It would have been bull of a fight if they'd 
ever gone up against each other- 

jack did hard time-laid in deadlock-lay in cell 
all day-get out once a week-to exercise* take a bath* •• : 

In that cell 14 months* wouldn't take no orders. _ V 

Mabel Ray Quincy Earl’s dtr Cannon's night club . 
on 4th between Main and Jersey, She was pet of Frank Fuller- 
got everything from him* 

get m ug shot Earl and others from jdt ! son authorities 
After Eric Galt announced Jerry went dovrn see Jack 
on his day off* They talked in Grapevine how to help 
JER, what they could do- they knew who it was* But there Was 
nothing they could do-didn't know where to get in touch 
with hlm-Jerry wasn't sure going Mexico or Canada* Told 
FBI Mexico to throw them off. I told Jack I hope I never 
hear from him again-knowing then he'd escaped-he knew 
better /than get in touch with us- 


Jerry Hay Interview 
Tuesday r May 30, 1972 
Page 7 

we didn't know how much money he had, weren't sure how much 
he had spent 

I wasn't even sure when I went St* Loui3 Jack knew 
Jack sore as heU-a fellow In that long-tried so hard 
to get out- then go and do this-bound to catch him-too 
much heat-been OK If he had killed ordinary white man 
When JER returned Canada to Chicago he told Jerry- 
Now I'm- gonna be Eric Starvo Galt 

■ L hm 4 ^ me 


From James EsdrX'i^ay- -t o -J erry- Ray 



M emphis- 20 letters- 8/1 2/68- Z/17/&? 

8/12/68-Why he want Jerry go Bin s? 
"9/9/6 3 What kind of^iobZ 
^9/19/tb asked Jerr^ talk Percy F* ■>.. 

9/25/68 doesn't t hing "t hat guy in Ga 
Jack*" s — -—al go' ^he Tiaathat racial thing against him 

opinion about JER taking 

that much of a lawye r" 


bad right tnere^ 

That loo k 

No remorse of any kind- instructions to Jerry-running the 
ca se^ ^KoTlie^n't a bit sorry for that* " . . . 

"Signs "Jimm y* ■ ■■ ’ - . .-■••• 

10/24-asks Jerry to find names of book authors admite d to 
tria l "I suppose peonle _JLhat were red<^endgd^y'"^stlaa. Dept*. 
No ^fear^ nor jCrlghL* - . . . , ■ - 

Has Jerry told JER he Is talking to me, this timaj 
He. says no* - 

* Nashville - 2k letters 3AV69-3A3/70 . 

3/20/ 69— What Almanac? watch? _ . . * •' 

* 4/7/69 H If they ca n outsmart me. as smart a3 they sav I aa> 
then you don* t~ have a chance** 7 - : . 

Who I s the real estate tycoon? Jack* Grapevine? 

"I learned when I was about 6 yrs old that envelope s V 
can be~~steaaed open" ~ 

Who I s the Budwelser King? Jerry 
Who is She ppard woman? Sb* Louis TV, 

Size 9 shoe 


Jerry Ray Interview 
Tuesday, May 30, 1972 
Page 8 

Jerry may have s 

E ls concern for Jerry-* about a Job* 

McMillan i “That character must be nuts* 

McMillan i “Se nt me a c-ra gy He*s b een talking 

t o - 

H e cal l s old man 

McMillan “is the worst of the lot* 


tayed with Stoner to work on e scapes 


daa from Betel Mot el- to help quarters Jerry worked ' 

11 pm to 7 am* First time he had called couple of weeks*; 

Didn't surprise me too much . *;_*>;• 

"Tomorrow it wlH&l be over* he told Jerry v V 

Ee was excited, wouldn't let me talk* ^ 

SThe Bis Nigger has one more day. " he. said - . - 

Talked about Z\ minutes. He paid call* 

. Said he might not see me a while- Bruiser, Jack 
"Don't worry about me." 

I was expecting something to happen jfext day* 

Usually he talk, I talk. If I tried to tell him „ 

anything, he'd not let me. I tried tell him about trying 
to switch to bartending-Eut he wasn't wanting no small talk 
He'd repeal himself 

. "The Big Nigger has had it." - * : ' 

I knew he didn’t bullshit around. .But didn’t have 
full effect till next • 

Call was between 9 and 11 in morning. Wasn't from bar. 

No noise in background. . ... 

Harvey Lowmyer was friend from Quincy- ex- convict Menard 
Monday Atlanta- checked Rebel Wednesday 7i20 p.m. 

.Thus call was Wednesday morning April £3- 

He sounded as If he had Just worked it out, excited^ 
all happy about it 

It wasn't on road, no sound of cars, no tavern, 'no 
sound of voices- Just his voice end my voice 
He had fired rifle at Corinth. 


Jerry Ray Interview • 

Wednesday, ■ May 31, 1972 

Page 2 * 13 

Two’ weeks before he said things going according to 
plan* That was last call before the last one* It was 
probably from Alabama, Selma area 

Lot of people talk that stuff I knew what was on hi a 
mind* He was past making money to get by on and do the 
other thing. But he didn't give me any details 

I first knew he had a definite idea when he got 
Blm* and when I weftt down there. That's why I wouldn’t 
go down there. 

he'd say- "somebody got to stop him-, the sooner, the 
better" I knew him-knew he was thinking that he was the 
one who was gonna stop him 

• only time I ever left Chicago in period between Jeff 
City and gemphis was the time I went Birm* 

They J&R a loner but he likes to have people around- 
Wanted me in 3 ira* Had Bife at Leavenworth* Has one at 
Brushy Mountain* Bums, Brake arfi one of the Menards 
at Jeff . City 

Jack never saw him between Chicago and Memphis* May - 
have talked phone but not often. 

_Hbw did t h ey have money at Jeff City? Well, when - 
outlawed money, cons Just didn't turn it in, declare it* 
“There was a helluva lot of money in there” 

Money comes in thru guards, they bring it ln-Guards 
don't giake a damned thing, have to make money on side* 

Be began send money out 19 63 , for about 4 yrs. §500 
a year* Sent little under $4,000 to Jack in 4 yrs. 

Mate t ime not 7 years _but 4 years* ;> . 

T^tHinkTl handedQ §100 bills-I had. sent $200 to Lawyer* 

First meeting Chicago / ; . 

He talked about Canada, Bhodesia-which best route to 
leave country. Said Canada easiesk passport, learned prison* 
He 'never talked Mexico at ell. He said "you two should 
have passport" I said "can't get one-my name's too fouled 
up" He explained to us exactly how get passport. 

Midnight -Insider News-two pubs where put ada about 
pix-got some replies and one reason went Kex was to get 
whore pose cheap-wanted typewriter to correspond with 
people who answered ads. Couldn't answer longhand. If 
you can get it down pat, get good names, guys who really 
pay for stuff* You have to run ads in every tabloids, 
with pir, they cost. Then you have to pay girls* * 

They talked this over in Chicago 

Customers have diffenent things they like-some- ^ 
body beating on somebody 

To do business you've got to have everything 
every kind of thing going on- Black and White-head Jobs 
Whipping, everything, queers, lesbians- 

When people write in for picture you send him something 
legal, girl, then,- ask him if he wants more- 



Jerry Ray Interview 
Wednesday, May 31» 1972 
Page 3 

Keep teasing him, give him something better* on up to movies 
To be careful (we discussed this a long time in 
Chicago that night) make guys send cash and when send stuff 
wipe fingerprints, no return address* 

Buzz used to cut guys, keep money when he gets deep 
enough in* 

JER said he was gonna study-would go in it all the way 
But" he didn't" stay any place long enough to work . : ; ' ~ 

the business. He took box in LA • . V - 

He had skill-he could make the movies* 

That night Chi it boiled down to two thlngs-dope 
end porno plx-It was porno that took Mexico 

He might harc sent some pix out when he had Box in 
LA* - but no big money 

All those moe/ths he was free he was torn between different 
ldeas-porno pix, dope, killing MLH, Wallace- 

He had as much pro-Wallace on his mind as he did anti- 

King* . ■ V v; 

When we met Chicago I hadn't seen him since 1949 _ 

or 1950# since I was 13 * Xou're so happy to see somebody*. ~ 
Also first time Jack had been around him since 1948 or 1949 
Why help hjm- "Hell, he # d help us* 

lie probao!y _ made $7000 out of dope* He spent about $12,000 
He was broke la London . 

Way it happened was ”lt kept on his mind, kept bn his 
mind, kept on his mind, getting stronger and stronger** , ' 

When he left LA "he was on King” **'«; ‘ 

Jerry always asked if OK on money .and he never asked -/ 
for a nickel. . 1“ 

Bart endlng-he' talked about that In Chicago that , 
night* - John told him he was gonna open grapevine. JER said 
always get Job as bartender, any country, place to make contacts, 
prostitution, dope. * *. ■ 

(remember Sneedy's advice-show business, easy work , 

. sta yjtS XeanT • 

'“Dancing school- If you want to go out with girls. It 
was to meet right girls-like he did in Canada* 

(He dl dalt just have one thing on his mind) 

He had"ltinEiindrto get rl ch wo man-y ou * ve got know 
right talk. Try to con them 

That night Chicago went over everything from snatching, 
purses to rolling drunks- . 

Locksmithlng-thls don't sound sensible but main reason- 
he's paranoid about one thing-about licking himself out of 
car-he must have done It once-come in handy other things* 

Mention that many times-Llke on a robbery where you have to 
get in car quickly v - 

Kose changing. GXasses-dlsgulse- M He knew what he was 
doing then. 

The thing was supposed to have happen before t hat -means 
1st time in 31rm. not Selma-too many people around, didn't 
Tiave~ right - opening- NOTE- check MLK's visits to Ala during time 
JER Birmingham — 



Jerry Hay Interview 
Wednesday* Hay 31* 1972 
Page 4 

That's table stuff-a girl 

The Jig Is up-when 1st man on moon* 

DOPE RACKET-Met 3 times In 2 months in Northbrook* Tavern 
Went to Quincy, E. St. Louis before going Canada 
(Hule p» 391 and that was to contact Ted- to get info and 

When went Canada it wasn't to leave country then- 
went to work dope racket H I*m positive of that*” 

Did not try to get seaman's Job 

Did not hold up who re house- JER now laughs about it 
Did not hold up food store Montreal 
Spent $300 on new clothes, trying get rich girl at 
Grey Hocks. Not ID. It was the money he wanted* 

In Canada h ad suit (48 ) sent Blrm-thus must have 
kno wn from _then-obvlousl v fro mltlme he esc aped- thathe 
was going kill KLX and intended do It AIa*-Blrm» 

• DOPS-his first time in H. 0. was first I knew he was 
working dope-He ran stuff from N. 0. to Callf-at least' 
twice* maybe 3 times ' * •••'•• : - - 

He was in 3irm for other (than dope) reasons-to * 
watch HLK's movements, to buy car and make his plans* Get 

He didn't contact anybody Blrm. Wouldn't have trusted* 
People can be die-hard segs and still turn you Into the 
police when you talk about killing MLK 

Dope! and: dirty pix-these only secondary- Just ways • 
to get money-to keep alive until right moment came to kill 
MLK - ■ ■■■’; * ‘ - • * * : 

He didn't know he was gonna do Memphis thing until 
couple days before-lt Just clicked off perfectly for him 
These things, (assassinations) not easy if you really 
mean n ot t o get caught-Thls is the big difference between 
JEH~andTother ass ass in s re a l lv^tho u^ht he was golng~ fro_ 

get^a^ayT He hadTIcavefullv planned esca pe aa had. 
other ass a ssin. . • • . . ■ . . . • • 

. CIPHE33 INN is Northbrook Tavera-that was meeting place 
That's why he 'didn't do Birm. He could have shot 
MLS if he hadn't cared being caught like Bremer, Sirhan, 
Oswald. . * V ^ 

He didn't go Mexico escape route-He had that figured V 
out exact ly-knew the route-that Canada would be it- . v 

Went Mexico for fun but mainly to make money on 
dirty pix. 

Everything second to King-even Wallace-he'd see 
something in paper about HLK, he'd take off- v 

NOTE-This is more honest version than I was getting this 

Be left Mexico when he had taken his dirty pix 
Went LA because he had dope run from N* 0* to Calif. 


Jerry Ray Interview 
Wednesday, Hoy 31* 1972 
Page 5 

He wasn’t following MLK, not 
In fact and JER did nothing, 
where he killed KLK# 

While In LA he went on with his preparatlons-nose* 
bar lessons, dance lessons 

Put French culture ad in hippie paper to find girl 
who would pose for dirty plx, Not for himself* 

DO PS- Ml gilt have made as much as $5,000 dope-running 
across border T . . V 

$1,000 a trip 

Probably had $6,000 when went Bira. 

Next dope was trip to New Orleans and made run to C aLlr . 
before went Mexico 

Probably made $2500. Not too much chance getting caught 
but a bad rap. He would get maximum. . ^ . - 

Went from LA to Mexico *'•--* 

JER had had experience dope with Elf e 
He went Mexico In Interlude when no dope run to be 
made "Went to Mexico when he had time to kill.** 

Worked When had stash-but usually doing something 
else-preparatlons for Big Nigger 

Staying In Germany —wh e n came home on fu rl o ugh— He helled 
Hitler. Then, even before he went to Germany# He said 
he’d like to live over there-ln a white country. 

- • - L ater told me Stro heim asked him to stay. 

Speedy beat children? Never with fist. Slap me across 
face. Lucille would do any whipping had to be done with switch 
off tree andshe seldom did It. 

* He wasn’t a dirty kid-never see his face dirty- 
kept clean what he could keep clean. 

Speedy would be same If he had 1 or 20 children— 

Just didn't pay no attention to ’em-show nothing one way 
or the other. Lucille show affection for all kids 

Escaped attempts 19 6 l and 19 66 

I96l-He got kite out to John, long letter, to pick him 
up certain tlme-John working Arlington Hts. So John took off, 
went down. But JER caught. 

1966-got caught out again to John. . Then at Grapevine*. 
John went to pick him up. Meanwhile we had been visiting, 

F*d planned one for 1965 which didn’t work out. 

Another guy with him. some way to go over wall. If things 
go right I’ll get kite out But he kited that if fell thru. 

When I’d go down there main thing he’d talk .about v 
wa 3 escape, drivers* license, where to pick him up, clothes 

•frrAflrt h-rnek 13 the corraet story. 

'Eetalked about Wallace some when I went down there. 

- 16 

stalking there-HLK wa3 out there 
It Had to be a southern State 


Jerry Ray Interview 

Wednesday, May 31* 1972 17 

Page 6 

Wrote to me Sportman's how "big he was for Goldwater- 
only 3 of us there for him-telllng me to vote for him, every— 
body in family should vote- but Jerry didn't even, vote 

Goldwater sparked hlm-flr3t time he showed any strong * 
Indication for any candidate. 

GOING STRAIGHT 19 5 0-19 52- Why did he give up? Jerry J Ln 
St^Ch^lej^ SXthat Eime- Kg_ didn't gothat straight 'T'7 
ar^wayT^ge~T ro^STy d id othe r^robberles.~^^ve r same 
afteF^ r g g^Ne ver did tha t, t allT anymore ahout_iiot_ robblng 

MEXICO-rlght after Leavenworth-made §4000 score and 
went down-even came see John a/nd I Kenard-t allied to us 
about Mexico 

• He never thought Wallace be presldent-We started vote 
for Nison to keep Humphrey out. 

Began to write out of Jeff City about headaches* 

Had them practically every day* Wanted outside doctor. I* 
.figured they came from that dope stuff-taking bennies 
not hard stuff 

After Leavenworth fooled around Willie a few months, 
painting signs roads. He stayed Willie, .Kotels-ma&e pretty 
good money. . 

Headaches etc. Jeff City-in last year he in Jeff City 
he wrote more and more about headaches 



SUBJECT: Telephone call from Jerry Ray 

This ia one of several C9II9 I*ve bad from Jerry 
about Eugene Straub(Gilbert LeRoy Cameron). 

He's still trying to get additional §250 out of ns — 
v - a ich I have refused to pay hia unless he gives me way 
to prove out Gilbert Cameron is Eugene Straub. 

Jerry insisted that guy in North Carolina ie the 
fettsx same Cameron who was in Jeff City. He does seem 
to know the gguy who was ia Jeff City. 

What be told me NEW 2 today was that he cou Id 
give me ltters from Cameron to himself, Jerry. These 
he said, I believe he said, v re signed Straub. 

He said he would give tfcax me the guard* s name who 
had cazrried money out of Jeff City and drugs in. for 

He said he would show me two cancelled checks 
Slxsnxx paid to Straub — one for §3,000 and one for 
§2?&x §2,500. . This raises questions, if it ia true. 

I have checks already for §3,300 ia listed in Carol Ray’s 
cash register for her aacount at the Mercantile Trust 
Co. That would come to a total of §8,800. I believe 
Jerry said these two new* large checks were written in March 
1967 and April 1967. 

Is it possible monies above were involved in Carol's 
purchase of own home in St. Louis? Check dates. 

Jery said also that he had three plx of Cameron, one 
of which had straub written on theback. One of these pix 
was taken at Jeff City, one in Milwaukee, one at some 
spot that Jerry can't identify. * 

He also this time offered pix of whole family together, 
taken in 1°45 approximately when J^mmy was on furSLOUgh from 
the Army, mprobatly Just before he went overseas. 

Jerry said he had a letter from Cameron written to him 
Jerry from pison in Asheville Just nine monthsx ago. 



Also he told me that JKR had some thing 
on his mind each time he tried. to escape from 
Jeff C ty — and thaWthe time he succeeded 
was his third try. . ihad thought there were 

only two- attempts. . ■: 

■ • . 

He said would, tell! me why the map had - v . 
those particular-rc lr cl e a on It, the map of 

*r~- r : ; • »: - " • "• T ^ r 1 . ~ • ^ v- ' -> - • 

39-935 0 - 79 - 25 



? w&if&Y y 

S^. IJe i/VM Ji£i/\wwy to k/tfyz ^9 r — t7~ i t/£Ld c 1 ^ . 

✓w, )_i/\Wif cti ._ e/iYt/ij /r.j _ V/J&li t7n& J r . / 

-j ^/? tn0l_wirue^ _ *? 

$*d„AU JV£^- -MWtlMf .?- " •-' r.:'— ‘-^, 

- - " yvirfut w * • ^ 

^/r* w 8 ir to : A, f 

c^w y~A?c. z.v. ; -.j- » 

^ f r Le ft Wit iftl gfl| 

_$.t t _. whu /> / fa &JV'C& 

/ 7^7 ‘ 

„>> PLnTJ -T /Zgr * » ir*UAJYtU/\ If M /TjT 

& ar! a 'jZmto l**JtAf2... J?~ 1 j./ / /X. 

^ 7 . / ^o 7 ^g fa\el H t .A- ■ * 9 ■■"Htj. 


/.wit. &tms oL lA 



Chairman Stokes. Has counsel been provided with a copy? 

Mr. Speiser. Do you have a copy of that, Mr. Pepper? 

Mr. Pepper. We are going to object to the admission of author 
McMillan’s notes until we have had an opportunity to look at them 
and see specifically which notes the counsel is referring to. 

We are doing that particularly because of the enormous discrep- 
ancies and considerable question that has been raised about author 
McMillan’s objectivity and the facts in his work. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Pepper, if I may respond to that, I do not choose 
at this time to question Mr. Ray about all of the notes of Mr. 
McMillan. I am going to direct his attention to certain pages and I 
am here not to test the credibility of Mr. McMillan. I am here to 
question Mr. Ray, your client, as to whether or not he did or did 
not tell Mr. McMillan what is reflected in Mr. McMillan’s notes. If 
he feels he did not say that to Mr. McMillan, all he has to say to 
me is no. 

Mr. Pepper. We are going to object to the inclusion of any of 
author McMillan’s notes out of context. If the author’s notes are to 
be admitted into the record of the proceedings of this committee, 
we will request that the entire vestige of his work be admitted; 
that nothing be taken out of context, and we will request to see all 
of those notes ourselves. 

Now, to do otherwise, to take an author or investigator’s partial 
research and to put it in is highly prejudicial, particularly in line 
of the total scope of Mr. McMillan’s work. 

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel for the committee want to be 

Mr. Speiser. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Again, as I just stated to Mr. 
Pepper, I am not going to question Mr. Ray about the entire notes 
that are contained in Mr. McMillan’s manuscript. I am only going 
to question him about certain portions. 

Now, it is Mr. Pepper’s position that these portions may be taken 
out of context. Assuming Mr. Pepper is arguing accurately, I am 
not interested in whether Mr. McMillan is accurate or inaccurate. I 
am interested in hearing Mr. Ray’s position here as to whether or 
not he did or did not tell author George McMillan what I am going 
to question him about. 

If he did not tell him that, all I want to hear is a no. If he did 
tell him that, in jest, I would like him to explain that. That is the 
sole purpose of questioning him about the notes. Not for substance 
but for credibility. 

Ms. Kennedy. One of the disadvantages, Mr. Chairman 

Chairman Stokes. The Chair is going to suggest to counsel that 
you put all of the notes into the record as requested by Mr. Pepper, 
if you are going to examine the witness from any of it, and that 
those portions of the record which you are going to examine the 
witness from be furnished to counsel at this time. 

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate that, and we would 
appreciate it further if counsel would advise us as to how the 
authenticity and the time frame in which these notes were written 
has also been verified for counsel and the committee’s satisfaction. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, F-599, which I choose to have en- 
tered into evidence, contains all the notes of author George McMil- 


lan. I was about to direct Mr. Ray’s attention to one page concern- 
ing the question I propounded to him. 

These notes have been furnishd to us by Mr. McMillan, and Mr. 
McMillan represented to us that these notes represent all the notes 
he took in his interviews with your client, Jerry Ray. 

I would like to question Mr. Ray about one page in those notes at 
this time if you will permit me. 

Mr. Pepper. Counsel, I will certainly permit you to do that, but if 
you will just bear with me, I am sure you appreciate the concern 
that we have with respect to the authenticity in verifying the 
authenticity of those notes with respect to the time in which they 
were written and we would like to know if Mr. McMillen under 
oath has dated for you effectively and verified for you the time in 
which he took these notes. 

Chairman Stokes. All right. Perhaps it can be stated by counsel 
questioning the witness with reference to whether he did have such 
conversations with him within that frame of time. 

Ms. Kennedy. Sir, on this same point, I am really not trying to 
be contentious, but it is extremely important to note that where 
you have a committee hearing which relies so heavily on hearsay, 
people who no one has an oppportunity to cross-examine, there 
must be some effort on the part of this committee to establish the 
authenticity, the bias, the political conflict of interest that might 
obtain between a writer, a journalist, a witness in these circum- 

We have no opportunity to confront this witness; we have no 
opportunity — and this is a part of the nature of this survey and 
this inquiry, and it is just that a witness without all the facilities of 
government is confronted with all kinds of prejudicial hearsay and 
with no opportunity to cross-examine or check the authenticity or 
any political conflict of interest or any other attempt to cover what 
we believe perhaps is a situation which will be prejudicial to the 

We just feel that this is typical of the kind of disadvantage that 
this and other witnesses before this or any congressional subcom- 
mittee has. 

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, I think you have stated your 
objection adequately. 

Will counsel make a further statement for the record? 

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Pepper, Mr. McMillan has 
represented to us that these notes were taken contemporaneously 
with his interviews with Jerry Ray. Now again, we are here just to 
find out whether in Mr. Jerry Ray’s opinion these notes are accu- 
rate or inaccurate. 

I am not here at this point trying to test the credibility of Mr. 
McMillan. Indirectly that may be the result, but directly what I am 
trying to do is question your client. 

Now, you have a copy of those notes and now I would like you to 
turn to page 25. 

Now, on page 25, beginning in the second full paragraph, accord- 
ing to Mr. McMillan, on the May 30, 1972 interview with your 
client, your client indicated that Jack — and Jack presumably refers 
to John — is your brother John also known by the name Jack? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 


Mr. Speiser [reading]: 

Jack saw James Earl Ray day before he escaped. Jimmy asked him to come— you 
know, something up— Jack called Jerry that night told him to expect to see Jimmy 
couple days. Prison not bugged. He told Jack where he wanted him to pick him up. 
Jack gave him phone number in case something went wrong. Jack went down to 
pick him up about 40 miles from prison. He'd drive by right on highway, flash his 
headlights, drive on by, go on a mile and Jimmy come out. He did that twice. Then 
realized something went wrong. Went back to St. Louis. Waited for call and James 
Earl Ray did call him — and he picked him up. Went to east St. Louis and came 
right up Chicago. Then all three met in Chicago. It was the next day after the 
escape. I was ready with money. 

Now, is that information accurate or inaccurate in your opinion? 

Mr. Ray. There is no way possible I can remember everything 
George McMillan said because he hounded me since 1968 and to us 
he was just a joke. He was a joke writer. So I can’t tell what he’s 
got down here. I don’t remember. 

Mr. Speiser. Well, Mr. Ray, 

Mr. Ray. I am going to have to invoke the fifth amendment on 
all this stuff because I can’t remember all this stuff and this has 
been going on since 1968 with McMillan. 

Mr. Speiser. Is your answer that you cannot remember or are 
you saying that you are asserting your fifth amendment privilege? 

Mr. Ray. I am going to take the fifth amendment privilege. 

Mr. Speiser. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note for 
the record that committee counsel secured on November 8, 1978, an 
order from the U.S. district court Judge Charles Bryant. Judge 
Bryant ordered as follows: 

That Gerald (Jerry) William Ray, in accordance with the provisions of Title 18, 
U.S. Code, Sections 6002 and 6005, shall not be excused from testifying or providing 
other information before the Subcommittee on Assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther 
King or of the Select Committee on the Assassinations or the full Select Committee 
on the grounds that the testimony or other information sought may tend to incrimi- 
nate him. 

It is therefore ordered further that Gerald (Jerry) William Ray appear when 
subpoenaed by said subcommittee or committee and testify and provide such other 
information that is sought with respect to matters under inquiry by said subcommit- 
tee or committee. 

And it is further ordered that no testimony or other information compelled under 
this order or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or 
other information may be used against Gerald (Jerry) William Ray in any criminal 
case except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise failing 
to comply with this order. 

Now, Mr. Ray, I understand you have just asserted your fifth 
amendment privilege. 

I would like to have the chairman at this time — first of all, I 
would like to have this immunity order entered into the record as 
MLK exhibit F-589. 

Chairman Stokes. Let’s also furnish the witness and his counsel 
a copy of it. 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-589 


In the Matter of the Application of ) 





; - ) 

OKDJjK m v?c p r* *‘-£y C 



The United States House of Representatives Select Committee 
on Assassinations having made written application, pursuant to Title 18, 
United States Code, Sections 6002 and 6005, for an order conferring 
immunity upon Gerald (Jerry) William Ray and compelling him 

to testify and provide other information before the Subcommittee on 
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Select 

Committee on Assassinations or the full Select Committee, and the 
court finding that all procedures specified by 8 6005 have been duly 
followed, it is hereby, this ^ X). day of 1978, 

ORDERED, that Gerald (Jerry) William Ray in accordance 

with the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 6002 
and 6005, shall not be excused from testifying or providing other 
information before the Subcommittee on the Assassination of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Select Committee on Assassinations 
or the full Select Committee on the grounds that the testimony or other 
information sought may tend to incriminate him* 

* District 

; • ** * v '*Srfcfc of Col 5 :!*'.. 

\ copt 

Misc. No. 78 — d 3 & 

F i L U. D 
HOI s 1273 


ORDERED FURTHER , that Gerald (Jerry) William Ray appear 

when subpoenaed by said Subcommittee or Committee and testify and 
provide such other information that is sought with respect to matters 
under inquiry by said Subcommittee or Committee. 

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no testimony or other information 
compelled under this order (or any information directly or indirectly 
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against 
Gerald -(Jerry) William Ray^ in any criminal case, except a 

prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise failing 
to comply with this ORDER. 

Baited States District JpOge 

Dated! NOV 6 - »78 

Chairman Stokes. I would also request the clerk to do that, 

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of clarification with 
respect to our client asserting his fifth amendment privilege, let us 
just state that is being done with respect to the specific material 
and questions being advanced by the committee’s counsel due to 
the extraordinary period of time that has elapsed and the rather 
understandable difficulty that our client has in remembering very 
specific kinds of details. 

Our client is also very wary of the possibility of informants 
coming in before this committee and attesting to things which are 
untrue which might set him up for perjury charges and is highly 
suspicious of the activity of author George McMillan in the entire 

Chairman Stokes. Is it the intention of your client, counsel, to 
assert his fifth amendment privileges on each and every succeeding 
question or is it as to this specific question? 

Mr. Pepper. Our client is going to cooperate with this committee 
to the fullest extent it is possible for him to do so with respect to 
what is available to his memory. He is going to answer as candidly 
and openly as he can. 

The difficulty is with respect to specific details of matters alleged 
to have taken place 6V2 to 10 or 11 years ago. He has to be 
protected with respect to that. 

He is not going to assert the fifth amendment with respect to 
every single inquiry of this sort. If he doesn’t remember, he is 
going to say: “I don’t remember.” 

If he does remember, he is going to set forth his position. 


He has the desire to be candid and open with this committee. He 
is very wary of being set up in terms of perjury and we have to put 
that on the record. 

Chairman Stokes. Counsel may proceed. 

Mr. Speiser. At this time I would request the Chair to confirm 
the fact that the order of immunity has now been bestowed upon 
Mr. Ray. 

Chc.irman Stokes. Mr. Ray, have you received a copy of the 
immunity order? 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, before I have you respond to the pending 
question, I would like to advise you that despite the fact you have 
been granted immunity that you must be cautious and leery, that 
immunity does not protect you from possible prosecution for per- 
jury under title 18, United States Code, section 1621, or for obstruc- 
tion of justice, which is title 18, United States Code, section 1505, 
or for contempt, civil or criminal. Do you understand that? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, will we have an opportunity to 
confront McMillan who, without going into great detail, is very 
well known and very well connected with cover stories written by 
his wife and him on the Kennedy 

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, there is no basis for this com- 
mittee to afford a confrontation. The witness was merely being 
asked a question as to whether the statement was true or not, 
which was read to him, and he has now asserted his privilege. We 
are now in the process of conferring immunity upon the witness if 
he refuses to answer. That is all that is before the Chair at this 

Ms. Kennedy. Sir, is there a record in executive session of any 
establishment of the political commitment of McMillan? Has there 
been any examination in executive session 

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, you are entirely out of order. 

Ms. Kennedy. Well, Your Honor, I feel this witness has a right 
to place the question on the record and obviously it is within your 
discretion to deny it. 

Chairman Stokes. At this time, Ms. Kennedy, we are going to 
ask you to please refrain from these type of statements. 

Ms. Kennedy. Sir, I would ask you to exert some kind of control 
over counsel in his bringing before this committee and before the 
public this kind of far-reaching hearsay. 

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, you are out of order. 

Would you proceed? 

Mr. Speiser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ray, let me repeat the question to you. Did you state the 
information that I just read into the record on page 25 of Mr. 
McMillan’s notes? Did you state that information precisely or sub- 
stantially to Mr. McMillan? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t have no idea what all I told McMillan. I seen 
him since 1968 and — what day was that? 

Nineteen hundred and seventy-two; I don’t even think he was— 
in May 1972 he wasn’t even writing about the crime back then, I 
don’t think. He didn’t even want to discuss anything about the 
crime. He said his book was ending when James escaped from 
prison. So I don’t remember saying anything like that. 


Mr. Speiser. So your answer is no, you did not state that to— — 

Mr. Ray. I am saying I don’t remember saying anything like 

Mr. Speiser. You have no recollection of saying that to Mr. 

Mr. Ray. No, I don’t remember saying anything like that. 

Mr. Speiser. Is it your statement also that you did not know who 
assisted James Earl Ray in escaping from Jefferson City? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t. 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, that question has already been 
asked and that question has already been answered. 

Chairman Stokes. Proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Speiser. Did you also tell Mr. McMillan that on the two 
prior attempts of James to escape from Missouri State Prison that 
John attempted to pick him up and had planned and intended on 
picking up James, had he escaped? 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I object to the form of the question 
and the use of the word “also.” 

The witness has denied any recollection of this. The use of the 
word “also” implies that there has been an admission which has 
not been made by this witness and I ask that the question be 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, I don’t agree with Ms. Kennedy, but 
I will be more than happy to rephrase the question. 

Chairman Stokes. Please do. 

Ms. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Speiser. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, did you tell Mr. McMillan that your broth- 
er John assisted James in his escape plans in 1961 and 1966 from 
the Missouri State Prison? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t ever remember telling him anything like that. If 
I did, it was false because I didn’t know anything like that. 

Mr. Speiser. Have you furnished Mr. McMillan with false infor- 

Mr. Ray. Have I furnished McMillan with false information? 

I think Hon. Walter Fauntroy and everybody knows what type 
guy McMillan is. He is just a leech and he hounded me since 1968 
and so I would feed him a few lines now and then just to get him 
off my back. You can read his book; his book was a joke. 

Mr. Speiser. Is your answer yes, you did provide Mr. McMillan 
with false information? 

Mr. Ray. I led him along a few times. 

Mr. Speiser. Excuse me? 

Mr. Ray. He kept following me and he was always hounding me, 
coming to see me in St. Louis and Atlanta and Chicago and every 

Mr. Speiser. Your answer is yes? 

Mr. Pepper. Counsel, the witness has indicated, I think twice 
now, that what he has attempted to do at various times was get 
Mr. McMillan off his back, and whether it is false information to 
say that he was not going to be in a particular place 

Chairman Stokes. We can’t have counsel to testify here. 

Mr. Pepper. I think the witness has answered the question. 

Chairman Stokes. It was a very simple question and I think the 
witness ought to answer the question. 


Ms. Kennedy. He did. 

Mr. Pepper. My suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is that he has already 
answered it twice. 

Mr. Speiser. You have indicated that Mr. McMillan hounded 
you. Did you ever attempt to set up interviews with Mr. McMillan? 

Mr. Ray. Seemed like one time I met him at the airport in St. 

Mr. Speiser. So your recollection is that only on one occasion 

Mr. Ray. Only one I can remember, the one I can remember. 
Seemed like we met at St. Louis for a while a few years ago before 
his book was published. 

Mr. Speiser. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would request that 
MLK exhibit F-96A be marked for evidence and be introduced into 
the record and a copy be furnished to Mr. Ray and his counsel. 

Chairman Stokes. What is the exhibit? 

Mr. Speiser. MLK exhibit F-96A, of which we have a blowup, is 
a record of entries made into the bank account of Carol Pepper in 

Mr. Ray. That is when we met in St. Louis. That is when he 
came to St. Louis. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into 
the record. 

[The information follows:] 


Mr. Pepper. Question, Mr. Chairman, on pertinence. 

Chairman Stokes. Counsel will reply to the question put to the 

Mr. Speiser. By responding to the objections raised, I will be in 
effect indicating to Mr. Ray what my question is, but I have no 
problem in doing so and what the gist of the questioning is intend- 
ed to elicit. 

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman 

Chairman Stokes. He is trying to answer your question. 

Mr. Pepper. I know, but we could probably eliminate further 
objections along this line if the Chair would direct counsel to 
advise Mr. Ray explicitly — with clarification as to what, in fact, is 
the objective and what is the overall goal of this line of question- 
ing. Client is entitled to this under the Watkins ruling as well as a 
number of others with respect to the investigatory proceedings, and 
so I think we can save a lot of time if counsel would in fact set out 
explicitly what is the purpose here of this line of questioning. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, if I may respond, I don’t think it is 
necessary and incumbent upon me every time I ask a question to 
Mr. Ray that I set forth the background for the question and what 
my objective is. 

I am asking Mr. Ray a question that I feel is relevant to the 
scope of this inquiry. It is directed toward the credibility of Mr. 
Ray and some of the statements that he has made which would 
cast and create the impression that perhaps a conspiracy existed. 

Now, I want to know from Mr. Ray whether, in fact, the informa- 
tion which I am about to question him upon, was intended to be 
conveyed to Mr. McMillan for the purpose of creating the impres- 
sion that a conspiracy existed. 

If I may proceed, Mr. Pepper, that is the gist of what I am trying 
to establish. 

May I proceed? 

Mr. Pepper. Yes, so long as you are operating within that con- 
text you just set out. 

Chairman Stokes. Counsel may proceed. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, what has been furnished you and what 
appears on the easel are three statements taken from the bank 
records of Carol Pepper. Now, on these bank records which we 
obtained from Carol Pepper and not from Mr. McMillan, there are 
certain entries, three in number. 

These entries are made under the name of Eugene Straub and 
the entries appear in the amount respectively of $1,000, $2,000, and 

Now, did you sell these bank statements to Mr. McMillan? 

Mr. Ray. Well, to tell you honestly how it came about — McMil- 
lan— we talked on the phone from Carol Pepper’s house in St. 
Louis and Carol Pepper and her husband was supposed to be down 
at my dad’s house. He lived on a farm by Hannibal, Mo. So when 
they was out, McMillan knew that she kept pictures of James and 
bank records and that, so he told me if I would get them out— that 
she had them hid someplace in luggage— if I could get them out he 
would buy the pictures and the bank records. So actually what he 
was doing was being involved as an accessory to a burglary because 
he thought I was burglarizing her house to get this stuff out. 


He said he would pay for them if I got the stuff. So I met him at 
the airport. Of course, they wasn’t even down at my old man’s 
house. She was there, see, so I just got the books and added a 
couple numbers on them and took them out. It was his idea to pay 
me for the books. 

Chairman Stokes. Would the counsel establish for the record 
who Carol Pepper is? 

Mr. Speiser. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Carol Pepper is the 
sister of James Earl Ray, Jerry Ray, and John Ray. Is that correct? 

Mr. Ray. Yes, that’s right. 

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. 

Mr. Ray. So it was his idea and actually he was promoting a 
burglary. He was trying to get me to burglarize her house to get 
these bank books and the pictures. 

Mr. Speiser. I am asking you, Mr. Ray, at the time these records 
were transferred to Mr. McMillan, did Mr. McMillan know that 
these entries had been made by you at a subsequent time and were 
in fact false? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t know. I don’t think so. Well, he should, though, 
because he came to Chicago to see me and he had all of her bank 
records. I don’t know how he got them. He had all her bank 
records from different banks and she kept the money spread out in 
savings and loan. He had them all and shown them to me in 
Chicago so he should have known they were false from looking at 
his own records. 

Mr. Speiser. Did you tell him you made these entries? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t remember saying anything like that. 

Mr. Speiser. Did you receive any money for these statements? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t know if he give me money for the statements or 
for the pictures, because also he had some pictures. 

He had one picture of John Ray when he got out of jail back in 

Anyway, he give me $250 for the pictures and the bankbooks. 

Mr. Speiser. Why did you make these three entries in this bank 
ledger for $1,000, $2,000, and $300 under the name of Eugene 
Straub? What was your purpose in doing that? 

Mr. Ray. Mainly because he is a leech and like I say, I strung 
him along every once in a while and just used him. 

Mr. Speiser. So, it was false information that you furnished Mr. 

Mr. Ray. Well, it’s not all — the bank records and everything was 
true except a couple entries and the pictures — they had one picture 
of John Ray, so it wasn’t all false. He got some information for his 

Mr. Speiser. So, Mr. McMillan paid you $250 for these three 
bank statements and you are admitting here that these three en- 
tries were made by you after the fact? 

Mr. Pepper. Objection, Mr. Chairman. The witness has stated 
that he received some money from Mr. McMillan but that he 
provided material other than the bank statements and he is not 
sure and neither can anyone be sure as to what the money was for, 
whether it was for the package of the material or the photographs 
or what, and we are not in a position to say that the money at all 
was received in exchange for the bank statements. 


Chairman Stokes. Counsel will confine his questioning then to 
the statements as made by the witness. 

Mr. Speiser. What was this money for that Mr. McMillan paid 
you, this $250? Was it for these records? 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I object to that question as having 
been answered already, sir. 

Mr. Speiser. Your cocounsel requested me to restate the ques- 
tion, Ms. Kennedy, and that is what I am doing. 

Ms. Kennedy. I ^apologize. 

Is that what you want, Bill? 

Mr. Pepper. I just objected to counsel’s question which related to 
the receipt of money for the bank statements when Mr. Ray had 
indicated that he had provided photographs and other materials as 

Ms. Kennedy. My objection was to a different aspect and it was 
as to the question of whether or not the misleading entry— in the 
first place, it obviously wasn’t under oath and I am just trying to 
interest this committee in the importance of this— the witness has 
already indicated he wanted to throw the guy off the track. 

Chairman Stokes. That is the purpose of counsel’s question, so 
that the committee can get at the truth, Ms. Kennedy. 

Does the witness understand the question? 

Mr. Ray. Being as McMillan is an FBI writer, a pro-FBI writer, 
and his wife is a CIA writer, he didn’t have no trouble getting the 
stuff he wasn’t supposed to get. 

See, he had all my sister’s bank records. Well, it was illegal for 
him to get it, but the prosecution, they worked with him 100 
percent. So he wasn’t actually paying for the bankbooks or bank 
statements; he was paying for the pictures, the way I took it. 

Mr. Speiser. What was your purpose in making these entries in 
the record? 

Mr. Ray. Just to confuse him. 

Mr. Speiser. To confuse Mr. McMillan? 

Mr. Ray. Yes; he is confused anyway and I wanted to confuse 
him a little bit further. 

Mr. Speiser. Was your purpose to try to create the impression 
that there was a conspiracy in the assassination of Dr. King ? 

Mr. Ray. I always thought it was a conspiracy myself. He always 
said there wasn’t because that is what he wanted to believe, but I 
always thought there was a conspiracy. I knew he wouldn’t go 
along with no conspiracy anyway, because he said from the start 
that he just decided there wasn’t no conspiracy from the day it 
happened and he wasn’t going to go along with no conspiracy. 

Mr. Speiser. Who is Eugene Straub? 

Mr. Ray. I think it was a landlord my sister had years ago. 

Mr. Speiser. Did you tell Mr. McMillan that this money that had 
been paid allegedly to Mr. Straub was in fact money connected 
with the assassination? 

Mr. Ray. I can’t remember. Sure I remember that name Straub. 
I think it was her landlord back in 1968 or 1969 or something, but I 
can’t remember all my conversation with McMillan. 

Mr. Speiser. I would like to return to another area of questioning 
at this time, Mr. Ray. 


I would like to focus at this point on the contacts that you had 
with your brother, John Ray, during the period between James’ 
escape from Jefferson City and the date of his capture in London, 
England on June 8. 

Now, do you have any recollection of meeting with John during 
this period of time? 

Mr. Ray. From his capture 

Mr. Speiser. Between the date James Earl Ray escaped from 
Jefferson City and the time he was captured in London. 

Mr. Ray. I met him one time, I can’t remember the month, but 
after he, you know, had opened that tavern up I seen him one 
time. On my day off I spent a day down in St. Louis and went back. 

Mr. Speiser. John Ray’s tavern, you are referring to the Grape- 

Mr. Ray. Yes, the Grapevine. 

Mr. Speiser. That was opened in Christmas of 1967? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t know when it was opened. I can’t remember 
when it was opened because I always worked in Chicago, but after 
it was opened I think I was there once before King got killed. It 
wasn’t on vacation, just a day off. On my day off I went down 

Mr. Speiser. In July of 1967 do you have any recollection of 
meeting with your brother John in Chicago and exchanging cars 
with him? 

Mr. Ray. No. 

Mr. Speiser. Are you denying that you did or is it that you do 
not have any recollection? 

Mr. Ray. I am almost positive I didn’t because a guy by the name 
of Jack Gawron picked up a car for John but I don’t remember 
seeing John at all in July. 

I remember a guy by the name of Jack Gawron picking up a car 
for John. 

Mr. Speiser. You think it was Jack Gawron that picked up the 
car for John? 

Mr. Ray. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. I would like to direct your attention to MLK exhibit 
F-601, a copy of which I would request the clerk to furnish Mr. 
Ray with at this time, and I would request the chairman to have 
this marked into evidence and introduced into the record. 

This is an interview of Mr. Ray by the FBI on May 13, 1968. 

Chairman Stokes. Which Mr. Ray? 

Mr. Speiser. Excuse me, Mr. Jerry Ray. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 


MLK Exhibit F-601 


JBBBX WILLIAM /R AY i m shown the new photograph bf'blsr 
’'brother, JAMES EARlTRATr; IBTE bus Iness salt taken sometime la ^ * 
January or February, 1968. After viewing the photograph, 
f JESSY stated that tfeg photograph Is a good likeness of his 
/ brother except tbt~fce remembers him being thinner In the r 

face. In fact, this particular photograph depicts JAMES 
fuller in the face, than JERRY has ever seen him. 

•- v--.. 

JESBT advised that his father, JERRY BATHES, 

Cente r, M isso uri , left bis Bother in 1951 to live with RUBY 
CARPENTER. RUBY has a son, JEROME, who is presently in - 

prison, Jeff arson , City , Missouri, and la acquainted with 
the subject. JERRY also knows JEROME since he wee in the . 
reformatory at St. Charles, Illinois, with hla. JERRY 
classified JEROME as being "off mentally" and a person who 
v er y seldom talks to anyone. JERRY believes that JEROME 
may have been In the hospital for the criminally Insane 
Fulton, Missouri, when the subject escaped from prison. ,' v 
JEROME Is presently doing time for the murder of a Negro. 

JERRY also related that when bis father left, JERRY was . 
la the Boys* Reformatory at Sheridan, Illinois. 

JERRY said that he does not know HEAL EDGAR ASBY, 

JAMES DAVID DAILEY, nor is be acquainted with the Half Way 
Restaurant at 1549 South Jefferson, St. Louis, Missouri. 

Be said that he never heard bis brother mention DAILEY nor 
does he have any information that DAILEY had ever hidden . 
his brother from the lav. JERRY also advised that he never V 
beard of an organisation named the "Coolies" nor did be ever. 
hear his brother mention that organization. JERRY said ' y : 

that when he was la prison, he was Involved In a fist fight ' ** ' 

with (First Name Unknown) MENARD, who worked with him .la 
the shoe shop. Be said that he could not recall this 
Individual fs first name and that there would he no record \ 
of the fight at the prison since It was not reported nor 
were they observed fighting. Be said that on one of the - 

occasions when be visited with his brother In prison, be told ~~ 
hlm about it and JAMES was joking with him because JAMBS 




to was close friends with the MENARD brothers 
then la Jefferson City, Missouri, prison with 

JERRY said he visited his brother shout three 
or four times while be was In prison la Jefferson City, 
Missouri, the last time being around 1964. JAMES case tb 
Menard prison to visit JERRY on one occasion. JERRY again 
stated that the last time be saw bis brother JAMES outside ..... 
of prison was In 1931 in Quincy, Illinois, and JERRY. was 
fifteen years old at that time. The father was still . .v.„ 
living with his mother then. _ . . ■ . 

Be said that he believes that VALTER TERRY REPS and 
JAMES vent to Leavenworth together but that LOHNIE RITE . . 

never did time with JAMES. Be said- that if he bad given . 
the impression that LONNIE did do time with JAMES In the ‘ ^ 

previous Interviews, this was In error. JERRY again stated 
that to himself has done time In Menard, Illinois, with ; /•- 
both RIPE brothers. 

r • ’ : -t 

Be stated that to has so idea as to the present 
whereabouts of "BLACKIE" AUSTIN and doubts if his brother ~ 
has maintained contact with AUSTIN nor would be la contact 
with him since his escape. Be said that of all of the . 
persons that be knows of, JAMES was the friendliest and 
closest with AUSTIN. JERRY pointed out, however, that his • 
knowledge of this is limited since JERRY was In prison 
when both AUSTIN and his brother were on the street. Be 
does know that "BLACKIS" liked bis brother and has always 
talked about him. ‘ ’ 

la clarification, JERRY advised that his brother. 

JOHN first came to Chicago s onetime around July, 1960, and 
to, JERRY, came to this area around September, 1960. JOHN 
first worked at MUfrpby’s Steak Bouse, H» also worked at 
the White Plato Country Club and JOHN'S last employment in 
the Chicago area was the Indian Hills Country Club, Bloomlagdale 
Illinois. JERRY advised that be was employed with his 
brothers JOHN and FRANK at the Rolling Green Country Club 
beginning In September, 1960 and JERRY stayed there for 
about sixteen months and JOHN for eight or nine months. --.- -yVyr 
He was uncertain to ‘ -a length of time that his brother ^^3*5* 
FRANK worked there 1 • believed be had left a good length***' 


prior to bio death in September, 1903. 

JERRY advised that somatime during June or 
July, IBB7 P when he was living at 2897 Techny Road, Northbrook, 
Illinois, JOHN drove here in a 1961 Plymouth vblcb he had ^ ^ 
bought from the father, JERRY RAYNES. At t his time, JERHt 
owned a 1962 air-conditioned Rambler* JOHN was having 
trouble with the transmission in the Plymouth and they 
switched cars* He does recall that JOHN transferred some 

clothes and other items from the Plymouth to the Rambler* 
Also, that JOHN left some old shirts and pants and some ; 

other papers in the garage at Techny Road and JERRY hid - ' 
these items above the rafters in the .garage* He said that 
JOHN stayed a couple of days and vas in either an apartment • 
or a hotel in Chicago and did not reside at JERRY 9 a residence 
while here. JOHN left with the Rambler and both cars gre . 
presently at his father's farm i n Cen ter, Hissourl* JERRY 
said that his wife did not meet JOHN on this occasion but* 
did meet him at Christmas time, 1967, when JERRY and his» M > 
wife went to St. Louis where they had dinner at CAROL ** ! 

PEPPER # s house and JOHN vas present* JERRY advised that 
JOHN did not know how to find his residence in Northbrook, 
Illinois, and that he, JERRY, net him in the town of _ 

Northbrook and then JOHN followed him to the residence. ' 
JERRY also advised that his brother JAKES did not ever know 
that JERRY resided at this address in Northbrook. 

In previous interviews, JERRY advised that he 
borrowed somewhere between $40 and $50 from his brother _ j 
JAIIES while JAKES was in prison. He reiterated that state- : 
sent in this interview at which time the financial trana- / ~ 
actions from his brother's account at the Inmates Bank, ’ • * 
Hissourl State Penitentiary# Jefferson City, Hissourl,* were 
discussed with JERRY. It was pointed out to him that this 
list shows that his brother bad sent him $266.25. JERRY 
advised that this must be an error since the only amount 
he recognized vas $55.25 which was sent to him on June 22, 
1964* He stated that at this time, he, JERRY, was in 
St* Louis, Hissourl, and needed moony to return to Chicago -- 
.to obtain employment# Be wrote to his brother requesting .a*; 
this loan and vas in the process of paying JAKES back when 7$ 



JAKES escaped . JESSY suggested that the money listed to’^fc. 
his was instead paid to his brother's attorney, name unknown', 
in Jefferson City, Missouri. JESSY advised that he himself 
did not receive money from his brother to be sent to the * 
attorney or anyone else. JEBB7 advised -that this attorney 
had been hired by his brother to handle his appeal and that '/ 
he believed the attorney did visit with JAMES while JAMES ■■•*■■***-■ 
was la prison. JESSY said that his brother never mentioned 
anything concerning Benzedrine inhalers or any type of 
"bennies" or dope. JAMES never mentioned being involved 
in any illegal drug selling while in prison nor did he 
ever mention that be was involved in any type of racket 
with a guard. Be also never mentioned any guard that he 
was particularly friendly with and in fact, made no comment 
whatsoever concerning the prison officials that JESSY can 

* te ■* ' 


JBB87 also advised that his brother never r 
mentioned reading any of the James Bond novels and In - 
fact, JESSY did not believe his brother was much of a 
"reader." The only location that he can recall his brother 
making a comment as to bow much be liked it was Tijuana, 
M ex ico, and be believes his brother was there sometime in 
1991. The brother made no mention to him at anytime as 
to the identity of any persons with wham be was acquainted 
in Mexico. 

JESSY advised that when he left Chicago on this 
latter occasion , he stayed with his brother JOHN for two 
nights, with his father one night, with his sister CAROL . 
one night, at the St. Begis Hotel one night and at the ' V 
Mac Arthur Hotel one night. In conversations with his !. v 
brother JOHN and sister CAROL, they both stated that they 
believe, from newspaper stories, that the subject is the 
victim of a frame-up or being used as the "fall guy." He 
also stated that CAROL is concerned over the newspaper 
articles speculating that the subject is dead and she has 
that opinion. Be said that JOHN told him that some people . 
came to the tavern at the time of the KING funeral request- 
ing him to close down for that day which he did sot do. 


'$JQHV also aald that If ha himself receives aay publicity 
Jha will close does the tavern and leave because he feels 
*^that people will throw flrebonbe la his place. JERRY 
related that one of the newspaper reporters located «■<» 
Interviewed a woman named RUBY who works for his brother 
•lace JOHN had use d th at woman's address about three or 
four years ago. RUBY told the newspaper people that she 
did not know the whereabouts of JOHH. JERRY also said that 
in conversations with JOHN, JOHH told him that the subject 
would be "craxy" to give himself up because even If be 
Is not guilty of the KX2IG murder, he still would have . 
eighteen years to do In the penitentiary at Jefferson City. 
JERRY explained this by stating that bis brother has 
thirteen years left on bis previous sentence and that 
he would get at least an extra five years for the escape. 

JERRY again speculated that If his brother 
Was OHC's murderer, he would have had to have been paid 
because be could not see bow his brother would have obtained 
enough money to purchase the 1966 Mustang, take the trips* • 
he was supposed to have taken and to pay $150 for the * "v:'* 
telescope used la the murder. He said that there was Just ' '** 
too much money coming la and la response to a direct ques- 
tion, he said that be did not think his toother would have . 
been able to steal this much money because he would have fr*d « 
"slipped up and been caught." He explained that in bis 
opinion, his brother was not an accomplished thief and that 
most of his previous scores were "nail time." 

JERRY advised that be Is presently residing la'' 
Apartment 14, 314 Wisconsin Avenue, Lkke Forest, Illinois, 
which rooming bouse was recommended to the Sportsman's • 
Country Club by WAYHE CUMStSS (phonetic). JERRY noted ' 
that his ex-wife DJBRDIS also used to reside at this rooming 
. house. Be said that he Is not listed as a tenant and that - 
the rent of $60 per month Is being paid by the country club.' 
He advised that there Is no phone at the building with the 
nearest one four blocks away. He said that be plans to ■ 
continue bis employment at the Sportsman ’s Country Club . 
and will contact SA REHS J. DUMA IKE on a dally basis. 


H» advised that his ex-wife presently works at ' 

* restaurant near tbe expressway and is living in a motel 
In Vbeeling, Illinois. He vent on to say that yesterday . 
there was a knock on tbe door of bis apartment and wben 
be opened it, bis ex-wife was there. She said that she 
had found him by inquiring of tbe rooming bouse manager, 
tbe room numbers of tbe last two tenants and then came to 
talk with him. He said that they talked of personal matters 
with nothing of interest in this case. JESSY advised that 
he may have to move from this address since bis ex-wife 
might Inadvertently give out bis whereabouts. He said that 
he was not concerned with the problem of people making * 
threats against bis safety because of what bis brother did 
but that be was most concerned of tbe people who would 
attempt to barm him without making threats. In explanation, 
he made tbe comment, "Like that guy who shot King, be 
did not make any threats." * 

* V - 

— - JESSY advised that be : will continue to cooperate 

with the Bureau in furnishing information. 

Mr. Speiser. This is a six-page report on the interview with Mr. 
Jerry Ray. I request that you direct your attention to page 3. 

The first full paragraph indicates as follows: 

Jerry advised that sometime during June or July of 1967, when he was living at 
2897 Techny Road, Northbrook, 111., John drove here in a 1961 Plymouth which he 
had bought from his father, Jerry Raynes. At this time Jerry owned a 1962 air- 
conditioned Rambler. 

In going a little bit further down in the paragraph, it reads as 

He said that John stayed a couple days and was either in an apartment or a hotel 
in Chicago and did not reside at Jerry’s residence while here. 

Does this refresh your recollection about meeting with John and 
exchanging cars with him in July 1967? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t remember. I don’t even remember — if they got it 
written down, I must have made a statement, but I don’t remember 
it and I don’t remember seeing John up there. I remember a guy 
by the name of Jack Gawron picking up a car around that time. 

I don’t know how it would get — John actually picked it up be- 
cause a guy by the name of Jack Gawron picked the car up. I 
remember I had a car like that — a Rambler like that, and picked it 

Mr. Speiser. Let me ask you for your answer. Is your answer 
then you did not make this statement or did you make this state- 

Mr. Ray. I don’t remember. I must have made it because it is 
written down there, the FBI wrote it down there, so I don’t know. I 
don’t remember ever making the statement. 

Mr. Speiser. As of July 1967 had you met your brother James 
following his escape from Missouri State Prison? 

Mr. Ray. Did I meet him? I met him about 3 weeks afterward, 
after the escape when he went to work in Klingman’s Restaurant 
in Winnetka. 

Mr. Speiser. When is the first time you met James? 


Mr. Ray. The first I remember meeting him was a few weeks 
afterward. That is the first I can remember meeting him, is when 
he went to work at Klingman’s Restaurant. 

Mr. Speiser. You don’t have any recollection of meeting James 
following his escape within several weeks after his escape? 

Ms. Kennedy. The witness has already said he met him 3 weeks 
after the escape. It is already on the record. 

Mr. Ray. I ean’t remember meeting him no sooner than that. 

Mr. Speiser. So you do have recollection of meeting James within 
3 weeks after the escape? 

Mr. Ray. About 3 weeks. 

Mr. Speiser. James escaped on April 23, 1967, so that would put 
your meeting with James prior to the July meeting with John, 
would it not? 

Mr. Ray. Oh yes, before. Yes. 

Mr. Speiser. So that prior to your July meeting with John you 
had met James at least once? 

Mr. Ray. Yes, I had met him several times. 

Mr. Speiser. Several times. 

By the way, when you were first interviewed by the FBI, did you 
tell the FBI that you had not seen your brother James since he had 
been incarcerated at the Missouri State Prison? 

Mr. Ray. Read that again? 

Mr. Speiser. My question is, did you tell the FBI when they first 
interviewed you, when James was identified as a suspect in the 
assassination, that you had not seen — and, by the way, the date of 
that interview was April 19, 1968. 

Did you tell the FBI that you had not seen your brother James 
since he was incarcerated in the Missouri State Prison? 

Mr. Ray. I can’t answer that because I don’t remember what all I 
told the FBI or people. That has been too long ago. 

Mr. Speiser. Your recollection is that you do not recall at this 
time telling the FBI you did not meet with James? 

Mr. Ray. I don’t recall our conversation as to what we said. I 
can’t even remember who I met him with. 

Mr. Speiser. When you met John in July 1967 as you have 
testified, you had previously met James at least on two occasions. 
Did you tell John that you had met James and that James was out 
of jail; that he had escaped? 

Mr. Ray. I didn’t even admit to meeting John in July. I said — 
you got it down some place reading the statement, I said I don’t 
remember meeting him. I said it is possible I met him but I said I 
know a guy by the name of Jack Gawron is who picked up the car. 

You read off where he met me on Techny Road and 1 don’t even 
remember meeting him in July. I remember meeting Jack Gawron 
and he picked up the car for John. It was a 1960 or 1961 red 

Mr. Pepper. The witness has been consistent, Mr. Chairman. He 
has answered that question already and he has been consistent in 
the answer. 

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, I am just trying to assist Mr. Ray in 
refreshing his recollection. I know he has responded that he does 
not recall meeting John in July 1967, but I have introduced initial- 


ly one FBI report which reflects that Mr. Jerry Ray advised the 
FBI that he met John in July 1967. 

Mr. Pepper. I object to the phrasing of counsel. It doesn’t do 
anything of the sort. There is a statement here that Mr. Ray said 
that, but there is no authenticity attached to that statement. 

Mr. Speiser. Well, I am solely trying to refresh Mr. Ray’s recol- 
lection, if I may. 

Now, here we have one FBI report in which the agent who wrote 
that report purportedly was advised by Jerry that Jerry met John 
in July 1967. 

Now, at this time, if I may continue, I would like to introduce 
another FBI report. 

Ms. Kennedy. Excuse me a moment. 

Chairman Stokes. The witness can testify as to whether or not 
the document has refreshed his recollection. 

Has it, Mr. Ray? 

Mr. Ray. No. 

Ms. Kennedy. Just for the record, could I ask when this FBI 
document was prepared and how long this information has been 
available to the Government? 

Is this a recent preparation or has this been in the hands of this 
Government for 10 years or 11, 12? 

Chairman Stokes. The document is before counsel and the docu- 
ment should speak for itself preferably. 

Ms. Kennedy. We haven’t had a chance to study it and confer 
about it and I thought maybe Mr. Speiser could just answer that 
for me, but I will look. 1968. So it was 10 years ago. Thank you. 

Chairman Stokes. Proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Speiser. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would request the 
witness be shown MLK exhibit F-602 an FBI report dated May 22, 
1968, of a May 17, 1968, interview with John Ray. 

I request that this document be marked into evidence. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the 

[The information follows:] 


rtMoa (n~. i^hsi -05RAL SUREAU OF INVESTIGATtOK 

JOBS lAFfflY RAT was Interviewed at the Grapevine Tavern/ 

1&S2 Arsenal Street, St. Louis, Missouri. 

He stated that with regard to bis belief that his brother, 
JAKES EARL RAT, had plenty of money on him at the time of his escape 
from prison was based on the fact that he had been questioned regarding 
his knowledge of his brother's dealing la amphetamines while In prison* 
He stated that- It was pure guess work on his part and he merely felt 
this way because he recalls that from his experience In prisons 
that usually the people who deal In narcotics in prisons are among 
the wealthhr Inmates. He stated he has no Idea how JAMES EARL 
RAT wMild have spent any money he earned In prison, either while 
In prison or subsequent to leaving prison. He reiterated that 
he ha* not seen or heard from JAMES earl RAT since his escape and 
has never heard anyone say that he was in Chicago, parti cul&ry In 
the summer of 1987. He recalls that In the summer of 1987 he was 
I n Chi cago himself at which time he traded cars with his brother 

Q> 5/17/Pfl. at 3t. Louis, Missouri FlU #ST.: 44-i77S 

| br 3A PATRICK T. BHABLET/lMb -i 8/80/88 

! ~ ^ 

MLK Exhibit F-602 

Chairman Stokes. I would like to direct your attention to 

Mr. Pepper. Just a minute more, please. 

The special agent’s name in this statement, Mr. Chairman, is 
special agent Patrick Bradley. Is that correct, counsel? 

Mr. Speiser. The document reads for itself, Mr. Pepper. 

Mr. Pepper. Has special agent Bradley been called before this 
committee and testified under oath? 

Chairman Stokes. That is certainly not pertinent, counsel. I am 
sure counsel knows that. 

Mr. Pepper. I do, Mr. Chairman 

Chairman Stokes. The document, counsel, has been furnished 
you and the witness, for the purpose of the counsel being able to 


examine your witness regarding that document. It is not appropri- 
ate to pose questions 

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, we certainly will do that. We will 
examine it and appreciate it, but we are concerned, Mr. Chairman, 
about the credibility of the document that is being put forth here. 

Chairman Stokes. The committee will ultimately decide the 
credibility of all documents in the record. 

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, is there any possibility that those 
FBI or other documents will be relied on by the committee and 
counsel could be available to this witness so that we don’t have 
pages and pages of materials thrown at us on such short notice so 
we could have a recess and an opportunity to examine these docu- 
ments, because it does seem tremendously unfair for this commit- 
tee to collect incredible volumes of information that covers a great 
deal of territory, and then to have us sit here and have to respond 
or in any way relate to representing this way on this sort of ad hoc 
instant hearsay evidence. 

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, any document that counsel de- 
sires to examine the witness from will be furnished to counsel and 
counsel will be given adequate time to read and confer with the 
witness on that document. 

Mr. Speiser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have already shown 
you, Mr. Ray, the FBI report in which the agent writing that 
report notes his recollection that you advised him that you met 
John in July 1967, in Chicago, to exchange cars. 

Now, you have before you MLK exhibit F-602 which is an FBI 
interview of your brother John. 

Now, if you look at the last sentence, let me quote that: “He 
recalls in the summer of 1967 he was in Chicago himself, at which 
time he traded cars with his brother Jerry.” 

Does that serve to refresh your recollection as to whether or not 
in July 1967 you met with John and exchanged cars with him? 

Mr. Ray. The only thing I know definitely and the only thing I 
can make a definite statement on is that a guy by the name of 
Jack Gawron picked up the car — we switched cai s for Jack. Jack 
wanted another car, something wrong with his car, and I had to 
take and get a transmission job done on it, and anyway we 
switched cars. It was for Jack but Jack didn’t switch cars with me. 
He had a guy by the name of Jack Gawron who picked the car up 
and give me the other car. 

Mr. Speiser. I just want you to know, Mr. Ray, I am not trying to 
trick you or trap you. I am asking a very simple, innocuous state- 
ment to try to determine whether or not you met John in July of 

Now, I understand your testimony is that you have no recollec- 
tion; that you think you met Jack Gawron, is that right? 

Mr. Ray. I know I met him. I know I met Jack Gawron, but 
John — I just can’t remember meeting him. 

Mr. Speiser. Now, I asked you previously whether or not you 
advisea the FBI when they initially interviewed you as to whether 
or not you had not seen your brother James since the first time 
you visited him at Missouri State Prison, and that you had no idea 
as to his whereabouts. 


Now, I would like to at this point introduce into the record, and 
a copy be furnished to you, MLK exhibit F-615, which is an FBI 
report dated April 29, 1968, and reflects an interview with you on 
April 24, 1968. 

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, MLK F-615, will be accept- 
ed into the record at this time. Would the clerk please furnish Mr. 
Ray with that document? 

[The information follows:] 

MLK Exhibit F-615 


.' 4 r : the- outsat of th« interview, JERRY william ' 

RAY was advised of the provisions of Section 1001 , Title IS; ; 
United States Code*. Ha was advised that he did not . have 
to talk to the interviewing Agents but that they wished : • 
to stress to him the importance of his coopera t ion an d 
truthfulness in the matter of the murder of MARTIN LUTHER 
- RING . Jr . v : ..’ . , ;v 

It: was-- pointed out to JERRY that he had lied to 
the Agents in the previous interviews in that the FBI 
bad located his- brother, JOHN, and that it would have bean . : j 
impossible for JERRY not to have known his whereabouts. . 

He* then stated that: he had lied but only in an effort to 
protect his brother JOHN’S, investment in a bar in St* 

Louis. JOHN had put up S2SOO to purchase the bar and JERRY ..*• 
was of the opinion that if FBI Agents harassed JOHN, he wou Id ; V 
;> lock up the bar, take a loss and leave* The bar, known as 
Grapevine”', Is-, located in; St. Louis; '.’Missouri,;, and. - 
: licensed . in 'the: name of -CAROL, gffgP ER ; . their sisterv-t- Ife>4f^^ 

said' ; that : he . ha s* no' informat ion nor does - he. be^leve : ^ thatr'-5;;^^;^ 

:■ ;HATT has bee%:-is: ; contact- w-ith JOHN since. hisr escape 

from. - prison in April r .1967. JSUIY went on • to : say t hat 

doubted very much- that JAMES RAT was aware of . the present > 

^/ whereabouts- of JOHN: si nce JO HN was classif ied aa a '•drifter’*’?^ 

. It. was. pointed out to JERRY that JOHN bad been a visitor th-^r 
the Missouri Prison on the day before JAMES RAY’ s'- esc ape . 

■'■-■ [ .'In answer to a direct question, JERRY then admitted that. 

it would-be possible for JAMES RAY to know the location of Vj ;C: 
his- brothe r’s ta vern. He said that he doubted if JAMES RAY 
.'rS^ : ;^fenew- his-, JESRT’s; present, employment at the Sportsman *s< 

-OClubv Northbrook, Illinois, but that he* might -be aware. 

•;./ it; since he had.. written a letter to; the Parole Board In which- -:’V 
oaotionod his present employment saying that; !>? 
;-;.;he' possibly, could obtain employment . for his brother-, JAME5--.- v - 
^ : ;;>^^RAT^:either at: the country club or in the immediate neighbor-..^ 
hood^-Hd^ denied that he had ever furnished JAMES RAY with: 
present; employment. He said, that to- his positive : : ;> ■ 

> ^•.■ "knowledge, the- only way, t^t JAMES could get v in : touch* wlth^^vg- 


him was through P; O- Box 22, Wheeling, Illinois. since . 
he. JERRY had obtained this box for the specific use of 
his brother since he did not want mail from the penitentiary 
coming; to the country club. , 

JESSY related that JOHN came to this area sometime 
around 1964 and stayed for about 2 \ years. To the best of 
JESSY* s recollection, JOHN first worked at Murphy's 
Steakbouse, then went to the Soiling Green Country Club 
and from there to the White Pines Country Club where he 
was employed as a pot washer.. JOHN then went to bartending; .... 
school in Chicago and went to work for the Indian Hills 
Country Club in Itasca, Illinois. JESSY is of the opinion 
that his brother, JOHN, uses the name RYAN. ' 

? " ‘ JESSY said that on April 20 or 21, _19 68, he T'Uir. 

; telephonic ally contacted his sister, CAROL PEPPEE, and 
' explained that the uncooperative attitude of both CAROL and . ^ 
JOHN 'arose, from the harassment 'of the newspaper reporters-, 

In the neighborhood and that both were afraid of unf avorabler^ 
•publicity, which would, adversely effect : the tavern business ^ 
causing them to sell out and move. He said that his ' V 

. sister, CAROL v has told him that she feels that she now : has;;>% 
to move from the particular neighborhood where she resides 
in St; Lou is Missouri. CAROL has commented to him that 
the picture tn the newspaper of JAMES RAY does look something 
like him. JERRY said that he - agrees with this but that felt ■; 
it could not be his brother because hd read in: th.e newspapers 
that the person* sought by the r 31 for the KING murder had ^ - 

attended dancing school in New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1964 
and 196 3 v. but since his brother was imprisoned during these 
years , he • knew it. could no t be. ; him . . 1‘; ' /. ' ; v •; r 

. :-;i: jrv ‘v'-^S^Cbnceraing ’ his trip to St. Louis;- Missouri, in* ^ : 
February. 1 ;!' 1968. JERRY advised that he stayed at the Mac Arthur 
Hotel for one night ; he believes the date to be February 2, ; 
1963 , and that- : hiS brother ,,, JOHN, either stayed, in an 
apartmen c . over" th e t avern or nearby , . but; not at "the; hot el 
as he previously implied ;>•’ He said that about every six: or ^ 
seven: weeks ‘ he % drives ' to St ^ :Lou is v V Missouri, to vis it^ith-^ < } 


39-935 0 - 79 - 27 


CAROL and sometimes J0H2T sineo they aretheonlyfaaily 
he his. He denied that his brother r JAMES RAY, had been 
at this /family reunion at this last or any other tine,/ v 

JERRY advised t hat he owns two automobiles, one . 
a 1360 light green four-door De Soto which presently is 
parked in front of the cottage at the Sportsman r s Country 
Club. ' The other v a 1961 two door white over red Plymouth, 

Both of these cars were purchased from a stepfather, ^ JERRY ^ 
RAV»gs «ho resides on a farm in Center, Missouri, Re 
exhibited a receipt from the Dunhurst Currency Exchange 
showing that Missouri driver's license R250-6227-822-98-473UO t 
plus title and registration for 1960 De Soto bad been turned ; • 
in. The receipt was in the name of JERRY. WILLIAM RTAK^ . 

2B9T Techny Road ^ JERRY said that he' had turned over 
these items April 24 r . 1968, and expected to obtain his ^ 
Illinois drlver^s license and license tags within the next > 
several’ days. .. Z 

: Z fiprt her . ; related that he paid S200 f or thexT; 
iSSl Pljrmouth and has owned it fbxf about -"six' months 
car is presently at his stepf ather 's farmland “is. 
regist ered'iv: The;.* reason it is , no t • registered ; is that • t he. /> V 
title -to this car via filed by his stepfather in St . Louis, 
Missouri, but. was^ not ^returned. Both he and' his stepfather -hZfi- 
made- icpu iiry cocicerning t he ri tie;' but -it was e video t Xy ; : 
lost. JERRY said that he has driven the car ! to* Chicago and ZZ- ; ; 
to- this/ area on one; occasion utillalng- license plates from 
•^a Junk cari; CAROL PEPPER has also driven the ear; on several 
occasions with the same plates. However , : the plates have ; 
-‘^iids.-beea^rwbve^ 'fromY-tbe- .cra/and^deg t r oy ^:.^:^^ 

Z : response to cfuestions coaceming Post Off ice' > 

: Box* 22 V; Wheeling^; Illinois', JERRY reiterated that ; the onlyxr 
! person whe has ever written to him was his brother JAMES - RAY-.' 
with the rare exception that be might receive some 
Cad^ert is ihg:; 1 iterators, of n& cooseq u ence v ‘He pers is ted. 
r in stating- that ; that 'he had .received no comsunicat leas at this 
v Post Of t ice box «it bid- recent weeks Af ter f urther auestxbn ing.' 

C JERRY admitted: that bit April 23, 1968,; he received a telegram , 
: : addressed-, to’ him : ar.;S;yO:^Bo^ 


JERRY advised that sometime axoundSeptember; I960, 
shortly if ter his release from prison , he was unemployed 
ta S tv Louis and he was contacted by his brother , JOHN ,. 
who told him to cone to the Chicago area which JERRY did-, 

He commenced employment at the Rolling Greens Country Club, 
Arlington Heights, Illinois, from September, 1960, until ’ • 
January, 1962. He then returned to St. Louis, Missouri, 
and returned sometime in April, 1962, where he obtained 
employment at the North Shore Country. Club, Glenview, Illinois. 

He also worked for the Olympia Fields- Country Club for 13.; 
days and then went to work for the Medlnah Country Club 
until sometime in December,; 1963, when he was hit by a car - ; 
as he was walking along a highway. JERRY apent some time in , ^ 
the hospital as a result of these injuries and then went back ^ 
to Sb. : Louis, Missouri, with JOHN. He again returned to this, 
area and was employed at the Flossmoor Country Club, from ; 

Apr il un til September, 1964 At that time , : he commenced 
his" present, em ployment •- at Sportsman Country ..Club .rj : ; • v 

T " , v ^ JERRY said that he^ had resided at the Sportsman 
Country Club except for a short period of time from. Mares ;to; : ^^^ 
September ,1967, when he resided at 2897 Tec hay Road, 

Northbrook, Illinois, with bis wife GJERD IS STREET who presently 
resides on Wisconsin Avenue, Lake Forest , Illinois.- He .said -v;; 
that while they were married,; she had a child, however, this ; v 
child was by : her: p